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  Abstract ix 
The question of how the university can relate to the world is centuries old. The poles of the debate can 
be characterized by the plea for an increasing instrumentalization of the university as a producer and 
provider of useful knowledge on the one hand (cf. the knowledge factory), and the defense of the 
university as an autonomous space for free inquiry and the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake 
on the other hand (cf. the ivory tower). Our current global predicament, however, forces us to rethink 
the relation between university and world. Indeed, an easy instrumentalization of the university for the 
purposes of society is no longer possible in troubled times when the future of society itself seems to be 
at stake. Nevertheless, urgent societal concerns do need to be addressed by the university. Hence, the 
disinterested position seems a highly irresponsible option. The aim of this dissertation is to reconsider 
the relation between the university and the world from an educational perspective by addressing the 
question “How to situate study in the relation between university and society?”  
The dissertation consists of three parts. In Part One, the existing literature on the relation between 
university and society will be discussed. The first chapter discerns two main approaches to this issue, 
namely the transcendental-philosophical approach (cf. the idea of the university) and the critical-
sociological approach (cf. academic capitalism) that conceive of the university, respectively, as an idea 
and as an organization. By means of an excursus on the emergence of the university in the Middle 
Ages, the case is made for an ecological approach to the university. In the second chapter, the work of 
two authors who have recently adopted such an ecological approach is briefly presented. Whereas 
Ronald Barnett’s theory of the ecological university is situated more in the transcendental-philosophical 
tradition, Susan Wright’s investigations of the university in the knowledge ecology can be placed in the 
critical-sociological tradition. Both conceptions, however, are hinged on an institutional understanding 
of the university. In line with recent developments in social theory, namely the focus on practices, it is 
proposed to work towards an ecology of study practices. 
Part Two presents Isabelle Stengers’ idea of the ecology of practices. The third chapter elucidates 
Stengers’ work on scientific practices by first situating it within the so-called Science Wars, which 
provided the impetus to elaborate a theoretical framework for a civilized dialogue between scientists 
and the broader public. The basic tenets and concepts of her approach, such as the understanding of 
practice as a set of requirements and obligations, are presented, explained, and discussed. In the fourth 
chapter, the focus shifts from scientific practices to study practices. Assisted by Stengers’ writings on 
Whitehead’s speculative philosophy, this chapter aims to flesh out Whitehead’s description of the 
university as a ‘home of adventures’ in order to come to an educational understanding of the study 
practices of the university. A conceptual inquiry into how study practices activate certain worldly 
problems and turn them into matters of study is presented. 
Part Three develops the conceptual work on study practices further in relation to the activities of 
the Palestinian experimental university Campus in Camps. Chapter Five presents the work of Campus 
in Camps and explains how it relates to the theoretical discussion offered in the second part. On the 
basis of Stengers’ conception of practice, which discerns requirements and obligations as vital 
ingredients, this chapter argues that life in exile is what drives the study practices of Campus in Camps, 
and hence, that it is the issue of life in exile that participants are obligated to when they study. Whereas 
Chapter Five is focused on what is being studied in Campus in Camps, Chapter Six inquires in to the 
specific requirements its activities need to fulfill in order to be study practices; in other words, how the 
participants study. Four requirements are discerned that, taken together, seem indispensable to 
understand the study practices of Campus in Camps; namely, storytelling, comparing, mapmaking, and 
using. 
The concluding chapter returns to the research question and again takes up the main ideas 
developed in the dissertation, such as the adventure of study and the cohabitation of scientific and 
study practices in the university. The last two sections of the conclusion deal with two remaining issues 
of a more practical nature; namely, how to relate to institutionalization when working from a practice-
theoretical point of view, and lastly the question of what can be done. In all, and returning to the initial 
problem, the dissertation asks what it means to conceive of the university as situated by and engaged 
with worldly questions.    
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De vraag hoe de universiteit zich tot de wereld kan verhouden wordt reeds eeuwenlang bediscussieerd. 
Dominante posities in het debat zijn enerzijds het pleidooi voor een verdere instrumentalisering van de 
universiteit als producent en aanbieder van bruikbare kennis (cf. de kennisfabriek), en anderzijds de 
verdediging van de universiteit als een autonome plaats voor vrij onderzoek en het nastreven van 
kennis omwille van de kennis (cf. de ivoren toren). Onze huidige globale conditie echter, dwingt ertoe 
de verhouding tussen universiteit en wereld te herdenken. Een al te gemakkelijke instrumentalisering 
van de universiteit voor de doelen van de samenleving is immers niet langer mogelijk in tijden waarin 
de toekomst van de samenleving zelf op het spel lijkt te staan. Desalniettemin lijkt het nodig dat de 
universiteit ingaat op urgente maatschappelijke bezorgdheden. Daarom lijkt de gedesinteresseerde 
houding een hoogst onverantwoordelijk alternatief. Het doel van dit proefschrift is om vanuit een 
pedagogisch perspectief een nieuw licht te werpen op de verhouding tussen universiteit en 
samenleving. Daartoe staat de vraag “Hoe studie te situeren in de verhouding tussen universiteit en 
samenleving?” centraal.  
Het proefschrift omvat drie delen. In het eerste deel wordt de literatuur over de verhouding tussen 
universiteit en samenleving bediscussieerd. Het eerste hoofdstuk onderscheidt twee belangrijke 
benaderingswijzen, namelijk de transcendentaal-wijsgerige benadering (cf. het idee van de universiteit) 
en de kritisch-sociologische benadering (cf. academisch kapitalisme) die respectievelijk de universiteit 
als idee en als organisatie verstaan. Door middel van een excursus over het ontstaan van de universiteit 
in de middeleeuwen wordt gepleit voor een ecologische benadering van de universiteit. In het tweede 
hoofdstuk wordt het werk van twee auteurs die recent een dergelijke ecologische benadering 
voorgesteld hebben, kort gepresenteerd. Waar Ronald Barnett’s theorie van de ecologische universiteit 
zich eerder in de transcendentaal-wijsgerige traditie situeert, past Susan Wright’s onderzoek van de 
universiteit in de kennisecologie eerder in de kritisch-sociologische traditie. Beide opvattingen echter 
zijn geschraagd op een institutioneel verstaan van de universiteit. In lijn met recente ontwikkelingen in 
de maatschappijtheorie, met name de focus op praktijken, wordt voorgesteld te werken naar een 
ecologie van studiepraktijken.  
Het tweede deel presenteert het perspectief van de ecologie van praktijken van Isabelle Stengers. 
Het derde hoofdstuk licht Stengers’ werk over wetenschappelijke praktijken toe door het eerst te 
situeren binnen de zogenaamde Science Wars die de aanleiding vormden voor het uitwerken van een 
theoretisch kader voor een geciviliseerde dialoog tussen wetenschappers en het publiek. De 
basisprincipes en -concepten van haar benadering, zoals het begrijpen van een praktijk als een geheel 
van vereisten en verplichtingen, worden gepresenteerd, uitgelegd, en bediscussieerd. In het vierde 
hoofdstuk verschuift de focus van wetenschappelijke praktijken naar studiepraktijken. Geïnspireerd 
door Stengers’ werk over Whitehead’s speculatieve filosofie, tracht dit hoofdstuk Whitehead’s 
omschrijving van de universiteit als een ‘home of adventures’ uit te diepen om zo tot een pedagogische 
begrip van universitaire studiepraktijken te komen. Op een conceptueel niveau wordt onderzocht hoe 
studiepraktijken bepaalde wereldlijke problemen activeren en transformeren in kwesties van studie. 
Het derde deel ontwikkelt het conceptuele werk met betrekking tot studiepraktijken verder in relatie 
tot de activiteiten van de Palestijnse experimentele universiteit Campus in Camps. Het vijfde hoofdstuk 
presenteert het werk van Campus in Camps en legt uit hoe het verband houdt met de theoretische 
discussie van het tweede deel. Op basis van Stengers’ praktijkbegrip waarbinnen een onderscheid 
gemaakt wordt tussen vereisten en verplichtingen als vitale ingrediënten van praktijken, 
beargumenteert dit hoofdstuk dat het leven in ballingschap de drijvende kracht is achter de 
studiepraktijken van Campus in Camps, en dat vandaar de kwestie van leven in ballingschap datgene 
is waaraan deelnemers verplicht zijn wanneer ze studeren. Waar het vijfde hoofdstuk focust op wat 
bestudeerd wordt door Campus in Camps, wil het zesde hoofdstuk de specifieke vereisten onderzoeken 
waaraan voldaan moet worden om van studiepraktijken te spreken, of in andere woorden, hoe ze 
studeren. Vier vereisten worden onderscheiden die onmisbaar zijn om de studiepraktijken van Campus 
in Camps te bestuderen, namelijk verhalen vertellen, vergelijken, kaarten maken, en gebruiken. 
Het concluderend hoofdstuk herneemt de onderzoeksvraag en presenteert de belangrijkst ideeën 
die ontwikkeld zijn, zoals het avontuur van studie en het samenhuizen van wetenschap en studie binnen 
de universiteit. De laatste twee secties van de conclusie gaan dieper in op twee kwesties van een 
eerder praktische aard, namelijk hoe zich te verhouden tot institutionalisering binnen een 
praktijktheoretisch perspectief, en ten slotte de vraag wat gedaan kan worden. In het algemeen en 
terugkerend op het initiële probleem heeft het proefschrift als doel te onderzoeken wat het betekent om 
de universiteit te verstaan als gesitueerd door en geëngageerd in wereldlijke vragen. 
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Figure I: Le poulpe brandissait la victime comme une plume. Illustration by Edouard 
Riou for Vingt mille lieues sous les mers, Jules Verne (1871). 
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In 1903 publiceerde William James een korte opinie onder de titel The PhD-Octopus 
waarin hij aan de kaak stelt hoe een jonge onderzoeker ondanks zijn capaciteiten niet kon 
aangenomen worden aan zijn universiteit tenzij hij eerst het doctoraat behaalde. In de 
tekst schetst James de manieren waarop de universiteiten van de Verenigde Staten zich 
in toenemende mate in de greep van het doctoraat verstrengeld weten en zich steeds 
moeilijker aan haar greep kunnen ontworstelen.  
Hoewel James vanuit een volledig andere problematiek schreef, vind ik het beeld van 
het doctoraat als octopus niet alleen een treffend, maar ook een heel herkenbaar beeld, 
tenminste als niet zozeer de universiteit als wel de doctoraatsstudent begrepen wordt als 
de prooi die zich verstrikt en verstrengeld in de greep van het doctoraat bevindt.  
Voor mij immers begon dit doctoraat pas echt bij de ervaring die de universiteit van 
een onderzoeksonderwerp in een probleem veranderde, en mij in haar student. Het is een 
ervaring die mij gedurende bijna twee jaar in haar greep hield en van daaruit haar tastende 
tentakels uitsloeg naar de personen rondom mij. Het is daarom niet minder dan gepast 
om hen te bedanken die samen met mij niet anders konden dan de greep te aanvaarden 
en van daaruit pogingen te ondernemen om zelf terug grip te krijgen.  
Jan, Maarten, bedankt om altijd mee te denken, en af en toe ook tegen te spreken, 
om mij veel tijd te geven om te lezen en mijn eigen weg te vinden in het onderzoek, om er 
in te blijven geloven zelfs op de momenten dat niet alles vanzelfsprekend verliep, om ook 
de keuzes te onderschrijven die misschien niet zozeer problemen oplosten als wel 
situaties echt in problemen veranderden, om steeds nieuwe ideeën en perspectieven aan 
te reiken, en om mij steeds aan te moedigen om gedachten altijd nauwkeuriger en 
preciezer te formuleren. 
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Pelin, Martin, Søren, Stefan, the members of the examination committee, thank you 
for having taken the time to read my dissertation and for your thoughtful comments on my 
work.  
Sue, Bart, Patrick, Geert, Stefan, the members of the mid-term committee, thank you 
for helping me to rethink my research project and to develop a slightly different approach 
when it was most necessary.  
Alessandro, Isshaq, Aysar, and the other participants of Campus in Camps, thank you 
for your thought-provoking work and your generosity in sharing ideas and questions. 
All my past and present colleagues in Leuven and abroad, the members of the 
different reading groups I attended, and all the other intellectual messmates I had the 
opportunity to share a table with in the past few years during conferences and colloquia, 
thank you for reading and discussing together. More in particular, I want to thank the 
colleagues who have read and commented on parts of the dissertation in the final phase, 
Carlijne, Ilse, Lavinia, Benedikte, Massimiliano, Thomas, Silvia, Nancy, Goele, and Itay, 
thank you for helping me to further develop my argument and for your encouragements. 
Mijn ouders, Jonas, en Gijs, wie beter dan jullie weet hoe vervelend het is om nadat 
je eerst bent opgestaan om de kat buiten te laten, enkele minuten later alweer opgeschrikt 
wordt door het krabben aan het kozijn, dat koppigheid en besluiteloosheid geen 
tegenstelling vormen, maar elkaar net lijken te veronderstellen. Bedankt om steeds de 
deur op een kier te zetten, om binnen of net buiten te laten, voor jullie begrip wanneer 
Neerpelt weer eens te ver of de trein te traag was, en om steeds mee jullie schouders te 
zetten onder alles wat ik doe. 
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Think We Must 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem Statement 
 
Think we must.  In 1937, Virginia Woolf wrote a long reply to a letter she received a few years 
earlier from ‘an educated gentleman’ – she never mentions his name – who had asked her 
how, in her opinion, war could be prevented (1938/2016). Given the rise of fascism in Germany 
and Italy at that time, war was looming and the gentleman deemed Woolf a loyal ally to protect 
their so-called ‘culture and intellectual liberty’, as preserved in the public professions and 
educational institutions of their time, such as the university. Woolf declined the invitation of the 
gentleman to support his cause and instead took the opportunity to problematize the 
warmongering values of these professions and institutions.  
She finds herself in a tension between, on the one hand, the desire to leave the private 
house in order to prevent war – a cause she, as a pacifist, definitely shares with her 
correspondent – and, on the other hand, an unwillingness to form an alliance with the public 
world of men. "Behind us lies the patriarchal system; the private house, with its nullity, its 
immorality, its hypocrisy, its servility. Before us lies the public world, the professional system, 
with its possessiveness, its jealousy, its pugnacity, its greed” (Ibid., pp. 193-194). She 
questions the utility of a university education if it instills such values that make it impossible 
for her to prevent war. Moreover, she problematizes the values that need to be defended, 
claiming that these are not her values and that, hence, she is not inclined to defend them. 
Besides, the idea of ‘defending’ values in order to prevent war sounded a bit strange to her 
Making a university 4 
ears, as she spent most of her time in what she calls the private life, which offered her a 
perspective in which the ceremonies, decorations, and traditions of the public life seem quite 
odd. Neither is she inclined to join what she calls the ‘procession of educated men’. She writes 
that “we have to ask ourselves, here and now, do we wish to join that procession, or don’t we? 
On what terms shall we join that procession? Above all, where is it leading us, the procession 
of educated men?” (Ibid., p. 180).  
In spite of her pacifist commitments, Woolf hesitates before the invitation that is offered 
to her to help prevent war. Instead of rushing in, she prefers to linger a bit longer on the 
threshold between private house and public life. Woolf argues that, in fact, she and all the 
others who have been excluded from a university education do not need the university in order 
to think. She argues that “the daughters of educated men have always done their thinking 
from hand to mouth; not under green lamps at study tables in the cloisters of secluded 
colleges. They have thought while they stirred the pot, while they rocked the cradle” (Ibid., p. 
180). In that sense, they were thinking long before they were offered the opportunity to go to 
the university:  
 
Think we must. Let us think in offices; in omnibuses; while we are standing in the crowd 
watching Coronations and Lord Mayors’ Shows; let us think as we pass the Cenotaph; 
and in Whitehall; in the gallery of the House of Commons; in the Law Courts; let us 
think at baptisms and marriages and funerals. Let us never cease from thinking – what 
is this ‘civilization’ in which we find ourselves? What are these ceremonies and why 
should we take part in them? What are these professions and why should we make 
money out of them? Where in short is it leading us, the procession of the sons of 
educated men? (Ibid., pp. 180-181).  
 
Perhaps it is the kind of hesitation that Woolf communicates via her letter – a certain 
willingness to join, delayed by a vigilance concerning what consequences joining might entail 
– that could still be relevant to those who think about entering the ranks of the university today 
and, even more urgently, to those who have already entered.  
Although it is evident that the university today does not resemble the university of Woolf’s 
time, the question whether we want to join the procession or not – and if yes, how? – is an 
urgent question. Besides, the question becomes all the more urgent as universities are 
currently increasingly mobilized in a knowledge economy with buzzwords such as flexibility 
and competitiveness, which significantly impact the thinking practices of the university. Think 
we must. Do we want to join the procession of educated men (and women), nowadays a 
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procession under the banners of progress and growth? The challenge for us today will be to 
hear Woolf’s cry not as a call for desertion, to bite the proffered hand, but rather as a call to 
reclaim our thinking practices, and to rethink our university. Think we must. 
Let us dwell a bit longer, however, on this ‘think we must’, the hesitation it communicates, 
and the kind of thinking it calls for. Given the current mobilization of the university as the prime 
pawn in the knowledge economy, this ‘think we must’ might help to raise a slightly different 
awareness of the situation and to devise an interesting and relevant research question. It can 
be argued that this syntagma has a threefold efficacy.  
First, it affirms the necessity to think. It makes clear that thinking is not a skill to be learned 
or a competence to be obtained. Hence, we do not need a university as a site where we would 
acquire the capacity to think – as if we were not able to think before entering the university. 
As such, the syntagma ‘think we must’ serves as a protection against the idea that lures us 
into believing that the university would be the thinking head of humankind. It dispels every 
understanding of the university as a thinking institution that contrasts a non-thinking outside, 
because it forcefully asserts that this outside was already thinking ‘while stirring the pot and 
rocking the cradle’. Besides, it immediately attaches the university to issues of societal 
concern such as questions of how war can be prevented or how women can enter the public 
professions – issues that people, men and women, were already thinking about long before 
they were offered the possibility to join the ranks of the university. Think we must.  
Second, ‘think we must’ not only conceptually convokes a ‘we’ around the issues of war 
or the public professions, but also – and pertinent to the framework of this dissertation – it 
turns the university itself into a problem. On a rhetorical level, it calls together a public, a ‘we’, 
around the question whether we would like to join the university, and on what conditions, 
especially given the fact that we do not need it in order to think. Moreover, the ‘we’ that is 
being invoked is not simply a ‘we’ of academics, of people who know the university from the 
inside, or of those who have acquired a specialized expertise on it. Rather, it includes 
everyone for whom the future of the university and its role in contemporary society could be 
of concern. In doing so, ‘think we must’ creates a public around the question of the university. 
Think we must.  
Third, and finally, ‘think we must’ prevents us from rushing in when slowing down is 
required. It allows us to take care of the consequences of the transformations that the practices 
of the university (e.g. giving lectures, doing fieldwork, writing articles, conducting experiments, 
organizing seminars) are inclined to undergo given their current mobilization in the knowledge 
economy. Moreover, it resists such a mobilization that seems to require us in fact not to think, 
but instead to produce and to deliver as fast as possible, because it engages a thinking public 
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around the question of the university. In short, the efficacy of Woolf’s cry is to dispel an 
understanding of the university as the thinking head of humankind, to invoke a ‘we’ around 
the question of the university, and to slow down before the consequences of the current 
mobilization of the university in the knowledge economy. Think we must.  
Given its threefold efficacy, ‘think we must’ poses a double challenge, both parts of which 
need to be addressed together. On the one hand, it forces us to think about the relation 
between university and society without taking recourse to an understanding of the university 
as the thinking head of humankind. On the other hand, and given the first challenge, it 
demands that we think about the specificity of the thinking that takes place in the course of 
the practices of the university without assimilating this kind of thinking to the thinking done 
during other social practices such as ‘stirring the pot and rocking the cradle’. Combined, these 
challenges that come from Woolf’s ‘think we must’ lead to the problem statement of this 
dissertation, namely to investigate what it means to think in a university, given the fact that the 
university is not the only place where it is possible to think, that people have been thinking 
long before they entered the university. The question regarding the specificity of thinking at 
the university, moreover, transforms the relation between university and society into a problem 
since it is assumed that people do not need a university in order to think. As such, this 
dissertation is situated by an interest in the specificity of thinking at the university as well as 
the relation between university and society. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. The next section 
explains how this problem statement connects with current theoretical and practical issues. In 
the third section, I shed light on the specific trajectory of the research question and on the 
research process. The fourth section aims to give the reader an insight into how I conceive of 
doing theory by means of a methodological account, and the last section finally contains an 
outline of the dissertation. 
 
 
Practical and Theoretical Relevance 
 
The practical and theoretical relevance of the problem statement will be demonstrated by 
situating these two challenges in discussions in both the social sphere and disciplinary 
standpoints. Before doing so, however, it is important to underscore that the theoretical 
relevance cannot be easily separated from the practical relevance, that theoretical issues 
inevitably touch upon practical concerns, and that practical problems give rise to theoretical 
discussions; that, in short, practical issues are theoretical through and through and vice versa. 
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It seems as if the separation between university and society as it is present in the research 
question persists in the belief that theoretical and practical relevance are two different 
domains, as if theoretical relevance pertains to the university and practical relevance to the 
societal realm. Having touched upon this issue, the conceptualizations of the relation between 
university and society might be a good point to start. 
Whereas in the case of Woolf the societal issues in which the university could or should 
meddle predominantly concerned the prevention of war and the entry of women in the public 
professions, today one could think of issues such as climate change, migration, 
unemployment, housing, or nuclear waste. These issues require knowledge and expertise, 
but in trying to formulate a proper response to them, knowledge and expertise cannot suffice, 
as these issues are strongly intertwined with the ways in which we live our lives collectively. 
As such, purely scientific-technocratic solutions are doomed to fall short as they fail to engage 
a public in the discussion of these problems. Herein lies the question of what role the university 
should take in mediating between scientific and political discussions; a role, moreover, that 
seems to be of continuous concern.  
In the Belgian context, the two previous rectors of KU Leuven advocated conflicting views 
on this issue. The scholar who held the position from 2013 until 2017 claimed that the 
university should be a beacon of light for society. In his rectoral address of 2015, when the 
question of how to deal with refugees coming to Belgium was heavily debated in the media, 
he made a plea for the university as a place where thought is cherished and cultivated at times 
when emotions threaten to take over. It is possible to discern here, yet again, the university 
stepping to the front as a thinking institution that guides the ship of society through the storm 
(Torfs, 2015).  
This poetic rendering of the university stands in sharp contrast with the more prosaic 
vision of the current rector. In an opinion piece on the societal role of academics, he referred 
to a report on the economic contribution of Flemish universities to society. In the report it was 
calculated that every euro invested in a university in Flanders yields seven euro for the wider 
economy. This was taken as proof of the contributions that the university has to offer to society 
(Sels, 2018). These are just two examples of how the relation between university and society 
and the possibilities and impossibilities for the university to assist in societal affairs have been 
brought forward. 
It is not only during mediatized interventions, however, that the relation between university 
and society is discussed in various terms; an entire academic field is emerging that tries to 
develop issues related to the future of the university. Most notably in this respect is the 
foundation of the Philosophy and Theory of Higher Education Society in 2017, accompanied 
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by an annual conference on Philosophy of Higher Education and a journal, the Journal of 
Philosophy and Theory of Higher Education. The initiators of this branch of philosophy of 
education also started a book series, called Debating Higher Education, in which they aim to 
provide a forum to discuss several issues related to higher education.  
Next to these efforts by philosophy of education to come to terms with questions related 
to the university, there has been the formation of the Center for Higher Education Futures, 
which adopts a broader approach to similar questions and engages an international 
community of scholars around issues of higher education policy, didactics, and experimental 
projects. These are just two developments that exemplify the increased concern for higher 
education and the university in academic educational discourses. 
Within the academic discussions a variety of propositions have been uttered in recent 
years concerning the question how the university can relate to societal concerns. First, I will 
discuss the work of Rikke Toft Nørgård and Søren Bengtsen, and Jan Masschelein and 
Maarten Simons, for whom the concept of world seems to be an important point of reference 
in understanding the university. Thereafter, I will discuss the authors that have recently taken 
up the challenge to understand this relation between the university and the world in ecological 
terms.  
Nørgård & Bengtsen (2016) have proposed the idea of a placeful university that aims to 
foster academic citizenship. Emphasizing the importance of the spatial aspects of academic 
education, they argue for a university that integrates, among others, the private, the social, 
and the professional spheres on the campus. The concept of integration is crucial in their 
argument since it allows for understanding the entanglement of these various spheres that 
turns the campus into a multifaceted place of academic discussion and debate in close relation 
to the spheres outside its spatial confines. A few years later, Nørgård & Bengtsen (2018) take 
these concerns regarding the university and its environment up again in what they call the 
worldhood university. The worldhood university, so they argue, is a university that thinks from 
the world and whose thinking affects the world, that is, in their words, both world-made and 
world-making. Thing, place, designing, and thinking are four concepts that make up the 
theoretical groundwork of the worldhood university, which is intimately entwined in worldly 
problems.  
Nørgård & Bengtsen, however, have not been the only ones to situate the university in 
relation to the world (a somewhat broader and perhaps more philosophical rendering of what 
in the problem statements was termed ‘society’). In 2009, Masschelein & Simons wrote not 
one but two proposals for what they call a world university. What is interesting is that in spite 
of the striking commonalities in the analyses that gave rise to their idea of the world university, 
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the two proposals seem to diverge in terms of the aims of the world university, the practices 
that are exemplary for such a world university, and the concepts that are deployed to 
understand these practices.  
In the first proposal by Simons & Masschelein (2009), the world university is the place 
where the question how to live together, which they suggest is a political question in the 
Rancièrean sense, is taken up as a central concern. This question, they argue, asked by 
people not part of an established regime of living, emerges “from the mere presence of illegal 
immigrants, or the presence of demonstrators walking in the streets, or the public appearance 
of fully covered Muslim women in some countries” (p. 12). It requires of the inhabitants of the 
world university an attitude of curiosity for what is happening to us today and how we can live 
together. The practices that are exemplary for such a world university are those that allow for 
becoming attentive to the world. They associate these practices with study, which they 
understand as “an activity to become passive, and hence to become attentive” (Ibid. pp. 13-
14). Examples that are given include reading, writing, listening, learning by heart, and mental 
as well as physical exercises. Central notions in the conceptualization of the world university 
are curiosity, care, exposition, and attention. These concepts are rather open, in the sense 
that they allow the authors to describe and grasp a variety of activities practiced at the world 
university.  
These rather open concepts – or weak concepts, in the sense that they do not so much 
enforce a particular interpretation of the practices of the world university – stand in contrast to 
the rather strong concepts deployed in the second proposal for a world university by 
Masschelein & Simons (2009). In this second proposal, they conceptualize the university 
through the exemplary practice of the lecture (as opposed to the rather general practices of 
reading and writing of the first proposal). Public use of reason and public gathering come 
forward as important concepts to understand the world university. In a particular Stengersian 
reading of Kant’s text What is Enlightenment?, they propose to understand this public use of 
reason as a thinking in the presence of something that has – due to the committed or devoted 
speech of a professor – acquired the power to call into being a thinking public. As such, the 
aim of the world university (once more, but not yet finished), is to gather a thinking public 
around something that the professor has lectured about (e.g. a virus, a poem, a river, a 
formula).  
It is this second conception of the university, understood as a public gathering and 
grounded in the practice of the lecture (and the seminar), that they will further elaborate in 
later texts in which arguably even stronger concepts (e.g. de-identification, profanation, 
suspension) are brought in to grasp the scene of teaching (Masschelein & Simons, 2013, 
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2014). They will argue, for instance, that the educational gesture performed by the professor 
during the lecture is one of profanation, which they understand as an untying of the link 
between an object and its regular use, the way it functions in social, political, or economic life, 
thus making it free for common use. Discussing the profanation of the book, of reason, of 
culture and time, and production and communication, they trace the precise meaning of this 
gesture in different time frames (Masschelein & Simons, 2013). The reader is left with the 
question why they abandoned the first proposal, which differs most strongly from the second 
in the altogether different configuration of the political and the educational that they put 
forward, as well as the practices they understand as paradigmatic for the university.  
Concerning the first point, the relation between the political1 and the educational, it might 
be important to note that in the majority of their texts, and in almost all texts published after 
the first proposal for a world university, they understand this relation as one of suspension. 
This means that they assume that when public pedagogic forms, such as the lecture, but also 
the school, happen, the political is suspended, which means, according to them, that it is 
temporarily out of operativity, interrupted. An interruption that coincides with and is made 
possible by the profanation, the opening up, of the world and making it available for public use 
(and hence, detached from the regular use an object, a word, a motor, a tree might have in 
our current societies); an interruption moreover, that coincides with a de-identification of those 
who enter the school or the lecture hall, as being no longer coerced by certain expectations 
that might come from the family or the society.2 
It is this understanding of the relation between the educational and the political as one of 
suspension that has been radicalized in recent years in what is called post-critical pedagogy. 
In a conversation between the authors of Manifesto for a post-critical pedagogy, Joris Vlieghe, 
one of the initiators of the movement, suggests that “a political activist relates in a different 
way to the world than the educator does: whereas the first is driven by indignation and hate, 
the latter is infused with passion and love” (Hodgson, Vlieghe, & Zamojski, 2017, p. 92). 
Although educators and activists obviously have different ways of relating to the world, such 
a sharp distinction comes through as an insurmountable contradiction between hate for the 
world, the political stance, and love for the world, the educational stance.  
                                                        
1 The notion of political is understood throughout these paragraphs in a very general sense as that 
which concerns the question how we can live together. 
2 The doctoral dissertation of Lut Vanden Buverie contains an elaborate ethnographic account of how 
these educational processes of suspension and profanation take place in school contexts which she 
theorizes as a pausing of expectations and functionalities external to the school (Vanden Buverie, 
2018). 
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Though I sympathize with Maarten Simons’ attempt to turn this contradiction into a 
contrast when he suggested after a presentation of the post-critical perspective on teaching 
last year, that both educators and activists might perhaps share a concern for the world, 
instead of being divided by love and hate for the world, respectively, suspension and 
interruption are concepts that I have learned to distrust, and I hope this dissertation bears 
witness to my conviction that an interesting connection between the political and the 
educational might be more fruitful than a strong separation. In that sense, shared concerns 
are more prone to foster polite encounters, whereas a combination of love and hate can only 
lead to bad break-ups. Nevertheless, having grown up with the images and stories of Belgian 
colonial history, I am aware of some of the many bad encounters between politics and 
education that have taken place and continue to take place all over the world, and that the 
wager on an interesting connection between the two thus always implies a risk, that it is not 
an easy or innocent job to do.  
Concerning the second point, i.e. the practices referred to in order to understand the 
university, to focus only on the lecture and the seminar in the texts published in line with the 
second proposal for a world university is remarkable. It might be interesting to have a look at 
other practices that take place at the university as well. For instance, the practices that are 
named ‘practices of study’ in the first proposal, but remain barely conceptualized (e.g. reading 
and rereading a text, learning by heart, physical and mental exercises). As such, practices of 
study as a point of entry to shed light on the relation between university and society might 
offer an interesting avenue of thought next to the conceptualizations of this relation based on 
the practices of the lecture and the seminar.  
In conceiving of the relation between university and society, the terms worldhood 
university or world university, however, are not the only routes that have been taken. Given 
our current global predicament marked by climate change, the term ecology has been taken 
up in recent years as a valuable concept in trying to understand the relationship between 
university and society. Susan Wright (2017), for instance, has raised the question whether the 
university can be a livable institution in the Anthropocene. Concerned about the increasing 
capitalization of the university in a knowledge economy, she proposes to rethink the bonds 
universities entertain with other organizations that make up its ecology (e.g. publishing 
houses, governments, transnational agencies) in order to arrive at a more livable landscape 
in which the university can fulfil its societal and public role. Also David Roussel (2016) raises 
the question of how what he calls university learning environments can be reimagined in 
response to the social and ecological changes stemming from the Anthropocene. Troubled by 
the humanist bias of the traditional university, he proposes a learning environment that 
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consists of “a series of emplaced bodies, objects, modules, networks and design elements 
that students and teachers collectively assemble into working prototypes and architectures to 
test ideas” (p. 149).  
Other authors have intensified the link between the university and ecological thinking by 
not only conceiving of the university from an ecological point of view, as challenged by the 
Anthropocene, but by conceiving of the university as ecological through and through. Ron 
Barnett (2011, 2018), for instance, has suggested the idea of an ecological university as a 
way to understand how the university can relate to the ecosystems of, for instance, learning, 
knowledge, and social institutions amidst which it is situated, and repair human-induced 
impairment. Michael Peters (2016) has proposed the idea of an eco-university. Situated 
between economy and ecology, both sharing the root eco-, the university has to be reinvented 
in order to do justice to the responsibilities it has towards the world. In the second chapter of 
this dissertation, the work of Ron Barnett and Susan Wright, two authors who have been 
seriously engaged in thinking the university in relation to ecology, will be discussed at length.  
Before moving on to the second challenge coming from Woolf’s cry, namely the question 
regarding the nature of thinking in relation to the university, it might be relevant to underscore 
that focusing on the relation between university and society is an attempt to come to terms 
with the specific entanglements of the two and to avoid the dangers of either paying too much 
attention to the university in itself, as if there were no societal expectations to be met or urgent 
questions to be addressed, or conceiving of the university as just another cog in the societal 
machine whose only role is the constant and uninterrupted functioning of social reproduction. 
The relation between university and society is turned into a problem by Woolf’s ‘think we must’, 
as it puts forward the question what thinking means for the university. This brings us to the 
second challenge; namely, how thinking can be understood in the context of the university. 
In a somewhat timely manner, in 2018, Søren Bengtsen and Ron Barnett published an 
edited volume titled The thinking university (2018). They open the book with the following 
curious phrase: “The university is a thinking institution. Surely, that does not need to be said 
but it does” (Barnett & Bengtsen, 2018, p. 1). In spite of the fact that they assume that this is 
obvious, they still claim that it makes sense to reaffirm that the university is a thinking 
institution, it seems to pose a problem in the light of Woolf’s ‘think we must’. What could 
Barnett and Bengtsen mean when they claim that the university is a thinking institution? 
In an article published one year before the book, the authors sketch the problems the 
university faces in the era of cognitive capitalism. The condition of the university in this era is, 
they argue, marked by a digitization of knowledge content and an increased importance of 
disciplines related to sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM-disciplines). 
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This brings the university’s relation to knowledge and truth into a crisis. The authors propose 
thinking as a possibility for the university to reinvent itself. They argue that the university can 
rethink itself as an institution that thinks from the world, which means that it takes up worldly 
issues that require thought (Barnett & Bengtsen, 2017). They define the thinking university as 
“a university that is irredeemably inter-connected with the world. This inter-connection is not 
only about the university addressing the world, but also responding to the world” (Barnett & 
Bengtsen, 2018, p. 3). They explain that their concept of world not only includes society, but 
also the wider world of other societies and cultures, of subcultures within society, and of the 
natural world “and all that it encompasses of species and forms of wild growth” (Ibid., p. 3).  
Returning to Woolf’s ‘think we must’ and its efficacy to dispel the ghosts that would make 
us believe that the university is the thinking head of humankind, Barnett and Bengtsen’s 
thinking university becomes suspicious. Although they do not assert explicitly that the world 
outside the university is not thinking, the reader is left with the question what the people 
outside the university have been doing all the time if the university is characterized by the fact 
that it thinks. As such, the thinking university might lead us into believing that the thinking 
university thinks from (and for) a non-thinking world, a world, moreover, that has its problems 
but is in need of the university to find ways of dealing with these problems, to think them 
through. Not hostile to the thinking university, but vigilant concerning what believing in a 
thinking university might entail, my question concerns what this thinking then precisely means, 
how it can be characterized?   
At this point, the concept of study that has recently been rediscovered in educational 
discourses might help to shed light on the mode of thinking of the university. Study, as 
conceived in this dissertation, is the hypothetical name for the way in which the university 
relates toward the world. It is important to make clear that this statement serves as a 
proposition, as an idea that is being proposed to the reader, the consequences of which need 
to be traced in the course of the dissertation. From its inception onwards, the university seems 
to have been closely connected to the activity of study.   
Universitas studii, the community of study, is the name medieval universities acquired 
when they were sanctioned by the Emperor or the Pope (Rüegg, 1992; Verger, 2013), and the 
name denoted, more than the usual name of universitas magistrorum et scolarium, the activity 
of this community, namely study (Durkheim, 1938). In the first chapter of this dissertation, I 
will reflect on the specific meaning of universitas, but it might be relevant to unpack the 
meanings of studium at this point. In the Oxford Latin Dictionary, we find that the verb studēre 
means not only studying, learning, or pursuing knowledge, but also being attached to or being 
in favor of. As such, the concept denotes not only a cognitive activity but also an affective 
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capacity. It is important to underscore yet again that the name universitas studii does not serve 
as the foundation upon which the dissertation is constructed, but rather as an historico-
etymological heuristic device to give the proposition some plausibility and to invite the reader 
to follow where its consequences might lead.  
There are, however, not only historical reasons to focus on the concept of study. In recent 
years, the theoretical concept of study has gained the interest of anthropologists (cf. Ingold, 
2018) and cultural theorists (Harney & Moten, 2013; Manning, 2016). Moreover, study 
experienced a revival in educational philosophy and theory, for instance via the attempts to 
reconceptualize it in a volume edited by Claudia Ruitenberg (2017).  
Most pertinently, Tyson Lewis has written extensively on the concept of study, particularly 
from an Agambenian point of view. In The fundamental ontology of study, Lewis (2014) argues 
that study can be considered as the profanation of learning.3 As the acquisition of knowledge 
increasingly becomes an end in itself, detached from all kinds of intentions or aims initially 
held, the learner transforms into a student. As such, Lewis tries to get conceptual grip on these 
moments that one forgets that one is learning, that one has to achieve something, and that 
one is lost in a text or a book for instance. In his chapter in the aforementioned edited volume, 
Lewis (2017) compares the act of studying to melancholy. Referring to Freud, he argues that, 
whereas mourning implies an intentional relation towards something outside the subject that 
mourns, melancholy is a rather ambiguous or diffuse experience in which a feeling of loss 
discloses itself. What is disclosed in the act of studying, Lewis argues, is the educability of the 
student herself:  
 
Study becomes a kind of pure means without end. The result is an experience of 
educability without end. Here educability is not placed in the service of any aim outside 
itself. It is not made into a mean for an end. Nor is it merely an end in itself. Rather, it 
suspends the means-end logic altogether, producing a pure experience of the self as 
educable – as a ‘whatever’ being freed to be otherwise than (Ibid., p. 14). 
 
The image of the student we encounter in Lewis’ text seems to me to be rather sad and 
gloomy. Alone in the archive, reading books, completely forgetting about her intentions to 
study, Lewis’ student gains an experience of her own educability. What she has lost, however, 
seems to be the world and its questions and problems that made her a student in the first 
place (or a learner, in Lewis’ framework). Moreover, is the dilemma that Lewis confronts us 
                                                        
3 Again, we encounter the concept of profanation. It is quite a remarkable fact that educators often refer 
to theological terms to conceptualize educational experiences.  
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with – learner or student – and its accompanying understanding of education in terms of 
‘means’, ‘ends’, ‘ends in itself’, and ‘pure means’ not reductive of educational realities and 
experiences? Is it not possible to think in an educationally interesting way about aims, 
intentions, attachments, efficacy, maybe even learning?  
Jan Masschelein (2017) also seems slightly hesitant to fully embrace Lewis’ isolated 
student. Comparing the iconography of Saint Jerome, in solitude, absorbed in the book, to the 
iconography of Saint Thomas, engaged in a conversation with a public while reading to them 
from a book, he argues for an understanding of the university as a form of collective public 
study. Such a university, he argues, is aimed at making something present (e.g. a planet, an 
insect, a disease, a stone) while at the same time raising the question of how to live together 
with what is made present.4 He explains that collective public study has to do with specific 
architectures, experimental devices, modes of address, artifacts, etc., of which he gives a few 
examples. Zigzagging between Saint Thomas lectures during the early years of the university 
of Paris and Hannah Arendt’s writings on the Greeks, he contrasts the pedagogical or 
scholastic art of speech with the political and philosophical art of speech (rhetorics and 
dialectics, respectively). Study seems to serve as a collector term to hold together all the 
activities of a university that gather a public (e.g. lecture, seminar). In that sense, it is quite a 
broad concept that encompasses many activities. What interests me still, following my 
discussion of the world universities (in the plural), is the specificity of study in what was then 
called ‘practices of study’ and how it diverges from the mode of study that can be discerned 
in the lecture and the seminar. 
Maarten Simons (2017) has also published a small note on the concept of study in relation 
to the question of how the university can be situated towards truth and politics. After an astute 
analysis of how personalizing tendencies play into the hands of both post-truth politics as well 
as evidence-based policies, he puts forward a conception of the university as a site of study: 
“By taking care of something, by turning something into a matter of concern, by allowing it to 
speak or become visible and to make us hesitate, practices of study suspend the claims of 
both truth and politics” (Ibid., p. 244). Again, study is conceived here as a process of 
suspension. In the next sentence, however, Simons envisages the university as a site “to 
prepare for new connections between politics and truth” (Ibid., p. 244). As such, there seems 
to be a tension between university and study, in which the latter suspends the claims of both 
truth and politics, whereas the former wagers on a possible connection between the two. A 
few sentences later, however, the text is drawn to a close.  
                                                        
4 Perhaps this text could be read as an attempt to remedy the rift between the two world universities?  
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It is clear that there are both historical and theoretical reasons to conceive of the university 
in relation to the concept of study. By placing studying center stage, however, I defer from 
Woolf who wrote about thinking as something that we do anyway and for which we do not 
need a university. Focusing on the educational concept of study, instead of the more 
philosophical concept of thinking, however, allows for a rendering of the relation between 
university and society that is closer to the educational discussion in which this dissertation 
aims to intervene. Nevertheless, fleshing out the specificity of study in contrast to thinking is 
a matter that will have to be addressed in this dissertation, and that I will discuss at the end of 
Chapter Six. 
Given the two challenges that stem from Virginia Woolf’s ‘think we must’ and the 
theoretical work on study that seems to offer an interesting point of view, this dissertation aims 
to address the following question: “How to situate study in the relation between university and 
society?”.   
 
 
Trajectory of the Research Question 
 
The question of how to situate study in the relation between university and society has 
emerged from work undertaken as part of two research projects that I have been involved in. 
The first project, Under the spell of learning: The ‘learning society’ as challenge for the public 
role of school, university, and family education,5 started from the observation that educational 
theories increasingly have embraced learning as a referent for the educational practices and 
processes they investigate, at the expense of notions such as education, upbringing, or 
teaching. The ambition of this project was to analyze how the traditional educational 
institutions – school, university, family – have been affected by the current discourse of 
learning. More particularly, the aim of this research project was to investigate how this trend 
has affected the kind of gatherings or associations that are enacted within these institutions 
and, specifically, what this entails with regards to their public character. Based on 
ethnographic fieldwork with concrete case studies and philosophical theories on more 
fundamental issues, the project aimed to come to a cartography of actual trends and 
developments, a morphology of the school, the university, and the family as particular 
pedagogical forms, and an educational theory that articulates their public character under the 
regime of the learning society (cf. Laboratory for Education and Society, 2018).  
                                                        
5 Supervised by Jan Masschelein (KU Leuven), Maarten Simons (KU Leuven), and Stefan Ramaekers 
(KU Leuven).  
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The second project, The place of university lecturing: A comparative analysis of the 
practice and experience of lecturing in physical and digital spaces,6 had as its point of 
departure the unabated presence of lecturing as the prime practice of contemporary university 
education. The objective of this project was to investigate the differences and similarities 
between physical and digital lecturing practices and, more specifically, the transformations 
that occur in the educational character of lecturing from the physical lecture hall to the digital 
Massive Open Online Course (MOOC). Concretely, this research project aimed to arrive at an 
educational theory of university lecturing, based on historical, philosophical, architectural, and 
ethnographic theories and methodologies with a specific interest in the materialities and 
experiences of both physical and digital lecturing. Hence, this project had a strong interest in 
the architectures of university education (e.g. lecture halls, digital platforms, seminar rooms, 
and online fora), including how these infrastructures are and have been experienced by 
professors and students.  
While formulating my own research proposal to present to the mid-term committee in 
January 2017, I made an attempt to remain loyal to both initial projects, while also being well-
aware that, given the specific requirements of each project, some kind of betrayal would be 
unavoidable. The project I presented, Making a university. An educational inquiry into the 
conditions and potentials of university education as exemplified by Campus in Camps, 
inherited from the first research project a strong interest in the relation between university and 
society – its so-called public character – and, more specifically, how the university investigates 
and responds to societal issues. From the second project I inherited a curiosity concerning the 
architecture of physical universities, while my colleague Lavinia Marin decided to delve into 
the practices and experiences of digital lecturing. Since both projects share an interest in 
ethnographic methodologies, I decided to do fieldwork with Campus in Camps, a Palestinian 
experimental university in Dheisheh Refugee Camp, with which I had been in contact for a few 
months already.7 
Corresponding with Alessandro Petti, the program director, and Isshaq Al-Barbary, one 
of the participants, we agreed on a two-month visit, during which I would be involved in two of 
their projects – one concerning the presence of women in the camps, the other about 
designing walking tours for people who visit the camps – that would allow me to contribute to 
                                                        
6 Supervised by Maarten Simons (KU Leuven), Jan Masschelein (KU Leuven), Marc Depaepe (KU 
Leuven), and Bart Verschaffel (UGent).   
7 In the first two years I had worked on a typology of architectural enactments of the relation between 
university and society. I discerned three different ways in which universities relate to the built 
environment (namely, instrumental, symbolic, interactional), each exemplified by a specific case study 
(respectively, the African Virtual University, the Rolex Learning Center, and Campus in Camps). 
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their work while taking notes on the ways in which the participants inquire in the camp and 
propose specific social and spatial interventions. Based on Tim Ingold’s ecological 
anthropology and Peter Sloterdijk’s philosophy of anthropogenic spheres, the two questions 
that would guide my fieldwork were: (1) In which and through which medium does the 
university take place? And (2) Which techniques enforce the event of the university as an 
educational sphere? Via these questions I hoped to shed a light on the study techniques that 
Campus in Camps deploys in order to affect and be affected by the sociopolitical medium they 
inhabit.  
Nevertheless, in spite of the collaborative work that had been done in order not only to 
formulate my own questions, but also to consider which questions the participants of Campus 
in Camps would be interested to collaborate on, in spite of my efforts to establish a well-crafted 
network of contacts living inside Dheisheh as well as in their neighboring town, Beit Sahour, 
and in spite of my interlocutors’ experiences in receiving foreign guests as part of their work 
with Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency (DAAR), KU Leuven’s advisory board for risk 
destinations deemed it irresponsible to let one of their researchers travel to the West Bank as 
part of a doctoral research project.8 Needless to say, this decision severely impaired my 
research project and it took almost half a year to devise a modified research proposal that did 
justice to my initial theoretical interests as well as the importance Campus in Camps had 
gained in my thinking about the university.  
For me, it was already clear, quite early on, that there was no use in detaching the 
theoretical perspective that I had started to develop in relation to Campus in Camps from their 
actual practice in order to apply it somewhere else, which would resonate with the repeated 
suggestion on behalf of my supervisors to do fieldwork in another setting. I am infinitely grateful 
to Donna Haraway (2016) who gave me, in her own inimitable prose, the words to finally 
express my intuition that indeed “it matters what matters we use to think other matters with” 
(p. 12), and that it was not just stupid stubbornness that I felt at that time. There were important 
reasons for not doing theory in general, but always in relation to concrete practices, to study 
something, instead of everything or anything. Respecting the negative decision of the advisory 
board as well as my commitment to study Campus in Camps, I had to enforce a coupling 
between these two experiences that seemed, at first sight, and for a long time, impossible.  
                                                        
8 If Deleuze and Guattari (1994) are right that indeed “the feeling of shame is one of philosophy’s most 
powerful motifs” (p. 108), then this dissertation might after all – although I would refuse it for many other 
reasons – be worthy of the name ‘philosophy’, as it was enormously embarrassing to communicate this 
decision, taken by a committee that did not even make the effort to discuss their doubts with either me 
or my hosts in Dheisheh, to my interlocutors in the field.  
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The decision of the advisory board of KU Leuven forced me to think; not only in the sense 
that I had to think about how to rewrite my research proposal, but also, and most importantly, 
in the sense that it made me think about what it means to be a researcher given the constraints 
the university has put on my work. Moreover, it had become an experience I could not exclude 
from my thoughts and that I did not want to exclude, since it touched so deeply upon my 
research interests as well. It had become clear to me that the challenge was not so much to 
find something else to do, to ‘select another case’, as if it was just a matter of lack of feasibility 
with the previous one, but to find a way to inherit this event that made me think:  
 
To attempt to inherit an event, to dare become children of the event, then, is to affirm 
that it is the latter that poses a problem, and it is this problem posed that transforms 
one into a researcher, into a developer of problems (Savransky, 2016, p. 167). 
 
For me, it meant that I had to come to terms with the fact that I had got caught up in an 
experience that I could not exclude from my thinking anymore and that this event had 
transformed me into a researcher. 
While rewriting my research proposal, I stayed close to my initial question concerning the 
relation between university and society. It was, however, clear that, given the impossibility of 
conducting fieldwork where it seemed relevant for me to do so, my dissertation would acquire 
a more theoretical character, and that it could be helpful to encounter an author with a rich 
and complex oeuvre that would allow me to delve deeper into the issues that concerned me. 
I have found such a companion and ally in Isabelle Stengers, a Belgian philosopher of science 
and Whitehead scholar, parts of whose work I had already read but barely understood, in 
particular her Cosmopolitics – in the course of my master’s internship on the so-called learning 
sciences – and her discussion of the work of Whitehead – in whose philosophy of the event I 
had gained an interest in the first year of my research (cf. Stengers, 2010, 2011c, 2011e).  
One can only guess how it is possible to acquire such a sudden affinity for an author, but 
in this case I think my recent experience with the university administration provided an 
appropriate medium (in the chemical sense) for a very powerful molecular binding with a 
recalcitrant author, best known for her analyses of the degenerating milieu in which scientific 
practices try to survive. Indeed, with an author such as Stengers, the concept of practices, 
including how they relate to other practices that make up their milieu, takes center stage. And 
hence, I had to take this up in reformulating my research proposal.  
I translated my interest in the medium (as milieu) and techniques of Campus in Camps – 
the research in which they would have been the central matter of study – into an interest in 
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the university both as an ecology of practices and from the perspective of an ecology of 
practices (to borrow Stengers’ term). In short, whereas the notion of techniques was 
broadened to practices, my interest in the medium was exchanged for an interest in the 
ecology of the practices of the university. It is clear that the notion of practice will play an 
important role in formulating an answer to my research question – “How to situate study in the 
relation between university and society?” – of which I have sketched the history. In the next 
section, I will reflect on my relation toward both Stengers and Campus in Camps and how I 
conceive of doing theory.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
In the previous section, I explained that I had to exchange my initial research design, based 
on participant observation, for a different way of addressing my research question. Given this 
adjustment in favor of a research design that is low on ‘data’, traditionally understood, a section 
on methodology might seem a bit odd. Indeed, is it necessary to claim the name of 
methodology if it is obvious that what has been followed is anything but the Royal Road to 
Scientific Discovery? For a long time it was not clear to me how to conceive of doing theory if 
I could not do it based on ethnography. What kind of relationship would be possible with the 
university I was particularly interested in if I could not properly take part in its work? Again, it 
was Haraway who helped me out, and the aim of this methodological section is to give an 
account of how I conceive of doing theoretical work, rather than providing assurance that I 
have followed the ‘right road’. A second aim of this section is to shed light on my relation 
towards both Campus in Camps and Isabelle Stengers.  
Cat’s cradle is a game played all over the world albeit in different versions, Haraway 
(2016) explains.9 In spite of the many different sequences and figures that can be made, some 
common characteristics can be discerned. The game is played with one piece of string of 
which both ends are tied together in order to form a loop. This loop is held between two hands 
and so the game begins. Now, another player takes over the piece of string which allows for 
                                                        
9 String figures sparked the interest of ethnologists at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
century. Franz Boas was the first to write a short text on Eskimo cat cradling and he was closely followed 
by Alfred Cort Haddon whose daughter came across this game while she accompanied him on an 
expedition in the Torres Straits. Haddon was the first to write a more extensive and comparative account 
of string figures in different regions of the world. He discerned a variety of openings and possible 
sequences. With String figures. A study of cat’s cradle in many lands, Caroline Furness Jayne (1962) 
took up Haddon’s work and furthered his attempts to collect and analyze different cat cradling games 
and string figures.  
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another pattern to emerge.10 Thereafter, the first player (or a third for that matter) receives the 
pattern again, thus creating a new figure. The game continues in this way until the players 
arrive at a string figure that does not allow it to be passed back again.11 As such, cat’s cradle 
is a game without winners or losers, or more precisely, to win means to be able to go on time 
and again, to take what is passed on and respond. To play cat’s cradle, then, means to engage 
in a collective process of continuous unfolding in which new patterns arise continually.12  
Often, the string figures depict scenes that are part of stories told while playing the game. 
A few examples are Little Boy Carrying Wood, a string figure found around the river Klamath 
in Oregon, Canoe with Two Sails, a string figure from the Gilbert Islands, Fish in a Dish, a 
quite common string figure that was rediscovered in various places, or the Navajo string figure 
Two Coyotes Running Opposite Ways.13 Haraway argues that as storytelling devices string 
figures are not only a child’s game but also a pedagogical practice, as they initiate children 
                                                        
10 The game, however, can also be played alone but that often also requires other limbs such as teeth 
and toes in order to play.  
11 There are cultural differences as to which string figures are understood as deadlocks, because 
practically any string figure can give way to another configuration. 
12 See Figure 1. 
13 See Figure 2. 
Figure 1: Baila Goldenthal, Cat's Cradle/String Theory, 2008. 
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into the stories and narratives of the older generation while at the same time giving them 
literally out of hand to the new generation. For me, the game of cat’s cradle, however, is not 
only a child’s game or a pedagogical practice, but also a way to understand what it means to 
do theory in educational research. In order to make this clearer, I will further explain some of 
the game’s features. 
First, in the game of cat’s cradle different people come together to play around a common 
thread. The different patterns that emerge when the thread is passed on present an idea of 
ongoing transformation without falling into the trap of growth, as the thread does not become 
bigger or longer. String figures do not propose an idea of educational theory as progress, 
development, or growth. It is not about an accumulation of knowledge. Besides this, it is a way 
of creating a series of patterns without cutting the loop. It is not about denunciation or 
debunking in order to lay bare particular presuppositions and so to extract a certain position 
from the debate, but rather to compose with unasked-for patterns. Taking care of the thread 
is hence the second feature and the core rule of the game. Cat-cradling never boils down to 
growing or cutting.  
A third feature is that it demands a certain loyalty to what is given – maybe a methodology 
of ‘data’ after all, in a very literal sense –, and here loyalty should be distinguished from fealty 
or fidelity. The loyalty of taking the relay has to do with the care for the thread that is required. 
Knowing that what you take has been held-out requires a thinking in-between, a willingness 
to take the relay and draw out another pattern. As such, it is not the same as commenting, 
which stays often inappropriately close to what is commented on, or hacking a text to make it 
Figure 2: Two Coyotes Running Opposite Ways. 
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affirm one’s own ideas. Fourth, thinking in relays requires a response to the trust of the held-
out hand. It is important to make clear that this trust is not a trust in the other, but rather a trust 
in the creative uncertainty of a specific encounter, an always partial connection in a particular 
milieu, of the in-between of the relay. It means to accept not to be the author of one’s ideas, 
but to participate in a process and practice of thinking thoughts with other thoughts, to expose 
oneself to the risks of always-emerging beginnings without the security of fixed end-points. It 
is in giving hold and taking hold, passion and action, attachment and detachment that new 
patterns can be composed. Finally, it is an activity in which the participants experience the joy 
of creation, of making and thinking together, of taking care of a common thread in relay and 
return, of giving way to always new and unforeseen futures (Haraway, 2016; Hughes & Lury, 
2013; Stengers, 2011d).   
I like to think about the writing of my dissertation as a game of cat’s cradle with Stengers, 
Campus in Camps, and others in which we play around the common thread of the question 
how to situate study in the relation between university and society. Although this question is 
of course neither the question of Stengers nor of Campus in Camps, I am convinced that they 
would deem this an interesting and relevant question and that there is hence a certain 
willingness to play, to take care of the thread. Since it is not a question that drives their work 
or activities, but nevertheless a question their work or activities touch upon, it provides a 
challenging opportunity to think together in the in-between of the relay. Trusting the creative 
uncertainty of their encounter, I wagered on the possibility of an interesting connection.  
As playmates, however, both Stengers and Campus in Camps have other ways of 
interacting, of giving and soliciting response. It might, therefore, be relevant to elucidate how 
they relate to the issue of the university. In order to do so, some general remarks about their 
work and activities will be made.14  
Throughout her work, Stengers has mainly addressed the transformations scientific 
practices undergo due to changes in the environment that either nourish or poison them. She 
has also addressed the question of how the public can meddle in scientific discussions, 
matters that are for her never questions that concern only the experts, but rather everyone 
and everything affected by the decision that risks being taken. Given this interest, it is highly 
                                                        
14 Later on in the dissertation, these will be elaborated more extensively. Section 4 of Chapter Two 
contains a general introduction to the work of Stengers. Chapters Three and Four deal respectively with 
Stengers’ work in philosophy of science and her reading of Whitehead’s speculative philosophy. 
Campus in Camps is introduced at the beginning of Chapter Five, and both Chapter Five and Chapter 
Six contain more elaborate analyses and discussions of their activities.  
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remarkable that she only sporadically writes about the university and almost never in a more 
elaborate fashion.15  
A short passage from an interview she gave to Erik Bordeleau in 2011, in which she 
adopts an extremely defeatist stance with regards to the institution of the university, is 
noteworthy in this respect. She declares that:  
 
They [the universities] have already died once, in the Middle Ages, with the printing 
press. It seems to me that this is in the process of being reproduced—in the sense that 
they can only exist as diplomatic institutions, not as sites for the production of 
knowledge. Defending them against external attacks (rankings, objective evaluation in 
all domains, the economy of knowledge) is not particularly compelling because of the 
passivity with which academics give in. This shows that it’s over. Obviously, the 
interesting question is: who is going to take over? (Stengers & Bordeleau, 2011, p. 12). 
 
Her position is that the university qua institution is not an interesting locus of resistance 
anymore, and that it is probably more relevant to focus on scientific practices. Although her 
plea to concentrate on recalcitrant practices instead of compliant institutions is certainly 
reasonable and interesting, Stengers risks narrowing down the practices of the university to 
scientific practices and thus forgetting its other practices, most importantly its educational 
practices.16 
In December of the same year, Stengers came back to the issue of the university in the 
course of her inaugural lecture for the Willy Calewaert Chair at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
(VUB). On that occasion she took issue with the dismissal of Barbara Van Dyck by the rector 
of KU Leuven after she had participated in political action on a potato field where scientists 
were experimenting with genetically modified crops. Stengers’ lecture was a plea for a slow 
science, in which she argued that current fast and competitive research lacks balance, which 
means that it does not include the interests and opinions of the public in general, and promotes 
                                                        
15 A notable exception is her book with Vinciance Despret in which they collected a variety of 
experiences by female colleagues of working at a university. This book, however, does not present her 
own stance towards the university, as it is conceived as an assemblage of the different responses they 
received to the question of what it meant for their colleagues to enter the university and work there. For 
this reason, it is excluded from this short presentation of Stengers’ thoughts about the university 
(Despret & Stengers, 2011).  
16 In a short video-interview with a student, Stengers makes a similar analysis of the threats posed by 
a university that behaves like a private business, inspired by the Bologna reforms. She focuses on the 
marketization of higher education informed by notions such as competitiveness and flexibility. She 
argues that these reforms severely harm the public and democratic character of the university. See 
https://vimeo.com/8116026.  
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speed over relevance and quality. She expressed her wish that “research institutions and 
researchers learn to be affected, actively affected, by the fact that for many people the task of 
universities, our task, and thus our responsibility, are engaged in the creation of this future, a 
future which would be worth living” (Stengers, 2011a, p. 12).  
In her lecture, it is possible to sense a more positive appreciation of the university, 
although it is clear that she leaves it to the scientists to make the best of it,17 to resist the 
acceleration of science,18 and to reclaim scientific practices. Here again, it is remarkable that 
she defines the university almost exclusively as engaging in scientific practices. Although she 
refers to the shame she feels while addressing her students who come with great expectations 
of the university – a shame provoked by the incapacity of the university to prepare these 
students for the future they will have to face according to her – she does not further elaborate 
on the potentiality of the university’s task to teach as a site for slowing down.19  
The initiators and participants of Campus in Camps have an altogether different relation 
towards the university. Instead of turning one’s back on the university and focusing on 
scientific practices in order to resist the acceleration of research, like Stengers did, the people 
involved in Campus in Camps claimed the notion of university as a denominator for their 
different practices. Calling themselves a university, instead of a social work initiative, a political 
action group, an organizer of cultural activities, or a non-governmental organization (NGO), 
allowed a new perspective to be opened up on their practice of bringing people together to 
investigate and discuss together their current living conditions in the camp, including possible 
futures.  
In their handbook, which was written for the occasion of their second anniversary in 2013, 
Alessandro Petti, the program director, explained that: “Campus in Camps does not follow or 
propose itself as a model but rather as public space in formation. Al-Jame’ah translates in 
English as “university” but its literal meaning is a place for assembly, a public space” (p. 28). 
Hence, it is clear that Campus in Camps is mainly interested in the connotation that the name 
                                                        
17 A plea, as she reminds her audience, is always held from a marginal position towards a party that 
can effectively act upon a certain issue. Situating herself as a philosopher, she speaks to the scientists 
that are capable of effectuating the possibility of slow science that she aimed to activate, against the 
probability of acceleration.  
18 She explains that the acceleration of science is not a new phenomenon. As a philosopher of 
chemistry, she refers to Justus von Liebig who dramatically altered what it meant to be a chemist. For 
centuries, chemistry was conceived as a craft that took a lifetime to be mastered. In Liebig’s laboratory, 
however, a student could obtain the doctoral degree after four years of intensive training, which was no 
longer focused on the acquisition of techniques and recipes, but rather on the following of standardized 
protocols. In the period from 1824 to 1851, he trained hundreds of students in his laboratory in Giessen, 
many of whom would create similar laboratories in other universities (Bensaude-Vincent, 2009; 
Bensaude-Vincent & Stengers, 2001; Stengers, 2011a; Stengers & Bensaude-Vincent, 2003). 
19 Instead she refers in this respect to the third task of the university, service to society, as a site to 
reclaim scientific practices and to slow down.  
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university bears of being a place of public gathering. This raises the question of the ways such 
gathering carries also an educational dimension. In texts on the activities of Campus in 
Camps, its initiators suggest that it has to do with the unlearning of colonial knowledges – 
decolonizing the mind – and communal learning based on shared and collective experiences. 
A strong conception of what a university is, or what is particular to its practices, is still lacking, 
however. 
Playing string figures with Stengers and Campus in Camps means relaying to them a 
question that is not central to their work and activities. As argued above, Stengers is not so 
much interested in the university, and focuses instead on scientific practices. As far as the 
university is concerned, her interest in it is limited to the university as a milieu for scientific 
practices. The university as an educational milieu or as a habitat for educational practices 
seems to be of little importance to Stengers. Although Campus in Camps has warmer feelings 
towards the university, their conception of it is limited to it being a place for public assembly. 
This is obviously an interesting idea, especially in relation to resisting the acceleration of 
science that Stengers describes, but it lacks a profound educational dimension.  
Playing string figures with Stengers and Campus in Camps means not to criticize them 
for not being interested in the educational dimensions of the university. Rather, it means to 
relay a question to them that is not theirs – How to situate study in the relation between 
university and society? – but to which their work and activities might come to matter. It is about 
composing and drawing out new patterns that were not already there. Lastly, playing string 
figures with Stengers and Campus in Camps means to receive unasked-for patterns, being 
forced to invent ongoingness when the received pattern could be considered a deadlock, such 
as, for instance, Stengers’ defeatist statements concerning the university. It means to reckon 
with the fact that every held-out hand exposes itself to the risk of being bitten. I have 
experienced playing string figures with Stengers and Campus in Camps as a very challenging 
process and practice. At times it was hard to create the in-between of an interesting encounter 
with partners that were sometimes far removed, both literally and figuratively.  
To conclude this methodological section, I will clarify which were my main sources in 
writing my dissertation. In this manner, I want to give the reader an insight into the thoughts I 
tried to think other thoughts with, in order for the reader to be able to verify what I have written. 
With regards to the work of Stengers, two books have been very helpful in guiding my own 
reading of and writing on her work. Her book La vierge et le neutrino. Les scientifiques dans 
la tourmente has been a useful source to understand Stengers’ philosophy of science.20 
                                                        
20 Some but not all of Stengers’ work has been translated into English. The two books, however, upon 
which I draw the most in this dissertation have no English translation yet. When I quote from her work, 
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Whereas the first part of the volume discusses the Science Wars and the problems with the 
idea of modern science as an objective vector of progress, the second part outlines the 
contours of what she calls an ecology of practices, the possibility of a peaceful conversation 
between diverging practices, all with their own particular requirements and obligations.21 The 
third chapter of this dissertation contains a concise presentation of Stengers’ ecology of 
scientific practices.22  
The fourth chapter on the contrary, is mainly based on her book Civiliser la modernité? 
Whitehead et les ruminations du sens commun. Going back to the inspiration Stengers finds 
in Whitehead allowed me to retrieve an educational dimension in her work. In this book, 
Stengers reads Whitehead’s philosophy of civilization mainly from an interest in its political 
implications. It is, however, important to bear in mind that Whitehead had a genuine 
philosophy of education in which this notion of civilization played a crucial role. In the fourth 
chapter, I take Whitehead’s address at the inauguration of the Harvard Business School on 
the task of the university as a starting point to elaborate an ecology of study practices.23  
With regard to Campus in Camps, it is important to discern two types of sources I have 
worked with. First, there are the texts written by the initiators, Alessandro Petti and Sandi Hilal, 
and by close collaborators such as Eyal Weizman and Bianca Elzenbaumer. These texts were 
important to get a general idea about the vision and activities of Campus in Camps. They 
have, however, only played a marginal role in the analysis, as they only provide a general 
account of what happens.  
In order to acquire a more detailed understanding of their work, I have consulted the 
publications that the participants have worked on to present their activities. These were 
collected in The Collective Dictionary and The Initiatives. Whereas the first series deals with 
different notions participants deem relevant to understand the camp condition, the second 
series presents a variety of concrete actions they have undertaken in investigating the camp 
and effectuating social and spatial interventions. These series contain reflections, reports of 
discussions, photographs, and maps that have been generated in the course of the first two 
                                                        
I have used the English, official translation if possible. If there was no English translation published, I 
translated the quote myself and put the original in a footnote so the reader can check the translation.   
21 Requirements and obligations are two technical concepts in the work of Stengers that will be quite 
central to the argument of this dissertation. Whereas the concept of obligation comes quite simply from 
the French ‘obligation’, the concept of requirement comes from the French ‘exigence’. In some 
translations, the French ‘exigence’ is translated as ‘exigency’, but I have followed Robert Bonnono, who 
translated the seven volumes of Cosmopolitiques, in translating it as ‘requirement’.  
22 Next to the aforementioned book, this chapter is based on Stengers’ Cosmopolitiques, seven short 
volumes on the history of physics, and The invention of modern science (2000, 2003a, 2003b).  
23 Next to Stengers’ most recent volume on Whitehead, this chapter is based on her authoritative 
introduction to Whitehead’s speculative philosophy (2011e).  
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years of the program. It is mainly on the accounts that can be found in these two series that I 
have based my analysis of their task.  
Playing string figures with Stengers and Campus in Camps has been for me a way of 
inheriting the event of the decision of the committee for risk destinations, an event that made 
me think about the university and that I wish to amplify with this text. Writing a text as a way 
to inherit an event means, however, that the text is “neither comprehensible nor audible except 
insofar as it is a function of a certain problematic which it contributes to modify, from which it 
allows an escape” (Schlanger, 1983, p. 228). As such, it might be important to keep the event 
that gave rise to this text in mind while reading it, in order to get a better grasp of the 
problematic from which it emerged and that which it seeks to escape from in order to modify 
it (cf. Savransky, 2017a).  
Writing as a way of inheriting an event obviously holds consequences for the style of 
writing. In fact, I only became aware of these consequences after writing, but it might be 
relevant to contextualize these consequences somewhat, and to try to explain why I write in 
the way that I write, although this is probably an impossible task. Many of the claims that are 
made will seem to be untrue, slightly exaggerated, or grotesque. It is important to note that 
these claims are, in the first instance and intent, not aimed at describing what is, or what, 
according to probabilistic logics, will be. Instead, they are aimed at an activation of the 
possible, in the sense that they do not so much transmit a ‘knowledge of’ as they give 
expression to a ‘belief in’. They bear witness to a belief in the university, a strange kind of 
belief I could draw strength from while writing this text, and that I found very hard to 
understand. This time it was not Donna Haraway but Kathrin Thiele (2010), taking the relay 
from Deleuze, who gave me the appropriate words to express my intuition; namely that:  
 
Thinking the world differently, when ‘belief in’ replaces ‘knowledge of’ the world, turns 
the world from something given into something to be explored, always to be 
constructed and created, and this again not according to the measure of ‘what is’ but 
according to the measure of ‘what this world is capable of’ (p. 33) 
 
Belief in the world in spite of all the reasons we have to despair is a vital ingredient in the 
process of doing theory in the speculative-pragmatic mode. It means to wager on the 
possibility of a future that is different from the one that presents itself as obvious or 
unavoidable. For me, it is this way of doing theory that has helped me to inherit the event that 
has transformed the university into a problem and me into its researcher (cf. Savransky, 
2017b; Wilkie et al., 2017). As a consequence, this text is written in a style that bears witness 
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to a passion for creating, rather than deconstructing, and for composing, rather than critiquing, 
to a willingness to forge interesting connections, and, most of all, a zest for thinking thoughts 
with other thoughts. In the framework of this dissertation, this has resulted in a style of writing 
that is perhaps as assertive as it is associative, and that does not concern itself too much with 
theoretical nuance or empirical detail. 
Doing theory in a speculative-pragmatic mode is a way of theorizing that has gained 
importance in recent years and that emerged in line with Isabelle Stengers’ pragmatist reading 
of Whitehead and the commitment he voiced “to make thought creative of the future” 
(1929/1958, p. 82). It welds together, on the one hand, speculation about possible futures and 
the concern for how these futures may constitute lures for action in the present, on the other 
hand (Debaise & Stengers, 2017). It is a line of thinking that has gained importance in fields 
such as social theory (cf. Wilkie, Savransky, & Rosengarten, 2017), ethics (cf. Puig de la 
Bellacasa, 2017), and architecture (cf. Doucet, 2015). With this dissertation my aim is to relay 
this way of doing theory to discussions in educational philosophy and theory.  
 
 
Outline 
 
To conclude this introductory chapter, I will briefly outline the structure of this dissertation. As 
argued in the previous sections, the aim of this dissertation is to reconsider the relation 
between university and society from an educational perspective by addressing the question, 
“How to situate study in the relation between university and society?” The dissertation will 
address this problem by drawing on the philosophy of Isabelle Stengers, as well as on the 
work of Campus in Camps.  
As such, this dissertation is oriented in four directions. First, it is situated toward an issue, 
namely the relation between university and society. Second, it is situated towards an interest, 
namely the concept of study as a way to conceive of the activity of the university. Third, it is 
situated toward a perspective, more precisely Isabelle Stengers’ ecology of practices. And 
fourth, it is situated toward a practice, namely the Palestinian experimental university Campus 
in Camps.  
This text consists of three main parts that each contain two chapters. Whereas the first 
part analyzes the existing literature on the relation between university and society, the second 
part develops a theoretical framework based on Stengers’ writings on the ecology of practices 
in order to shed a different light on this relation. In the third part, the approach that is proposed 
in the second part will be developed further in relation to the work of Campus in Camps. 
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Finally, the conclusion brings together the major findings of the research. In the following 
pages, the three parts will be presented in more detail.  
The aim of Part One is to introduce the approaches that have been developed to the 
relation between university and society in a general way. Chapter One starts by discerning 
two main approaches to this issue: the transcendental-philosophical approach that emerged 
at the beginning of the 19th century in Germany, on the one hand, and the critical-sociological 
approach that came into being in the second half of the 20th century in the United States, on 
the other hand. It will be argued that whereas the transcendental-philosophical approach 
conceives of the university as an idea, the critical-sociological approach understands the 
university as an organization. In spite of the seemingly contradictory conceptions of the 
university – as idea and as organization – it will be argued that both approaches are hinged 
upon an institutional conception of the university. By means of an excursus on the emergence 
of the university in the Middle Ages, in order to omit such an institutional understanding of the 
university, the case is made for an ecological approach to the university and its relation to 
society.  
In Chapter Two, the work of two authors who have recently adopted such an ecological 
approach is briefly presented. Whereas it can be argued that Ronald Barnett’s theory of the 
ecological university is situated more in the transcendental-philosophical tradition, Susan 
Wright’s investigations of the university in the knowledge ecology can be placed in the critical-
sociological tradition. Both conceptions, however, in my view, do still rely on an institutional 
understanding of the university. As such, it is clear that a merely ecological approach to the 
university is not enough to come to a more situated account of the relation between university 
and society from an educational point of view. In line with recent developments in social theory, 
namely the emergence of practice theories, it is proposed to combine both an ecological 
approach and a focus on practices and hence to work towards an ecology of study practices. 
Part Two presents Isabelle Stengers’ writings on the ecology of practices to shed a 
different light on the relation between university and society in which practices take center 
stage. Chapter Three elucidates Stengers’ work on scientific practices by first situating it in 
the context of the so-called Science Wars, which provided the impetus to elaborate this 
theoretical framework for a civilized dialogue between scientists and the broader public. The 
basic tenets and concepts of her approach, such as the understanding of a practice as a set 
of requirements and obligations, are presented, explained, and discussed.  
It is important to note that Stengers’ work is situated within philosophy of science. This 
means that she has not, or at least not extensively, written on the study practices of the 
university. Moreover, as shown in this introduction, she holds quite negative views with regard 
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to the university and to education in general. Nevertheless, Stengers often uses typical 
educational notions such as learning, attention, empowerment, and care in her work. An 
explanation for this could be her interest in the work of Whitehead. Indeed, Whitehead had his 
own philosophy of education in which the concept of civilization, as opposed to 
professionalism, has an important position. However, Stengers holds on to a very political 
reading of this concept, which risks obscuring its educational dimension to a rather great 
extent.  
Chapter Four – on study practices – therefore starts from Whitehead’s description of the 
university as a ‘home of adventures’ in order to draw out an educational dimension in the work 
of Stengers. Assisted by Stengers’ writings on Whitehead’s speculative philosophy, this 
chapter aims to flesh out Whitehead’s description of the university in order to come to an 
educational understanding of the study practices of the university. A conceptual inquiry into 
how study practices activate certain worldly problems and turn them into matters of study is 
undertaken. Together, the third and the fourth chapters propose a theoretical framework on 
the scientific practices as well as the study practices of the university.  
Consequently, Part Three develops the conceptual work on study practices further in 
relation to the activities of the Palestinian experimental university Campus in Camps. Chapter 
Five presents the work of Campus in Camps and explains how it relates to the theoretical 
framework elaborated in the course of the second part. On the basis of Stengers’ theory of 
practice, which discerns requirements and obligations as vital ingredients of a practice, this 
chapter argues that life in exile is what drives the study practices of Campus in Camps, and 
hence, that it is the issue of life in exile that participants are obligated to when they study, i.e., 
it is life in exile that makes them think. As such, it is the obligation of the practice of Campus 
in Camps that is at the center of attention in the fifth chapter.  
Whereas Chapter Five is focused on what is being studied in Campus in Camps, Chapter 
Six inquires into the specific requirements their activities need to fulfill in order to be validated 
as study practices, in other words, how they study, or still in other words, which specific 
activities need to be done in order for the practice to be intelligible as a study practice. Four 
requirements are discerned that together seem indispensable to understand the study practice 
of Campus in Camps; namely, storytelling, comparing, mapmaking, and using. This analysis 
helps to develop further the conceptual work on study practices of the fourth chapter and to 
situate it within the work of an existing university, namely Campus in Camps.  
Finally, the concluding chapter returns to the research question and takes up again the 
key ideas developed in the dissertation. The main arguments on the relation between 
university and society, the educational quality of study, and the togetherness of science and 
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study within the university are summarized. The last two sections of the conclusion deal with 
two remaining issues of a more practical nature; namely, how to relate to institutionalization 
when working from a practice-theoretical point of view, and lastly, the question of what can be 
done in relation to the university based on this dissertation. Overall, and returning to the initial 
problem, the dissertation inquires into what it means to conceive of the university as situated 
by and engaged with worldly questions. Think we must.  
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The question how to situate study in the relationship between university and society can be 
approached from different angles. The aim of this chapter is first to shed light on two strands 
of literature that each conceptualize the relation between university and society in another 
way. In the first two sections of this chapter, respectively the transcendental-philosophical and 
the critical-sociological approach will be unpacked. At the outset, it is noteworthy that the 
educational concept of study, present in the research question, is quite alien to both the 
philosophical and the sociological discourse. Hence, the focus will be predominantly on the 
relationship between university and society, and what, according to both discourses, can be 
situated in this relationship if not study. By means of an excursus to the medieval university, 
the third and fourth section of this chapter argue for a different approach to the relation 
between university and society, more precisely an ecological approach. The chapter ends with 
an overview of the basic tenets of such an ecological perspective. In this first section, however, 
I will analyze the transcendental-philosophical discourse on the university. 
 
 
The Idea of the University 
 
For decades, philosophers have written texts and given addresses on the topic of the 
university. Coming from different national and theoretical backgrounds, they have given their 
thoughts on the question of the university and its relation to society. Hence, there is a vast 
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literature containing textual sources with titles promising an idea of the university, even to the 
extent that one could claim that it is a philosophical genre sui generis. It is important to note 
that the philosophers pertaining to this tradition did not present an idea of the relation between 
university and society but that it was their attempt to formulate an idea of the university in and 
of itself. This means that in their thinking they conceive of the university as an idea and that 
this idea of the university has specific consequences for the institution of a university (and 
hence also for its relation to society).  
Perhaps the most famous text in this genre are the lectures John Henry Newman gave in 
1852 upon his inauguration as the rector of the catholic university in Dublin. Throughout these 
discourses Cardinal Newman pleads for a liberal university education. Liberal should in this 
context, however, not be understood as referring to the liberal arts, but rather as an 
educational orientation or an educational spirit. Newman believed that in the university 
knowledge should be pursued for the sake of knowledge, and that such an unselfish strive for 
wisdom would lead to an ascent of the mind (Newman, 1852/1976). Newman’s lectures on 
the idea of the university were very influential in the establishment and the expansion of the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberal arts colleges and keep on inspiring discussions on the 
philosophy of higher education until today.  
Newman, however, was anything but the only philosopher who thought about the 
university. In the German context, there are, for instance, Heidegger’s rectoral address 
(1933/2018), or Habermas’ reflection on the university reforms that caused the German 
university to differentiate in so many sub-systems (1987). In the United States, Clark Kerr 
(1963/2018) had made a similar observation when he stated that he often thought of the 
university as “a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common 
grievance over parking” (p. 470). Until recently, the reader interested in philosophical 
discourses on the university could get easily lost in the complex body of texts on the matter. 
Only a few guides were available that could give a sense of direction in the multifarious 
landscape (cf. Drèze & Debelle, 1968; Horst et al., 2010; Scott, 2006).  
In 2018, however, philosophers of education Michael A. Peters and Ronald Barnett 
published an authoritative anthology of the texts pertaining to the tradition of the Idea of the 
University (2018b). Well-aware of the problems and challenges associated with the collection 
of a canon of texts on the idea of the university, they group different authors together under 
four national contexts: the German tradition that placed philosophy central in the university 
(e.g. Schleiermacher, Jaspers, and Gadamer), the Anglo-Saxon tradition which organized the 
university around the national literary heritage, most notably the work of Shakespeare (e.g. 
Arnold, Leavis, and Oakeshott), the American tradition that had to deal with the establishment 
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of a general and democratic education for a multicultural society (e.g. Flexner, Hutchins, Bok), 
and lastly the authors that tried to think the university through the postmodern critiques of 
knowledge and truth (e.g. Lyotard, Derrida, and Said).  
In this first section, the presentation of this literature will be limited to two texts. The conflict 
of the faculties, written by Immanuel Kant at the end of the 18th century, was selected because 
it inaugurated the tradition that approaches the university as idea. What becomes immediately 
clear in this text is that it is impossible to think about the university as idea without taking into 
account the institutional form the university should take. Hence, it can be argued that the more 
theoretical question concerning the idea of the university is intimately entangled with the more 
practical question concerning the foundation of an institution. The second text that will be 
discussed is On the spirit and the organizational framework of intellectual institutions in Berlin 
by Wilhelm von Humboldt. Humboldt was one of the first in taking the relay from Kant in 
formulating a vision of the university as idea. It gained enormous importance because it served 
as a guiding framework for the establishment of the modern research university of Berlin in 
1810 which would become a model for many universities around the globe. Both texts were 
written at a time when the university was in decline and aimed to breathe new life into this age 
old institution (Bahti, 1987; Peters & Barnett, 2018a).24 
In The conflict of the faculties, a compilation of three essays written in the 1790s, Kant 
(1789/1979) addresses the relationship between the university and the state, including the 
question how Reason can be given a place in a university that has been instituted by the state, 
and bears as such responsibilities for it. Indeed, the state is concerned with the welfare of its 
citizens, and more precisely their health, security, and salvation. These three objectives 
correspond to the three higher faculties of respectively Medicine, Law, and Theology. The 
lower faculty, of Philosophy, however, has no such responsibility for the administration of 
government and is solely interested in the pursuit of rational inquiry and disinterested 
knowledge25.  
Kant discerns a conflict between the higher faculties who work in the service of the state 
by providing physical, civil, and eternal well-being, and the lower faculty which is only 
concerned with truth and which acknowledges no other command than from Reason itself. 
Kant points out that the higher faculties base their teaching which the government entrusts to 
                                                        
24 For a more detailed account of the texts by Kant, Humboldt, and other authors that wrote on the 
university in the context of the German nation-state at that time, see Kwiek (2006). 
25 To complete Kant’s institutional chart, it should be added that the lower faculty of philosophy is 
subdivided in two departments. Whereas the department of historical knowledge is concerned with 
history, geography, philology, the humanities, and the natural sciences), the department of pure rational 
knowledge focuses on pure mathematics and pure philosophy, the metaphysics of nature and morals.  
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them on writings, more precisely on the statutes of each of the disciplines. Otherwise, there 
would be no universally accessible norm that would grant the disciplines their unity. Whereas 
the theologian draws his teaching from the Bible, the professor of law is dependent on the law 
of the country, and the medical professor draws his method of therapy from the medical 
regulations (Kant, 1789/2018). As such, the higher faculties are dependent on the statutes 
sanctioned by the state. The role of the lower faculty is then to inquire these statutes and to 
judge whether they are in accordance with Reason.  
In this vein, Kant (1789/2018) argues that the faculty of Philosophy is the home of Reason 
and that it is from there that it scrutinizes the workings of the higher faculties. He adds that: 
 
the higher faculties must, therefore, take great care not to enter into a misalliance with 
the lower faculty, but must keep it at a respectful distance, so that the dignity of their 
statutes will not be damaged by the free play of reason (p. 9). 
 
In short, the university, by holding together the higher faculties who operate in the service of 
the state, and the lower faculty, only obedient to Reason itself, constitutes a membrane 
between Reason and state, knowledge and power. Whereas the higher faculties are subject 
to the state and have a utility in government administration, the lower faculty has to be 
conceived as free and subject only to the laws given by Reason, not by the government.  
Kant (1789/2018) argues that the conflict between the higher faculties and the lower 
faculty is not only inevitable but that it is legal as well, since the lower faculty has the duty to 
inquire and judge everything put forward in public, including the teachings of the higher 
faculties. He formulates four principles of procedure for the conflict of the faculties and the 
consequences resulting from it. The first principle has to do with the nature of the conflict. Kant 
argues that it should not be conceived as a quarrel between friends, but as a lawsuit that calls 
for a verdict, “the decision of a judge (reason) which has the force of law” (Ibid., p. 16). As 
such, it is not just an exchange of opinions but an attempt to make Reason triumph over the 
content of the statutes of the higher faculties. Secondly, he goes on to explain that the conflict 
is ongoing and never-ending. The lower faculty should never stop scrutinizing the statutes of 
the higher faculties and must always be vigilant about attempts on their behalf to acquire 
power. As a third principle, Kant underscores that the conflict is not one between the lower 
faculty and the government, but between the higher faculties and the lower which the 
government can look at without being moved. In calling the university a parliament of learning 
he draws attention to the fact that the higher faculties, supporting the government’s statutes, 
occupy the right side of the parliament, “but in as free a system of government must exist 
University, idea and organization 
 
39 
when it is a question of truth, there must also be an opposition party (the left side), and this is 
the philosophy faculty’s bench” (Ibid., p. 18). The last principle explains that this ongoing 
conflict incarnates a constant progress of both ranks of the faculties, and that it ultimately 
allows for a government fully inspired by Reason to come into being. 
With this exposition of Kant’s conception of the university, I have given the reader an 
insight in the seminal text of the transcendental-philosophical literature on the university. 
Approaching the university as idea, however, brings inevitably consequences concerning its 
institutional infrastructure with it, and it is at this point that the university’s relation to society 
seems to come into play. I have shown that the social mission of the Kantian university 
consists in the fact that the university produces technicians for the state, and that the lower 
faculty perfects the reasonable character of the state by scrutinizing the teachings of the higher 
faculties. Kant proposes a university as a membrane that at the same time protects Reason 
from coercion by the state and protects the state from the free play of Reason. By means of 
the higher and the lower faculties the membrane both separates and gathers power and 
Reason respectively.26 In the following paragraphs, I will present another text that can be 
situated in the same strand of literature.  
In On the spirit and the organizational framework of intellectual institutions in Berlin,27 
published in 1810, Wilhelm von Humboldt provided the German nation-state with a blueprint 
for an institution for university education. The opening lines of his text contain the most 
important notions to understand his idea of the university:   
 
                                                        
26 With Mochlos; or The conflict of the faculties, Derrida (1992) has written an influential commentary 
on Kant’s text. In his reading, Derrida problematizes the strong separation of Reason and power which 
seems to be at the basis of Kant’s idea of the university. He argues that “the whole forms an invaginated 
pocket [sic.] on the inside of every part or sub-set” (p. 26). Just like the university as an institution 
founded by the state is an invaginated pocket of the state itself, the lower faculty is an invaginated 
pocket of the university as a whole, and the department of pure rational knowledge is an invaginated 
pocket of the faculty of philosophy. Derrida argues that there is continuous regression of Reason within 
this institutional framework. Moreover, the problem with the place of Reason is radicalized when 
considering the foundation of the university. With the foundation, Derrida means the very political act of 
establishing or founding a university. He raises the question how Reason can find a place within an 
institution of which the foundation is always an act on behalf of the state, and hence power (cf. Derrida, 
2001; McCance, 2004). Readings (1996) takes the relay from Derrida and asks whether the 
institutionalization of Reason’s autonomy in the university does not necessarily entail that it becomes 
dependent on itself, that, hence, the translation of the idea of Reason into an institutional reality can 
only be performed theoretically. He argues that in fact the Kantian university is a fictional institution: 
“Reason can only be instituted if the institution remains a fiction, functions only ‘as if’ it were not an 
institution. If the institution becomes real, then reason departs” (p. 60). 
27 In the original title, Über die innere und äußere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen 
Anstalten in Berlin, the distinction between the inner organization, the educational principles of the 
university as idea, and the outer organization, its embeddedness amidst other scientific and educational 
institutions, is clearer.  
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The idea of disciplined intellectual activity, embodied in institutions, is the most 
valuable element of the moral culture of the nation. These intellectual institutions have 
as their task the cultivation of science and scholarship28 [Wissenschaft] in the deepest 
and broadest sense. It is me calling29 of these intellectual institutions to devote 
themselves to the elaboration of the uncontrived substance of intellectual and moral 
culture30 [Bildung], growing from an uncontrived inner necessity (p. 46).  
 
It is clear that the notions of Wissenschaft and Bildung take center stage in the Humboldtian 
university as its most significant aims. Important to underscore is the fact that both are deeply 
intertwined and that they are to the benefit of the individual as well as the state.  
According to Humboldt, participation in scientific and scholarly research is educational 
through and through. Hence, it is not the case that the Humboldtian university first researches 
and then afterwards disseminates the findings of this research via teaching. Rather, the 
university initiates processes of collaboration in which intellectual achievements of one person 
can arouse the intellectual interests of others so that what was first expressed by an individual 
becomes a common intellectual possession. Humboldt argues that the inner life of the 
university should “call forth and sustain a continuously self-renewing, wholly uncoerced and 
disinterested collaboration” (p. 47). He argues that the synthesis of the minds of professors – 
more mature but oftentimes somewhat one-sided – and students – less able and committed 
but very open and responsive – proves to be a fruitful combination for collaborative study (von 
Humboldt, 1809/2018). 
With the regards to the inner organization, the spirit, it is therefore possible to argue that 
the collaborative research practices of the university are what keeps Wissenschaft and 
Bildung, professor and student together. In the course of the collaborative research practices 
knowledge is created and at the same time shared among professors and students alike. Both 
the accumulation of knowledge as well as its simultaneous dissemination among the members 
of the university contribute to the national culture of the nation-state, the ultimate aim of the 
                                                        
28 The editors have translated the German Wissenschaft for ‘science and scholarship’ to underscore 
that the meaning of the term is not limited to the natural sciences, but that it includes the humanities as 
well.  
29 The explicit reference to the person of Humboldt himself as an advocate of the proposal is not present 
in the original German: “Der Begriff der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten, als des Gipfels, in dem 
alles, was unmittelbar für die moralische Kultur der Nation geschieht, zusammenkommt, beruht darauf, 
dass dieselben bestimmt sind, die Wissenschaft im tiefsten und weitesten Sinne des Wortes zu 
bearbeiten, und als einen nicht absichtlich, aber von selbst zweckmässig vorbereiteten Stoff der 
geistigen und sittlichen Bildung zu seiner Benutzung hinzugeben”. 
30 It is important to bear in mind that the German term Bildung was translated here into culture. Bildung 
is a central concept in Humboldt’s idea of the university which will be discussed further on.   
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modern research university.31 The Humboldtian university aims to unite research and teaching 
under the sign of culture, and German culture more particularly since the university’s societal 
mission becomes part of a nationalist agenda that intends to promote the cultivation of reason 
among the citizens of the nation-state. As such, the university of culture of Humboldt has a 
double mission. One the one hand, it searched for objective cultural meaning as an historical 
entity, Wissenschaft. On the other hand, it provided subjective moral training of the subjects 
of the state that could become bearers of that identity, Bildung (Readings, 1996; von 
Humboldt, 1809/2018).  
With regard to the outer organization, it is worth mentioning that Humboldt made the effort 
to carefully distinguish the university from the schools, the demands of practical affairs of the 
state, and the academy. First, Humboldt argues that the state should not conceive of its 
university as a school, and moreover that both educational institutions are unrelated. “The 
state must understand that the universities are neither a mere complement to the schools 
within the same category, nor merely a further stage in school” (p. 51). Such a strong 
separation between school and university grants both educational institutions their autonomy 
since the school is not conceived as a preparatory phase for the university and, vice versa, 
the university is not conceived as the fulfilment of school education. In spite of the fact that 
both schools and universities participates in the civilizational project of the nation-state, both 
institutions have their own finality. Whereas the aim of the school, according to Humboldt, 
aims to develop all the capacities of its pupils for participation in public life, the university 
engages in science and scholarship. Humboldt argues that if the state would treat the 
universities like schools, this would possibly harm the autonomy of the university by 
instrumentalizing it. This brings us to the next point.  
Secondly, Humboldt warns the state about adopting an instrumental approach in relation 
to the university. The university, indeed, functions in the service of the state, but this does not 
mean that it should be conceived as a training center for public officials. Instead the university 
requires a great degree of autonomy in order to set its own aims in science and scholarship. 
If the university is granted this freedom, Humboldt argues, it will also be to the benefit of the 
state. Indeed, when the university is free to pursue its own ends, it will willy-nilly also pursue 
objectives relevant to the nation. Humboldt argues that the state “should adhere to a deep 
                                                        
31 Readings (1996) explains that Humboldt was inspired by the texts of Schleiermacher (1808/2018) 
and Schelling (1802/2018) who argued against an all too stark contrast between Reason and the state 
as it is present in Kant. The concept of culture allowed to think a process of cultivation, through 
Wissenschaft and Bildung, that could form a bridge between the population of the nation-state as it is 
and the cultured nation-state with educated officials.   
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conviction that if the universities attain their highest ends, they will also realise the state’s ends 
too, and these on a far higher plane” (Ibid., p. 50).  
Thirdly, the academy is perhaps closest to the university, as it has the same goal of 
pursuing Wissenschaft. However, whereas the university stands in direct relation to the 
German nation-state, the academy is relatively free, Humboldt explains. This has to do with 
the fact that the university has an educational purpose of its own, namely the promotion of 
Bildung. The academy, on the contrary, limits itself to Wissenschaft without any educational 
purpose. It rather refers to the community of scientists and scholars whose purpose is to 
subject the work of each member to the assessment of all of the others. Humboldt (1809/2018) 
even goes as far as calling the academy “the highest and ultimate sanctuary of science and 
scholarship and as that corporation which is freest of the control of the state” (p. 53). 
In this section, two texts on the university, formative of a wide-ranging tradition, have been 
presented to give an impression of the transcendental-philosophical approach that conceives 
of the university as an idea. Based on these two texts, it is possible to indicate three general 
features of this literature. First, it is clear that there is no way of conceiving the idea of the 
university without thinking about its institutional infrastructure. For both Kant and Humboldt, it 
is necessary to think about respectively the organization of the faculties and the unity of 
teaching and research, in order to put flesh on the bones of their conception of the university 
as idea. Secondly, the formulation of the idea of the university always bears on the question 
how the university can organize its inside, as well as how it relates to its outside. Kant, for 
instance, thought about the distinction between the higher faculties and the lower faculties, 
both pertaining to the inside of the university, in order to grant the university autonomy while 
relating to the state, its outside. Humboldt formulated principles which the university should 
adhere to in order to attain its double objective of Wissenschaft and Bildung, the inside of the 
university. Besides, he reflected on the place of the university amidst other educational and 
other-than-educational institutions of his time such as the Gymnasia and the academies. A 
last common feature is that the transcendental-philosophical literature on the university could 
be described as quite imaginative of a future university. Indeed, both Kant and Humboldt 
propose a possible institutional infrastructure that would respectively lodge Reason in the 
structure of the state, and make the university an important mediator in the cultivation of 
humankind. In the next section, an altogether different literature on the university will be 
discussed.  
 
 
University, idea and organization 
 
43 
Academic Capitalism 
 
The previous section aimed to present the philosophical imagination of the university by 
shedding light on two characteristic and foundational texts in what has been called the 
transcendental-philosophical literature. For the current section, a short travel in space and 
time will be made in order to discover quite a different landscape of texts on the university, 
more precisely the mostly sociological literature that critically analyzes how economic 
developments impact the university. The German nation-state of the beginning of the 19th 
century which provided a milieu for the reinvigoration of a declined institution, will be 
exchanged for the United States at the end of the 20th century, where sociologists of education 
are tacking stock of the effects the emerging knowledge economy has had on higher 
education. In the time between its first formulation and the second world war, the Humboldtian 
model of the modern research university had been slowly spreading across the globe. In the 
postwar years, however, there had been a massification of both the institutions of higher 
education as well as the students attending these institutions (Neave, 2011; Rüegg, 2011). In 
the same timespan, the economy had transformed itself from an industrial to a knowledge 
economy, promoting the production and dissemination of commodifiable knowledge and 
information over the manufacture of goods (cf. Castells, 1993; Chomsky, 1994; Drucker, 1969; 
Sassen, 1991). It is exactly the impact of this transformation on the university that sociologists 
of higher education have tried to come to terms with at the end of the 20th century, and that 
constitutes today a considerable literature on the university next to the ideas literature. Again, 
it will be interesting to discern with which concepts these authors grasp the changing 
relationships between university and society.   
The central role of the university in the new economy as producer and seller of knowledge 
has spawned a vast amount of articles and books that seek to construct the conceptual and 
methodological tools to map the thoroughgoing economization of the university in detail. Clark 
Kerr’s book on The uses of the university, published in 1963, has been programmatic in that 
it set an entire research agenda about for instance, the relation between university and 
industry, the disintegration of the academic body into a loosely assembled network of research 
units that have closer relations to external parties than to the university itself, and the rise of 
the administrative staff and the correlated peripheralization of academic staff.  
These and other related topics have been taken up in the second half of the 20th century 
by researchers whose aim was to investigate the university from a critical-sociological point of 
view. Analyses of the effects on the university of the transformation from an industrial economy 
towards a knowledge economy are variegated with regards to the national contexts that are 
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scrutinized, as well as to the topics that are specifically dealt with. Etzkowitz & Leydensdorff, 
for instance, have proposed the term of the triple helix of university-industry-government 
relations to analyze the new landscape in which institutions of higher education find 
themselves (Etzkowitz, 1994; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997). Krimsky (1991) has traced the 
emergence of industrial genetics in the entanglement of the academic field of biotechnics and 
corporate interests. Marginson (1993) has studied the impact of trends in public policy on the 
higher education system of Australia. In another study of policy, Mowery (1994) has adopted 
a transnational approach in the analysis of the interrelationships between science and 
technology policies across different economies. Geiger (1993) has analyzed the increase of 
commercial endeavors on behalf of the university. And whereas Soley (1995) has argued that 
the industry is slowly taking over academe, Bowie (1994) asserts that universities are all too 
eager to sell out to corporations. These studies are just exemplary for the literature that 
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s that grappled with the new place of the university in the 
knowledge economy.  
Particularly successful in this regard was the term of academic capitalism coined by Sheila 
Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie (1997). It has proven to be a relevant concept to study trends 
and developments that have taken place in the university and the wider societal network in 
which the university operates.32 A sample of studies that have taken the term up again to grasp 
the shifting landscape of research and teaching at universities, includes the work of Hoffman 
(2011) who inventoried the new vocabularies that have severely altered the image and 
meaning of academic knowledge production. He discerns ‘market-oriented 
entrepreneurialism’, ‘external consulting work’, ‘consumer-oriented research’, and 
‘interdisciplinarity’ as new concepts with which researchers are expected to understand their 
work under the academic capitalist regime. Cantwell (2015) has made a qualitative inquiry of 
laboratory management at three research universities in the United States in order to explore 
how the microdynamics of academic knowledge production possibly contribute to the regime 
of academic capitalism. In the context of international mobility, Kim (2017) has interviewed 
                                                        
32 Historians have argued that the concept of capitalism is making a comeback in social theory. They 
explain that in spite of its popularity in the second half of the 19th century, it was for a long time deemed 
too vague, too broad, too polemical, and too ideological. Recent years, however, have seen a 
reemergence of the concept in social, political, and historical research. They argue that this rediscovery 
has been amplified by the financial crisis of 2008 (Kocka & van der Linden, 2016). In the same timespan, 
there has been renewed interest in the theme of the commons (Linebaugh, 2008). After Hardin’s tragic 
diagnosis of their precarious existence (Hardin, 1968), economists have investigated the commons as 
a forceful and robust alternative for market economies (cf. Ostrom, 1990). In his critique of primitive 
accumulation, Karl Marx (1867/1990) explains that the expropriation of the commons formed the 
starting point for capitalist modes of production. It is perhaps no coincidence that in recent years the 
commons have been rediscovered as a powerful counternarrative against capitalist market economies. 
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researchers from different national backgrounds that have settled for a shorter or longer term 
at universities in the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, Korea, and Hong Kong. 
In doing so, she aims to grasp different local experiences of academic capitalism. A last 
example of recent scholarship on academic capitalism is the work of McClure. Instead of 
focusing on the research and teaching activities of the academic staff, he investigated the role 
administrators play in the promotion of an academic capitalist regime. Moreover, he argues 
that an institutional orientation towards knowledge privatization and profit-making is largely an 
administrator-driven project that is often contested by faculty members (McClure, 2016).  
These examples illustrate that the concept of academic capitalism is easily taken up as 
an analytical tool to study a wide range of activities of the university in the knowledge 
economy. In what follows, hence, a few of the salient features of academic capitalism will be 
discerned based on the seminal work of Slaughter & Leslie (1997), and others that have made 
it a central concern of their writings. In a follow-up to the book of 1997,33 Slaughter and 
Rhoades (2004) explain that:    
 
The theory of academic capitalism focuses on networks – new circuits of knowledge, 
interstitial organizational emergence, networks that intermediate between public and 
private sector, extended managerial capacity – that link institutions as well as faculty, 
administrators, academic professionals and students to the new economy. New 
investment, marketing and consumption behaviors on the part of the members of the 
university community also link them to the new economy34. Together these 
mechanisms and behaviors constitute an academic capitalist knowledge/learning 
regime (p. 15).  
 
Based on this definition, it is possible to discern four mechanisms and two behaviors elicited 
by the knowledge economy.  
With regards to the mechanisms there are first of all new circuits of knowledge. Indeed, 
knowledge is no longer confined within the scientific, professional, and scholarly networks, 
                                                        
33 Whereas the original study had a more empirical interest – it primarily aimed to map the new 
landscape of higher education in the national contexts of the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia –, the volume of 2004 has a stronger focus on the development of a theory of 
academic capitalism, elaborated in relation to the context of the United States.  
34 Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) use the terms new economy and knowledge economy 
interchangeably for the economic system that is, first of all, global in scope, that, secondly, approaches 
knowledge as a raw material that can be claimed by legal devices such as patents and consequently 
marketed as a product or service, that, thirdly, promotes non-Fordist manufacture which means that 
mass production is exchanged for just-in-time computer-regulated manufacturing processes, and 
whose outlet, fourthly, consists mainly of educated workers and technology savvy consumers.  
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and teaching is no longer the transmission and discussion of knowledge within the lecture hall. 
With regards to teaching, online platforms have made it possible to standardize teaching 
across different universities. Nationwide students can watch the same weblectures for 
instance, or get identical assignments or tests. This implies that the university administrators 
become more accountable for the task of the university to teach students, instead of the 
faculty. Another example of new circuits of knowledge, more related to research instead of 
teaching, has to do with the university-industry-government partnerships. University research 
is no longer judged only by peers but more and more also by patent officials. Moreover, the 
review boards of academic journals become increasingly populated with degree holders who 
work in the industry. It is obvious that these developments severely alter the expectations 
authors have to meet when submitting an article to a journal and that applied research 
increasingly becomes the norm (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  
A second mechanism is interstitial organizational emergence. With this process, 
Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) indicate that the generation of external revenues often requires 
that universities engage in new activities and partnerships with corporations. They explain that 
these interstitial organizations are boundary spanning, which means that they induce close 
contacts and collaborations between academics and industrials. Examples of such interstitial 
organizations include technology licensing offices (management of intellectual property), 
economic development offices (linking the research strengths of the university with certain 
economic needs), and educational profit centers (providing instructional programs that are not 
part of the official curricula to specific niche markets). These new organizations emerging at 
the boundary of the university, draw the university closer to the world of industry and 
economics and force moreover the university to reconceive itself as a for-profit economic 
actor, just like the ones it engages with.  
A third mechanism that the authors identify is the establishment of intermediating 
networks between public, non-profit, and private sectors, including the university. Examples 
of such network organizations are the Business Higher Education Forum, the University-
Industry-Governments Research Roundtable, and the League for Innovation. Such 
organizations aim to gather different forms of expertise and public and private interests to 
solve common problems stemming from issues related to the knowledge economy. This 
implies that the university is increasingly inclined to understand its activities as contributing to 
the global knowledge economy and that it is more and more conscious about its pivotal role 
in societal economic welfare (Kauppinen, 2012; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  
The last mechanism has to do with the effect foregoing mechanisms have had on 
university administration. Management of online course content, involvement in the creation 
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of interstitial organization via research collaborations, and participation in intermediating 
network organizations have called for an extended managerial capacity of the administration 
of higher education institutions. At its turn, this expansion of management functions has made 
it possible to engage with the corporate sector more frequently, as well as more intensely. As 
such, this is a self-amplifying mechanism since the expansion of collaboration with non-
academic organizations has called for an increase of managerial staff which has, in its turn, 
made it possible to pursue even more such collaborations (Jessop, 2017, 2018; Slaughter & 
Rhoades, 2004).  
With regards to the behaviors – and it is obvious that these new behaviors cannot be 
understood separately from the shifting organizational landscape sketched above –, two 
features can be discerned. First, there is an increased display of market and marketlike 
behaviors on behalf of universities, “attaching a price to things that were once free or charging 
more for items or services that were once subsidized or provided at cost” (Slaughter & 
Rhoades, 2004, p. 26). Examples of such behaviors are not limited to competition for external 
resources, but span the entire university infrastructure. Whereas in the past, students could 
obtain cheap meals in university restaurants, food services are nowadays often outsourced to 
fast-food companies such as McDonald’s, which can be found grouped together in the on-
campus minimalls. Besides, ‘athleisure’-wear corporations work together with universities in 
branding campaigns turning students, prospective students, and alumni – its most important 
outlet – into colorful billboards (Hoffman, 2012; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  
The second behavior has to do with the fact that departments and fields close to markets, 
for instance biotechnology, pharmaceutics and medical devices, or information technology, 
increasingly develop commercial strategies that help to position themselves via prospective 
customers. Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argue that the proximity between a field of study 
and a possible market in no way predicts how successful it will be in terms of its ability to 
generate additional external revenue. They gave the example of classics departments – 
notoriously far removed from lucrative businesses – that have adapted extremely well to the 
new economy by organizing profitable educational trips to Greece and Rome. In the field of 
psychology and educational sciences, some departments sell tests and measurements 
copyrighted by the faculty. There are archaeology departments, lastly, that “offer tours of 
prehistoric sites, charging for the tour and the pleasure of digging” (p. 27). It is here not so 
much the case of calling guilty or claiming innocence, but rather of observing how different 
fields of study try to survive in an environment that increasingly consists of corporate and 
commercial organizations (Jessop, 2017; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  
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The central concern of the theory of academic capitalism seems to be the redrawing of 
the boundaries between public and private in the higher education sector under the pressure 
of an increased economization. In the course of the second half of the 20th century it was 
possible to witness a shift from a public good knowledge/learning regime to an academic 
capitalist knowledge/learning regime.35 It is important to stress that both regimes endorse and 
operate within a different value framework. The first regime values knowledge as a public good 
to which the citizenry should have access. Communalism, universality, free flow of knowledge, 
organized skepticism, together with an idea of academic freedom as the right for each and 
every professor to follow research where it led, formed the cornerstone of the public goods 
regime. Necessary for such a regime is a strong separation between public and private 
sectors, which as we have seen, has become under pressure36. The ascendant regime of 
academic capitalism, on the contrary, values “knowledge privatization and profit taking in 
which institutions, inventor faculty, and corporations have claims that come before those of 
the public” (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004, p. 29). Knowledge, in this regime, is conceived of as 
a raw material that should be commodified as a private good via patents and trademarks. It 
acquires monetary value in the stream of profit-generating high-technology products that flow 
through global markets. The cornerstone of this regime is the necessity of a link between 
academe and commercial corporations in view of profitable growth (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; 
Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  
A few remarks on the general features of the literature on academic capitalism will 
conclude this section. First, an asset of this perspective is that it does not treat the university 
as a unified organization with sharp boundaries that separate it from the corporate world. 
Whereas conceptions such as the marketized university (Berman, 2012; Molesworth, Scullion, 
& Nixon, 2011; Regini, 2011; Robins & Webster, 2002), the corporatized university (Aronowitz, 
2000; Barrow, 2018; Giroux & Myrsiades, 2001; Jarvis, 2001; Soley, 1995), or the enterprise 
university (Marginson & Considine, 2000) evoke the image of a bounded institution that has 
transformed its own value-system, the discourse of mechanisms, networks and behaviors 
allows to perceive the entanglements between parts of the university and several commercial 
and governmental organizations. The theory of academic capitalism rejects the assumption 
                                                        
35 Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) explain that this shift occurred gradually and that, hence, both regimes 
coexist at the same time. However, the academic capitalist regime is slowly taking prominence over the 
public goods regime.  
36 Having grown up in Cold War America, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) explain that their work should 
not be understood as a form of nostalgia for the public goods regime which often spent a 
disproportionate amount of money on warfare and defense budgets.  
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that the university operates separated from but in close connection to state and market, in 
favor of a view that presupposes that they are enmeshed with each other through and through.  
Secondly, with regards to the research question, it is clear that the literature of academic 
capitalism would refute a strong separation between university and society as two distinct 
entities. Focusing on the shifts in the organizational landscape in which university departments 
and faculties try to survive, it calls for a more networked view in which it is possible to discern 
how a capitalist logic parasitizes on the activities members of the university engage in, more 
specifically market and marketlike behaviors and commercial strategies. Hence, from a 
critical-sociological point of view the university appears as thoroughly enmeshed in and 
influenced by societal trends and developments.  
The last remark refers back to the transcendental-philosophical literature of the first 
section and hence serves as a conclusion to the first two sections. It is possible to draw out a 
few differences and similarities between the transcendental-philosophical and the critical-
sociological perspective. First, there is the obvious difference that whereas the 
transcendental-philosophical literature emerged in the German nation-state at the beginning 
of the 19th century, the critical-sociological texts dealing with academic capitalism are situated 
mainly in postwar United States under the predicament of globalized capitalism. A second 
difference has to do with the fact that the first literature is more imaginative of a possible future 
university. Proposed are various conceptions how the university should be equipped in order 
to fulfil its societal role. The second literature, on the contrary, relates critically to shifts and 
transformations that have occurred in the field of higher education in the recent past. 
Deploying the analytic framework of academic capitalism, authors in this tradition scrutinize 
the increasing capitalization of the higher education sector. This relates, consequently, to the 
third and most salient difference which concerns the issue how both literatures conceive of 
the university.  
When adopting a transcendental-philosophical approach, the university comes to the fore 
as an idea. This means that the different authors in this tradition have proposed a more or less 
elaborate idea of the university, including how it can and should be institutionally incarnated. 
The second critical-sociological literature understands and analyzes the university as an 
organization entertaining a manifold of relationships with other organizations of the 
governmental or commercial kind. The institution of the university is conceived as intimately 
entangled within an organizational network.  
At this point it is possible to discern a link between the two approaches to the university. 
Both discourses indeed seem to rely on an understanding of the university as institution. This 
means that an institutional understanding of the university seems to be a ‘common 
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presupposition’ of both the transcendental-philosophical literature on the university as idea 
and the critical-sociological literature on the university as organization. Nevertheless, it needs 
to be remarked immediately that both of the approaches relate differently to the university as 
institution. Before going somewhat deeper into what it might mean that both approaches share 
a ‘common presupposition’, it might be relevant to clarify what is meant with an institutional 
understanding of the university.   
Invoking the concept of institution here, may cause troubles with regards to its precise 
meaning in this context. Institution is indeed a rather vague and broad notion that includes 
both formal institutions of, for instance, the political, religious, or educational kind – think, 
respectively, of the US Congress, the Catholic Church, and the Catholic University of Leuven 
–, as well as informal institutions that have to do with passing on customs and values – think, 
for instance, of gift-giving or praying (North, 1990; Unsworth, 2010). In the context of this 
dissertation, an institution is conceived of as the formal structure that aims to warrant the 
persistence of certain informal customs and values. Hence, in this understanding, institutions 
come to the fore as formal bodies with implicit and explicit rules that are based on certain 
values and customs for which the institution grants endurance. However, as stated before, 
both literatures appropriate the university as institution in a slightly different way. 
On the one hand, the first literature requires the institution of the university in order to put 
flesh on the bones of its idea. The idea of the university seems only to make sense if one 
conceives of it in relation to its institutional infrastructure. As such, it could be argued that the 
idea of the university has to do with its customs and values, for instance passing on knowledge 
to the broader public, but that these customs and values need to be thought of as embodied 
by a formal institutional infrastructure (e.g. the relation between the faculties, the relation 
between the university and the academy) to give them very precise meaning and to grant them 
endurance. The second literature, on the other hand, conceives of higher education 
institutions as organizations that are increasingly enmeshed with other organizations. The 
reliance on an institutional understanding of the university might be less outspoken in the 
second literature. It becomes, however, more present when considering the fact that they 
understand the impact of the ascending academic capitalist regime as a transvaluation of the 
values of the university as public institution (e.g. communality, openness, and universality) in 
favor of more entrepreneurial and mercantile values.  
It is important to be nuanced at this point and to make clear that it is not because both 
approaches seem to be hinged on an institutional understanding of the university that it would 
be possible to equate them, or that the concept of institution means the same from both 
angles. It is as if the institution of the university is at the background of both approaches and 
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forms a common presupposition. Although it is more or less hidden behind the university as 
idea and the university as organization, it has a clear and distinct function in the construction 
of the argument of both approaches. Whereas in the first approach the institution comes in to 
make the idea of the university more palpable, the second approach takes its recourse to the 
institution to evoke that which is currently under threat by the capitalization of academia. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that both approaches seem to presuppose the importance of 
an institutional understanding of the university with both its formal and informal aspects. 
However, it needs to be clear that asserting that both the transcendental-philosophical 
and the critical-sociological approach share a common presupposition, should not be 
confused with the argument that they would find common ground there, or that they stem from 
a common root. What seems rather to be the case is that there exists a reciprocal capture 
between both of the approaches in that each strand of literature seems to refer to the other in 
order to gain its strength and relevance. Although this is perhaps less clear for the early texts 
of Kant and Humboldt,37 contemporary texts that articulate the idea of the university often do 
so in relation to analyses of the critical-sociological kind in order to defend the idea of the 
university in the face of the threats posed by current neoliberal policy reforms. Symmetrically, 
these analyses of the university under the predicament of globalized capitalism seem to take 
the transcendental-philosophical accounts of the modern research university as a zero-degree 
to measure the impact of changing policy discourses on academia. The literature of academic 
capitalism seems to suggest that the modern idea of the university as an autonomous 
institution for the disinterested pursuit of knowledge has been eroded since the 1950s and 
more intensely since the development of neoliberalism in the 1980s.  
Foregrounding the institution of the university as a link between the transcendental-
philosophical and the critical-sociological approach lays bare a last similarity between the two 
strands of literature, namely a negligence of the non-institutionalized university (in the sense 
of ‘formalized’), or more precisely, a forgetting of the medieval university. It might be 
worthwhile therefore to have a look at the emergence of the university in the Middle Ages 
which will be the topic of the next two sections.  
 
 
 
                                                        
37 Nevertheless, this case could be made as the modern texts on the university generally aim to breath 
new air into an institution that had been in decline due to organizational failure for decades already (cf. 
Bahti, 1987; Peters & Barnett, 2018a).  
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In the course of the long twelfth century, at various places in Europe people started to gather 
around texts in order to study them. These were the very first universities, named universitas 
magistrorum et scolarium, a term which meant in that time simply ‘association of masters and 
students’. In my attempt to offer an other-than-institutional understanding of the university as 
it is present in the transcendental-philosophical and critical-sociological literature on the topic, 
I will focus in this and the next section on the very birth of the university in medieval times. Not 
only, however, will the specific grounds for the emergence of a university (which in its first 
years was much more like a grassroots movement than a full-fledged educational institution) 
be under scrutiny, also the specific claims that were made on the university will be discussed. 
Different reasons can be figured why, at a certain instant, in a certain city, a university would 
come into being. It is possible to discern five strongly interrelated ingredients of the medieval 
context that allowed for the birth of the university: first of all, the presence of translators and 
translations in the area around the Mediterranean Sea; secondly the struggle between secular 
and religious powers, most notably the Investiture Controversy; thirdly, the discovery of 
universitas38 as an organizational principle for the guilds in the expanding cities; fourthly, the 
proliferation of monastic and cathedral schools; and fifthly a change in the reading and writing 
technologies, more precisely the emergence of the bookish text that could be read at a glance. 
This section begins with a presentation of these ingredients and how they interrelate with one 
another.  
A first ingredient is the presence of translators and translations. Already in the Carolingian 
era, a lot of translations of antique texts had been produced. For instance, the Bible, texts by 
the Church Fathers and other classical authors had been around for centuries. A great amount 
of Latin and almost the entirety of Greek literature, however, remained practically inaccessible. 
Translators living close to the Arab and Byzantine world, for instance James of Venice, 
Burgundy of Pisa, Aristippe of Palermo and John of Sevilla, rediscovered many works, 
                                                        
38 The concept of universitas was found for the first time in written sources in Cicero’s translation of 
Plato’s Timaeus. Cicero used the word as a translation of τό παν, a syntagma that denoted the world 
in its entirety. The concept brings to the fore a sense of comprehensiveness and totality. It designates 
the world as an all-comprising whole. Next to this mention in Timaeus, Cicero uses the concept twice 
in his De natura deorum. Here it is accompanied by a genitive that clarifies what is contained within the 
totality of universitas, first the totality of things, ‘universitatem rerum’, secondly the totality of human 
beings, ‘universitatem humani generis’ (Schnorr von Carolsfeld, 1933). Whether it was of human beings 
or of earthly things, the concept of universitas expressed the idea of a totality, an all-including 
assemblage. Universitas designated a singular unit, constituted by different elements that could 
however not be defined as merely an enumeration of these constituting parts. The universitas has an 
existence of itself, independent from the elements that compose it (Michaud-Quantin, 1970).  
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especially from Greek philosophy and science. Not only Aristotle’s Logic, Physics, and 
Metaphysics were translated, but also mathematical works from the Ancient Greeks, such as 
Euclid and Archimedes, and medical works of Hippocrates and Galen. Besides, a lot of Arab 
commentaries on these texts were made accessible, for instance the works of Al-Khwarizmi, 
Al-Razi and Avicenna. At last, and quite important for the next condition of emergence, was 
the rediscovery of the Corpus Iuris Civilis of the Byzantine emperor Justinian.39 In short, the 
quantity of secular and religious texts that had become accessible in translation represented 
an enormous amount of intellectual materials that could be investigated and studied. It should 
be noted, however, that accessibility should not be overestimated in times before the invention 
of the printing press. Texts were available in vernacular language, but needed to be carefully 
copied and transmitted (Leff, 1992; Verger, 2013).  
The second ingredient is the conflict between ecclesiastical and secular power that 
reached its climax in the Investiture Controversy between the emperor Henry IV of the Holy 
Roman Empire and pope Gregory VII. This conflict, which also gave rise to a self-redefinition 
of the Church as universitas fidelium, induced a réveil of juridical activity in France and Italy. 
In order to defend their arguments, followers of Pope and Emperor took recourse to the 
classical texts to be found in the Corpus Iuris Civilis.40 This renewed attention for Roman and 
                                                        
39 Noteworthy is the fact that in this text the concept of universitas acquired a juridical meaning. The 
document aimed to draft a categorization of things and to whom they could pertain. Firstly, the things 
belonging to divine law are discerned as res sacrae et religiosae, sanctae quoque res. Secondly, the 
things pertaining to human law are subdivided into four categories. First, there are the things that belong 
to nobody or to everybody, called res nullius or res omnium respectively. An example of something that 
belongs to nobody would be the sun or the moon, whereas the sea and the land are examples of goods 
that were believed to belong to everybody. Second, there are the things that belong to somebody. This 
somebody could either be an individual or a community. Public goods such as stadiums or theatres 
were believed to belong to the universitas, the community, whereas private goods were believed to 
belong to individuals. It is cleary explained that the universitas, in this case as communia civitatium, the 
community of citizens, does not equal the aggregate of the individual citizens. The universitas has an 
existence of its own and slaves pertaining to the universitas could not be used by an individual member 
of the community of citizens. The servant of the community could only be employed for tasks ordained 
by the community as a whole. The quasi-metaphysical meaning of the word universitas as it came to 
the fore in Cicero’s work which expressed the idea of the universitas as an all-encompassing whole, 
shifts here towards a rather juridical conception of universitas, indicating a community of citizens 
(Schnorr von Carolsfeld, 1933). 
40 The struggle between secular and ecclesiastical power provided the impetus for a politicotheological 
revaluation of universitas. This struggle had mainly to do with a reinterpretation of how libertas, an 
important medieval virtue, could be realized. In its original form, the medieval liberty pertained to the 
private sphere of the familia and its associated ideas of peace and protection. It was believed that the 
solidarity of the family tie granted the individual members their freedom. This freedom was not absolute, 
it did not express an independency of all possible bonds, but, on the contrary, conceived of these bonds, 
especially the familial ones, as a precondition for freedom because they provided shelter for the family 
members. This structure of organizing private life was extended to public life in the feudal system in 
which dependency relations between suzerain and vassal safeguarded the freedom through mutual 
protection. A crucial turning point in the reinterpretation of libertas was the experience that this feudal 
system was insufficient to provide peace and protection. On the contrary, it led to several wars and was 
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Byzantine law resulted in a collection of both primary and secondary texts compiled by the 
Bolognese monk Gratian, called Decretum Gratiani, a work that would become the central 
object of study of medieval canon law. In short, not only the presence of texts, but also the 
societal need to study in order to formulate responses to timely issues necessitated the coming 
into existence of a university (García y García, 1992; Nardi, 1992; Verger, 1999).  
This relates to the third ingredient. As a result of the Investiture Controversy, the Church 
reinvented itself as universitas fidelium outside and above the hierarchical system of secular 
feudalism. Inspired by the ancient legal texts, the Gregorian reform, written down in the papal 
bulls Dictatus Papae and Libertas Ecclesiae, conceived of the Church as a community of 
equals cut loose from the dependency structures of feudalism. This new social structure would 
quickly become interesting for other associations founded in the growing cities.41 Because of 
                                                        
primarily a system of exploitation. The entirety of dependency ties proved to be no guarantee for 
freedom, but even to be a means to institutionalize unfreedom. As a consequence, the medieval 
libertas-idea was enriched with a sense of liberation, which it lacked previously since it was mainly 
understood as protection. Libertas was being reinterpreted as the liberation from the web of secular 
personal dependency ties that pervaded the entire society. These dependency ties which originally 
were believed to safeguard the individual’s liberty, indeed stifled individuals in an exploitative and 
belligerent feudal sociopolitical organization. As a reaction to this failure of the secular power to act as 
patronus, advocatus et defensor of the Church and the believers, a new ecclesiastical order was 
established. The reformation of Cluny disconnected the bishops from the feudal order and under the 
guidance of the monk Hildebrand, the new pope Gregory VII, the Church reconceived of itself as one 
association that autonomously could realize its goals, as it believed itself to stand above the secular 
power. The Church hence played an important role in redefining the medieval libertas by re-inventing 
itself as universitas fidelium. It should be noted that this new self-conception of the Church was not so 
much aimed at the destruction of the feudal system as such, but rather at going above and beyond this 
system in a new order which made it possible to postulate the supremacy of the Church. The 
engagement of a believer towards the universitas fidelium was very different from the feudal relation. 
Inspired by the Stoic and Paulinian tradition, an egalitarianism between believers is implicated in this 
new social structure of universitas. The social, horizontal ties of the people included in the universitas 
is of another kind, than the personal, vertical ties of the people being part of the feudal system. 
Hierarchy, dependency and inequality, all implicated in the feudal verticality, were replaced by the 
personal freedom and mutual equality of the members of the universitas (Van Den Auweele, 1984; 
Waelkens, 2014). 
41 In the course of what is often called the Renaissance of the 12th century universitas increasingly 
became the hallmark of a communitarian ideal. It did not express anymore the totality of the world as 
such (cf. Cicero) or a legal category (cf. Iustinianus), although these meanings are still present in the 
notion albeit to a lesser extent. Instead, it became the name for politicotheological body that held 
together in a tensive agreement the existence of an immortal and eternal collective on the one hand, 
and its mortal and perishable members on the other. In The King’s Two Bodies, Ernst Kantorowicz 
(1997) describes the politicotheological meaning of the universitas as follows: “The essential feature of 
all corporate bodies was not that they were ‘a plurality of persons collected in one body’ at the present 
moment, but that they were that ‘plurality in succession’, braced by Time and through the medium of 
Time. It would be wrong, therefore to consider the corporational universitas merely as the simul 
cohabitantes, those living together at the same moment; for they would resemble, in Aquinas’ language, 
only the physical body of man whose members were present ‘all at once’, but they would not form the 
genuine corpus mysticum such as Aquinas had defined it. The plurality in succession, therefore, or the 
plurality in Time was the essential factor knitting the universitas into continuity and making it immortal” 
(Kantorowicz, 1997, p. 310). As such, the concept of universitas preserved the tension between the 
unity of community given the plurality of its members, as well as the tension between the reality of 
University, idea and organization 
 
55 
the improvement of life conditions in the 11th and 12th century, this era saw a rapid population 
increase, especially in the cities. The cities, where people practicing the same craft lived and 
worked close to each other and shared similar socio-economic interests, allowed for the 
establishment of corporations or guilds, which were called universitates. People in similar 
conditions could, when associated, achieve more than individuals. Examples include the 
association of ironworkers, of druggists, of bakers, of furriers, and of saddle makers. The urban 
context facilitated a self-organization of people in labor associations where they could meet 
as a community around their craft, unlike as in the feudal structure, and together claim the 
same rights and privileges). In short, the third ingredient hence refers to the myriad of labor 
associations that emerged in the medieval cities. Universitas no longer denoted merely an 
association, but more specifically an association around a craft. It brought together master 
craftsmen and apprentices that engaged with the materials and techniques of their craft. In 
this way, the organizational structure of universitas sparked also the interest of the 
communities that formed themselves around texts in order to study them (Miethke, 1999; 
Verger, 1992, 2013).   
The fourth ingredient for the emergence of universities is the increase of student numbers 
in the cities. Around 1117, Guibert de Nogent wrote that when he was a child there were barely 
any masters to be found in the cities. Besides, their knowledge was so little that it was not 
even comparable to the big amount of knowledge of the ‘clercs vagabonds d’aujourd’hui’ 
(Verger, 2013). In the 12th century, the number of schools exploded and it became more 
problematic for students to find appropriate housing. Moreover, schools were overflown by the 
swelling current of masters and students. Masters started to organize their own private schools 
where one could obtain the licentia docendi, which allowed one to teach in all schools of the 
diocese. To preserve its monopoly on education the Church laid claim on these teaching 
facilities by granting the universitas magistrorum et scolarium, a corporation of masters and 
students analogous to the universitas fidelium, the universitas civium and the different 
universitates wherein different people from a similar labor context were associated, the 
privilege to hand out the licentia ubique docendi, the right to teach everywhere. This made it 
possible to decrease the proliferation of private schools. Besides, the rediscovery of Aristotle’s 
                                                        
perishable members participating in an immortal association. After its politicotheological revaluation this 
new mode of social organization was copied in the conception of the city as universitas civium. It 
involved a desacralization of the Paulinian-Stoic doctrine of the corpus mysticum and reinforced it with 
the Aristotle-interpretation of Avicenna concerning society, viz. that a social existence within a society 
is a precondition for the survival of man. “Le lien social est ainsi découvert et avec lui la conscience de 
sa permanence: les individus peuvent changer, l’universitas demeure” (Mairet, 1978, p. 197). As such, 
it become possible to conceive of the coexistence of human beings in the emerging Italian cities as 
universitates civium. Universitas came to contain and preserve the tension between the one and the 
many, oneness and allness, concrete reality and abstract concept of a communitarian ideal. 
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Organon introduced dialectics as a new way to read texts, specific to this new universitas, as 
opposed to the schools. In short, the increase of students induced a proliferation of schools 
and hence also their related often idiosyncratic teaching methods. In order to preserve some 
unity, the Church deemed it necessary to establish an educational association that could grant 
a degree to teach everywhere, something the schools were not allowed to (Nardi, 1992; Riché 
& Verger, 2006; Verger, 1999). 
The fifth ingredient has less to do with the social, cultural, economic, intellectual, or 
political milieu in which the university came into being as it has to do with the technological 
conditions that allowed people to establish another relationship toward text, the principal 
material of study in the medieval universities. It has been argued that in the course of the 12th 
century, the text underwent some drastic changes in order to make it readable at a glance (as 
we can still do nowadays). A few of these new features include a more extensive use of 
punctuation, adding footnotes, and structuring the text into paragraphs. Perhaps the most 
import shift, however, was separation of words with white spaces. Whereas before the text 
had to be read out loud in order to be understood, it could now be read at a glance. This 
technological shift induced a transformation of the experience of reading. Before the 
emergence of what has been called ‘university script’, reading was a spiritual exercise that 
required not only the eyes, but also the mouth and the ears. After this technological shift, the 
eye took center stage as the text became readable at a glance. Reading was no longer 
primarily a matter of sensory embodiment of the divine text, but became an exercise in taking 
a certain distance with regards to the text. At the same time, the text was no longer something 
that could only be believed in, but it became something that could be studied (Illich, 1991, 
1993; Marin, Masschelein, & Simons, 2018).  
In sum, five ingredients together formed a milieu in which the first first universities could 
come into being, namely the accessibility of study materials in the form of texts, tensions 
between Pope and Emperor that necessitated a learning process around questions of how to 
live together, the rediscovery of universitas as an organizing principle for church, city, and 
craftsmen associations, the need for the Church to assert itself as most important distributor 
of knowledge, and the coming into being of university script as a textual format. It is clear that 
the coming into being of the university was a highly contingent event and that the foregoing 
five ingredients as such should not be conceived as causes, but rather as intellectual, political, 
socio-economical, cultural, and technological particularities of the environment of the medieval 
cities. It has been argued that specific societal concerns such as the conflict between Pope 
and Emperor, urban expansion in Italy, and the decline of the feudal structure required not 
only political debate, but most importantly, that they initiated study activities. These study 
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activities were facilitated by the presence of a vast amount of ancient text that were 
rediscovered or made accessible in translation. However, it was not only due to the amount 
of text that study had become possible. Maybe even more important was the fact that the text 
was transcribed as university script which allowed for a different sensory experience of the 
text, one in which the reader could acquire a certain distance towards the text and study it. 
Lastly, universitas, as a principle of self-organization for craftsmen groups brought together 
with similar interests, proved to be very helpful in granting these newly formed communities 
of students some sustainability.   
The spontaneous emergence of the first universities was closely followed by a second 
movement, the discussion of which will be the topic of the remainder of this section. This 
second movement, that comprises both the increase of universities as well as the attempts of 
powerful actors to lay claim on their activities, was foreshadowed by the fourth ingredient 
mentioned before, namely the interest of the Church in these newly formed associations of 
study. Soon after the emergence of the first universities as grassroots associations of masters 
and students both secular and religious powers attempted to seize hold over these 
communities by offering them official statutes and sanction them as legitimate educational 
organizations, or so-called studia generalia. The birth of the first universities was indeed 
initiated by different masters or students coming together in an association to gain some 
autonomy, these were truly universitates magistrorum et scolarium. When these associations 
were recognized by Church or Empire, however, they received the title of studium generale. 
The force field of different powers and social changes that the 12th century was – most notably 
students and masters organizing themselves in their quest for autonomy, the Church trying to 
preserve its monopoly on education – unleashed the potential for a university to come into 
being. This potential was actualized in several concrete universities of which Bologna and 
Paris are the most prominent examples. In the historical literature, these universities are called 
universities e consuetudine [having grown by custom], as opposed to swarm universities and 
universities e priviligio [foundation by explicit decree]. These studia generalia already existed 
as associations of masters and students before they were officially recognized and were 
granted there statutes. Other early universities e consuetudine are the universities of 
Montpellier and Oxford. The medical school of Salerno shared a lot of characteristics with 
other studia generalia but was only later recognized as a real university (Nardi, 1992; Verger, 
1992, 2013). 
From the first decades of the 13th century onwards, two principal ways in which a 
university could be established crystallized: by ‘swarm’ or by prior decision of the civil or 
ecclesiastical authorities. A swarm university involved a group of masters and students who, 
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because of their discontent with their prior university, fled away to another city. Most of the 
time, when conditions improved in their prior university, they returned but also sometimes it 
marked the beginning of a durable new scholarly community. The university of Cambridge, for 
instance, came to be founded after disputes in Oxford between 1209 and 1214. In France, the 
universities of Orléans and Angers benefited from the flight of the Parisian masters and 
students between 1229 and 1231, although they were only officially recognized much later. 
Yet, northern Italy is considered to be the heartland of university migrations. These migration 
processes benefited enormously from Italy’s economic wealth, the student population which 
was itself often a mix of migrated students from different towns and regions, and its political 
structure of rivaling city states which made authorities very aware of the fact that they should 
keep the students in their town pleased which afforded the students the opportunity to claim 
a lot of rights and privileges. Some universities founded after a bargaining process between 
student associations and cities are Padua, Reggio Emilia, Vicenza, Arezzo, Vercelli and 
Siena. All these universities, except the university of Padua, disappeared again after a few 
years or decades (Cobban, 1975; Verger, 1992).  
In contrast to the swarm universities, some universities, the so-called universities e 
priviligio, were founded (or ‘planted’) by decision of civil or ecclesiastical authorities. A first 
example is the university of Naples which was planted by the Emperor Frederick II to compete 
with the university of Bologna and to train the jurists he required. Another university e priviligio 
was the university of Toulouse, initiated by a civil authority. It was founded with the Treaty of 
Paris, after the crusade against the Cathars and the count of Toulouse. This top-down decision 
to plant a university in Toulouse incited a lot of discontent in the city which caused the 
university to change its program from one centered on theology to a more juridical one. Not 
only civil authorities planted universities. Also the pope created a university. Innocent IV chose 
to establish a university in the curia itself, studium curiae. Undoubtedly it was the Iberian 
peninsula that saw the most universities e priviligio to come into being. The studium of 
Palencia was initiated by Alfonso VIII, king of Castile, and confirmed a few years later by a 
papal bull. After a few years, royal favor had shifted to Salamanca where another university 
was founded. Other examples are the university of Valladolid and the university of Lisbon. 
This phase of university development ended around 1378, when the Great Schism began. By 
this time there were thirty-one universities (Gieysztor, 1992; Rüegg, 1992; Verger, 1992).  
In sum, it can be argued that already shortly after the first masters and students began to 
organize themselves in associations, both secular and religious powers successfully 
attempted to co-opt these grassroots movements. Studium generale became the name for an 
organization for higher learning in the fields of theology, law, or medicine, authorized by either 
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Prince or Pope. As such, it is clear that the history of institutionalization of these newly formed 
associations of study is almost as old as these associations themselves. Whereas this section 
aimed to sketch out the first phases of university development in Europe, the next section, this 
rather general account will be provided somewhat more detail by focusing on the organization 
of three of the earliest universities.  
 
 
Salerno, Bologna, Paris 
 
The three universities that will be central in this section are the proto-university of Salerno, 
and the universities of Bologna and Paris. The medical school of Salerno is included because 
it had a similar reputation in medicine as Paris had in theology and Bologna in law. In line with 
Alan Cobban (1975), it is called a proto-university here, because of the fact that it got its papal 
recognition as studium generale much later than the universities of Bologna and Paris. De 
facto, it was organized as a universitas but because the school matured quite slowly it got its 
official recognition only in 1280. Bologna and Paris are discussed because they are 
considered to be the two archetypes of university organization in the Middle Ages. Oxford, 
historically the third university, is not included because qua organization it is modeled after the 
Parisian archetype. The guiding thread throughout the discussion of the three cases will be 
how universitas provided a model for organizing activities of collective study in the Middle 
Ages.  
To begin with, the school of Salerno was the first center for medical teaching and learning. 
Its foundation is estimated to have taken place in the 9th century. Throughout the 9th and 10th 
century it was the most important center of medical learning, with a strong focus on medical 
practice, instead of theory. What makes it unique qua organization is its lack of organization. 
Salerno was a heavily specialized center in medical practice, with a reputation comparable to 
the reputation of Bologna in law and of Paris in theology, but technically it was for a long time 
not institutionalized as a studium generale. Medical practice was deemed more important than 
theoretical considerations which resulted in a very dispersed body of literature. For a long 
time, there was no formalized instruction, nor a fixed curriculum or regularly appointed 
teachers. The medical school benefited from its central position in the Mediterranean area, 
which allowed it to access a lot of sources of both Greek and Arab philosophy and medicine. 
Constantine the African, who taught medicine in Montecassino but moved to Salerno in 1077, 
has made Latin translations of many theoretical and medical texts, for instance Viaticus of Al 
Dschaafar, compilations of Isaac Judaeus on diets, urines and fevers, and, most importantly, 
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the encyclopedia of medicine of Haly Abbas written more than a century earlier in Baghdad. 
Besides, his translations of Hippocrates and Galen gave a new impetus to the study of Greek 
medicine, although some of these texts were already in circulation. As such, in the 11th and 
12th century Salerno became a melting pot for Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Byzantine, Muslim and 
Norman science and philosophy (Cobban, 1975; Siraisi, 1992).  
In the 12th century, the focus of the Salernitan school shifted from a more empirical to a 
more theoretical interest. Application of the scholastic method as practiced in Bologna and 
Paris, allowed the scholars of Salerno to develop a body of theory and commentary.42 This 
constituted in fact a synthesis of the Greco-Arab literature on medicine. The result was a 
curriculum that was, through the efforts of Gilbert of Corbeil, the first teacher of medicine in 
Paris, transmitted to his alma mater, but also to faculties of medicine in other university cities. 
This period is considered to be the apogee of the medical school of Salerno. From 1224 
onwards, when Frederick II founded the studium generale of Naples, the Salernitan school 
started to decline. It did not disappear completely but was marginalized and lost its reputation 
as the most important center for medical teaching. In a statute conferred on the school of 
Salerno by Charles I of Anjou in 1280 the medical center is for the first time in history 
specifically named a studium generale. It lasted however until 1359 for the students of the 
school to obtain degrees and medical licenses valid for the whole kingdom (Cobban, 1975; 
Verger, 1999). Due to its lack of organization, the medical school of Salerno is often called an 
embryonic university, or – as we have seen –, a proto-university.  
The university of Bologna, to move on to the second university that will be discussed, was 
in origin designed for the career interests of laymen studying Roman law. It was lay both in 
terms of the people teaching and attending, and in terms of subject matter. Only from the 
1140s onwards canon law was being taught in Bologna. The focus on Roman law was due to 
the flourishing of career opportunities for laymen occupied with law and jurisdiction in the 11th 
century cities. The professional demands stimulated the school activities aimed at the 
production of practical legal skills such as the compilation of official documents and pleading 
in courts. Besides, there was a renewed attention for the texts of Roman law because of the 
Investiture Controversy. For laymen the study of, and argumentation based on texts from 
                                                        
42 The scholastic method places a strong emphasis on dialectical reasoning to extend knowledge by 
inference and to resolve contradictions. It often takes the form of explicit disputation, both written and 
orally. This means that a topic drawn from the tradition is brought forward in the form of a question, to 
which opponents' responses are given, and for which a counterproposal is argued. Because of its 
emphasis on rigorous dialectical method, scholasticism was eventually applied to many other fields of 
study (e.g. law, medicine). Scholasticism began as an attempt to harmonize the various authorities of 
the Christian tradition, and to reconcile Christian theology with classical and late antiquity philosophy, 
especially the philosophy of Aristotle (Hyman & Walsh, 1973; Schoedinger, 1996). 
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Roman law was the best way to confront the papal governmental claims and to establish an 
original political theory (Cobban, 1975). Pepo was the first master to teach at the law university 
but especially relevant for its intellectual development was the presence of Irnerius in Bologna 
between 1116 and 1140. Irnerius commented extensively on Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis. 
He used a method of critical analysis reminiscent of Abelard’s Sic et Non, some hermeneutical 
rules of thumb to gather and confront different authorities or different claims in one and the 
same authoritative text (Verger, 1999).43 In the 1140s, the monk Gratian who taught at the 
Bolognese monastic school of San Felice, completed his Concordia Discordantium Canonum, 
which role in the establishment of canon law in Bologna is similar to the Irnerian commentaries 
and glosses for Roman law. The combination of a quasi-curricular basis for Roman law, 
consisting of on the one hand texts of Roman law, most importantly the books comprised in 
Corpus Iuris Civilis, and on the other hand the method of scholastic dialectics, made Bologna 
the most important center for law studies attracting students, mostly professional lay lawyers, 
from all over Europe (Cobban, 1975; García y García, 1992; Verger, 1999).  
                                                        
43 For an impression of a medieval lecturing scene, see Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Laurentius de Voltolina, Liber ethicorum des Henricus de Alemannia, 14th century. 
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These students coming from other Italian cities or from abroad, however, were not 
protected by the city laws of Bologna. Therefore, emperor Frederick I Barbarossa issued in 
November 1158 the Authentica Habita as the formulation of a privilegium scolarium, a privilege 
which acquired a specific significance for academics because it protected them and their 
freedom from humiliations and malpractices such as reprisals for debt. Since Bolognese 
students were already protected by municipal law, and canon law students were already 
protected by canon law itself, this meant an amelioration of the rights and privileges of foreign 
students. Besides, it was a means to promote the study of civil law. The Authentica Habita 
protected the students from exterior factors but it left the question of the organization of a 
student body open. Echoing the emergence of communes, craft guilds, and trade guilds, 
characterized by their democratic and anti-feudal nature, the students organized themselves 
as a universitas, a protective association of students (Kibre, 1962; Rüegg, 1992). By the end 
of the 12th century, the foreign students of Bologna founded their universitas scolarium. This 
was a student association with elected officers, statutes and an independent legal status. 
Around the mid-13th century, there was a universitas citramontanorum for the students coming 
from the Italian peninsula, and a universitas ultramontanorum for the other foreign students. 
Each universitas had its own elected student rector. The doctors assembled in a quite 
rudimentary association for the regulation of examining procedures and the entry to their 
professional group (Cobban, 1975; Gieysztor, 1992; Kibre, 1962; Nardi, 1992).  
Since students were protected by the universitas and doctors by the commune, there was 
no cohesive academic community. Students were very well organized, while doctors did not 
really form a strong association. The student associations adopted a trade union attitude in 
order to survive, bargaining for strong rights. After some time, the student association was so 
strong that it resembled a totalitarian student regime. Students had a distinctive social status, 
were assembled in executive committees, and treated doctors as hirelings who had to take 
the oath of submission. Each year students elected a number of doctors whose income 
depended on the student fees. The statutory controls imposed by the students were extremely 
rigorous, which granted them a very powerful position. Besides, under the student 
governmental system doctors were excluded from voting in the university assemblies, yet they 
had to obey the rules that were postulated there. The strong control of students over doctors 
was exemplified in the fact that doctors were constantly assessed. Four students were elected 
to act as spies and attended the courses in order to report irregularities such as bad lecturing 
and cancellation of lectures. Besides, student permission was required for almost every 
doctoral act which severely damaged the independence and autonomy of the doctors. This 
even went so far that students were able to control the doctors’ private life. By the mid-14th 
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century, at last, students progressively lost their controlling power over the teaching staff 
(Cobban, 1975; Verger, 1992, 1999). 
In short, the Bolognese universitas scolarium exemplifies at the same time both the wish 
for a democratic organization of university life and the reality of a totalitarian regime. Students 
established a social structure so strong that it left no space for doctoral autonomy. Power was 
concentrated in the hands of a few long-tenured student executive officials who could decide 
which doctors should be hired, what their salary should be, and how they should be controlled. 
Due to the existence of the two universitates of law, ultramontanorum and citramontanorum, 
next to a universitas of arts and a universitas of medicine, which were founded a few decades 
after the university, the university of Bologna as studium was an amalgam of separate 
jurisdictions, a series of self-contained empires. The studium hence existed as a diversity with 
different rectors, which made that the different universitates were more important than the 
studium generale as a whole. As such, conflict prevailed over co-operation in the university 
that claims to be Europe’s first.  
University life in Paris, at last, developed more or less in the same time span as in 
Bologna. It took, however, a few years longer for the Parisian university to crystallize. Besides, 
the context was slightly different which resulted in a university that differed qua organization 
from the Bolognese. Already in the 11th century, there was a lot of educational activity in Paris, 
more specifically around the cathedral schools in the houses of the canons around the Notre-
Dame. In the 12th century, the social and cultural climate of Paris seemed very fruitful for the 
expansion of schools. The arrival of the logician Peter Abelard in Paris is both a cause and a 
sign for the proliferation of schools, masters and students in and around Paris. After a dispute 
with the archdeacon, Abelard was forced to move from Île de la Cité to the left bank of Paris 
where he started to teach at Mont Sainte-Geneviève, which induced a multiplication of the 
masters and students in the monastic schools located there. In his Metalogicon, John of 
Salisbury, who has studied in Paris from 1136 until 1148, bears witness to the enormous influx 
of students from all parts of France, Germany, and England in the schools of the 12th century. 
The cathedral schools of the Notre-Dame remained the most important for theology while the 
old and new monastic schools around the bridges and on the left bank offered refuge to the 
masters in logic and grammar44 (Riché & Verger, 2006; Verger, 1999). This dispersion of 
schools and learning resulted in a quasi-anarchical educational situation in which the Church 
became practicably incapable to control what was taught in the schools. Hence, what 
developed in the course of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century was a conflict 
                                                        
44 For a map of medieval Paris including the location of university activities, see Figure 4.  
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between the Church and the masters, informed by at the same time a quest for educational 
autonomy and ecclesiastical imperialism. The Parisian masters did not want to submit to the 
demands of the Church while the interest of the Church was to bring some unity in the laicizing 
multiplicity of schools (Cobban, 1975; Nardi, 1992). 
At that time, the students were, however, very dependent on the Church because the 
Church provided them with clerical rights on the condition that the students themselves were 
considered to be clerics, clerici vagantes, religious people who led a wandering life going to a 
school in a town which was not their hometown (Schwinges, 1992). In this way, students were 
submitted to ecclesiastical jurisdiction and became dependent on the Church in exchange for 
security. In the years between 1170 and 1180, the first embryonic associations between 
Parisian masters and their schools came into being in order to claim more rights vis-à-vis the 
bishop of Paris and the chancellor of the Notre-Dame, who were still in charge of granting the 
licentia ubique docendi, the right to teach. In the first decade of the 13th century, these hesitant 
associations gained some momentum resulting in an overarching community of masters and 
students in Paris. In 1215, the legate Robert of Courçon sanctioned the de facto statutes of 
this universitas. The masters were authorized to recruit new masters themselves, to let them, 
by oath, obey to the statutes that they could themselves issue. Besides, they obtained the 
right to exclude recalcitrant masters. At last, rents of lodging, costume, burial, lectures and 
disputations were formalized. In this document the right to act as a guild or universitas 
magistrorum et scolarium was confirmed. The struggle between the masters and the 
chancellor and the bishop over the licentia docendi, however, continued (Solère, 2005; Verger, 
1999).  
The next step in the quest for ecclesiastical recognized autonomy of the universitas was 
initiated by the street riots in 1229. Several students were killed by royal sergeants which was 
seen as a severe violation of the clerical privilege which exempts them from civil jurisdiction. 
This event caused a magisterial strike and initiated the exodus of masters and students out of 
Paris to other cities in the north of France, Toulouse and even England. In 1231, pope Gregory 
IX promulgated his bull Parens Scientiarum, exclaiming Paris to be the new Cariath Sepher, 
the brilliant Old Testamentic city of books and letters. In this bull he granted the Parisian 
masters the right to confer the licentia docendi. This was an essential step for the autonomy 
of the university of Paris which consequently became a real and autonomous studium 
generale (Cobban, 1975; Nardi, 1992; Verger, 2013).  
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The university of Paris comprised an extensive faculty of arts. Two thirds of the 
university’s population were part of this faculty that was divided into four nations: French, 
Norman, Picard and English-German. Each nation was led by a proctor who had his own 
administration. They all had their own statutes and archives, finances, seal, schools, assembly 
point and feast days. The faculty of arts had its own head or rector unifying the four nations. 
This faculty functioned as a propaedeutic to the superior faculties of theology, medicine and 
canon law. Each superior faculty had its own organization and dean. In contrast to Bologna, 
the studium generale of Paris had just one rector. He represented the symbolical unity of the 
universitas. All students with the degree of master of arts were full member of the university 
government. The students of the faculty of arts were considered to be associated in the 
university government and were allowed to attend assemblies although they had no voice. 
This implies that once a student was in the superior faculty of theology, canon law or medicine, 
he was considered to be a worthy participant in the university government (Cobban, 1975; 
Riché & Verger, 2006; Verger, 1999).  
The Parisian archetype exemplifies less the wish for a democratic organization than the 
Bolognese. It was less legalistic and far less vociferous in its expressions of democratic 
involvement and control. However, in reality, the organizational infrastructure of the university 
Figure 4: Map of medieval Paris. 
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of Paris turned out to facilitate the democratic process to a greater extent than in Bologna. In 
Bologna, power was concentrated in the hands of a small student committee, while in Paris it 
was dispersed and flowed through all nations and faculties of the university. 
To summarize the relevance of this short excursus on the medieval universitas 
magistrorum et scolarium for our study of the relation between university and society, it seems 
as if the early university confronts us with a double challenge. First, it makes clear that from 
the very beginning onwards, the university was enmeshed in societal affairs through and 
through. Not only because it emerged out of the need that was felt to investigate and study 
societal issues, or because it was modelled after an organizational structure that had gained 
importance also for the organization of society which became increasingly urbanized, but also 
because immediately after its inception a myriad of claims have been made on its activities on 
behalf of both religious and secular powers in society.  
Besides, and this is the second challenge the medieval university poses, the early 
universitas magistrorum et scolarium cannot be thought of as a full-fledged educational 
institution. Here it is important to bear in mind that the notion of universitas had two meanings 
and that both are necessary to grasp what this organization was about. On the one hand, 
universitas denotes association and community. This meaning foregrounds the collective 
aspect of the university, more precisely that it is always a gathering of different people. In that 
sense, it is clear that from the perspective of universitas, it is impossible for a person to study 
alone or to form a university on him- or herself. On the other hand, universitas means guild. 
We have seen that in the same timespan other professional groups started to organize 
themselves as guilds. This brings in a specific focus on the university as a community of 
people engaged with a craft, a particular technical way of dealing with materials. It has been 
argued that indeed the medieval university was such a community that dealt with texts and 
that the invention of university script allowed them to establish a different relation towards the 
text, to maintain some distance. It is these two challenges that we need to bear in mind in the 
continuation of this review of the literature. In the next section, it will be proposed to address 
the first challenge by adopting an ecological approach towards the question of the university 
and society.   
 
 
An Ecological Approach? 
 
Based on the previous sections, it could be argued that each time a university emerged, it was 
in close relation to the problems and challenges of a particular time and place. The 
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urbanization occurring in the North of the Italian peninsula, for instance, forwarded the 
question how to organize societal life outside the hierarchical, feudal order. The Investiture 
Controversy, to take another example, initiated the rediscovery and reinterpretation of ancient 
legal texts. It could be argued that gathering around these texts, such as the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, allowed for responding to aforementioned problems and issues. This response, the 
result of taking in hand again texts that were almost forgotten, should, as we have seen, not 
be understood as a purely political decision, but rather as an ongoing process of study. In 
spite of the fact that indeed these emerging universities were almost instantaneously captured 
by other-than-educational aims, such as the Church’s concern for an orthodox reading of the 
Scriptures, or the establishment and maintenance of a legal class, the contingency of their 
coming-into-being can be considered an event of educational relevance that at the same time 
requires and overshoots its historical and societal context.  
Looking back now on the literatures of university ideas and academic capitalism under 
the constraint of the challenge to understand university and society as intimately intertwined 
– let us call this for a moment a proto-ecological point of view –, it is striking that they also 
emerged around the time of a profound rescaling of sociopolitical life that is to a certain extent 
comparable to the intensive urbanization of the 12th century which played an important role in 
the coming into being of the universities in the first place. At the time of the birth of the 
university, the question how to live together outside a feudal order was a pressing societal 
issue that needed to be addressed.  
In a similar vein, Kant and Humboldt imagined their ideas of the university under the 
constraint of the respective questions how to give reason a place in the nation-state, and how 
to civilize the nation-state. It could be argued that the prospective German nation-state as a 
new sociopolitical environment created the necessity to give thought to the question of the 
university or how the university could be re-invented given its new environment.  
Lastly, the literature on academic capitalism emerged exactly at the time when the nation-
state was in decline in favor of a global economic environment. Again, the rescaling of 
sociopolitical life and the coming-into-existence of an expanded global habitat had severely 
altered the activities of the university that inhabits this global environment. It is these 
alterations that the literature on academic capitalism aims to grasp and scrutinize.  
In short, from a proto-ecological point of view it could be argued that the city, the nation-
state, and the globe have taken turns in being the name for the environment in which living 
together had to be organized, coinciding with the emergence of the medieval, the modern, 
and the contemporary university respectively. 
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Understanding the university in close relation to its environment seems to offer a relevant 
and promising perspective. The reader will have noticed that the initial formulation of 
‘university and society’, as if these would constitute two bounded and separate entities, has 
been exchanged for ‘university in its environment’. Although the term of environment could 
denote the society in which a specific university is situated, it is broader and takes into account 
that this environment could denote a city, a nation-state, or even the globe. In that sense, it is 
more general than the notion of society, but because of that, it forwards the question what this 
environment more specifically is. Besides, the ‘in its’ of the new formulation imposes a 
conception of the university as always already situated within an environment that can be 
either fostering or damaging. It can be argued that such a perspective that aims to grasp the 
university in its environment, can be termed ecological.45 In the remainder of this chapter, the 
basic tenets of the ecological approach will be outlined following three stages that can be 
developed in relation to ecological thinking.46 
Historian of ecology, Frank Egerton (2012), explains that it is not easy to date the 
emergence of ecology as a theoretical perspective. For thousands of years, human beings 
have been making descriptions and drawings of a variety of animals and plants in their 
coexistence. Egerton mentions for instance Herodotos who travelled to Egypt in the 5th century 
BC and wondered about the huge Nile crocodiles. Basking in the sun they would open their 
mouths for the sandpiper to eat leeches from inside, without ever harming the little bird 
(Egerton, 2001b).47 Another example of proto-ecological descriptions are the botanical and 
zoological treatises by Aristotle and Theophrastus and the tradition of writing accounts in 
natural history that ensued (Egerton, 2001a). It took, however, until 1866 for the first definition 
of ‘Ökologie’ to emerge. In Generelle Morphologie der Organismen, Ernst Haeckel48 asserts 
that:  
 
                                                        
45 And in that sense, the initial readings of both the transcendental-philosophical and the critical-
sociological literature from an interest in the relation between university and society, can be termed 
proto-ecological as suggested before.  
46 Important to underscore is that what follows is a rough sketch of three stages in the development of 
ecological thinking. It will become clear that ecological thinking has been taking place centuries before 
an ecological science crystallized in the beginning of the 20th century with the work of Arthur Tansly, 
botanist and founding editor of the Journal of Ecology, and Frederic Clements, author of Research 
methods in ecology (Begon, Howarth, & Townsend, 2014; Smith & Smith, 2015). 
47 In the modern lexicon of 19th century almost organized ecology, such situations would come to be 
known under the denominator of mutualism, a concept coined by Pierre Joseph Van Beneden in 1876 
in his study Animal parasites and messmates (Van Beneden, 1876). 
48 Perhaps Haeckel is most well-known for his artful lithographic representations of plants and animals 
in Kunstformen der Natur (see Figure 5).  
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By ecology, we mean the whole 
science of the relations of the 
organism to the environment 
including, in the broad sense, all 
the ‘conditions of existence’. 
These are partly organic, partly 
inorganic in nature; both, as we 
have shown, are of the greatest 
significance for the form of 
organisms, for they force them to 
become adapted (Haeckel as 
quoted in Stauffer, 1957).  
 
A great admirer of Alexander von 
Humboldt’s expeditions49 and a 
fervent reader and 
contemporary of Darwin, 
Haeckel brought different 
zoological descriptions together 
in support of his attempt to 
reorganize zoology along 
evolutionary lines. Ecology is defined by him as the study of the relations between organism 
and environment which he understands as a compound of inorganic (e.g. light, warmth, and 
humidity) and organic (e.g. other organisms that might foster or harm the organism) conditions 
to which the organism is adapted. Here we touch upon a first feature of the ecological 
approach, namely that it offers a perspective of interdependency. Haeckel explains that an 
animal exhibits specific features that are directly related to the environment in which it lives. A 
rabbit for instance has long pointed ears and eyes at the sides of its head to increase 
awareness for potential predators such as foxes. Its tail is short and white because it had 
evolutionary advantage in warning the rest of the colony so they can withdraw into the warren 
in case of danger. The presence of the fox in the territory of the rabbits, however, is not merely 
harmful to their survival. The regular elimination of the weaker and slower rabbits, protects the 
                                                        
49 The brother of Wilhelm von Humboldt whom we encountered at the beginning of this chapter, traveled 
from 1799 until 1804 through Latin America in order to collect descriptions of plants and animals which 
he brought together in drawings that aimed to relate the prevalence of specific sorts to isothermal lines 
in mountainous areas (see Figure 6) (Egerton, 2009).  
Figure 5: Ernst Haeckel, Gamochonia, 1866. 
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colony from nutritional shortage due 
to overpopulation. Hence, rabbit 
and fox depend on each other for 
their survival and enact the feature 
of interdependency.50  
The view that the natural world 
including the relationships between 
organism and environment does not 
constitute a static entity, but is rather 
to be conceived as a dynamic 
process, an evolution, was seen as 
a slightly disreputable idea in the 
early 19th century (Egerton, 2011). 
Moreover, in spite of for instance 
Lamarck’s speculations about 
species striving to change, there 
was no convincing argument to 
account for the evolution of species. 
With On the origin of species, Charles Darwin (1859) wrote a coherent and convincing theory 
concerning the evolution of populations over the course of generations through a process of 
natural selection. He argued that the diversity of life arose by common descent through a 
branching pattern of evolution. He evidenced the theory with findings from research and 
observations he made during his expedition with a government ship, HMS Beagle, to the 
Galapagos Islands in the 1830s. What puzzled him during that expedition was that there were 
differences in the morphology of the beaks of finches that were related to the specific island 
they inhabited. He argued that an evolutionary process had been taking place in the course 
of which specific beaks had been more successful in surviving under the environmental 
constraints of a specific island. Whereas the beak of the large ground finch, for instance, is 
more suited to crack nuts for nourishment, the beak of the woodpecker finch allows him to 
pick insects out of trees and shrubs51. Hence, it is due to specific environmental conditions 
                                                        
50 The example represents an important concept in classical ecological discourses, namely balance of 
nature. This principle assumes that nature has its own ways of maintaining equilibrium by means of 
negative feedback loops. In the case of the example this means that if the foxes would kill too many 
rabbits, this would result in a shortage of prey and consequently a thinning of the skulk until the 
population of rabbits has restored itself (Egerton, 2012).  
51 For a diagram depicting four types of beaks, see Figure 7.  
Figure 6: Alexander von Humboldt, Anden: Heiße Zone, c. 
1802. 
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that certain phenotypes manage to 
survive and reproduce, while others 
extinct. Moreover, Darwin argues that 
because of the importance of the fit 
between organism and environment, 
new species have come into existence 
over the course of thousands of years 
(Egerton, 2010, 2011). Here, a second 
characteristic of the ecological approach 
comes to the fore, namely the feature of 
generativity. From an ecological 
perspective, the world is in continuous formation and interdependent relationships between 
different organisms engender ever more differences. This means to perceive the world not as 
a container filled with static entities, but rather as an entanglement of different living lines.  
As a third stage in the development of the ecological perspective, the work of Rachel 
Carson is worth mentioning. With the publication of Silent spring in 1962, she triggered a 
movement of eco-alarmist writings. It is important to underscore that ecology in this context 
does not refer solely to questions concerning the birds and the bees dealt with from a 
perspective that embraces interdependence and generativity as its most important features. 
With Carson’s work, the focus of the ecological approach becomes the complex interplay 
between different actors and the ways in which these entanglements foster or hinder diversity 
of life. Silent spring is hence not only ecological because it is concerned with the terrible 
possibility of a spring without birdsong, but also because it sketches out the different links 
between the spreading of disinformation by the chemical industry, the naïve attitude of public 
officials, the indiscriminate use of pesticides, and increasing rates of illness and disease 
(1962). Her work is not a description and analysis of natural phenomena as if they would occur 
in a vacuum, but explicitly addresses the place of the human being in complex ecosystems. 
To a certain extent, it is possible to argue that in her writings the ecological approach unveils 
itself as a normative perspective, since she adopts a critical stance with regards to the 
developments and policies of her time. In fact, it seems as if the ecological endeavor was 
normative from its beginnings, as concerns such as biodiversity seem not only to denote 
natural phenomena but also to attribute a value judgment – biodiversity is deemed better than 
monoculture. The conflation between a descriptive and a normative account seems to be the 
third feature of the ecological perspective. What sets the ecological approach apart is its deep 
Figure 7: Charles Darwin, Diagram of beaks of 
Galapagos finches, 1889. 
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concern for matters of living and dying on a shared planet, matters that are political through 
and through.  
In the wake of Silent spring and the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, 
authors coming from a variety of disciplines retooled the ecological approach or the ecological 
conceptual apparatus for the questions they were dealing with. Social anthropologist Gregory 
Bateson (2000), for instance, brought several of his observations and theories together under 
the denominator of the ecology of mind. Within perceptual psychology, James Gibson (1986) 
elaborated an unconventional, even quirky approach to visual perception which he described 
as ecological. Urie Bronfenbrenner (1979), a developmental psychologist, proposed an 
ecological approach to human development. He underscored the fact that the parent-child 
relationship does not take place within a social vacuum but is imbued with meanings from 
broader social, political, religious, and economic contexts. A last example comes from Félix 
Guattari (2000) who made a distinction between three ecologies, the mental, the social, and 
the environmental ecology, and warned for the deterioration of these three interlinked 
systems.52 Bearing in mind the three characteristics of ecology, namely interdependency, 
generativity and the concern for living and dying on a shared planet, the next chapter will 
explore how the ecological perspective can be a fruitful approach to study the university.  
 
 
                                                        
52 Following quote is just an example of how Guattari (2000) maps and analyzes similar developments 
in the three ecologies: “In the field of social ecology, men like Donald Trump are permitted to proliferate 
freely, like another species of algae, taking over entire districts of New York and Atlantic City; he 
'redevelops' by raising rents, thereby driving out tens of thousands of poor families, most of whom are 
condemned to homelessness, becoming the equivalent of the dead fish of environmental ecology” (p. 
43). 
Chapter Two 
Ecology and the 
University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In recent years, two authors have already embraced ecology as a promising perspective to 
rethink the relation between university and society. Within the field of philosophy of higher 
education, Ronald Barnett has proposed the idea of an ecological university. It is the 
culmination of his life-long work on the history and theory of the university, including its relation 
to its environing world (cf. Barnett, 2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2014, 2016). In the field of 
anthropology of policy, Susan Wright has, together with a team of fellow-researchers, mapped 
the environment in which universities try to survive and make their living. In her own writings, 
Wright (2016, 2017) has related this to the concept of a knowledge ecology in which 
universities, next to, for instance, publishing houses and governmental agencies, are situated. 
In the project Universities in the knowledge economy, they come to terms with the shifting 
landscape of higher education policy and organizational infrastructures.53  
The first two sections of this chapter aim to present the parts of the work of both authors 
that deal with the university in relation to an ecological approach. Thereafter, it will be 
explained how these strands of theory development can be inherited in a way that possibly 
opens up another perspective on the relation between university and society, loyal to the 
legacy of ecology. It requires, as will be argued, to conceive of ecology in relation to the 
concept of practice, the topic of the third section. The last two sections of this chapter aim to 
present Isabelle Stengers, the author who has introduced the concept of ecology of practices 
                                                        
53 For more information about the research project, see http://unike.au.dk.  
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as a means to think the relations between diverging scientific and other-than-scientific 
practices. The chapter starts with a presentation of Barnett’s ecological university.  
 
 
The Ecological University 
 
Barnett (2018) explains that the occasion for his conception of the ecological university was 
formed by the observation that universities nowadays enormously grow both in number and 
size, and that they play an increasingly prominent role in national and transnational policies 
around the globe. This development raises the question as to their purposes and their relation 
towards the world. Barnett argues that universities greatly fail in realizing their potential to take 
up their responsibilities in an ever-changing and always challenging global environment. In 
taking up the task to repurpose the university to its current global situation, Barnett deploys 
the notion of ecology in a double sense, running parallel with the double objective he pursues.  
On the one hand, Barnett aims to place the university in an ecological perspective and to 
identify the concepts that come into being in doing so. He argues that once one places the 
university in an ecological perspective, one has to rethink the categories in which one is 
usually inclined to think about the university. He identifies, for instance, the figure of the 
ecological learner, the necessity of an ecological curriculum, and the possibility of an 
ecological professionalism. On the other hand, Barnett aims to promote his conception of an 
ecological university that could serve as a guiding idea for reshaping higher education 
institutions. He places himself in the long-standing philosophical tradition of formulating ideas 
of the university that goes back to Kant. According to Barnett, the ecological university is a 
feasible utopia whose time has come and he discerns specific principles and maxims such a 
university should adhere to.  
In short, Barnett’s objective is to grasp the ecosystems amidst which the university is 
situated and to propose an idea of the ecological university which can be understood as a 
university that intensifies the relationships with its surrounding ecosystems54: 
 
The ecological university accepts that it is already ecological, albeit in a weak sense. 
Willy-nilly, the university is implicated in seven ecosystems. It can choose to ignore 
those ecosystems, it can act malevolently – even if unwittingly – towards them, or it 
                                                        
54 Barnett is aware of the two differing understandings of ecology. Therefore he proposes to preserve 
the name ecosystem for the notion of ecology in the descriptive sense. The name ecology is then 
preserved for the normative idea of the university that he wishes to put forward.  
Ecology and the university 
 
75 
can choose to explore its ecological possibilities. With this last stance, ecology 
becomes a unifying and strong narrative for the university (Barnett, 2018, p. 39). 
 
Barnett argues thus that the university is always already implicated in different ecosystems 
but that the university can be named truly ecological when it becomes aware of and seeks to 
intensify the bonds with these ecosystems (Barnett, 2018).  
Before presenting Barnett’s description of the university and its ecosystems on the one 
hand, and his normative idea of the ecological university on the other hand, it might be helpful 
to bring forward the definition of ecology that he seems to endorse. Barnett (2018) discerns 
five dimensions particular to the notion of ecology, namely interconnectedness, potential 
diversity, impairment, responsibility, and restoration. Besides denoting a holistic 
understanding of the world in which different parts are connected to each other, hence 
facilitating or inhibiting a diversity of life-forms in various flourishing or deteriorating 
ecosystems, his conception of ecology also encompasses a strong orientation towards the 
damaging effects human interventions have had on the world – the dimension of impairment 
–, and the imperative to take up responsibility for the recovery of all ecosystems and their 
interconnections. Barnett’s ecology is essentially an ecology on human soil. In spite of his 
awareness of the existence and interconnectedness of various ecosystems, these systems 
seem only to matter to the extent that they relate to humankind, and that humankind relates 
to them. Barnett’s distinction that separates ecology as a descriptive notion to understand the 
relation between the university and the world, from ecology as a normative ideal – in which 
hence human responsibility comes in – will be used as means to analyze his ideas. His 
descriptive notion of ecology will be presented first.  
Barnett (2018) argues that the university – every university – lives, moves, and has its 
being amidst different ecosystems. He discerns seven such ecosystems that surround the 
university, namely knowledge, social institutions, the economy, learning, human subjectivity, 
culture, and the natural environment. Together they constitute the ecosphere of the university. 
He explains that every university unavoidably always has to relate towards these ecosystems. 
In claiming that the university is necessarily implicated in its ecosphere, Barnett underscores 
that it is important to note that not only the university moves throughout these ecosystems, it 
is also always already permeated by them:  
 
Being caught in these ecosystems, the university is influenced by them, whether it 
realizes it or not. But then, especially if it has a care for the world, the university is 
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impelled to turn towards these ecosystems and bend its resources in assisting their 
advancement (Ibid., p. 113). 
 
Hence, he argues that the university is not only affected by current trends and developments 
in the natural environment, the economy, or social institutions. In addition, it actively helps 
shaping these trends and developments.  
Assuming that the university is always already an ecological university in the weak sense, 
means to open up a perspective on universities that pays attention to the entanglement 
between the university and its ecosphere. Understanding the university ecologically, which 
means for Barnett to understand the university as implicated in seven ecosystems, bears the 
germ for a university that is ecological in the strong sense. This is the second, more normative 
position that Barnett puts forward, which we encounter when the university not only realizes 
that it is implicated in its ecosystems, but more importantly has a care for these ecosystems 
and tries to develop them further, all in view of what Barnett calls the promotion of world 
wellbeing (2011b, 2018).  
In order to shed a light on the ecological university in the narrow, normative sense, Barnett 
(2018) places it on three axes, namely sustainability versus advancement, natural world 
versus whole Earth, and instrumentalism versus transcendentalism. He argues that the 
discourse of ecology is all too often focused solely on sustainability of the natural world. 
Barnett pleas, on the contrary, for a university that not only wants to sustain the natural world, 
but rather one that advances the different ecosystems in which it is implicated of which the 
natural world is just one. Barnett’s ecological university aims to develop the different 
ecosystems by restoring impairment and promoting world wellbeing. Since the ecological 
university does not stand outside the natural world, but is implicated in the whole Earth, this 
can, however, never be an instrumental aim. Rather, it is a disclosing of the ecological 
university’s “transcendental spirit that energizes it in and towards the whole Earth, as it 
imaginatively attempts to discern its possibilities” (Ibid., p. 75). As such, the ecological 
university is situated in the corner of advancement, whole Earth, and transcendentalism of the 
three-dimensional space constituted by the three axes.  
In his attempt to provide the reader with a stronger sense of what the existence of an 
ecological university sensu stricto would entail, Barnett (2018) enlists seven principles that 
each relate to a maxim of the ecological university he envisages. These seven principles and 
maxims are the following:  
 
i. Active concern: Strive to live out your concerns for the world; 
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ii. Exploration: Continue always to explore possibilities for realizing the 
potential of the university in the world; 
iii. Wellbeing: Aim continually to increase wellbeing in the world;  
iv. Epistemological openness: Go on opening yourself to new insights, new 
ways of conceiving the world and countervailing frameworks; 
v. Engagement: Engage with all that or whom you encounter; 
vi. Imagination: Develop and put to use your imaginative capacities, at all 
levels of the university; 
vii. Fearlessness: Hold fast to the university as a space of critical and open 
dialogue (Ibid., pp. 78-80).  
 
By keeping to these principles, he reasons that the ecological university stays true to both its 
inner and outer calling. Barnett (2011b) defines the inner calling of the university as the 
“traditional concern with the advancement of learning in wanting to permeate society with 
enhanced enlightenment and understanding” (p. 452) which he immediately relates to the 
outer calling of the university, namely to take up responsibility to society which he believes the 
ecological university is faithful to, due to its commitment to world wellbeing. However, because 
of the degree of vagueness of the general description of the ecological university as well as 
the principles and maxims attached to it, it is hard for the reader to get a clear picture of what 
it might entail if universities would live up to their ecological calling.  
To conclude this section, a few remarks will be formulated with regard to Barnett’s 
ecological university. Firstly, from the beginning of his book, Barnett is explicit about his double 
use of the notion of ecology as both a theoretical lens with which it is possible to grasp the 
university as implicated in a wider network of ecosystems, as well as a critical-normative 
standard that could be deployed as a guiding idea for shaping the future of the university. 
More than once, though these two lines of reasoning, corresponding to a different use of the 
notion, seem to get caught up with each other, which makes the distinction that is made at the 
outset between the university as implicated in ecosystems and the ecological university hard 
to uphold. In recent decades, new theoretical perspectives have been put forward that 
explicitly aim to go beyond the distinction between fact and value (cf. the onto-ethico-
epistemological perspective of spacetimematterings of Karen Barad (2003, 2007) or the 
ontological politics of Annemarie Mol (1999)), and it is clear that the notion of ecology bears 
the promise of going beyond such distinctions. Barnett’s intuition that the notion of ecology 
embraces both a theoretical-descriptive perspective as well as a critical-normative stance is 
probably right, but in his attempt to keep these two separate, he fails to recognize the 
Making a university 78 
possibility of developing a framework that could grasp how these interconnections between 
different ecosystems can come to matter.  
Secondly, and related to the first remark, it can be noted that Barnett’s trouble with the 
two-sidedness of ecology resurfaces in his conception of the university as situated in the 
middle of seven ecosystems. Placing the university in the middle as a point where each 
ecosystem reflects upon itself in the view of further advancement undermines the potential of 
a genuine ecological perspective, which means a perspective without an actual middle or 
where everything is a middle for another middle. In other words, Barnett fails to develop an 
ecological perspective that takes interdependency seriously. Such a perspective would pay 
as much attention to the interrelationships between the other ecosystems, for instance 
between learning and economy, or between knowledge and social institutions, as it does to 
the university and these ecosystems. Barnett’s ecology is an ecology with a center, and a very 
human center more precisely as it is burdened with the ethical obligation to restore human-
induced impairment and to promote world wellbeing.  
Returning to our research question of situating study in the relation between university 
and society, it could be argued that for Barnett study is the university’s way of reaching out to 
the seven ecosystems that make up its ecosphere, its environment. As such, it is very much 
a university-centered approach that risks to remain inattentive with regard to the ways in which 
these ecosystems lay their own claims on the university. The most obvious example in this 
respect would be the claims coming from the ecosphere of the economy that bid the university 
to produce useful knowledge. Such kinds of issues and problems are more developed in the 
second ecological perspective on the university discussed in the next section, namely Susan 
Wright’s work on the university in the knowledge ecology.  
 
 
The University in the Knowledge Ecology 
 
Since the main assets and stakes of economic development have shifted from labor power 
and industrial production to education and training, economists have argued that the second 
half of the 20th century has witnessed a transition from an industrial economy to a knowledge 
economy, apt to the opportunities and challenges of an increasingly globalized market of 
commodified information and communication (cf. Drucker, 1969). In such a global knowledge 
economy, universities form an important link between supply and demand of information and 
knowledge. The university has adapted to its new environment and has become an 
autonomous and entrepreneurial knowledge organization that promotes competition, is eager 
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to cooperate with private investors, puts higher education in the service of economic 
competitivity, and empowers students to maximize their skills and competencies in the global 
labor market (cf. Chapter One).  
It is these developments that Susan Wright (2016, 2017) aims to grasp as specific 
transformations in the environment of organizations amidst which universities are situated 
themselves. While investigating the university, she adopts an ecological approach by 
proposing to exchange the term of knowledge economy for knowledge ecology, which opens 
up, accordingly, new possibilities for the university to relate in more symbiotic ways to its 
environing organizations. Hence, it can be argued that Wright pursues a double objective. On 
the one hand, she wishes to shift from an understanding of the university as a static entity in 
an all-encompassing market economy, to one in which the university is grasped as a dynamic 
and fluid set of relations within a broader ecology of diverse interests and organizations. On 
the other hand, she aims to map new, alternative university initiatives and modes of university 
organization that relate critically to the current economization of higher education.   
Again, before presenting the basic tenets of Wright’s work on the university in the 
knowledge economy, it might be helpful to concentrate on her understanding of the notion of 
ecology. In that respect she refers to the distinction Karl Polanyi (2001) makes between the 
formal and the substantive economy. Polanyi argues that in substantive economies of non-
capitalist societies social, political, and religious relationships are the bedrock of economic 
transactions such as gifts and exchanges. When however economic relations constitute a 
sphere sui generis, apart from the social, political, and religious spheres, such as, for instance, 
in the case of a market economy, he argues that this new, formal economy reshapes the 
original relations in its image.  
Wright compares the knowledge economy with Polanyi’s formal economy in which 
educational relations have been reshaped in the image of a market model, hence becoming 
economic relations. Besides, Wright proposes to conceive of universities in a network of 
relations with for instance publishing houses, governments, and transnational agencies, 
forming as such a knowledge ecology, which comes close to conceiving of the current higher 
education landscape as a substantive economy. Here again, there is thus both a descriptive 
and a normative aspect to the notion of ecology, however more tightly interwoven than in the 
work of Barnett. Wright argues that studying the university as embedded in a knowledge 
ecology, rather than an economy, raises awareness for the manifold other-than-economic 
aspects of higher education that remain underappreciated in the light of the knowledge 
economy. Moreover, she argues that when conceived of as an ecology, it is more feasible to 
foster symbiotic relations between universities and their surrounding organizations, in 
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opposition to a conception of the university as an important resource in the economy of 
predative capitalism (Wright, 2016, 2017).  
The knowledge ecology in which the contemporary university tries to survive, can, 
according to Wright (2016) be characterized by different organizations and trends that make 
up the university’s environment. With regard to the organizations, Wright mentions first of all 
the governments that create the national policy environment, including national funding 
opportunities and student scholarships. These national governments, however, operate under 
the pressure of the second kind of organization Wright distinguishes, namely transnational 
agencies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
the World Bank. In spite of the fact that these organizations cannot decide directly on national 
policies, they forcefully exert control over the policy space in which national governments 
operate via management techniques such as benchmarking. It is also these organizations that 
have created the horizon in which universities come to the fore as important pawns in the 
competition of the global knowledge economy, rather than as public institutions of higher 
education.  
Wright argues that this upheaval, the removal of the protective ring around the university 
as public institution, has made the university an alluring partner around which a motley crew 
of commercial and other kinds of organizations have nested themselves. A few examples 
Wright gives are the proliferation of research collaborations with the industry, the emergence 
of an international trade market in fee-paying students, the intensification of bonds with banks 
and financiers, and the expansion of public-private cooperation for campus planning including 
its place in urban infrastructures. Moreover, she adds the entire industry that has formed 
around the world rankings and league tables such as Times Higher Education, QS, US News 
and World Report, and Shanghai Jiao Tong. Calling on data collected elsewhere, for instance 
the bibliometrics of Elsevier or Thomson Reuters, they classify and rank all universities in the 
world. Her last example of new inhabitants of the ecology around the university are 
consultancy offices and audit companies such as McKinsey and Deloitte that assist 
transnational agencies and local governments in shaping their higher education policies. 
Universities can invoke them to measure and optimize their quality in research, teaching, and 
administration in order to become ‘excellent’ in these domains (Wright, 2016).  
With regards to the trends, Wright argues, together with her colleague Cris Shore, that 
seven shifts are characteristic of the changing ecology of the university (Shore & Wright, 
2017). The first trend is the progressive withdrawal of government support for higher 
education. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Dearing Report published in 1997 has 
shown that in the previous twenty years state funding per student has dropped by forty 
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percent. Shore and Wright (2017) demonstrate that this trend is not limited to the UK, but gains 
access in other national contexts as well. Related to the first trend, is the creation of funding 
and assessment regimes that aim to increase productivity and competition between university 
both on a national and a global scale. Allocation of means is increasingly based on all kinds 
of easily quantifiable output-oriented quality indicators such as the number of publications. 
The third trend has to do with the raise in ranking systems and the performance and output 
measures that come in their wake. This has led to the installation of a pervasive audit culture 
in higher education. Shore and Wright argue that these audits not simply measure 
performance, but that they reshape the institutions in which they operate. Resources and 
activities, for instance, are increasingly focused on what counts to funders and governors, 
instead of disciplinary requirements or societal objectives. The enormous growth in number 
and status of university managers and administrators is what they identify as the fourth trend. 
They argue that this coincides with a change in the way administrators perceive their role, 
which is no longer to provide practical support for academics, but rather to manage them as 
so-called human capital and as a resource in order to meet the management’s targeted 
outputs and performance indicators. This relates to the fifth trend which has to do with the rise 
of what they call the ‘administeriat’ and the shift in power relations within the university this 
induced. They argue that today “rather than being treated as core members of a professional 
community, academics are constantly being told by managers and senior administrators what 
‘the university’ expects of them, as if they were somehow peripheral or subordinate to ‘the 
university’” (Ibid., p. 8). The sixth trend is a consequence of the cuts in national budgets for 
higher education. Universities nowadays have to find alternative income streams, such as 
lucrative partnerships with industry, conducting commissioned research for companies, 
commodifying the results of intellectual labor via patents and licenses, developing spin-off 
companies, and making profit from the rental of university real estate for residence, 
conference facilities, and industrial parks. The last trend has to do with a shift in the perception 
of investment in higher education. In the post-war era, higher education was deemed a public 
investment that contributed significantly to the economy and society, as well as to personal 
growth and social mobility of the population. In the 1990s, however, the aforementioned more 
Keynesian model was displaced by the Chicago School economic doctrine according to which 
the individual, not the state, should take responsibility for investment in education and training. 
Due to this shift of perception, the individual is made responsible for investing her human 
capital in order to keep up with the competition in a global labor market (Shore & Wright, 2017).  
Wright (2017) argues that the transformations in the ecology of the university share two 
common features. First of all, universities come to the fore as a new kind of subject in a new 
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context. Think, for instance, of the so-called world class universities, the entrepreneurial 
universities, the university sector as a competitive market, or the university as driver of a 
competition state.55 Secondly, this new context is without exception an economy that 
necessarily attributes to universities an instrumental role in knowledge production and the 
development of human capital. Wright (2017) concludes that in recent decades the university 
needed to transform itself from a public institution into “a new kind of subject, responsible for 
negotiating its relations with these diverse economic, political and social interests in 
‘surrounding society’, and is made responsible for determining its boundaries and maintaining 
its own values, research freedom and ethics” (Ibid., p. 22).  
Using Polanyi’s terms she seems to suggest that the context in which universities operate 
is no longer a substantive economy, but has become a formal economy. This has led to the 
reshaping of diverse activities of the university, such as teaching, research, and service to 
society, in the image of formal economic exchange in an increasingly globalizing market. 
Wright’s concern about the public role of the university urges her to reconceive of the relations 
the university has with its surrounding organizations in a somewhat different way. Here again, 
the notion of ecology proves to be an important inspiration. She pleads for a livable landscape 
in which universities can remain loyal to their core values:  
 
If the university is to have a relationship of responsibility and care towards humanity 
and the planet, it has to be the ‘critic and conscience’ of society, rather than the driver 
of a particular market-driven model of the formal economy. This requires a different 
way of thinking about the ‘scene’ or world that universities could inhabit and the 
relationships that would bring it about (Ibid., p. 27).  
 
By placing the university in the livable landscape of a substantive economy, Wright argues 
that the current landscape, damaged by the rationalities and relationalities of the formal 
economy, can become a fostering and nurturing ecology of symbiotic relations again. In line 
with Anna Tsing (2015), she convinces her reader that whereas the formal economy isolates 
people and things as resources for investment, alienating them from the entanglements of 
living, the substantive economy of the knowledge ecology enables to pay attention to the 
myriad of interconnections that make predatory or symbiotic relations between organizations 
in the ecology of the university possible. Wright gives some examples of more livable 
university habitats such as the cooperative university of Mondragon, the trust universities, and 
                                                        
55 These examples correspond to the policies of respectively Chile, Australia and New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and Denmark (Wright, 2017).  
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the free universities. Besides, she refers to the reclaiming movements that are organizing 
themselves in many universities around the world (Shore & Wright, 2017; Wright, Greenwood, 
& Boden, 2011).  
A few remarks conclude this section on Wright’s work on the university in the knowledge 
ecology. First of all, Wright’s careful and precise ethnographic analysis allows to map the way 
in which a myriad of commercial and other organizations relate to the university nowadays. 
This makes it possible to shed light on how the university has to position itself if it wishes to 
survive, but also on a variety of alternative forms of university organizations that relate critically 
to the trends and developments Wright has mapped. To a rather great extent, however, the 
university is still seen as a monolithic whole of which core values such as freedom, autonomy, 
and its public character, need to be defended in an increasingly hostile environment. Invoking 
the term ecology as a methodological lens with which to study the relationships between the 
university and its surrounding organizations, seems to involve a critical-normative perspective. 
It is indeed argued that when conceived of as a bundle of dynamic entanglements with other 
organizations, instead of as an isolated whole, the university is more apt to engage in 
symbiotic relationships with its contiguous organizations.  
In opposition to Barnett, for whom it was necessary to keep both the theoretical and the 
normative understanding of ecology separate, Wright makes a call for a livable landscape in 
which universities can flourish and that fosters entanglements in which the university can 
participate while keeping to its own value framework. In the next section, a third possibility will 
be put forward. Instead of presenting an idea of the university inspired by the discourse of 
ecology, or proposing an ecological framework to understand the university in relation to other 
organizations, the case will be made to focus on the practices of the university and hence to 
inquire the possibility of an ecology of practices.  
 
 
A Third Ecology 
 
At the end of the first chapter, it has been argued that an ecological perspective could be 
relevant to consider the relation between university and society. The first two sections of the 
current chapter have been devoted to a presentation and analysis of two such perspectives 
with regard to the university. Barnett’s ecological university, as has been argued, can be 
placed in the tradition of the university as idea, dating back to Kant. Wright’s critical analysis 
of the universities in the knowledge economy entails a great deal of the concerns of the 
literature on academic capitalism, including its conception of the university as organization. 
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As such, the work of Barnett and Wright takes the relay from respectively the literature of ideas 
and the discourse on academic capitalism in explicitly ecological terms. We have seen that 
both theoretical strands have always already dealt with issues concerning the inside and the 
outside of the university, its relation to the state and the economy, but with Barnett and Wright 
these ways of theorizing become ecological through and through. They respond to the first 
challenge posed by the medieval university, namely to think the university in close relation to 
its environment.  
However, they do not respond to the challenge formulated based on a comparison 
between the transcendental-philosophical and the critical-sociological literature, namely to 
understand the university in a non-institutional manner, as universitas. Indeed, it has been 
argued that what connects the university as idea and the university as organization is a 
common reliance on the institution of the university as a unit of analysis, albeit in relation to 
its environment. This was the first reason to reach back to the medieval university. We have 
seen that the communitarian ideal of universitas provided a model for the gatherings of 
students and masters around texts in the course of the long 12th century. Perhaps the newly 
formed universitates can point to a third possibility that allows to inherit the work of Barnett 
and Wright in a way that stays loyal to their ecological commitment but succeeds in omitting 
the university as institution. This means that it is not our aim here to criticize or to point out 
where Barnett and Wright were wrong. The question is rather again how to make the relay, 
how to take in hands what has been held out, how to compose with two diverging lines of 
thought.  
The medieval concept of universitas has helped here as it denotes at the same time – as 
we have seen – association and guild. The medieval universitas is not an institution but a 
gathering. It is however not any kind of gathering as it bears resemblances with the guilds. 
These were technical associations that practice a craft. Expanding on this, it might be 
interesting to think about the university as a mangle of practices instead of an institution. It is 
important to underscore that this historico-etymological argument here should not be 
understood as a final and watertight answer to the challenge of thinking the university without 
taking recourse to its institutional existence. It is rather to be conceived as an inspiring directive 
in taking the relay, knowing that there are many other ways in doing so. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I will outline the basic tenets of what has come to be known as the ‘practice turn’ 
in social theory and I will present the first major interlocutor, Isabelle Stengers, who has 
developed an ecology of practices.  
The focus on practices in social theory (instead of, for instance, discourses, structures, or 
systems) emerged in the course of the 1980s. Some theorists have even claimed that there 
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was a real practice turn comparable to the linguistic turn the academic world went through 
during the beginning of the 20th century.56 At the moment, one of the most prominent voices 
in this intellectual movement is Theodore R. Schatzki. His work will be used to give a general 
overview of the so-called practice turn.57 An extensive introduction of Schatzki’s practice 
theory will be omitted.58 Instead he will be read as a theorist of practice theory. While 
contextualizing the practice turn, Schatzki (1996) describes the history of social theory as one 
in which two master concepts dominated, viz. the society and the individual.  
Schatzki explains that under the denominator of society, we find the perspectives that 
privilege the social as a totality that is more than the sum of its parts. This implies that the 
social totality has an existence beyond that of its parts and that it can be regarded as an 
explanatory principle for the behavior of the parts. The notion of society as a bounded and 
unified totality has guided theorists such as Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Malinowski, Althusser, 
Parsons, and Luhmann. Critics of this approach claim that the totalizing view of sociality 
neglects the “contingent, shifting, and fragile relations among social phenomena that weave 
them into ever-changing constellations” (Schatzki, 1996, p. 2).  
Schatzki mentions two theorists who have critiqued such a totalizing view of social 
relations and have initiated a different approach to the social. Firstly, Zygmunt Bauman 
proposes a kaleidoscopic view of society in which social order is at once momentary and 
contingent. He compares it to a whirlpool in a flow of water, retaining its shape only for a brief 
period of time and at the expense of constant renewal of content (cf. Bauman, 2000). In his 
analysis of power, Michel Foucault, secondly, attends to local and small-scale phenomena, 
such as drill exercises or prophylactic campaigns. Power, a central category in his thought, is 
conceived of as flowing through a web of relations of force among individuals that find 
themselves in miscellaneous social formations, such as the prison, the hospital, or the school. 
                                                        
56 See, for instance: Ortner (1984); Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, & von Savigny (2001). From a Schatzkian 
perspective it is arguable that the practice turn is an outcome of the linguistic turn, since his 
understanding of practice theory is heavily indebted to the thought of Heidegger and especially 
Wittgenstein. For a discussion of the practice turn in educational theory, see: Higgs, Barnett, Billet, 
Hutchings, & Trede (2012). It is worth mentioning that in the latter volume practice theory as a 
methodological perspective is conflated with an understanding of practice theory as a didactical method. 
57 Stengers, whose concept of practice will be discussed later on, is critical of the idea of describing 
these movements in terms of turns. Her argument is that describing these often small theoretical shifts 
in focus in terms of turns is not to the benefit of intellectual discussions. According to her, the only ones 
who benefit from these so-called turns are the publishing houses. Hence, she persistently places 
practice turn between quotation marks. 
58 Schatzki’s own project for a practice theory is heavily indebted to the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
foregrounding the understanding and intelligibility of the tacit rules that govern practices. As a result, 
his approach understood the social initially mainly as what happens between human beings (see 
Schatzki (1996)). Later on, presumably under the influence of sociomaterial approaches to social 
theory, Schatzki was moved to attribute a greater importance to the material environments or 
arrangements in which practices take place (see Schatzki (2002)).  
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This view requires an ascending analysis of power, starting from its infinitesimal mechanisms, 
techniques, and tactics (cf. Foucault, 1977, 2000). Due to theoretical critiques, thinking the 
social as a bounded and united totality hence has become problematic.  
Mutatis mutandis, the same goes for thinking the social world as consisting of 
interrelations among individuals that are autonomous and free. Game theory, neoclassical 
economics, symbolic interactionism, and most versions of ethnomethodology are examples of 
schools of thought that employ an individualistic understanding of the social according to 
Schatzki. Critiques of this tradition have focused on the fact that the individual requires 
initiation in social structures of signification, or that the subject itself is fragmented and lacking 
unity. Julia Kristeva, for instance, drawing on the Lacanian lexicon, states that a human being 
only becomes self-conscious and intentional by mastering the signifier/signified structure of 
language. This structure is shared, transcends the individual and is moreover constitutive of 
its becoming (cf. Kristeva, 1991). Instead of focusing on the social constitution of the subject, 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, conceptualize how subject positions, such as ‘mother’, 
‘Catholic’, ‘professor’, and ‘lesbian’ function as identifications that enter into and help compose 
who people are. From this point of view, a person is a particular ensemble of subject positions 
she assumes whilst participating in various social arenas that can entertain more or less 
antagonistic relationships towards one another (cf. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). 
As an alternative to these either individualizing, or totalizing social ontologies, theory 
development of the late 20th century saw an increasing interest in the concept of practice and 
its promise to provide a middle way between the individual and society as a whole: “Practices 
are where the realms of sociality and individual mentality/activity are at once organized and 
linked. Both social order and individuality, in other words, result from practices” (Schatzki, 
1996, p. 13). In spite of the diversity of practice theories, Schatzki (2012) argues that the 
concept of practice can be characterized by three main features.59  
The first is that a practice is “an organized constellation of different people’s activities” (p. 
13). This means that different people are involved and brought together by an activity that 
unfolds according to a more or less organized structure. It is assumed that the people engaged 
in the activity know the tacit rules of the activity which not only means that they know what to 
do and how to do it but also that they know how to go on with the activity given unforeseen 
circumstances. As such, practices, according to Schatzki, are shared social situations in which 
                                                        
59 Bourdieu and Giddens are considered the first ones to embrace the concept of practice as a way to 
innovate social theory. Other practice theorists include Dreyfus, Taylor, Lyotard, Reckwitz, Shove, and 
Kemmis. 
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the different participants have certain expectations from each other’s activities and act 
accordingly.  
The second feature is that important characteristics of human life or social phenomena 
such as science, power, and social change must be understood as rooted in the organized 
activities of multiple people. A person’s individual behavior cannot, for instance, be understood 
outside of the context of the practice in which this person participates. From a methodological 
point of view, this means that practice theorists will focus not so much on science, economics, 
or politics in general, but rather on specific scientific practices (e.g. conducting an experiment), 
on economic practices (e.g. negotiating a price), and on political practices (e.g. a debate in 
the parliament).  
The last basic tenet of practice theory is that human activity rests on implicit rule-following 
and knowing how to go on. This non-propositional tacit knowledge is bodily. As such, practice 
theoretical accounts of social phenomena aim to challenge the modernist subject-object 
distinction, or the mind-body split. Being involved in practices means indeed not so much 
having a clear idea about what this means, but rather being capable of performing the activities 
of the practice according to the expectations that circulate around it.  
This last characteristic, the blurring of the boundary between subject and object – or 
human and non-human actors in a more contemporary vocabulary – is also a strongly 
developed idea in the work of Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, and other authors in the 
disciplines of sociology of science, philosophy of science, sociology of technology, and 
science and technology studies.60 They understand science as something that is always in the 
making, encompassing activities such as perfecting scientific instruments, writing articles, and 
having coffee machine conversations between colleagues. Another author that is situated in 
this field of philosophy of science is Isabelle Stengers whose concept of practice will be central 
in the remainder of this dissertation. She describes the practice-theoretical point of view as 
follows: “Nothing is 'done'. Everything is to be negotiated, adjusted, aligned, and the term 
'practice' refers to the manner in which these negotiations, adjustments, and alignments 
constrain and specify individual activities without determining them” (Stengers, 2006a, p. 
62).61  
The scientist, from a practice-theoretical perspective, in short, situates herself in a field, 
but not one that structures or dictates her behavior, but rather one that constrains her activities 
in the light of what can or cannot be risked, hence taking into account the consequences her 
                                                        
60 See, for instance: Latour (1987, 2005b); Latour & Woolgar (1986); Pickering (1995).  
61 “Rien n’est ‘tout fait’. Tout est à négocier, à ajuster, à aligner, et le terme ‘pratique’ désigne la manière 
dont ces négociations, ajustements, alignements contraignent et spécifient les activités individuelles 
sans pour autant les déterminer”. 
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action may involve. As such, Stengers’ concept of practice has a strong sense of open-
endedness. Science – or politics, or religion, or economics, for that matter – are always 
unfinished endeavors, in the making. This, however, does not mean that anything goes in a 
practice or that every practice is like any other. Stengers argues that practices are recalcitrant, 
have their own ways of defending their borders by means of inclusion and exclusion, and she 
proposes to draw out the specificity of a practice by means of investigating its requirements 
and obligations – two central notions in the practice theory of Stengers that will be explained 
and discussed in Chapter Three of this dissertation.  
 
 
Situating Stengers 
 
This section aims to present the major concerns of Isabelle Stengers and elucidate why she 
became a philosopher in the first place. Describing her intellectual trajectory and the events 
that cause her to think, will clarify the relevance of her work when writing about the question 
of the university and its relation to society. I discern three heavily interrelated problems that 
situate Stengers. In short, the first problem concerns the relation between the experimental 
sciences and the humanities. The second problem has to do with the relation between science 
and the public. The third problem, at last, concerns what Stengers prophetically calls the 
intrusion of Gaia. This section follows Stengers’ intellectual biography which provides the 
necessary information to distinguish the three problems and to understand their interrelations.   
Stengers entered the university as a chemistry student, but already quite soon she 
understood that she could not ask the questions that interested her most at a faculty of 
science. As a chemist she felt mobilized towards the questions and discussions that were 
recognized as relevant to the discipline, while the problems that caused her to think were more 
fundamental. After a few years she chose to desert and to reorient towards philosophy, a field 
that she retrospectively considers a refuge for the lost causes of the sciences, whom she 
considers as:  
 
refugees seeking in philosophy a host country, even, more precisely, political refugees, 
researchers who come to philosophy because the questions they want to ask, and that 
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their country of origin has led them to ask, is now refusing to acknowledge these 
questions as theirs (Stengers, 2004a, p. 42).62  
 
However, after obtaining her degree in philosophy, Stengers returns to the sciences and 
starts to work under the supervision of Ilya Prigogine. She contributes to his research into 
chaos theory, dissipative structures, and irreversibility. Together, they publish two books. In 
Entre le temps et l’éternité, they deal with the problem of the arrow of time and argue that 
physics’ focus on the universality of the laws behind natural phenomena has led to a neglect 
of the aspect of temporality. By introducing the arrow of time, Prigogine and Stengers (1992) 
pave the way for an indeterminist physics that attends to processes of becoming. In La 
nouvelle alliance they reconsider the relation between the sciences and the world, pleading 
for a more integrative understanding of their coexistence – a theme which will continue to play 
an important role in her work (Prigogine & Stengers, 1986). They propose to understand the 
production of scientific knowledge as “a ‘poetic listening’ to nature and to natural processes in 
nature, open processes of production and invention, in an open, productive, and inventive 
world” (Stengers & Prigogine, 1997, pp. 58-59).  
Stengers considers her time in Prigogine’s laboratory as a real apprenticeship during 
which she learned that science can be a lively, demanding, and inventive practice. She 
understood that science is in the first instance not a question of belief in the unity of intelligibility 
of the world, the physicist’s faith as she will later relate this to Max Planck (cf. Stengers, 2010). 
Rather, scientists are passionate and the physicist’s passion does not interfere with the lucidity 
of her investigations. Moreover, she learned that the humanities and social sciences – with 
which she became acquainted in the meantime – differ in some respects greatly from the 
experimental sciences. Here we touch upon the first problem, namely the relation between the 
experimental sciences and the social sciences.63 
In an interview, she explains that for social sciences it is harder to create a situation in 
which one can study an issue in depth. For the experimental sciences, it suffices to create an 
experimental apparatus which makes it possible to ask a specific question. For the humanities 
and social sciences, it is hardly possible to mimic such a situation because the respondents 
answer all too easily. The problem is, if the aim is to resemble the experimental sciences, to 
create the power relations that allow for making a difference between scientists and those who 
respond, and here the problem becomes indeed political. Imitating the experimental sciences 
                                                        
62 “des exilés cherchant en philosophie une terre d’accueil, voire, plus précisément, des réfugiés 
politiques, des chercheurs qui viennent en philosophie parce que les questions qu’ils veulent poser, et 
que leur terre d’origine les a menés à poser, cette terre refuse de les reconnaître pour siennes”. 
63 The terms humanities and social sciences are used interchangeably.  
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implies to create situations where the scientist can analyze the answers in a way that short-
circuits the respondent’s speech, and that situates the other in a framework that allows to 
detect the objective meanings of the responses uttered, of which the respondent is unaware 
(Stengers & Deléage, 2014).  
Such a strong demarcation, however, is according to Stengers too simple. Political events 
force the humanities to change, exactly because some people take the word and refuse to be 
reduced to an unconsciously uttered meaning. Her own work with users of illicit drugs has 
shown that because of their refusal to be identified as victims that should be helped in spite of 
themselves, these people managed to affirm themselves as citizens like any other, causing 
the expertise concerning the subject of drug abuse to change (cf. Stengers & Ralet, 1991). 
Moreover, she makes clear that the humanities have not invented the problem of the equality 
of men and women. Rather, the humanities were forced to change because others have 
foregrounded this problem through social and political struggle (Stengers & Deléage, 2014). 
The question of the relation between the experimental sciences and the humanities causes 
Stengers to think about the relation between science and society, a challenge that she will 
take up at various points in her work.  
Further inquiry into the issue of the relation between the experimental sciences and the 
humanities has brought Stengers to psychoanalysis. She discerns in the work of Freud the 
ambition to create a real experimental laboratory. In La volonté de faire science, Stengers 
(2006b) argues that the aim of Freudian psychoanalysis was exactly to transform the human 
being into an experimentally reliable subject that testifies to the functioning of the unconscious. 
From her work with Léon Chertok, she learned that hypnosis constitutes a major problem for 
those who believe that they can prove, like in the experimental sciences, that they have in no 
way induced the answer elicited from their respondent. The hypnotized subject demonstrates 
in a more dramatic fashion that he – and hence everybody – although less dramatically, 
accepts to play the role the question suggests. The subject’s speech and her susceptibility for 
suggestion problematizes the idea of a social science modelled after the experimental 
sciences as it is impossible to arrive at a truly ‘objective’ utterance without suggestion (Chertok 
& Stengers, 1989, 1990).  
Consequently, Stengers renounces the temptation of the humanities to pursue 
resemblances with the experimental sciences where in fact the differences should be 
emphasized. Understanding science as a unified and ossified category obstructs the 
possibility to conceive of the variety of scientific practices, pertaining to both experimental 
sciences and humanities, as they diverge. In her work with Prigogine as well as in her work 
with Chertok, Stengers recurrently encountered these problems concerning the identity of 
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science and its relationship with politics. She agitates against an idea of science that limits 
itself to a description of the world as it is, and attempts to think science as interested in what 
the world is capable of, hence open to participation of the world it studies (Stengers, 2003c). 
Dissolving the amalgam of Modern Science and opening up a space where knowledge 
practices, which – as we will see – seem also always to be practices of care and attention, 
can flourish, comes to be Stengers’ main project as a philosopher of science.  
Via a close reading of consecutive scientific debates in classical mechanics, 
thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, complexity theory, and biology the seven volumes of 
Cosmopolitiques aim to break open the ground for what she calls an ecology of practices, an 
approach which proposes to understand scientific practices via their specific requirements and 
obligations and hence allows for understanding their divergences instead of bringing the 
‘sanctioned’ under the denominator of modern science while expelling other – ‘nonscientific’ 
– practices to the realms of irrationality. As such, Stengers renounces strong divisions 
between the rational and the irrational, the objective and the subjective, fact and value, those 
who know and those who believe. She rather tries to think their intertwinement via the 
practices that produced them in the first place.  
Science, in the conception elaborated in the course of the seven volumes, is not about 
finding pre-existing truths, but is rather a constructive endeavor, an interdependent, diverse, 
and contingent system, that through specific practices helps to shape the truths it discovers 
(Stengers, 2003a, 2003b). The ecology of scientific practices will be presented and discussed 
at length in the third chapter. While Cosmopolitiques constructs a strong and well-grounded 
internal understanding of scientific practices, Stengers’ more recent work explicitly bets on the 
possibility of using this conception of scientific practice to tighten the links between science 
and society while preserving a space for other-than-scientific knowledge practices (Stengers, 
2006a). Events like the sudden involvement of the public in the discussion around genetically 
modified organisms (GMO) for instance, cause Stengers to reconsider the democratic 
dimension of scientific practices. It produced, she writes,  
 
a collective and widely shared learning process, weaving relations among the question 
of intensive industrial agriculture, environmentally destructive pesticides and fertilizers, 
the danger of monocultures, the monopoly on seeds, the patent policy, the problem of 
genetic transfer and acquired resistances, the direct enslaving of public research to 
the private sector by the knowledge economy, and the resulting conflicts of interest 
that make contemporary expertise deeply unreliable (Stengers, 2017a, p. 390). 
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She understands this process as a transversalization of different struggles, since it linked 
together discussions on seeds, law, science, pests, soils, production strategies, politics, 
development aid, and knowledge dispersal into a hybrid forum.  
What happened was that an assemblage of shareholders came into being around an 
issue that is of importance to all of them, although in different ways, in a manner that makes 
the insistence of the question resonate, that made them feel that there is something more 
important than their own particular interests, namely their shared future and how it could be 
affected by GMOs (Stengers, 2013a, 2017a). Stengers’ question of the relation between 
science and society, or how to think a science that is democratic in the sense that it allows the 
people it deals with a chance to redefine the situation in their own terms, is suddenly taken up 
into a more general discussion on the involvement of the public in scientific debate on the one 
hand, and the problem of the responsibility of the sciences for what becomes of the world on 
the other hand. Stengers considers the GMO-event, the fact that the public started to meddle 
in questions that matter to them in spite of their lack of scientific expertise, as a powerful 
possible, causing her to speculatively extend the scope of this event to retake the problem of 
the relation between science and society.  
The challenge we face today, according to Stengers (2013a), and which requires a new 
alliance between scientific practices and public discussion, is how to respond to what she calls 
the intrusion of Gaia – and this is the third problem. It is important to emphasize that Gaia is 
neither the Earth in the concrete, nor is it a name for she who is invoked to stress our 
connection to the Earth. The bastard of 20th century science and ancient paganism, Greek 
mythology and the Gaia-hypothesis formulated by Lovelock and Margulis, she is the living 
assemblage of oceans, atmospheres, plants, climates, micro-organisms, animals. She is the 
one that holds together in her own particular way and who responds in an unexpected manner 
to the questions that are addressed to one of her constitutive processes often bringing into 
play all of them (Stengers, 2014). Long before the Greeks conferred on their Gods a sense of 
justice and an interest in our destinies, Gaia already was the one who was feared by the 
peasants since they knew all too well that they depended on something greater than them and 
that nevertheless tolerated them, but in a way, that should not be abused. She was a cause 
for care and attention, hence definitely not to be offended. Today, this margin of tolerance has 
been transgressed, ticklish and irritable Gaia has been provoked. Utterly indifferent to the 
question who is responsible, Gaia is not interested in our response to her intrusion. She asks 
nothing of us. It is not she who is threatened today, as the micro-organisms will safeguard her 
existence as a living planet, with or without Man. Naming Gaia as the one who is provoked, 
as the one who intrudes, as the question of our time means to decentralize mankind, and to 
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pave the way for an unprecedented or forgotten form of transcendence: “a transcendence 
deprived of the noble qualities that would allow it to be invoked as an arbiter, guarantor, or 
resource; a ticklish assemblage of forces that are indifferent to our reasons and our projects” 
(Stengers, 2015a, p. 47).  
Here, we touch upon the concern which turns the three problems outlined above into 
causes for thinking. In an autobiographical text, Stengers proposes the following question as 
central to her work: “What has made us so vulnerable, so ready to justify the destructions 
committed in the name of progress?" (Stengers, 2004a, p. 68).64 She wonders how the present 
situation of ecological deterioration has come about, especially how we as human beings have 
paved the way for environmental destruction. Stengers argues that capitalist modes of 
production have injured the practices in which humans as well as non-humans participated in 
order to take care for the world, to pay attention to it. She warns for the devastating effects 
capitalist catchwords such as flexibility and competition have on the way we relate to 
ourselves, to others, and to the world. Inspired by Félix Guattari’s three ecologies, she asserts 
that this discourse and its correlated policies have an impact on an individual, a social, as well 
as an environmental level. It has for instance, severely damaged scientific practices, distorted 
their entanglement with the world in a quest for individual gain or profitable results, and 
impoverished the mental activities of the researchers involved. She argues that the damage 
brought to the Earth is correlated with the atrophy of practices of care and attention – often 
swept away as irrational by the standardized and sanctioned practices of modern science –, 
and the numbing of thought that scientists and other people involved in these practices can 
afford to bear on the issues that concern them. Stengers’ plea is to reclaim these practices, to 
rehabilitate their force, and nurture their inventiveness, in the light of the destructions 
capitalism has brought to them (Stengers, 2013a, 2013b; Stengers & Deléage, 2014).  
To conclude this section, it is important to emphasize that these three problems – the 
problem of the relation between experimental sciences and social sciences, the problem of 
the relation between science and the public, and the problem of the relation between science 
and the world – are interrelated and constitute the web of problems in which Stengers situates 
herself. On a general level, she is concerned about the ecological devastations capitalist 
science has brought to the world. Related to this first problem, is her second concern, namely 
how the public can let its voice be heard within the scientific discussion, which is, from a 
Stengersian point of view at least, never a joust with facts but rather a coming together of 
interested interlocutors around something that matters to them, and hence requires 
                                                        
64 “Qu’est-ce qui nous a rendus si vulnérables, si prêts à justifier les destructions commises au nom du 
progrès?” 
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consideration. Part of this problem is the first problem which concerns the relation between 
experimental sciences and social sciences, and how both make what they study come to 
matter (or not). I have shed light on what causes Stengers to think and what situates her as a 
philosopher. The different problems that are sketched out above will return in the second part 
where I discuss the ecology of practices which has a bearing on the three of them. In the next 
section, I will shift the discussion from what causes Stengers to think to what thinking means 
for Stengers as a philosopher.  
 
 
Towards an Ecology of Practices 
 
In this final section of the first part, I will unpack some of the characteristics of the thinking of 
Stengers. These characteristics will be brought forward in relation to some of the theoretical 
sources Stengers draws from. Characteristics, moreover, that have a bearing on her 
conception of the ecology of practices which will be presented in short. A more elaborate 
discussion of the ecology of practices and how it can come to bear on the question of the 
university and its relation to society will follow in Part Two  
In her struggle for a science that is both respectful to the world it inquires, including its 
many inhabitants, as well as considerate with regard to what it, due to the inventions of 
science, can become capable of, Stengers’ brothers in arms are Leibniz, Whitehead, and 
Deleuze, three philosophers from who she has learned to say ‘and’ when others are inclined 
to see ‘or’ and that help her to elaborate a philosophy that is reconciliatory, but nonetheless 
recalcitrant. Short characterizations of Stengers’ relation to the work of these philosophers will 
help to give an impression of how Stengers conceives of her position as a theorist.  
From Leibniz, firstly, she has learned the art of diplomacy, and a way to think variation as 
irreductive, this means that nothing is entirely the same as anything else, or entirely opposite. 
She keeps true to what she calls the Leibnizian constraint, viz. the requirement not to go 
against the established sentiments but rather to find a way to compose with them in order to 
arrive at a non-exclusive world. This means to think a world that does not ban those who are 
from the dominant point of view considered as irrational, but rather tries to find ways – and 
here the diplomacy comes in – to engage in a conversation with these sentiments, instead of 
against them. It means to take up responsibility for the consequences of what is said and 
done, just like a mathematician respects the requirements that make his problem meaningful 
and interesting. A mathematical discovery indeed does not imply the destruction of definitions 
and questions of the past. The old terms are preserved as a specific aspect of a transformed 
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definition that elicits new questions. Leibniz, himself a mathematician, knew this all too well, 
she claims. Similarly, the Leibnizian constraint unites truth and becoming by tying to the 
enunciation that one believes to be true the responsibility not to obstruct becoming. This 
implies to take up old definitions in new problems and questions (Stengers, 2000). In the third 
chapter, we will clarify how Leibnizian diplomacy allowed Stengers to make a peaceful 
intervention during the so-called science wars of the 1990s.   
From Whitehead, secondly, Stengers inherits the struggle against the bifurcation of nature 
and a commitment to a more integrative experience and understanding of reality. With the 
bifurcation of nature Whitehead described the split of reality into objective nature, a reality that 
is mute, devoid of values, and insensible, on the one hand, and subjective nature, a reality 
which is full of colors, sounds, and emotions, on the other hand. When seeing a sunset, a 
physicist could describe it in terms of waves and molecules, whereas the poet could celebrate 
its colorfulness and the glow in which the sunset covers the landscape. Both the physicist and 
the poet have an experience of the same sunset. What differs is the way they pay attention to 
it and the abstractions they produce in order to communicate their experience of the sunset. 
Our abstractions are what we experience a specific and concrete situation with. They pave 
the way for a certain kind of experience, rather than another. Compare, for instance, the 
experience of the physicist and the poet. In spite of the fact that they both witnessed the same 
event, the same sunset, each had a particular experience of this event based on the 
abstractions he experienced this event with. This does not mean that there have been two 
sunsets that are mutually incompatible or of which one is more real than the other. Likewise, 
this does not mean that the physicist’s account of the sunset in terms of radiation does more 
justice to the event than the poet’s account of the sunset in terms of illumination, that it would 
be more ‘real’. Rather, it is a matter of the abstractions with which both gentlemen have 
experienced the event of the sunset. Together with Whitehead, Stengers understands the task 
of philosophy as civilizing our abstractions through a welding of imagination and common 
sense. New abstract propositions can be a lure for the possible, to become attentive to an 
event, and to make something come to matter in a certain way rather than another (Stengers, 
2011e).  
Deleuze, whom Latour (1997) has called Stengers’ “only true mentor” (p. xii), thirdly, has 
been a highly inspirational philosopher for Stengers. Already in her early work with Prigogine 
she engaged with his ideas concerning time and becoming to think the problem of irreversibility 
in physics. From him, she learned what she calls to think through the middle. This means not 
to think from points of departure or fundaments, neither from points of arrival or ends, but 
rather through what is happening, and to understand what is happening as a complex process 
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of becoming in which different lines of divergence meet or part ways. Thinking through the 
middle requires to leave the point from which it is possible to judge – a judgement that can be 
based on principles or desired results – and forces to follow the situation where it leads. It 
makes it possible to think conjunction – and… and… – where there was only disjunction – 
or… or… And this, moreover, not by adding different causes that others would oppose, but 
rather to transform them so they are not mutually exclusive anymore. This resonates indeed 
with what before has been called Leibnizian diplomacy. For Stengers, as it was for Deleuze, 
thinking is creation and invention, instead of denunciation or deconstruction. It means to set 
out on an adventure knowing that “there is no adventure without a risky relation to an 
environment that has the power to complicate this adventure, or even to doom it to failure” 
(Stengers, 2011e, p. 18). 
Bringing these three theoretical commitments that Stengers has inherited together, it is 
possible to characterize Stengers’ thinking as at once constructivist, speculative, and 
pragmatic and it is – as will become clear in the next part – along these axes that also her 
ecology of practices can be understood. In explaining this characterization of Stengers’ 
thinking the reader will get already a first impression of her project of the ecology of practices. 
First of all, Stengers’ thinking can be characterized as constructivist. Her constructivist 
approach is echoed in her concept of practice. A practice, according to Stengers cannot be 
understood based on some kind of transcendental principle that would guarantee the practice 
its existence (e.g. a foundational knowledge or a universal aim). Each practice is always a 
specific, concrete holding together of human and other-than-human actors (e.g. a molecule, 
a microscope, a God, a text), situated at a particular moment in time and space. It is a radically 
contingent event. From a constructivist point of view, every statement concerning the nature 
of a practice (e.g. ‘scientific discovery is motivated by a general love for wisdom’) does not 
legitimize the practice from a transcendental point of view, but is rather an active ingredient in 
the self-maintenance of this practice, how it brings people together, how it understands its 
own functioning, and how it defends its borders (Stengers, 2005b). 
As constructions however, practices are no static entities. They are subject to 
transformations and change. At this point, the second characteristic of Stengers’ thinking, 
speculation, comes in. A speculative approach, according to Stengers, has nothing to do with 
formulating guesses as to the question why reality is as it is. Rather, it has to do with paying 
attention to the possible that makes itself felt in the course of practices. It is this possible that 
is present that bears the promise of transformation and change, that, indeed, there is an 
alternative. Thinking about the relation between a constructivist and a speculative mode of 
theorizing, Stengers (2002) writes that:  
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To try to think together, while knowing that we are, should be, and must continue to 
present ourselves as unable to transcend the actual limitations of this togetherness or 
to escape toward some dreamed of universality, is, I would submit, the very stamp of 
a constructivist philosophy. Speculation thus becomes not the discovery of the hidden 
truth justifying reality, but a crucial ingredient in the construction of reality (p. 239). 
 
Speculation, hence plays an important role in the way practitioners experience being part of a 
practice and its potential for change.  
Lastly, the mode of thinking Stengers proposes, can be termed pragmatic. Stengers 
explains that pragmatism has to do with care for the consequences. It avoids every ‘now we 
know… and thus…’ that links a so-called universal knowledge to a particular circumstance via 
the law of applicability. Instead, it forces to pay attention to the specific ways in which this 
knowledge comes to matter in this situation, and which chain of consequences it sets in effect. 
Moreover, and coupling back to the speculative-constructivist understanding of practice, it 
makes present how the relation between the philosopher and the practices she theorizes 
about can be conceived. Philosophy, in the Stengersian understanding, is in short not so much 
about describing a practice as it is, but an attempt to activate the sense of the possible, a 
speculative gesture (Stengers, 2015b).  
Conceptualizing practices from a Stengersian perspective requires to create new relations 
with scientists and to rethink the relations between the world and its scientists.65 Calling 
Stengers approach to practice pragmatic does not involve that every idea or proposition would 
be reduced to the consequences it plays into, to what it ‘yields’ so to say. It rather requires 
refusing a separation between an idea or proposition and its consequences. It makes the 
question of the consequences, and our obligation to take care of them, present. Thought, in 
this understanding, takes as its point of departure the possible in the world, instead of the 
world as it is, and hence need to bear in mind the consequences of its creations (Debaise & 
Stengers, 2017).  
By means of this characterization of Stengers’ philosophy as constructivist, speculative, 
and pragmatic, the reader will have gained a sense of what it means to think with Stengers as 
well as have acquired a preliminary understanding of Stengers’ concept of practice. In the next 
                                                        
65 Endorsing a pragmatist conception of truth and foregrounding the researcher’s standpoint in studying 
its ‘population’, taking an interest in creating new possible relations with this ‘population’, or a so-called 
pragmatics of alliance, Stengers places herself in the feminist tradition of sociology of science (cf. Hilary 
Rose, Sandra Harding, Donna Haraway, Joseph Rouse, etc.). 
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part, Stengers’ ecology of practices will be discussed at length. To conclude this first part, 
however, I will summarize the argument thus far.  
 
  
Relay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this part has been to review the literature on the relation between university and 
society. In the first chapter, I have discerned two broad strands of literature that deal with this 
question. The first strand of literature is the tradition of writing texts about the idea of the 
university and how it reflects back on the institutional structure of the university. This tradition 
goes back to Germany around the beginning of the 19th century, but has spread over other 
countries as well. Famous texts in this line of thought include Kant’s The conflict of the 
faculties, Humboldt’s On the spirit and the organizational framework of intellectual institutions 
in Berlin, and Newman’s The idea of a university. I have called the approach these texts adopt 
vis-à-vis the relation between university and society a transcendental-philosophical approach 
and I have demonstrated that in this mode of reasoning the university comes to the fore as an 
idea.  
For the second strand of literature, we had to go to the United States of America a few 
decades after World War II. As the economy had shifted from an industrial economy based on 
the production of commodified goods to a knowledge economy based on the creation and 
circulation of commodified knowledge contents (cf. patents) and high-tech products, the place 
of the university in society had altered. The second strand of literature analyzes and critically 
reflects on these developments that are grouped together under the denominator of academic 
capitalism. It can be argued that Kerr’s book on The uses of the university has been seminal 
in setting the research agenda for investigating the changing role of the university in society. 
I have called the approach that researchers in this line of thinking adopt with regard to the 
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relation between university and society a critical-sociological approach and I have shown that 
in their studies the university is conceived of as an organization. 
In comparing the two approaches to the university, it was striking that in spite of clear 
differences in aims and scope, both seem to rely on an understanding of the university as 
institution. As such, it has been argued that although both literatures conceive of the university 
as either idea or organization respectively, they find common ground in the university as 
institution. Whereas the first approach requires the university as institution in order to put flesh 
on the bone of the university as idea, the second approach relies on the university as institution 
in order to scrutinize the transformations it underwent while engaging with other organizations. 
I have argued that next to this point of convergence between both approaches, there is 
something else that both literatures seem to share, namely a forgetfulness with regard to the 
medieval university.  
By means of a concise excursus to the 12th century, I have shed light on the specific 
ingredients that have played a role in the coming into being of the university in different cities 
of medieval Europe. What stood out was that the early universities matured in close relation 
to societal and political issues (e.g. urbanization, religious struggle) and that they created the 
possibility to relate to these issues via the study of texts. These texts had become accessible 
due to translations and transcriptions, but most importantly is the fact that due to a shift 
towards what has been called university script, masters and students alike started to relate to 
the text in a different, more distanced way. These small-scale universities organized 
themselves as a universitas, a concept that had gained increasing importance in that time, not 
only for religious and political organization, but also for the organization of communities of 
artisans and craftsmen (e.g. weavers, cobblers, or masons).  
I have argued that not only due to the strong link between the early universities and the 
societal and political contexts in which they originated, but also due to the fact that both the 
transcendental-philosophical and the critical-sociological approach to the university emerged 
at times of a profound rescaling of social life (cf. the German nation-state, globalized 
capitalism), it could be interesting to adopt an ecological approach with regard to the topic of 
our research, more precisely one that attempts to grasp the university as entirely entangled in 
its environment. To conclude the first chapter, I have generally outlined three basic principles 
of an ecological approach, namely interdependency, generativity, and a concern for matters 
of living and dying on a shared planet. 
Sharpening my focus, the second chapter aimed to present the work of Ronald Barnett 
and Susan Wright, two authors who have already embraced an ecological approach to the 
university. Whereas Barnett has proposed an ecological university that engages with its 
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different ecosystems in the pursuit of their advancement and hence promotes world well-
being, Wright has mapped, analyzed, and criticized trends and developments that happen to 
the university in the knowledge economy which she proposes to grasp as a knowledge 
ecology. My argument has been that indeed both authors have adopted an ecological 
approach and hence have addressed the first challenge the medieval university poses. 
However, they did not address the second challenge of the medieval university, namely to 
understand the university as universitas, an association of masters and students that practice 
together the activity of studying. 
It is this meaning of universitas, as a practice, that I aim to put forward to open up an 
alternative understanding of the university. Welding my interest in an ecological approach with 
a focus on practices has brought me to Isabelle Stengers’ ecology of practices. The last 
sections of this chapter contained an introduction to the thought of Stengers, including what it 
means to think with Stengers, an endeavor that is at once constructivist, speculative, and 
pragmatic. The next part extensively deals with the ecology of practices. More precisely the 
focus will be on scientific practices on the one hand, and study practices on the other hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
Part Two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ecology of  
Practices 
  
 
  
Chapter Three 
Scientific Practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this second part is double. First, I want to explain Stengers’ theoretical work on the 
ecology of practices in its own right in the current chapter, and then to bring it to bear on the 
question of the relation between university and society with a specific interest in study in the 
next chapter. The three problems around which Stengers’ thought revolves discerned in the 
previous chapter (the relation between the experimental sciences and the humanities, the 
relation between the sciences and the public, and the intrusion of Gaia) will echo throughout 
both chapters. In the current chapter, I will outline the basic ideas and concepts of the ecology 
of practices, while staying close to Stengers’ work in philosophy of science. The fourth chapter 
then aims to inquire how study practices can be situated in this ecology of practices. Therefore 
I will turn to a proposition concerning the university that Whitehead uttered at the occasion of 
the inauguration of the Harvard Business School. Stengers’ scholarship on Whitehead will 
help to understand this proposition and to come to terms with the consequences it entails. In 
short, whereas the third chapter aims to present Stengers’ ecology of scientific practices, the 
fourth chapter aims to expand this ecology of practices by developing the concept of study 
practices. As such, the third chapter will mainly contain a concise presentation of Stengers’ 
work in philosophy of science. The fourth chapter then will offer an educational reading of 
Stengers’ work on the speculative philosophy of Whitehead situated by an interest in its 
potential to bear on the concept of study practices.  
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Scientists in Turmoil 
 
Before presenting the central concepts of Stengers’ ecology of practices, this section aims to 
explain how she situates herself in a socioscientific context that is marked by firstly, the quarrel 
between natural scientists and their deconstructivst readership that took place in the 1990s; 
secondly, the changing relations between modern science and its interlocutors from the state 
and the industry; and thirdly, the possibilities that are opened up by the involvement of the 
public in scientific debates.  
In the opening lines of L’invention des sciences modernes, published in 1993, Stengers 
foresaw the coming into being of a conflict between the natural sciences and their interpreters 
(Stengers, 2000, 2006a). For many decades, there had been a more or less peaceful 
interaction between chemists, physicists and other natural scientists on the one hand, and 
philosophers of science on the other. In the tradition of French epistemology for instance, 
authors such as Pierre Duhem and Gaston Bachelard have been conceptualizing the relations 
between societal or technological developments and scientific discovery without provoking the 
scientists’ anger (cf. Bensaude-Vincent, 2005). During the 1970s and 1980s, however, the 
analyses of the interpreters of the sciences became bolder as they became more politically 
pledged, claiming that the scientific endeavor is in fact a social practice like any other. This 
stance undermined the scientific claims to objectivity and neutrality, and smudged the 
reputation of science as a rational and decent enterprise. A reaction from the besieged 
scientists could not stay out. In 1994, the mathematician Norman Levitt and the biologist Paul 
R. Gross launched a first counter-strike with the publication of Higher Superstition. The 
Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science about the misuses and abuses of science for the 
advancement of political goals (Levitt & Gross, 1994). Stengers (2006a) explains that this 
event constituted the commencement of “la tragicomédie académico-médiatique” (p. 7) that 
came to be known as the Science Wars.67  
In 1996, the conflict crossed the Atlantic with the so-called Sokal affair. In the journal for 
postmodern cultural studies Social Text, the physicist Alan Sokal submitted a hoax article 
“Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” 
to prove that in spite of the nonsensical content of the article the editors would publish it, since 
the message pertains to an ideological stance close to the one endorsed by the editorial board. 
These two events are exemplary for the quarrels between natural scientists and academics 
from the humanities. It is clear that the natural scientists were irritated by the attacks against 
                                                        
67 For a more extensive account of this debate, see Gieryn (1999). 
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their field coming from the impostors of disciplines such as social studies in science, 
anthropology of science, and sociology of science. Inheriting from postmodern authors such 
as Lyotard and Derrida, these newly emerging perspectives on the sciences attempted to 
deconstruct natural science as a practice like any other and to demystify physicists’ claims to 
neutrality and objectivity (Stengers, 2000, 2006a). The critical and often virulent exchange 
between the more realist stances defended by the natural scientists and the more relativist 
positions advocated by their postmodern interpreters hardened the fronts between the 
different disciplines.68  
Next to this academic skirmish between the natural sciences and their critical-
deconstructivist readership, Stengers (2006a) discerns in the same time span a real change 
in the relationship between the sciences and their classical interlocutors, namely the state and 
the industry, especially in the fields of biotechnology and biomedicine.69 Related to this quarrel 
about the validity of truth claims uttered in the field of natural sciences is indeed the problem 
of the relation between science and society, or more specifically the social and economic 
institutions that make science possible and expect something in return. Stengers (2006a) 
argues that progressively, the industrial and state protagonists have broken their contract with 
the sciences in which they were assigned the role of disinterested sponsor of scientific 
research which guaranteed the autonomy of the scientific endeavour. Patenting of 
experimental results that were suddenly called inventions, systematic partnerships with private 
companies, and spin-offs announced what she has called the enslavement of scientific 
research to private interests.  
These developments pose a serious threat to the autonomy of research which, as became 
clear during the Science Wars, is so dear to the scientists. More precisely, it is conflictual with 
the view of the scientist as the goose with the golden eggs (Stengers, 2013b). This goose, 
that needs to be fed in order to produce, cannot, however, be forced to produce since such a 
coercion would damage the autonomy of scientific research, and hence its claim to objectivity, 
thus spoiling the eggs. In line with Dominique Pestre, Stengers (2006a) argues that this 
                                                        
68 As the time we live in today is often described as a post-truth era, it could be argued that the concerns 
of the mostly leftist natural scientists who spoke up during the Science Wars with regards to the relativist 
position promoted by the deconstructivists were justified. Denouncing the claims to truth uttered by the 
representatives of knowledge institutions has not opened a mode of living together beyond rationality 
and irrationality, hence doing away with the straightjacket of normality, but has rather served populism. 
Especially rightwing politicians proved to be very eager apprentices of the craft of critique, that allowed 
them to denounce scientific knowledge, for instance proof that climate change does indeed exist, as 
being part of a leftist ideological agenda (cf. Latour, 2004). 
69 To a certain extent Stengers’ description of the changing relations between the sciences on the one 
hand, and the state and the industry on the other hand, echoes concerns that were voiced by authors 
that in the first part were situated in the critical-sociological discourse on academic capitalism (Kerr, 
1963; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  
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specific image that scientists have of their work and its relation to the state and the industry, 
originated in the knowledge regime70 of the 1870s that proclaimed the idea that scientific 
research participates in the modernist project of the advancement of society and that, hence, 
it is justified to finance the work of scientists with public funding. In reality, however, in spite of 
its societal ambitions, this knowledge regime emerging at the end of the 19th century is 
specifically characterized by an intensification of the bonds between academic, industrial, 
military, and state interests. The analysis of Pestre shows that the autonomy of the sciences 
as the goose with the golden eggs, was deceitful from its inception onwards (Pestre, 2003; 
Stengers, 2006a).  
In order to evoke the predicament the sciences find themselves in, Stengers (2006a) 
refers to the painting Fight with Cudgels by Francisco de Goya.71 Depicted in the painting, we 
see two men fighting each other while a rising mud flow threatens to engulf them both. On the 
one side, we find the cultural studies that critically deconstruct the claims that are made within 
the scientific field. Their attack comes in the shape of a demystification of notions such as 
‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’, which scientists use to validate their work, and is aimed at 
unveiling the sociopolitical liability of the sciences. On the other side, we find the natural 
sciences, offended by these humiliating accusations, and trying to defend their position as the 
privileged path to what they call physical reality. What both sides seem to be utterly unaware 
of – and what intensifies the situation even more – is the mud flow which has already risen to 
their knees. Fully involved in the conflict, accusing one another of political indebtedness on 
the one hand, philosophical drivel on the other, the belligerent scientists forget what threatens 
them both: the progressive atrophy of the academic body due to its enslavement in capitalist 
modes of knowledge production, of which the aforementioned patenting, spin-offs, and 
partnerships with private corporations are just a few symptoms.   
The question that situates Stengers in this problematic context as a deserted chemist and 
philosopher of science, is how to make an intervention that opens up what she calls a 
                                                        
70 A knowledge regime (‘régime de savoir’) is defined by Pestre (2003) as an assemblage of institutions, 
beliefs, practices, and political and economic regulations that delimit the place and mode of being of 
the sciences.  
71 See Figure 8. While Stengers interprets the rising mud as the ever stiffer grip of capitalism on the 
sciences, her fellow philosopher of science Michel Serres offers a slightly different interpretation. He 
opens Le contrat naturel with a description of the scene which he reads as the intrusion of the Earth in 
political debates. Serres argues that political theory has always neglected the Earth as a powerful 
political actor due to its focus on intersubjective relations. In recent decades and due to climate change, 
the Earth has claimed its place at the negotiating table. It is no longer possible to neglect its existence 
and the profound impact processes such as climate change have on political issues as diverse as social 
inequality or economic exploitation (Serres, 1990). Although Stengers gives another interpretation, it is 
arguable, because of her ecological commitments that become more clear in her later work, that she 
would probably sympathize with Serres’ reading of the painting.   
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possibility for peace when war is more probable. She follows the critical interpreters of the 
sciences when they claim that science is a practice, but diverges from their perspective where 
their argument becomes insulting, namely when they state that it would be a practice like any 
other. Stengers agrees that natural science is indeed a practice, but not like any other. There 
is a particularity to every practice which makes it diverge from other practices. The stakes of 
the Stengersian project of the ecology of practices is to make representatives of practices 
engage in a civilized dialogue about their specificity, what makes their practice unlike any 
other, rather than indulging in the violent attacks of the Science Wars. Her aim is to repopulate 
the scene depicted by Goya with a multitude of other people: 
 
It is not a question of dreaming that the fighters' would forget about what makes them 
diverge, of calling for an unanimous resistance to the mud, of a great reconciliation 
between the work of proof and subversive critique. It is rather a question of 
repopulating the stage with new protagonists, some interested in the work of the critics, 
others in what proof can do, and still others in aspects of the landscape which do not 
interest either of the fighters, what they would both agree as being of only secondary 
importance (Stengers, 2006a, p. 14).72 
 
                                                        
72 “Il ne s’agit pas de rêver à l’oubli par les combattants de ce qui les fait diverger, d’en appeler à une 
résistance unanime à la vase, à une grande réconciliation entre le travailleur de la preuve et le critique 
subversif. Il s’agit plutôt de repeupler la scène avec de nouveaux protagonistes, intéressés les uns par 
ce que peut la critique, les autres par ce que peut la preuve, et d’autres encore par des aspects du 
paysage qui n’intéressent aucun des deux combattants, qu’ils s’accorderaient à juger secondaires”. 
Figure 8: Francisco de Goya, Fight with Cudgels, c. 1820-1823. 
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Stengers admits that she can only speculate about such a possible transformation of the 
scene. She argues, however, that speculations are always elicited by a sense of the possible 
that has already begun to actualize itself, even if for the moment this possible has no other 
power than to disturb established ways of thinking.  
These days, Stengers discerns such a possible in the change of the role that is played by 
what is called the public. The public, traditionally conceived of as the beneficiaries of the 
golden eggs of scientific progress, or the flabbergasted spectators of the struggle between 
scientists, has acquired the capacity to leave this mute position of the beneficiary or spectator, 
and has learned to meddle itself in the scientific discussion. Stengers gives the example of 
the debate on genetically modified organisms, or what she calls the GMO-event. Suddenly the 
public understood that it is not necessary to undo the link biologists established between 
sequences of nucleotides of a DNA-molecule and of a protein’s amino acids, but that it is 
sufficient to follow the arguments of biologists in favor of GMOs and to learn to detect the 
difference between arguments for laboratory research on GMOs on the one hand, and the 
effects of using GMOs outside the laboratory on the other. She celebrates the GMO-event as 
a crossing of the boundary that held science and politics so neatly separated, as an event in 
which the public started to ask the questions how GMOs can affect their lives and what kind 
of consequences this has for our living together.  
From the perspective of the public, such kind of events are not so much about participating 
in disciplinary discussions that only interest the scientific community, but rather about 
meddling in the conversation on propositions that affect our very future, and putting forward 
questions that are often neglected by the traditional interlocutors of the sciences, viz. the 
industry, sponsors, and state representatives. Drawing on Dewey, Stengers argues that a 
public emerges at the moment when the indirect consequences of the activities of a specific 
part of the population become perceived as harmful to another part of this population. In the 
words of Dewey (1927/2016): 
 
The characteristic of the public as a state springs from the fact that all modes of 
associated behavior may have extensive and enduring consequences which involve 
others beyond those directly engaged in them. When these consequences are in turn 
realized in thought and sentiment, recognition of them reacts to remake the conditions 
out of which they arose. Consequences have to be taken care of, looked out for (p. 
78).  
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And in still other words, the coming into being of a public around an issue that is then no longer 
a private affaire, but becomes a public issue, makes count what was not taken into account 
before, and organizes itself to make those consequences matter that until then made nobody 
think (Stengers, 2006a).  
Hence, what is at stake for Stengers is to rethink the relations between the sciences and 
their milieu, to create, via practices, new modes of belonging. Contrary to an identity, a 
belonging, she explains, does not define those who belong, it rather unlocks the question what 
this belonging renders its participants capable of, makes the question felt how those who 
belong will be affected by the consequences a certain decision might entail. In the case of the 
GMO-event for instance, it means that biotechnologists are not pinned down on their scientific 
expertise, consumers on their economic interest in a profitable price, or subsistence farmers 
on their capacity and need to remain self-sufficient – what makes up their respective ‘identity’, 
but rather that they are all engaged in a process of collective thinking around an issue that 
calls a public into being. This means, moreover, that they perceive this issue not in terms of 
their private interests, their identity, but rather in terms of the way in which they belong to this 
issue, what this process makes them capable of perceiving and thinking about. The 
understanding of belonging that Stengers puts forward is, hence, not one of a belonging to a 
scientific discipline, an economic interest, or a political stake – something that could be 
‘identified’ which would stabilize the belonging – but rather one of a belonging to an issue, a 
matter at stake in the sense that it destabilizes the identities of the people that gather around 
it (Stengers, 2006a, 2015a).  
In conclusion, the ecology of practices, Stengers’ diplomatic intervention in the Science 
Wars and the ensuing discussion on the relation between the sciences, between the sciences 
and the public, and between the sciences and the world – Stengers’ web of thinking, her three 
problems –, is not aimed at describing scientific practices – or any practice whatsoever – in a 
way that determines what these practices are. Stengers deems descriptions of a science that 
is ‘good in itself’ but perverted by its relations with power and that should be returned its 
freedom to produce reliable knowledge in the service of everyone, as dangerous as the 
accounts that unveil a science identified with power, taking part in an enterprise of taking 
charge, of submission to calculation, and of manipulation. Both the utopian perspective of a 
science untied from the interests that it elicited, and the dystopian perspective of science 
compliant with power are to be averted.  
What is at stake for Stengers in the ecology of practices, is to think the possibility to weave 
the sciences differently into the fabric of the world, to refuse the confidence the scientists 
demand (‘more autonomy will save the sciences!’), but to trust in the possibility of other 
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relations between the world and its scientific practitioners. In the course of this chapter I will 
explain the theoretical underpinnings of the ecology of practices. For a more precise 
understanding of the problem of the autonomy of science – recall the story of the goose with 
the golden eggs –, we will need to go back to what Stengers calls the invention of modern 
science.   
 
 
Dissolving the Amalgam of Modern Science 
 
Stengers (2000, 2006a) identifies the invention of modern science with Galileo’s triumph over 
the Vatican. She argues that the Galilean event not only makes clear how the experimental 
apparatus works but also how it is used to defeat the warlords of ‘traditional’ knowledge, in 
this case most notably the Church. "All science, following that of Galileo, would have as its 
grandeur and destiny to face a tradition, to negate what this tradition adheres to" (Stengers, 
2006a, p. 87).73 This section begins with an analysis of Galileo’s experimental apparatus of 
the inclined plane, which gives the necessary background to understand what it means to 
found what Stengers calls a scientific territory. At the end of this section I discuss the shift this 
scientific territory underwent when it got surrounded by the representatives from the state and 
the industry, the classical interlocutors of modern science in the 19th century.  
In 1608, Galileo designed an experiment to scrutinize what philosophers had taken for 
granted since Aristotle: the motion of falling bodies. He decided to interrogate this motion 
without mystery in a new way and therefore he put an inclined plane on a table. A ball 
descends the plane, rolls over the table, and falls to the ground, as is shown in folio 116v.74 
Afterwards, Galileo measured the distance between the edge of the table and the point of 
impact on the ground for every different point of departure on the inclined plane and its 
corresponding height. The experimental apparatus relates two features of the situation in order 
to verify a reason (‘raison’). Two terms need some further clarification here. First, ‘to relate’ 
needs to be understood in the strong sense here. It is the creation of a relation between 
different variables. In French, Stengers calls this a ‘mettre en rapport’. It is important to bear 
                                                        
73 “Toute science, à la suite de celle de Galilée, aurait pour grandeur et destin d’affronter une tradition, 
de nier ce à quoi cette tradition fait adhérer”. 
74 See Figure 9.  
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in mind this strong understanding of 
relation as something that is made, 
rather than found, throughout the 
remainder of this chapter. Second, 
‘reason’ can denote both cause and 
proportion, from the French ‘raison’. It 
will be argued that in this context, the 
second meaning prevails over the first. 
The distance between table and 
point of impact measures a speed that is 
acquired during the descent and that has 
maintained itself in a uniform way while 
the ball traversed the table, and finally 
fell to the ground. Hence, it is because 
the apparatus is capable to verify the fact 
that the speed is ‘the same’ in its three 
phases – when it starts to roll, when it 
crosses the table, and when it falls to the 
ground –, that it constitutes the prototype 
of an experimental success. Galileo’s experimental apparatus of the inclined plane verifies a 
reason (‘raison’), in the sense of a relation (‘rapport’), but it does not give the reason for this 
relation. Consequently, Galileo can become the spokesperson of the experimental 
achievement that has proven how bodies fall. Nevertheless, he cannot dispute with the 
philosophers that are concerned with the question why bodies fall. Galileo and the 
philosophers need to face the experimental verdict, their accord is imposed by the facts as 
they are taken note of in Galileo’s logbook.  
Stengers characterizes the experimental achievement, which lies at the heart of modern 
science, as "the invention of the power to confer on things the power to confer on the 
experimenter the power to speak in their name" (Ibid., p. 90).75 Power comes to the fore three 
times in this definition and it takes up three times another meaning. Firstly, ‘the invention of 
the power to confer…’ refers to Galileo’s discovery of the fact that the inclined plane is capable 
of transforming the common phenomenal experience of the falling bodies into an articulated 
fact. This means that it is defined in terms of variables, in quantities that Galileo can vary 
                                                        
75 “l’invention du pouvoir de conférer aux choses le pouvoir de conférer à l’expérimentateur le pouvoir 
de parler en leur nom”. 
Figure 9: Galileo Galilei, Folio 116v, 1608. 
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independently from one another. The experimental apparatus of the inclined plane has made 
it possible to describe the motion of falling bodies by means of an articulation in terms of 
relations between point of departure and point of impact. As such, the first time power 
intervenes in Stengers’ definition of the experimental apparatus it has to do with the power to 
articulate, to give expression to a phenomenon by creating a relation between two variables.  
Secondly, ‘… on things the power to confer on the experimenter…’ is the definition of 
what is made possible by the experimental achievement, namely to solemnize the marriage 
against nature which ties together two lineages that had until then nothing in common, one of 
theoretical reasoning, the other of empirical description. Before the experimental event, bodies 
that fell had nothing to do with the empirical knowledge that could be produced due to the 
experimental event. For millennia, the fact that the apple falls from the tree was nothing but a 
particular instantiation of the general principle that heavy bodies fall to the ground. After 
Galileo, however, the physicist no longer deals with apples falling from trees, or avalanches 
hurtling down mountains, or human beings falling out of the window, but rather with something 
different, namely Galilean bodies of which the privileged locale is no longer the center of the 
Earth, as it had been since Aristotle, but instead the laboratory – and the Heaven76 – because 
their movement needs to align itself as close as possible with the ideal of frictionless motion. 
A relation has been created that allows the Galilean bodies to testify, to play a determining 
role in a discussion between human beings. As such, they give Galileo the power to disclose 
a new terrain of questions and problems, of new possibilities for scientific inquiry. Conceived 
as Galilean bodies, the moon, the planets, and the comets, for instance, gain the power to 
ratify the Newtonian astronomy and to introduce gravitational force of attraction. Hence, it can 
be argued that the second power is the power to abstract, to make the articulation of a 
phenomenon come to bear on a theoretical argument, in this case the motion of the celestial 
bodies.  
And lastly, ‘… the power to speak in their name’ means that Galileo becomes the 
spokesperson of the phenomenon of the falling bodies. He does not need anymore to 
convince his opponents by means of rational argumentation in an intersubjective discussion. 
Due to the experimental apparatus, Stengers (2006a) argues, he can turn his back to his 
adversaries, remain silent, limit himself to ‘showing the facts’. As such, and this is crucial, the 
third power is the power to authorize. This means not only that the experimental apparatus 
authorizes Galileo to make a valid argument in a theoretical discussion by ‘showing the facts’, 
but also that the experimental apparatus has become authorized to testify of the motion of 
                                                        
76 Stengers writes ‘le Ciel’ with capital letter.  
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falling bodies, that it has become a powerful witness in the discussion between Galileo on the 
one hand, and the philosophers and theologians on the other hand. The question that imposes 
itself now is the following: To whom will Galileo show the facts?  
Together with his discovery of the possibility to transform rolling balls into reliable 
witnesses of the way in which to interpret their motion, Galileo invented what can be called 
the scientific territory. This invention comprises two operations. First, Galileo needed to chase 
all who could be deemed an intruder – philosophers and theologians –, of the terrain in order 
to define a new class of legitimate inhabitants, those who recognize the experimental 
achievement just as it is. This means, those who are, together with Galileo, obligated by the 
fact that this very experimental achievement has been proven to be possible and are willing 
to extend its scope to new questions and verifications, such as, for instance, the movement of 
the celestial bodies. But, Stengers continues, one cannot chase philosophers and theologians 
if they just shrug their shoulders, if they accommodate to the possibility that we now know how 
bodies fall, but underscore that this not really matters to the questions they want to address, 
namely why bodies fall. Such indifference is an inconvenience to the belligerent scientists. 
Hence, it is important that they feel being chased. This means to hold them captive at the 
borders of the war zone, and let them watch how the scientists address the questions that 
were theirs in a new way.  
Hence, Galileo, the usurper, Stengers (2000, 2006a) argues, is the inventor of an ‘epic’ 
genre, in which the scientific hero as a groundbreaker for a new future, expels the impostors 
that turned their back to this future. In the course of the third day of the Dialogues concerning 
two new sciences, composed in 1637, after his condemnation, Galileo (1836/1914) defines 
uniformly accelerated motion. Conscious of his imminent death, he addresses his future 
colleagues and successors. He, however, not only bequeaths them his knowledge, but also, 
and most importantly, he relays a way of making relevant, come to matter, something that 
would otherwise perhaps interest nobody. Galileo disentangles the question of how bodies fall 
from the question why bodies fall. He does not pretend to give insight in the reasons why 
bodies fall, but merely provides a descriptive account of their trajectory. He claims moreover, 
that such a scientific approach, modest in nature since it limits itself to the question of how 
they fall, benefits from this modesty. In defining uniformly accelerated motion and describing 
its properties, Galileo does not address the reason for this motion. Assuming the disjunction 
between how and why – one of the achievements of the experimental event –, he dismisses 
the latter question to philosophical quarrel based on imaginations not worthy of examination. 
Galileo, in other words, cannot respond the question of the reason why bodies fall, but he 
turns this weakness into a strength by claiming that such a question can only arouse the 
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interest of merchants in nonsense. He, on the contrary, would practice a method that due to 
its modesty generates results that can be proven. From the Galilean point of view, only those 
who concern themselves with the how-question can give ground to the slowly progressing 
army that fights under the banner of modern science.77  
What Stengers (2000, 2006a) sketches here comprises two aspects. On the one hand, 
she argues how Galileo’s experiment apparatus of the inclined plane constituted a new way 
of inquiring phenomena, in this case the motion of falling bodies. She explains how natural 
phenomena gained the power to intervene in discussions between human beings due to the 
experimental apparatus that could describe the trajectory of the rolling ball in terms of two 
variables: height of the starting point and point of impact on the ground. On the other hand, 
she makes clear how the experimental event was abused to disjoin the question how bodies 
fall from the question why bodies fall. She argues that this disjunction allowed to denounce 
the latter question in favor of the first which is correlated to the slow but steady expansion of 
the newly founded territory of modern science: 
 
So I will argue that what has been called 'science' – that which ascetically restricts 
itself to the 'how' of things, and that which conquers a knowledge that is finally valid 
where before there existed only arbitrary opinions, where there were only conflictual 
quarrels - is nothing more than an 'interface product'. 'Science' can not be defined 
independently of the way in which it makes something come to matter, independently 
of an environment accepting as an image of itself all the judgments organized around 
the qualifier 'unscientific'. This image draws its power from the way it captures and 
reacts to its own benefit, questions and obsessions that belong to this environment, 
transforming them into a stable definition of the entire scientific milieu (Stengers, 
2006a, p. 97).78  
 
Stengers, hence, conceptualizes the invention of modern science which is correlated with the 
invention of the experimental apparatus by Galileo, as embedded within an environment from 
                                                        
77 Shapin and Shaffer make a similar analysis of the experimental event in the context of Boyle’s air-
pump and his quarrel with Hobbes (cf. Shapin & Shaffer, 1985). 
78 “J’avancerai donc que ce que l’on a appelé ‘la science’ – celle qui se restreint ascétiquement au 
‘comment’ des choses, celle qui conquiert un savoir enfin valide là où ne préexistaient que des opinions 
arbitraires, là où prévalaient des bavards en conflit – n’est rien d’autre qu’un ‘produit d’interface’. ‘La 
science’ ne peut se définir indépendamment de son faire-valoir, indépendamment d’un milieu acceptant 
comme image de lui-même l’ensemble des jugements qui s’organisent autour du qualificatif ‘non 
scientifique’. Cette image tire sa puissance de la manière dont elle capture et réagence à son profit des 
questions et des hantises qui appartiennent à ce milieu, les transforment en définition stable du milieu 
de toute science”. 
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which it detaches itself and denounces as nonscientific in order to strengthen its claim of 
scientific autonomy.  
In the course of the 19th century, however, this environment, Stengers (2006a) argues, 
underwent profound changes. The apparition of the modern state, industrial development, and 
the strong connection that is being established between technological progress and the 
progress of humanity in general creates a new environment for scientific practices and poses 
new challenges to its claim for autonomy. What is, moreover, significant for this era is the 
newly created alliance between science and the university which was conducive to the 
institutionalization of scientific practices. Although the scientific endeavor obviously took 
advantage of the opportunities made possible by this change of environment (e.g. funding), 
this shift posed also some challenges. The defenders of the scientific territory could not limit 
themselves any longer to chasing the representatives of the old questions. Given the new 
environment they found themselves in, they were compelled to attract the right interlocutors 
that could be interested in financing their venture, most notably the state and the industry, 
while at the same time keeping them at the right distance to prevent that they would become 
too interested, which means that they would harm the image of science as a disinterested 
enterprise because they would be interested mainly in what scientific discovery yields.  
The scientists, however, cannot chase these new protagonists from their territory because 
they are dependent on them for the financing of their research and the extension of their 
discoveries into the everyday lives of the people, which allows them to identify scientific 
progress with human progress. The claim for autonomy, hence, becomes only stronger. 
Scientists require autonomy to perform their practice, to choose their own questions and 
methods according to their own insights. Modern science relies on its environment, state and 
industry, for its financial resources, but, by making a strong demand for autonomy, they 
attempt to preserve the right distance. “Every practice needs an environment that accepts to 
nurture it without enslaving it” (Stengers, 2006a, p. 101).79 Stengers invokes here the 
aforementioned fable of the goose with the golden eggs to explain the image that scientists 
constructed around themselves. Like the farmer can only wait for the goose to lay the golden 
eggs, the interested interlocutors of the scientists should stay at a distance, feed the goose 
but not force her to produce faster and certainly not slaughter her for immediate output. The 
disinterested and hence ‘innocent’ goose, however, conceals, according to Stengers, the 
scientist-strategist who persuades with this deceitful narrative her possible partners to finance 
her without harming the autonomy of her research. Stengers claims that, contrary to the stories 
                                                        
79 “Toute pratique a besoin d’un environnement qui accepte de la nourrir sans l’asservir”. 
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scientists make their partners believe, there is no such thing as a disinterested or innocent 
science.  
Factually, a scientist, as Latour’s case study of Pierre Joliot-Curie has shown, does not 
demand to let her work in peace and quiet (cf. Latour, 1999). On the contrary, she incessantly 
enters into relations with different interlocutors, with diverging interests. The scientist needs 
to form alliances with the representatives of foreign realms (e.g. commercial, governmental), 
to turn the environment in which she finds herself into a nurturing milieu for her research, in 
order to create the possibility that her eggs are worth gold. The allies Latour distinguishes 
include the nonscientific protagonists who pay the scientists hoping that they will profit from 
the outcomes of the research, but also a bunch a resources, instruments, and equipment 
without which the scientists’ ideas would remain merely ideas, and the colleagues of the 
scientific community that need to recognize the credibility of her research. Lastly, the scientist 
needs to construct a public representation of her research and what it affords so the public 
can estimate its legitimacy (1999).  
Hence, Stengers argues, scientific practice is partly a ‘social construction’, in the sense 
that it is heavily formed by the demands and expectations of its societal interlocutors, but this 
does not mean that it would be a construction that effaces the particularity and recalcitrance 
of scientific practice itself. It is rather the environment in which the scientist needs to activate 
herself and mobilize the interests of her possible interlocutors in favor of her own research 
interests in order that the scope and importance of her work can be expanded via these 
interlocutors.80 The scientist works at the limit between ‘her’ territory and an environment that 
is a priori indifferent to her research but which she seeks to transform into ‘her’ milieu, or better 
milieus since the way the scientist presents her research changes according to the interests 
of the interlocutor she addresses.  
Consequently, Stengers (2006a) explains that the concept of modern science as a 
monolithic entity is an obstacle on our path to understand the particularities of scientific 
practices. The strong claim to autonomy, indeed obscures the embeddedness of scientific 
practices in different environments and the relations scientists have with their diverse 
interlocutors. The fable of the goose with the golden eggs may be a compelling narrative to 
keep too interested state officials or business men at a distance – it has indeed proven its 
worth –, but in order to really understand the specificity of scientific practice it is rather 
deceitful. Stengers proposes to dissolve the amalgam of modern science, and hence reject its 
                                                        
80 It is clear that this social construction constitutes the necessary, not the sufficient conditions for the 
experimental event to take place. In spite of the negotiations of the scientist with human and other-than-
human interlocutors, it is possible that the experimental achievement does not take place, that the 
experiment did not bring the expected outcomes.   
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claim to autonomy that unites different scientific practices in order to become capable to grasp 
the specificity of scientific practice itself. Instead of speaking of modern science in the general 
sense, Stengers chooses to inquire the meaning of the adjective ‘scientific’ via the generic 
question that according to her drives all scientific practices, namely “How to learn something 
new?“ (Stengers, 2006a, p. 78).81  
Asking this question to scrutinize the meaning of the concept of scientific practice sets a 
double operation in motion that will dissolve the amalgam. Stengers (2006a) argues that on 
the one hand, this question cannot unite scientific practices without making them diverge. In 
their attempt to respond to this question, it will become clear that in spite of the fact that this 
question concerns every scientific practice, they will all respond to it in a different manner. On 
the other hand, this question excludes the practices for which this question does not matter. 
Since scientific practices are engaged in different discussions, make use of different methods, 
and raise different standards concerning their work, it is impossible for them to answer the 
question how to learn something new – although this question is pertinent to all of them – 
unequivocally. In their attempts to respond to this question, the spokespersons of different 
scientific practices will inevitable diverge from one another. Besides, the practices for which 
this question does not matter, for instance, juridical, medical, or therapeutic practices, are kept 
out of the firing line, instead of being denounced and devalued as merely nonscientific.82 The 
generic question “how to learn something new?” unbinds the sciences from their consensual 
justifications that identify them with an approach that is rational in general, opposed to the 
irrationality of opinion. Instead, it allows to inquire the specificity of scientific practices as they 
diverge from one another.  
Stengers, the chemist, has put heat to the amalgam of modern science in order to undo 
it and disinhibit an activity that had been made impossible by it, namely to think science as an 
infinite variation of diverging scientific practices.83 The question that imposes itself now is 
double. On the one hand there is the question of convergence: what makes a practice 
scientific? On the other hand, there is the question of divergence: what makes a specific 
scientific practice different from any other scientific practice? These two questions correspond 
with two central concepts in the work of Stengers, namely requirement and obligation. 
However, before entering into this discussion, I will provide an example of a scientific practice 
that takes an important position in Stengers’ argument, namely the proof of the existence of 
                                                        
81 “Comment apprendre du nouveau?” 
82 Bruno Latour, for instance, has showed that the specificity of juridical practices lies not in learning 
something new, but rather in relating a case to other cases in order to recognize.  
83 Here it might be helpful to bear in mind the irenicist-irreductivist commitments that Stengers inherited 
from Leibniz as discussed in Chapter Two.  
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the neutrino. This allows not only to demonstrate the paradoxical mode of existence of 
scientific discoveries, but also how the scientific practice itself matters in making what it 
investigates come to matter, and how it comes to matter. Moreover, it shows that scientific 
practice is always a heavily constrained practice, and these constraints, what Stengers calls 
its requirements and obligations, make a particular scientific practice diverge from other 
scientific or other-than-scientific practices. The topic of requirements and obligations, 
however, will be left for the fourth section.  
 
 
Pharmacology of the Factish 
 
In the 1960s, the existence of neutrinos had already been predicted theoretically but it had not 
been detected empirically. In order to observe the neutrino, an almost weightless, electrically 
neutral particle emitted by the sun, that due to its non-participation in strong interaction passes 
through matter unimpeded, the chemist Ray Davis devised in 1967 an experiment in the 
Homestake Gold Mine in South Dakota. Davis placed a 380 m3 tank of perchloroethylene, a 
common dry-cleaning fluid which is rich in chlorine, 1,478 meters underground. Upon 
interaction with an electron neutrino, a chlorine-37 atom transforms into a radioactive isotope 
of argon-37, which can then be extracted and counted. Every few weeks, Davis bubbled 
helium through the tank to collect the argon that had formed. A small gas counter was filled 
by the collected few tens of atoms of argon-37 to detect its decays. In such a way, Davis was 
able to determine how many neutrinos had been captured. It turned out, however, that the 
number of neutrinos detected by Davis amounted to only a third of the number that the 
astrophysicist John Bahcall had predicted in his theoretical model of neutrino emission by the 
sun. This discrepancy between measurement and model has become known in the literature 
as the solar neutrino problem (Stengers, 2006a).  
What interests Stengers (2006a) in this example is how scientists have hesitated before 
this problem, how this hesitation can be understood, and how the nature of the neutrino as an 
empirically undetected, yet theoretically predicted particle is to be conceived. She 
distinguishes two rivaling narratives concerning the hesitation of the scientists. The first claims 
that the scientists hesitate because socially they did not manage to come to an interpersonal 
agreement on how the model needs to be accommodated to render the data intelligible. The 
second narrative states that the scientists hesitate because they did not manage to design an 
experimental situation that has the power to make them agree, after which can be claimed 
that ‘nature has spoken’. The notion of hesitation takes on a different meaning in both of these 
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narratives. In the first, the scientists are understood as searching for an agreement between 
human beings. Nature itself is excluded from this process and cannot make a difference 
allowing one interpretation of the phenomenon to prevail over the other interpretations. 
Stengers claims that this is the narrative of the critical-deconstructivist tradition of sociology of 
science which understands science as a social practice like any other. It holds the scientists 
responsible for the difference that can be made in the bargaining process over the right 
interpretation, which the scientists themselves attribute to nature itself.  
Contrary to this understanding of a scientific discussion as a conversation between 
scientists that try to convince each other of their own interpretation of a natural phenomenon, 
Stengers (2006a) argues that it is not a bunch of neutral scientists awaiting nature’s verdict 
on their conflicting interpretations that we encounter in the laboratory. As opposed to this 
narrative, the second narrative, rather conceives of the scientists as obligated by their 
scientific practice. It does not claim that nature intervenes in the scientific discussion to put an 
end to the hesitations and make scientists agree. It supposes, rather, that the way in which 
scientists hesitate, imagine, object, and search, testifies for what obligates them, namely the 
very possibility that ‘nature’ can make a difference between the different interpretations 
concerning a natural phenomenon. Scientists trust in the possibility to create a situation that 
confers on what the question addresses the power to make a difference between different 
interpretations. Stengers calls this the definition of experimental achievement as we have seen 
before, the fact that scientists are no longer free to interpret as they like, but that the 
experiment has put constraints on the different possible interpretations. In general, it is the 
possibility of experimental achievement that makes scientists construct experimental 
apparatuses that will hopefully recruit reliable witnesses to testify for a certain interpretation 
of a phenomenon. Concerning the solar neutrino problem, the scientific practitioners hesitate 
because their practice obligates them to hesitate. It obligates them not to decide until they 
have managed to create the situation of which they can claim that nature has spoken.  
Beyond the realist account that claims that nature speaks to silence the scientists, and 
the relativist account that claims that science is a social practice like any other, Stengers’ 
constructivist account claims that science is a practice obligated to the experimental success 
that confers on the scientists the power to speak in the name of the natural phenomenon under 
scrutiny. Long before the neutrino had been detected, it was already part of the scientific 
discussion since the existence of this phantom particle had been postulated for theoretical-
aesthetic reasons of symmetry and conservation. It is, however, not situated at the intersection 
of rational activity and phenomenal world, but rather “binds together the mutual involvement 
of two realities undergoing correlated expansions: that of the dense network of our practices 
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and their histories, that of the components and modes of interaction that populate what is 
referred to as the ‘physical world’” (Stengers, 2010, p. 22). Simultaneously and inseparably 
the neutrino exists ‘in itself’ and ‘for us’, and it becomes even more ‘in itself’ as it participates 
in countless experimental events that affirm its existence ‘for us’.  
Stengers (2010) calls the neutrino – and all other beings produced by scientific 
experiment – a factish. Following Bruno Latour (2009), Stengers defines a factish as 
something the experimenter fabricates and that at the same time fabricates the experimenter. 
It establishes an unnatural coupling between experimenter and experimental achievement, by 
giving the experimenter the power to speak in the name of the experimental achievement for 
which she had to construct the experimental apparatus that would allow for the experimental 
achievement to happen (cf. the threefold conferral of power). In that sense, the experimental 
achievement is dependent on the experimenter to take place, just like the experimenter is 
dependent on the experimental achievement to be able to speak on its behalf. In this case the 
scientist receives autonomy by giving the neutrino an autonomy she herself does not have. 
Understanding the neutrino as a factish creates a divergence between the themes of 
transcendence and assurance, Stengers (2010) explains. On the one hand, the factish 
transcends its creator. The neutrino, for instance, exists independently of Ray Davis, John 
Bachall, or any other scientist that has occupied himself with this particle. On the other hand, 
however, the produced transcendence does not make a transcendent world available from 
which it would be possible to judge or disqualify. “Factishes are a way of affirming the 
truthfulness of the relative, that is, a way of relating the power of truth to a practical event and 
not to a world to which practices would merely provide access” (Stengers, 2010, p. 24). The 
factishistic proposition makes it impossible to claim a neutrality that can be accepted by all. It 
rather forces physicists and other constructors of factishes to differentiate the fabricated 
autonomy of their creatures from the always-already-there autonomy of a world awaiting its 
discovery.  
In a next step, Stengers (2010) claims that modern scientific practice is itself a pharmakon 
that by claiming to provide a neutral and objective access to truth, denies its own 
pharmacological mode of existence, which it shares with other practices. She relates the 
question of the pharmakon with Plato’s problem with the sophists in so far the sophists embody 
the instability of the effects used to qualify them. Instead of pursuing universal truth like Plato 
and the philosophers, the sophists were men who relied on opinion which is changing and 
malleable. Dealing with a sophist, “vector of lucidity or creator of illusion, doctor or soul thief” 
(Ibid., p. 28), is always a gamble of which you never know whether the effects will be beneficial 
or rather detrimental. The pharmakon – the poison that cures, the antidote that kills – is 
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likewise instable. It does not have a clear and well-defined attribute. Depending on the dose, 
the circumstances, or the context the intended effects of taking the drug can turn into its 
opposite.  
Stengers (2010) explains that the pharmakon, just like the sophist, does not provide a 
guarantee, nor does it define a fixed point allowing us to recognize and understand its effects 
with some assurance. Stengers asserts that the question of the pharmakon is not unique to 
the tradition that expelled the sophists out of Plato’s city. She states that “every human culture 
recognizes the intrinsic instability of certain roles, certain practices, certain drugs” (Ibid., p. 
29). What makes our culture unique, however, is its intolerance for the ambiguity of the 
pharmakon. Our cultural tradition, Stengers argues, has a strong inclination towards fixed 
points, foundations, and guarantees, and today there are a manifold of modern practices – 
scientific, medical, technological, political, psychoanalytic, pedagogical – that denounce and 
disqualify their evil twins – the charlatan, the populist, the ideologue, the magician, the 
astrologist, the hypnotist, the charismatic teacher. The pharmakon, however, in spite of these 
efforts, cannot be excluded. It inhabits the heart of the fortresses that were to protect us from 
its instability. Like the sophists used Plato to promote their arguments, the question of relation, 
which is the expertise of traditional therapists, resurfaces as an enigma at the core of 
medicine, and, scientific demonstrations still imply an element of subjective persuasion 
although they claim to rely purely on objective proof.  
The problem of the pharmakon amplifies the challenge of the factishistic proposition. It 
raises the question how we can understand the presence among us of physicists and other 
constructors of factishes. The neutrino, the atom, DNA, or any other scientific creature is to 
be understood as a factish to the extent that it intends to resist the pharmacological 
accusation. This means that as factishes, these constructions have a strong pharmacological 
quality that needs to be covered up in order to stabilize their existence as objective knowledge 
of a real-world phenomenon, that they need to conceal the history of their construction. These 
productions can claim to exist autonomously with respect to the physicists who constructed 
them, that they are not just fictions powerful enough to deceive their authors.  
The factish exemplifies the experimental achievement: “the invention of the power to 
confer on things the power of conferring on the experimenter the power to speak in their name” 
(Stengers, 2000, p. 89). This threefold power, however, is not warranted by an external and 
fixed point that allows to differentiate scientific statement from personal opinion, but is related 
to the practical event of the experimental achievement elicited by the experimental apparatus: 
truth of the relative. Once the neutrino, the atom or DNA exits the specific site where it 
achieved its existence, the laboratory where the experimental event has taken place, and it 
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moves into the networks of scientific opinion, unbinding existence, invention, and proof, it 
starts to change meaning. In short, scientific factishes conceal a very strong pharmacological 
instability.  
The coming into being of the scientific factish is correlated with the functioning of the 
experimental apparatus and the figure of the experimenter (cf. Galileo and the invention of the 
inclined plane). Hence, it is strongly dependent on the circumstances in which it is produced 
and therefore situated. Stengers (2010), in line with Latour, argues in favor of an 
understanding of science as a cult of factishes. The notion of cult refers here on the one hand 
to the celebration of the coming into existence of a new being, and, on the other to the art of 
establishing relationships. As has been made clear, the modern cult attributes to the factish a 
power it does not and should not have, namely the power to disqualify practices and questions 
that are considered nonmodern such as those related to the charlatan, the magician, or the 
hypnotist. It is important to consider the cult – and here we can relate it again to Stengers’ 
notion of practice –, which produces the factish and establishes the relations between the 
factish and the world in which it comes into being. Indeed, all cults – or all practices for that 
matter –, are not equal, and when studying practices where factishes are produced it needs 
to be taken into consideration how the factish is ‘acculturated’: what kind of relationships are 
established with the factish, and how are its terms of use defined within the community that 
celebrates its coming into existence.  
Due to the strong interdependence between pharmakon and cult, factish and experiment, 
Stengers (2010) wagers on the possibility of an ecological approach to scientific practice. She 
defines ecology as: 
 
the science of multiplicities, disparate causalities, and unintentional creations of 
meaning. The field of ecological questions is one where the consequences of the 
meanings we create, the judgments we produce and to which we assign the status of 
‘fact’, concerning what is primary and what is secondary, must be addressed 
immediately, whether those consequences are intentional or unforeseen (Ibid., pp. 34-
35). 
 
Here again, it is possible to discern the three basic tenets of an ecological approach as 
outlined at the end of Chapter One, namely that it has to do with relations of interdependency, 
that difference is generated unintentionally, and that it touches upon matters of living and dying 
on a shared planet, taking care of the consequences this or that decision might entail. Hence, 
endorsing an ecological approach makes it impossible – and here we shift to the Latourian 
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lexicon –, to conceive of scientific practice as dealing with matters of fact, as if it only provides 
access to a factual and inert world that until then was undisclosed. It needs to be understood, 
rather, as enacting a matter of concern. Scientific practices initiate processes in which the 
world is put at risk due to the questions that are asked or the inquiries that are undertaken. 
This is, consequently, a process in which the consequences of our actions, and the milieu that 
emerges around the factishes we produce, should be taken into consideration.  
It means to understand our ways of living together and living with factishes as a symbiotic 
agreement. Contrary to a consensus, which always requires the putting aside of the particular 
interests of different parties in the name of a shared intent, or a superior good, a symbiotic 
agreement respects the diverging interests in the production of new, immanent modes of 
existence. It means to become entangled within a reciprocal capture, a noce contre nature, a 
mutual process in the course of which both the identity of the experimenter as well as the 
identity of the neutrino (or the factish in more general terms) is constructed. In the case of the 
neutrino, it means to take into account the newly produced being but also the producing 
community who has recruited it for their argument. Moreover, it means to understand the 
constraints that are put on scientific production/invention/discovery.84 This question, the 
question of constraints forces us to have a closer look on Stengers concept of practices and 
how scientific practices put constraints on thinking.  
 
 
Requirements and Obligations 
 
As we have seen, Stengers’ ecology of practices forces to turn the attention away from big 
overarching concepts such as science, politics, or power, and proposes to take practices as 
a methodological point of entry to study the relation between the sciences and their 
environment. The question that will guide this section is how Stengers conceives of practices 
and more particularly scientific practices, and how she relates to the work of scientists as a 
philosopher of science.   
It might be helpful here to return to the question that makes scientific practices converge 
according to Stengers, namely “How to learn something new?”. It has been explained that this 
question immediately engages the representatives of scientific practices in a debate, while the 
question concerns them all, although they will give different answers to this question. The 
                                                        
84 The notions of production, invention, and discovery can be used interchangeably from a Stengersian 
point of view. The three of them denote the very specific process in which due to an experimental 
achievement a paradoxical being comes into existence, a factish.  
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question evokes the core business of scientific practices and makes it possible to differentiate 
them from, for instance, political or religious practices. Hence, resisting a subsuming of 
scientific practices under the all too general denominator of so-called social practices. 
Scientific practices are indeed no social practices ‘like any other’, just like political and religious 
practices are no social practices ‘like any other’. The question now will be how to grasp the 
specificity of scientific practices and thereby refuse scientists the comfort of hiding themselves 
behind an identity. Instead, Stengers proposes to understand scientific practices in terms of 
the way in which they constrain processes of thinking practitioners engage in. Therefore, it is 
important not to understand practices as guided by a set of norms (which would grant the 
scientists the comfort of an identity), but rather as constrained by requirements and 
obligations.   
Indeed, Stengers is convinced that it is counterproductive to situate scientists in a field of 
norms, since these norms predominantly function as a way to construct a collective identity 
for the scientists that allows for unmasking those who ask questions about their practice as 
traitors, as people who do not adhere to the norms of the practice and question them. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that science is just a construction. Scientific practices have 
their own, non-arbitrary, way of functioning, although the people involved in the practice may 
obscure this by their attachment to particular norms. In order to grasp scientific practice itself, 
and not the norms, rules and values that hang around it, Stengers proposes to characterize a 
practice along two axes that the notion of norm does not allow to differentiate, namely 
requirements and obligations.  
Affirming the identity of a scientific practice, Stengers (2006a, 2010) argues, is always 
part of a defensive or offensive operation that renders the requirements that the practice needs 
to fulfill in order to pass through as scientific explicit. Its aim is always to silence the critics or 
to oppose objections during disputes. As such, it could be argued that requirements still grant 
the practitioners the comfort of an identity, although they do not refer to all too abstract norms 
such as objectivity or neutrality. Instead, requirements are the specific things that have to be 
done by a scientist to make her work intelligible to colleagues as seriously scientific (e.g. 
setting up an experimental situation). Requirements provide the scientific practice with some 
kind of consistency. Although they leave scientists with a large degree of freedom, they put 
specific constraints on their activities. In the case of the solar neutrino problem, an extensive 
experimental setting needed to be designed, as well as different colleagues needed to be 
mobilized to make sure that the right protocols were followed. In that sense, requirements 
grant some stability to scientific practices, because they allow to differentiate between 
scientific practices and other-than-scientific practices. 
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It is important to underscore, however, that the requirements not merely refer to the 
practices for which these requirements apply. This would indeed again reduce requirements 
to norms and scientific practices to social practices (in general). The requirements do not so 
much come forth from what, for instance, colleagues, students, financers, or the public require 
from the scientist, but rather from what the world requires, or more specifically what that which 
needs to be researched requires from the scientific practitioner in order for it to become 
responsive to the questions of the scientist. The construction of an experimental apparatus, 
for instance, is what the solar neutrino problem (and physics more in general) required in order 
to become responsive to the obligation of the neutrino, because the neutrino both affords and 
demands the construction of such an apparatus. This means that the paradoxical mode of 
existence of the neutrino (predicted but not proven) allows for setting up an experiment that 
could demonstrate the existence of a particle that had been a necessary unknown of 
theoretical models, and that the particle lends itself for such an experimental achievement. As 
such, requirements indeed do not merely refer to the practices as if they would be the rules 
that govern these practices, but rather, and most importantly, they refer to what the world 
requires in order to become an object of scientific inquiry. This means that they refer to what 
the scientific practitioners are obligated by, and that is, coming to the second axis, the 
obligations. 
Contrary to the requirements, obligations do not mobilize scientists, they do not grant 
stability, but rather make scientists hesitate. Because scientists are obligated towards what 
they inquire, they are not easily compelled to endorse the theories that their colleagues have 
fabricated concerning their object of study unless they have recruited reliable witnesses. What 
for Stengers seems to be at stake is to address scientists not only by identifying them with 
what they require, but also, and most importantly, to address them as being obligated via their 
practice. To address a scientist in this way, means to wager on the possibility that she is 
capable not to take shelter behind the identity the requirements afford. To address her, for 
instance, not as a physicist that follows the rules that govern her practice and make it ‘good 
science’, but as a physicist for whom something is at stake in this scientific practice, someone 
who is obligated by what makes her hesitate, and not only as someone who is mobilized by 
the requirements of ‘good science’: 
 
An obligation, indeed, does not identify, because it leaves open the question of how it 
should be fulfilled or what would betray it. It is not intended to gather around the same 
mode of judgment, and it can divide. Moreover, the question of what practitioners are 
obligated by is never general. It is always about what such a situation, such a proposal 
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obligates to. But it also asks from those who want to approach the practices not to 
claim to know, where practitioners hesitate (Stengers, 2006a, p. 68).85  
 
In short, whereas requirements grant stability to a scientific practice and make 
practitioners converge around what they inquire (in the sense that they prescribe what 
protocols or procedures have to be fulfilled in order to pass the test as being particular to that 
specific scientific practice), obligations make practitioners diverge. Obligated by the neutrino, 
scientists formulate hypotheses, devise experimental apparatuses, and perform calculations 
to substantiate theoretical arguments in order to slow down before the problem the neutrino 
poses to them. The obligation, hence, makes it impossible to claim to know, where 
practitioners are inclined to hesitate. Or in still other words, it could be argued that whereas 
obligations denote what is being thought about in the course of a scientific practice, 
requirements denote how practitioners are required to think. As such, requirements and 
obligations exist in a reciprocal capture which means that the requirements can only be 
articulated in relation to the obligation of a particular object of scientific inquiry (e.g. the 
neutrino) and that the obligations can only gain relevance within a scientific practice for which 
this obligation matters and that incites practitioners to become responsive to what this 
obligation requires (e.g. constructing an experimental apparatus).   
Stengers’ ecology of practices, and her unwillingness to think from the premise that 
reason can be segregated from opinion, fact from value, opens a perspective in which 
practices can be understood as specific constructions of requirements and obligations in which 
the question of what is true always needs to be considered in relation to the practice for which 
it has acquired the authority to be true. In line with Deleuze, Stengers calls this the truth of the 
relative. This does not mean that everything is true, or that truth depends entirely on the 
position of the one who speaks the truth, but rather that in relation to the specific requirements 
and obligations of a practice a proposition can be considered as true. “Truth happens to an 
idea. It becomes true, is made true by events” (James, 2000, p. 88). This implies that truth is 
neither universal, nor relative to the position of the one who speaks it, but rather that it is the 
effect of a risky construction that puts its own constraints, the aforementioned requirements 
and obligations, on the production of truth. Stengers (2010) argues: 
 
                                                        
85 “Une obligations, en effet, n’identifie pas, car elle laisse ouverte la question de savoir comment elle 
doit être remplie ou ce qui la trahirait. Elle n’a pas pour vocation de rassembler autour d’un même mode 
de jugement, et elle peut diviser. De plus, la question de ce par quoi les praticiens sont obligés n’est 
jamais générale. Il s’agit toujours de ce à quoi oblige telle situation, telle proposition. Mais elle demande 
aussi à ceux qui tentent d’approcher les pratiques de ne pas ‘savoir’, là où les praticiens hésitent”. 
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In constructivist terms, we could say that the production of obligations pertains to the 
register of creation, which must be acknowledged in its irreducible dimension, while 
the assertion of requirements presents the problem of the possible stability of that 
creation, of its scope, and of the meaning it proposes to embody for others. The 
concepts of requirement and obligation allow us to keep both the respectful ratification 
of claims to rationality and the relativist irony that judges them at a distance (pp. 53-
54).  
 
As such, practices are a specific holding together of requirements and obligations. Whereas 
requirements grant a certain stability to practices, obligations make them diverge. Dissolving 
the amalgam of modern science and conceptualizing scientific practices in terms of their 
requirements and obligations allows for understanding the immanent divergences of scientific 
practices.86   
This is the meaning Stengers attributes to the practice turn presented in the second 
chapter, which she believes to be able to break with the ideas of neutrality and objectivity that 
surround science, since a focus on practices, in the Stengersian understanding, demands of 
the people studying scientists – and this brings us to the question of Stengers’ relation to the 
scientists as a philosopher of science – to practice the pragmatic art of thinking starting from 
the consequences of which the verification is always creation, this means creation of new 
types of relations with the scientists (cf. Rose, 1996). Investigating practices from a 
Stengersian perspective requires to create new relations with scientists and to rethink the 
relations between the world and its scientists.87  
Calling Stengers approach to practice pragmatic does not involve that every idea, 
construction, or proposition would be reduced to the consequences it plays into, to what it 
                                                        
86 Interesting to note is the fact that in conceptualizing scientific practices in terms of what practitioners 
are obligated to and what this obligation requires of them, Stengers seems to omit the debates about 
scientific methodology. From a Stengersian perspective, the question of methodology seems to be an 
utterly modern question in that it reduces the scientific endeavor to a matter of following the right road 
(cf. the ancient Greek meaning of methodos as path or track), without properly taking into account how 
something might come to matter in the course of a scientific practice and which kind of requirements 
this coming to matter might impose on the scientific practitioners. To a certain extent, one could argue 
that methodology is the name for a thorough formalization of the requirements and hence a contribution 
to the institutionalization of science in what came to be known as Modern Science. From the point of 
view of an ecology of practices, the will to methodology could be understood as a defensive operation 
of a scientific practice in order to maintain its border and to keep out those who might ask the ‘wrong’ 
questions (cf. Stengers, 2000, 2006).  
87 Endorsing a pragmatist conception of truth and foregrounding the researcher’s standpoint in studying 
its ‘population’, taking an interest in creating new possible relations with this ‘population’, or a so-called 
pragmatics of alliance, Stengers places herself in the feminist tradition of sociology of science (cf. Hilary 
Rose, Sandra Harding, Donna Haraway, Joseph Rouse, etc.). 
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‘yields’. It rather requires refusing a separation between an idea, construction, or proposition 
and its consequences. It makes the question of the consequences, and our obligation to take 
care of them, present. It is not so much about describing scientific practice as it is, ‘in the 
making’, but rather to confer on the possible as possible the power to oblige us to think. As 
such, thought takes as its point of departure the possible in the world, instead of the world as 
it is, and hence needs to bear in mind the consequences of its creations.  
The possible, in this case, is what Stengers would call a cosmopolitics, a thing-centered 
discussion between scientists and other people affected by the issue at hand and the unknown 
consequences this problem could give way to. It is this possible, and Stengers’ speculation on 
how it can become actually possible, that will be the topic of the last section of this chapter.  
 
 
The Diplomat’s Peace 
 
Drawing on Stengers’ speculative understanding of peace, I argue in this section why the 
ecology of practices can be understood as a call for diplomacy. Moreover, and this will allow 
to open the way to the next chapter in which I discuss study practices, Stengers’ 
aforementioned concept of cosmopolitics is introduced as being at the heart of her project of 
the ecology of practices as an intervention in the Science Wars. In a first step, however, I 
summarize the basic tenets of Stengers’ ecology of practices. Grasping the multiplicity of 
practices in terms of an ecology foregrounds, I argue, four aspects.  
First, it requires to understand a practice itself as an ecology in which different human, 
other-than-human, and more-than-human beings depend on each other for their survival. 
Thinking a practice ecologically makes attentive to the reciprocal capture that comes into 
existence between the scientist and what she is obligated to. On the one hand, the scientist 
owes her existence to the neutrino, since the neutrino gives meaning to her activities. Claiming 
that neutrinos do not exist or only exist as theoretical constructs, insults the scientists that are 
obligated to them. Such a claim indeed undermines the scientific practice itself because it 
takes away that from which the practice of the scientists draws relevance. On the other hand, 
the neutrino owes its being to the scientists that are interested in proving its existence. Without 
the scientists who believe that the neutrino exists and are willing to prove this paradoxical 
mode of existence, the neutrino could not come to matter in the scientific discussion. Stengers 
understands this situation as a reciprocal capture. This means that each pole of the couple – 
neutrino and scientist – needs to include a reference to the other in order to give meaning to 
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its own existence, which is hence always dependent on the other. The identity of the scientist 
studying neutrinos is coinvented with the identity of the neutrino studied by the scientist.88  
Second, an ecological understanding makes attentive to the way in which practices relate 
to and engage with each other in sometimes fertile, sometimes hostile coexistences. This 
aspect highlights that practices never come alone but that there are always many and that 
these practices are often engaged in a struggle over what they consider as true and the means 
to achieve an insight in what is true. Stengers explains how scientific practices that conceive 
of themselves as pertaining to the monolith of modern science, which she argues is in fact 
rather an amalgam of different practices, often denounce and disqualify other practices that 
are considered irrational and hence nonscientific. Galileo’s expulsion of the philosophers and 
theologians is exemplary for the way in which new practices, in the case of modern science 
experimental practices, denounce their henceforth considered as superstitious predecessors. 
What the ecology of practices requires concerning the relation between practices, is that in 
order to engage in a dialogue, the representatives of the practices need to be clear about the 
requirements and obligations that circulate within the practice and that make the constructions 
hold together. It means to exchange the ecology of predator and prey in which modern science 
devours other knowledge practices, for an irenicist-irreductivist stance towards the diversity of 
practices. This means that no single practice can be conceived of as like any other, neither 
that any single practice is diametrically opposed to any other. This makes it possible to think 
a more or less peaceful cohabitation of different practices in a shared world.  
Third, the ecology of practices allows to grasp how practices are embedded in and 
influenced by at times fostering, at times poisoning environments. To think practices as 
embedded within an environment draws the attention to the way they relate to the state and 
the industry, which were the most important interlocutors of the sciences in the 19th and 20th 
century, and increasingly also to their relationship with the public which has started to meddle 
into scientific discussions over inventions that could profoundly impact the world in which we 
live, such as GMOs. It implies to understand scientific practice as heavily engaged with the 
nonscientific world in processes of, for instance, finance, public opinion, patenting, and output 
regulation. Stengers argues that capitalism has profoundly poisoned scientific practices. 
Catchphrases such as competitiveness and efficiency have induced an acceleration that 
severely damages these practices. The call for quick results creates a hostile environment for 
                                                        
88 Here it might be interesting to refer to the etymology of obligation. According to the Oxford Latin 
Dictionary, the Latin obligatio did in the first place not refer to duty, responsibility, or obligation (in the 
moral sense). Instead, it denoted a binding. Combining the verb ligare, which meant ‘to bind’ or ‘to tie’ 
with the prefix ob- which meant ‘against’ (think of ‘to ob-ject’) intensifies the sense of a coupling against 
all odds, of an anything but natural achievement. 
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practices that require that scientists hesitate before what obligates them to think. Eventually, 
capitalism will have turned scientific practices into mind-numbing procedures for profitable 
discoveries. Therefore Stengers’ ecology of practices needs to be read as an attempt to 
reclaim scientific practices. Reclaiming always means nurturing and fostering, to create an 
environment that is conducive to the flourishing of knowledge practices, after the destructive 
mutilation committed under the banners of capitalist imperatives such as competitiveness and 
efficiency.  
Fourth, to think practices ecologically also forces to keep in mind the relation between 
knowledge practices and the world. Via the ecology of practices Stengers expresses a deep 
concern about the world and about the part predatory practices have played in its recent 
devastations. The ecology of practices calls for a pragmatist conception of the relation 
between practices and the world. This means that the question how the consequences of a 
practice will affect the world needs always to be part of the discussion. It implies that 
knowledge practices should always be conceived as practices of care, this means as specific 
ways of dealing with the question how to live together with the factish at hand, under scrutiny. 
Scientific practices do not invent in the abstract, but always in close relation with the world 
that will harbor these inventions. Therefore, it is important to practice the pragmatic art of 
taking care of the consequences of our creations.   
What Stengers calls for with the ecology of practices is a civilized dialogue between 
practices. This requires that practices display their divergence, the specific ways in which they, 
via different requirements and obligations, hold together. It is a way to deal with the Science 
Wars, and more generally with the often fierce attitudes of the representatives of practices vis-
à-vis one another. It is however important to underscore that Stengers does not plea for an 
eternal and universal peace. She refuses to think peace as a transcendent principle before 
which different practices have to bend the knee. Instead of conceiving a posthistorical peace 
that would signify the suspension of all struggles in a finally harmonious coexistence of 
practices that tolerate each other, Stengers proposes to think peace as an ingredient of the 
current belligerent regime. It means to think peace as speculative, as a possibility, when war 
is more probable (Stengers & Spire, 2000). It requires that the representatives of practices act 
in the presence of a virtual peace. This means that peace is not already actualized or can be 
actualized once and for all, but that it is a possibility for which the conditions need to be created 
to be achieved.  
The diplomat’s peace, as Stengers calls it, cannot impose the terms on which this peace 
could be acquired since that would deny the recalcitrance of practices, the fact that they cannot 
be put under a common predefined measure. Gathering different practices together under the 
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constraint of a speculative peace requires to invent an always local, momentary, and partial 
connection via which the practices could engage in a civilized dialogue, an eventual 
convergence via the display of their divergence:  
 
The ‘diplomat’s peace’, therefore, is another name for a belligerent regime that is 
singularized by peace as a possibility. The diplomat’s commitment, the requirements 
her practice assumes, the obligations that put her at risk, make her the representative 
not of a general and hollow ideal of universal peace, but of possible peace, always 
local, precarious, and matter for invention (Stengers, 2011c, p. 387).  
 
As such, the aim of peace is not a unity beyond differences, requiring suspending differences 
in favor of an abstract principle of togetherness, but rather toward the creation of very 
concrete, small-scale, and always partial entanglements. It is an “ecological production of 
actual togetherness” (Stengers, 2002, p. 248).  
This is Stengers’ intervention in the Science Wars and her alternative for the ecology of 
predator and prey of modern science. Introducing peace as a possibility in the belligerent 
regime of modern science, forces scientists to hesitate where they were hitherto inclined to 
judge. It makes it impossible to uphold the binary opposition between those who believe and 
those who know, and opens a space for a diversity of knowledge practices, with their own 
requirements and obligations: truth of the relative. Stengers calls the situation she speculates 
about cosmopolitics:  
 
The term ‘cosmopolitics’ introduces what is neither an activity, nor a negotiation, nor a 
practice, but the mode in which the problematic copresence of practices may be 
actualized: the experience, always in the present, of the one into whom the other’s 
dreams, doubts, hopes, and fears pass. It is a form of asymmetrical reciprocal capture 
that guarantees nothing, authorizes nothing, and cannot be stabilized by any 
constraint, but through which the two poles of the exchange undergo a transformation 
that cannot be appropriated by any objective definition (Stengers, 2011c, pp. 371-372). 
 
Cosmopolitics is thus the name for a gathering of different practices around a problem 
that concerns them all and that cannot be appropriated because of the expertise of one of the 
participating representatives, or resolved by the quick fix of a transcendental principle to which 
all practices would have to comply. It requires of the participants to acknowledge that there is 
something more important than their own interests or the interests of the practice of which 
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they are the representative, and hence makes the cosmo-, the unknown that makes 
practitioners converge in their divergence, present. Moreover, it makes it present as a cause 
for thinking. This means that a particular situation can come to matter in its own terms, that it 
is conferred the power to make us think:  
 
The prefix makes present, helps resonate, the unknown affecting our questions that 
our political tradition is at significant risk of disqualifying. I would say, then, that as an 
ingredient of the term ‘cosmopolitics’, the cosmos corresponds to no condition, 
establishes no requirement. It creates the question of possible nonhierarchical modes 
of coexistence among the ensemble of inventions of nonequivalence, among the 
diverging values and obligations through which the entangled existences that compose 
it are affirmed (Ibid., pp. 355-356). 
 
The cosmopolitical event requires to establish a reciprocal capture between different 
practitioners and their problem in a way that gives this problem, that is henceforth no longer 
posed in the terms specific to a particular practice but rather in generic terms such as cause, 
obligation, and risk, the power to make the assembled practitioners think. This implies to 
succeed in establishing an always temporary and precarious convergence not in spite of but 
indeed due to the divergences of their respective practices, and more specifically by means 
of displaying divergence (Stengers, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a). It is clear that the cosmopolitical 
event is not easily produced. All too quickly we fall into the trap of either reducing the unknown 
to a problem which each practitioner can relate to in the terms specific to her practice – ‘the 
problem is only relevant to the practitioner in so far as it provokes the interests specific to her 
practice’ –, or producing a transcendent principle that would unite the different practitioners by 
means of a shared identification – ‘the problem is relevant to all of us and requires a common 
and shared response because all of us share in the common identity of being human’. As 
such, the cosmopolitical proposal comes with a challenge, namely to create the conditions for 
a civilized dialogue between the representatives of diverging practices.  
It is clear that Stengers’ intervention is political through and through (or cosmopolitical if 
you like). She inherits Whitehead’s speculative philosophy of civilization – which forms the 
theoretical background of her cosmopolitics – in a strongly political way. However, the 
argument could be made that an educational reading of the concept of civilization might also 
be possible, and even that it might help to think about the ways in which the conditions might 
be created that give something the power to make us think. This challenge will be taken up in 
the next chapter. Here I will return to a statement Whitehead has uttered on the occasion of 
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the inauguration of the Harvard Bussiness School in 1927. Inspired by this proposition, my 
aim will be to conceptualize study practices as a different response to the situation Stengers 
tries to address.  
 
 
Chapter Four 
Study Practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to conceptualize study practices in relation to but distinct from 
Stengers’ conceptualization of scientific practices as presented in Chapter Three. Whereas 
the third chapter aimed at a discussion of Stengers’ philosophy of science and the ecology of 
scientific practices which obviously have a place in the university, the current chapter focuses 
on the educational practices of the university which I propose to call study practices. Together, 
the third and the fourth chapter form the more theoretical or conceptual part of the dissertation. 
Although this chapter shares the basic assumptions of the ecology of practices as sketched 
by Stengers89, it is important to underscore that one of the challenges of this chapter will be 
to delineate study practices from scientific practices in order to come to a better conceptual 
understanding of their specificity. In crafting the concept of study practices, however, I will still 
draw heavily on the work of Stengers. But, whereas my presentation of scientific practices 
was based on her philosophy of science, I will draw my inspiration for the conceptualization of 
study practices from her work on the speculative philosophy of Whitehead.90 At the end of the 
previous chapter, it has been argued that Stengers mainly reads Whitehead’s philosophy in 
order to propose a political, or maybe better cosmopolitical, intervention in the Science Wars, 
                                                        
89 For instance, the assumption that every practice can be understood in terms of its requirements and 
obligations will prove to be very helpful in the analysis of a concrete study practice as undertaken in the 
third part.  
90 Next to her extensive work in philosophy of science, Stengers is a fervent reader of the work of 
Whitehead. Her authoritative introduction to his philosophy, Thinking with Whitehead. A free and wild 
creation of concepts, based on a course she had been giving for many years, has been of great help to 
me in getting a grasp on Whitehead’s thinking.  
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but that an educational reading of Whitehead might not be too far-fetched, especially given 
the fact that he had a genuine philosophy of education (cf. Whitehead, 1929).  
In this chapter, I will put forward the concept of study practice. In developing this concept, 
I will take my lead from a proposition Whitehead has uttered on the occasion of the 
inauguration of the Harvard Business School in 1927. In the course of his address Universities 
and their function, he argued that “the universities should be homes of adventure shared in 
common by young and old” (Whitehead, 1929, p. 98). The first two sections of this chapter 
aim to come to terms with Whitehead’s puzzling proposition.91 Whereas the first section 
focuses on how we should understand Whitehead’s notion of adventure, the second section 
inquires the meaning Whitehead attributes to the university as a ‘home’, and hence the 
question of habitation. It is at that point also that the proposition particularly comes to matter 
in respect to the research question of situating study in the relation between university and 
society. Arguing that the university should be a ‘home of adventures’ seems to imply a 
separation between the adventure that is inside the home and the world that is outside. Putting 
forward the theme of habitation in the second section will allow to bring Whitehead’s 
proposition to bear on the research question. At the end of that section, I will formulate a 
proposition with regards to the research question, namely that study practices enact a relation 
between the university and the world by convoking matters of study. In the remainder of the 
chapter, I draw out the implications of this proposition by explaining what this conception 
entails with regards to the relation between scientific practices and study practices, by 
situating the concept of matter of study, and by shedding light on what makes it possible for a 
matter of study to be convoked. In short, I will propose an understanding of the university as 
a habitat for study practices that due to the arts of composition, problematization, and attention 
fosters the coming into being of matters of study. However, Whitehead’s notion of adventure 
as it is present in the proposition he puts forward concerning the university will form the point 
of departure of this chapter.  
 
                                                        
91 I call this statement a proposition in the Whiteheadian sense. Stengers (2005d) explains that a 
proposition should not be understood as a declaration about the state of things as they are, but rather 
as something that is proposed and can make us think in certain way. As such, a proposition should not 
be evaluated on a cognitive level (‘indeed we know that the cat is on the mat’), but rather on an affective 
level. A proposition can make something come to matter. Therefore, propositions should not be judged 
(‘is it true?’), but should be entertained (‘how does it make something come to matter?’). “The primary 
mode of realization of a proposition in an actual entity is not by judgement, but by entertainment. A 
proposition is entertained when it is admitted into feeling. Horror, relief, purpose, are primary feelings 
involving the entertainment of propositions” (1978, p. 188). In a certain way, a proposition is an invitation 
to entertain one way of thinking about something rather than another. In this context, it means that I will 
accept Whitehead’s invitation and feel how it affects the thinking with regards to the research question.  
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Ruminations of Common Sense 
 
In order to understand Whitehead’s notion of adventure, it might be relevant to bring to the 
fore his commitment to the idea that thought should not exclude anything (Debaise & Stengers, 
2017). Stengers (2017b) explains this commitment by referring to Whitehead’s interpretation 
of Socrates’ activities on the agora. She argues that in Modes of thought, Whitehead goes 
back to the streets of Ancient Athens to witness the conversations between Socrates and the 
inhabitants of the polis in order to reinterpret the role of the philosopher. Whitehead, she 
explains, claims that there are different beginnings of philosophy to be distinguished based on 
the multiple interpretations that are possible of what he calls Socrates’ attitude towards 
ignorance. It is possible to encounter, for instance, Socrates, master of the aporia, who does 
not pretend to have an answer to the questions he raises, but who only wants to confront his 
interlocutors with the difficulty, if not impossibility, of formulating a response. Secondly, we 
encounter Socrates, master of Plato, for whom the aporia paves the way for a learning process 
during which the Athenians discover a knowledge that transcends the divergent responses 
that they have suggested earlier. It is the Socrates who, armed with his knowledge of the 
Good, pacifies all discords in the progressive realization of the ideal state. Finally, we 
encounter Socrates, the martyr, who has been condemned for poisoning the public peace and 
corrupting the youth.  
Whitehead wonders about the question which attitude it is possible to adopt in the streets 
of Athens, and he praises Socrates’ conversations as what Stengers (2017b) in a comment 
on Modes of thought calls a practice of assemblage. She explains that the Whiteheadian 
Socrates does not exclude anything from thinking. The different responses that he receives, 
no matter how divergent or partial, should not be disqualified, or reduced in order to evidence 
the interlocutor’s ignorance. The Whiteheadian Socrates listens to the question of 
Lysimachus, relays the issue to Nicias, whose answer elicits the dissenting opinion of Laches, 
consults Melesias’ feeling about the topic, and keeps on complicating the discussion. His 
attitude is not one towards ignorance, but rather towards a landscape of diverging lines of 
thought which he has activated and which he aims to transform instead of to pass judgement 
on. "If he does not step forward as an arbitrator, judging and excluding, the question of 
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divergence can become a matter of collective concern, that is to say become a dimension of 
what, with Whitehead, we can call common sense" (Ibid., p. 10).92 
Hence, the Whiteheadian Socrates does not interrogate his interlocutors in spite of their 
responses, but is in need of these responses to think and to make thinking a collective affair. 
He encounters citizens who were already thinking long before his arrival at the agora. Think 
we must. This Socrates is engaged in and situated by a common sense that ruminates and 
that was already ruminating long before his arrival. The Whiteheadian Socrates adopts an 
affirmative stance with regards to the diverging lines of thoughts he encounters and constantly 
complicates the conversation. “The many become one, and are increased by one” 
(Whitehead, 1978, p. 21). Instead of extracting, the gesture of critique, the Whiteheadian 
Socrates adds to what is already ruminating. In other words, Socrates does not step forward 
as the one who claims to know, not even as the one who knows that he does not know, but 
rather as the one who engages with the ruminations of common sense. More precisely, the 
Whiteheadian Socrates encourages the inhabitants of Athens to articulate their thoughts 
around an issue of collective concern, a question that makes common sense ruminate (e.g. 
virtue, bravery, justice), and forces time and again the participants in the discussion to go 
further in giving their reasons.  
As such, the ruminations of common sense are taken up in an adventure that transforms 
the terms which had been mobilized to articulate the positions of the participants with regards 
to the problem that gathers them. Whereas a critical attitude would purify the scene of 
reasoning, a speculative attitude, the attitude the Whiteheadian Socrates adopts, densifies the 
scene by continuously adding to the ruminations of common sense. This means that the 
Whiteheadian Socrates does not extract certain positions from a debate by means of 
debunking or criticizing. Rather, he aims to articulate specific diverging lines of thought while 
complicating the reasons uttered by his interlocutors. In doing so, the people Socrates’ 
encounters on the agora start to relate in a different way to the reasons they gave in the 
discussion and what they were talking about becomes truly a cause for thinking.  
In short, Whitehead (1978) proposes to understand thinking, which cannot exclude 
anything according to him, as a “welding of imagination and common sense” (p. 17), This 
means to endorse what we have called a speculative relation towards common sense, instead 
of a critical.93 Thinking, in this sense, does not satisfy the ruminations of common sense, but 
                                                        
92 “S’il ne se pose pas comme arbitre, jugeant et excluant, la question de la divergence peut devenir 
matière à préoccupation collective, c’est-à-dire devenir une dimension de ce que, avec Whitehead, on 
peut appeler le sens commun”. 
93 In the original text, Whitehead, writing as a philosopher, refers to philosophy as the welding of 
imagination and common sense. For my argument, however, which does not relate to a disciplinary 
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rather adds to it in a way that transforms the problem that makes common sense ruminate. 
His gesture is a speculative one. Whereas the critical gesture extracts by cutting away what 
is deceitful or illusionary, the speculative gesture adds by welding, a metallurgic operation, the 
possible to the problems that make common sense ruminate.  
It is important to underscore that speculation, in this context, certainly does not refer to 
the rationalities associated with financial speculation in view of future accumulation of credit, 
on the one hand, or the calculation of probabilities as part of security management procedures, 
on the other hand. It should rather be associated with a struggle against the probabilities that 
would make any future manageable in advance. It means to open up a possibility of a future 
that is not a mere extension of the present or of what presents itself as inevitable in the future. 
Rather, “speculating demands the active taking of risks that enable an exploration of the 
plurality of the present” (Savransky, Wilkie, & Rosengarten, 2017, p. 8). As such, speculation 
takes as its point of departure what is already there in the present, the ruminations of common 
sense, but seeks to open up the possibility of transforming what makes common sense 
ruminate into a cause for thinking instead of a cause for judgement (‘Laches is wrong and 
Nicias is right’) or for indifference (‘Both Laches and Nicias are right considered from their 
respective perspectives’). Judgement and indifference are two positions that do not require to 
take risk.   
Stengers (2015b) defines Whitehead’s speculative gesture as "a gesture that bets on the 
possibility of conferring on that which brings us together the power to make us think together" 
(p. 5).94 It is a risky gesture that wagers on the possibility to create a ‘we’ that is engaged in a 
collective process of thinking. It is clear that Whitehead refuses to understand thinking as 
revolutionary. Rather, according to him, the process of thinking is adventurous. Welding 
imagination and common sense requires a common sense that is capable of ruminating, of 
objecting, that is recalcitrant:  
 
The Whiteheadian adventure does not aim at awakening, leaving the cave. It is itself 
a dream, a storytelling: to learn ‘inside’ the Platonic cave, together with those who live 
and argue within it. Not in the hope that the false appearances will gradually yield their 
                                                        
discussion among philosophers, I have broadened the understanding of the term philosophy to include 
also other forms of thinking that take place at a university. Exchanging the term ‘philosophy’ with its 
strong disciplinary connotations, for the more general term ‘thinking’ allows to avoid a discipline-internal 
discussion of a discipline that is not mine and to argue for the relevance of this proposition as an 
ingredient of an educational study of the university. As such, my aim is to speculatively extend the 
scope of this proposition to bear on an educational problem.  
94 “un geste pariant sur la possibilité de conférer à ce qui nous réunit le pouvoir de nous faire penser 
ensemble”. 
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secrets, but in the hope that these ‘appearances’, if they are appreciated in their 
affirmative importance, might be articulated into fabulous contrasts (Stengers, 2011e, 
p. 516).  
 
As such, Whitehead’s notion of adventure denotes a future-oriented transformative process. 
Savransky (2016) reminds us of the fact that the concept of adventure, despite its more 
romantic connotations, derives etymologically from the Latin adventurus, “which signals an 
exposure to that which is about to happen, that is, an investment in the possibility of an event, 
where the latter becomes associated with a sense of difference that matters” (p. 40). An 
adventure in the Whiteheadian sense opens up a middle space, in between a problematic 
situation that makes the common sense ruminate, and the possible transformation of this 
problematic situation.  
Now, how can such a transformation be effectuated? How can diverging lines of thoughts 
eventually entangle in the presence of a possible convergence? How can something be given 
the power to make us think, collectively, engaged in and situated by the problem that concerns 
us? In the course of this chapter I will argue that it requires specific arts of composition, 
problematization, and attention that allow to gather around a problematic situation. First, 
however, it is necessary to inquire the specific meaning of the notion of ‘home’ within 
Whitehead’s proposition concerning the university and what it might entail with regards to the 
relation between university and society. This brings us to the question of habitation. 
 
 
Modes of Habitation 
 
In calling the university a ‘home of adventures’, Whitehead gives a straightforward proposition 
concerning what is inside the university, namely adventures. What Whitehead precisely 
means with the notion of adventures has been the topic of the previous section. The question 
remains how the university relates to its outside, a question which is particularly relevant in 
the context of this dissertation. With the terminology introduced by Whitehead, more 
specifically the notion of home, he seems to put forward the relation between university and 
world as a way of inhabiting. Firstly, the implications of this way of framing in terms of 
inhabiting will be unpacked. Secondly, Dewey’s thinking on habits and habitats will be brought 
to bear on this way of framing the relation between university and world in order to discern an 
educational dimension to it. Lastly, the intrusion of Gaia, Stengers’ way of conceptualizing our 
current global predicament, will be linked to the question concerning the relation between the 
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university and the world. Haraway’s concepts of sympoiesis and response-ability will prove to 
be helpful tools in reinterpreting the ways in which the university is entangled in the world, its 
way of inhabiting after the intrusion of Gaia. I start, however, with the university’s way of 
inhabiting. Therefore it might be relevant to dwell on the notions of habit and habitat.  
In The cosmopolitical proposal, Stengers (2005c) argues that the question of habit and 
habitat are strongly interrelated and that it is impossible to come to terms with one side of the 
problem without immediately taking into account the other. The etho-ecological perspective95, 
as she calls it, affirms  
 
the inseparability of ethos, the way of behaving peculiar to a being, and oikos, the 
habitat of that being and the way in which that habitat satisfies or opposes the demands 
associated with the ethos or affords opportunities for an original ethos to risk itself 
(Ibid., p. 997).  
 
Stengers explains that the inseparabitlity of ethos and oikos does not equal their dependence. 
No habit is entirely contingent on its habitat, and no habitat can transform in any predictable 
way the habits it engenders. Stengers makes clear that “the environment proposes but that 
the being disposes, gives or refuses to give that proposal an ethological significance” (Ibid., 
p. 997). She adds, however, that an ethos never contains in itself its own meanings, let alone 
that it can master its own reasons. The question what a being is capable of is subject to the 
highest unpredictability. If we are to follow Whitehead’s proposition that the university is the 
home of adventures, we need to take into account the inseparability of habit and habitat, and 
inquire how the university as a habitat possibly transforms the habit of thought by giving 
something the power to make us think, which means in this case, as the quote above makes 
clear, that this something that is made present in the environment affords an ethos the 
possibility to risk itself, to become engaged in a Whiteheadian adventure. An adventure, as 
argued in the previous section, cannot take place outside a landscape of diverging opinions 
in which those engaged in the adventure put their reasons at risk in the presence of a 
problematic situation that has acquired the power to initiate the adventure. To understand the 
                                                        
95 Implicitly the question of ethology is always already taken up in the ecological perspective. For 
instance, in von Uexküll’s study of the tick that has gained general recognition due to Heidegger’s 
analysis of the text in his thinking about boredom, he investigates how environmental features such as 
temperature and smell trigger specific behavioral traits of the tick (Buchanan, 2008; Heidegger, 1995). 
Stengers’ way of phrasing the issue as etho-ecological instead of merely ecological, however, makes 
the ethological bearing of an ecological point of view explicit. Besides, the ethological question is at the 
background of Haeckel’s definition of ecology as the study of a living being in its environment discussed 
at the end of Chapter One.  
  Making a university 144 
university accordingly implies to affirm that the adventures for which the university provides a 
home refer neither solely to the formation of the self, nor exclusively to the creation of a world, 
but rather that it allows for a mode of habitation, which requires to take the inseparability of 
habit and habitat as a point of departure.  
Thinking in terms of habitation, as Whitehead proposes to do, forces to investigate the 
possible connections between a relation to the self and a relation to the world, or maybe better, 
to conceive of both self and world as two opposite exaggerations of what was kept together in 
a mode of habitation. It means to conjoin “the mutation of the habits that animate certain ways 
of response with the constraints and possibilities of transformation that their respective 
habitats may provide” (Savransky, 2016, p. 211). Taking up modes of habitation as a central 
theme allows to avoid two distinct but complementary dangers that could emerge as a 
consequence of overemphasizing either of the two dimensions of habitation – habit or habitat. 
The first danger is to reframe habitation to a question of habits, of modes of individual 
behavior in a world that is unquestioned or even forgotten. In this context one could think of 
Foucault’s later work on ethics, subjectivity and truth in which he focuses on technologies of 
the self, practices of self-problematization and self-formation dating back to the Greco-Roman 
period, which he understands as “exercises of self on the self by which one attempts to 
develop and transform oneself” (Foucault, 1997, p. 282). Endorsing such a strong focus on 
the self, and more particularly on a conception of the self as an ethical substance to be worked 
on and ultimately transformed, risks to reduce the problem of ethology to a problem of ethics 
by forgetting the connection between self and world (cf. Foucault, 1990, 1992, 2001).96  
The second danger is to reduce habitation to a question of habitats, of designs of 
environments that would produce specific kinds of subjectivities and ways of living one’s life. 
Exemplary in this context is Sloterdijk’s theory of the anthropogenic island in which he 
analyzes architectural designs from the question of how they allow for a specific type of human 
being to come into existence. He defines modern architecture as “the medium in which the 
explication of the human sojourn in manmade interiors processually articulates itself” 
(Sloterdijk, 2016, p. 469). His study of the apartment is a case in point of how he treats the 
built environment as a methodological entry point to inquire our contemporary condition. 
“Dwelling itself and the production of its containers becomes a spelling-out of all the 
dimensions of components that are joined in primal coalescence on the anthropogenic island” 
                                                        
96 From an historical point of view, Pierre Hadot (1995) has made a similar remark by claiming that the 
exercises of the self that Foucault discusses always imply an insertion of the self in a social or even 
cosmic order, and that they hence are never purely exercises of the self on the self: “In my view, the 
feeling of belonging to a whole is an essential element: belonging, that is, both to the whole constituted 
by the human community, and to that constituted by the cosmic whole” (p. 208).  
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(p. 470). Hence, Sloterdijk’s overemphasis on habitats as production sites of human becoming 
risks to reduce the problem of ecology to a problem of – in a Sloterdijkian turn of phrase – 
ecologistics by understanding the world as a repository for anthropogenic resources (cf. 
Sloterdijk 2004, 2009).  
It needs no argumentation that both approaches have their worth for the questions they 
seek to address, of subjectivity and anthropogenesis respectively, but in order to come to an 
ecological understanding of the university and moreover one that does justice to Whitehead’s 
proposition to think the university as a home of adventure it will be necessary to take another 
route. What the theme of habitation requires is to omit both dangers by taking the risk of going 
through the middle. This means to think the university as a current flowing between the banks 
of self and world, habit and habitat, and study practices as techniques to navigate the 
midstream. Habitation makes it possible to conceive of the thinking that is generated within 
the university as situated relative to a problematic situation, and emerging from a real 
adventurous engagement with the world that opens the question how to transform our 
relations with this problematic situation that acquired to power to elicit thinking.  
In the foregoing paragraphs, the concept of mode of habitation has been proposed in 
order to conceive of the relation between the university and the world. It has been argued that 
understanding the university as a home, as Whitehead has encouraged us to do, means to 
grasp it in terms of habitation, in which habit and habitat are conjoined. At this point, it might 
be interesting to bring in John Dewey’s thinking on the educational implications of the 
embeddedness of the human being within an environment, since it allows to foreground also 
the educational bearing of Whitehead’s proposition. Dewey (1916) begins with assuring that 
the environment denotes something more than the surroundings which encompass the human 
being. Rather, it denotes “the specific continuity of the surroundings with his [the human being] 
own active tendencies” (Ibid., p. 11). Hence, Dewey affirms that the individual and his 
environment are both part of the same lively milieu, both participate in a process of what 
Donna Haraway (2016), inspired by Lynn Margulis, would call symbiogenesis, a becoming-
with of the world and the human being that is part of it. “The things with which a man varies 
are his genuine environment” (Ibid., p. 11). For Dewey, man and environment are strongly 
interrelated and co-dependent. The activities of an astronomer, as he explains, “vary with the 
stars at which he gazes or about which he calculates” (Ibid., p. 11). Likewise, the relics, 
inscriptions, and ruins that an archaeologist finds, constitute his environment and allow him to 
forge a connection with the epoch of his concern. A habit, consequently, is defined as “an 
ability to use natural conditions as means to ends. It is an active control of the environment 
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through control of the organs of action” (Ibid., p. 46). It determines the way a living being goes 
about in his environment.  
According to Dewey this process of mediation that takes place between a living being and 
its environment confirms to the definition of education as “consisting in the acquisition of those 
habits that effect an adjustment of an individual and his environment” (Ibid., p. 47). He 
underscores that a distinction is to be made between passive habits, ways of doing that are 
wrought within the organism, and active habits, ways of doing in which the individual takes 
control over his environment. He gathers the passive habits under the denominator of 
habituation which he defines as “our adjustment to an environment which at the time we are 
not concerned with modifying”. It is the way we get used to our surroundings – clothing, house, 
city, etc. – by making use of what they afford in our daily lives. “We get used to things by first 
using them” (Ibid., p. 47). The active habits are part of a process of what Dewey calls 
adaptation, which he defines as “quite as much adaptation of the environment to our own 
activities as of our activities to the environment” (Ibid., p. 47). With this concept he stresses 
the fact that individual and environment are both engaged in the aforementioned process of 
symbiogenesis and that each part effects transformations in the other.  
Dewey summarizes: “the environment consists of those conditions that promote or hinder, 
stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being” (Ibid., p. 11). In other words, 
the individual and his environment, including his relations with fellow human beings which 
Dewey calls the social environment, are different parts of a lively, organic whole. He gives the 
example of water which provides an environment for a fish, since “it is necessary to the fish’s 
activities – to its life” (Ibid., pp. 11-12). He goes on to explain that the north pole is “a significant 
element in the environment of an arctic explorer, whether he succeeds in reaching it or not, 
because it defines his activities, makes them what they distinctively are” (Ibid., p. 12). But what 
if, like today, water becomes increasingly polluted due to human waste? What will be the 
‘characteristic activities’ of the fish? What should the arctic explorer do as the prospect of a 
summer without a north pole becomes every year more likely? The ecological transformations 
we witness today bring Dewey’s understanding of the environment as those conditions that 
make the ‘characteristic activities’ of a living being possible or impossible in crisis.  
The intrusion of Gaia, as described in Chapter Two, does not demand us to explain what 
the characteristic activities of a living being are, but rather requires us to ask what a living 
being is capable of. Stengers (2017b) gives the example of amaranth: Faced with its probable 
eradication due to the massive use of Round up on soils destined for the production of 
genetically modified soja, the amaranth had to adapt itself to its new lethal living conditions, 
and has become capable of surviving in an environment that was designed for its 
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extermination. "The possibility that an amaranth becomes tolerant of Round up is therefore an 
'adaptation' that its population has been capable of at the moment the environment had 
become lethal. The science made in Monsanto has neglected what the aim of survival made 
the people of amaranths capable of" (Ibid., p. 123).97 Of course, this is not an intentional 
behavior on the part of the amaranth as active subject. Rather, the amaranth has become a 
site where an accidental event could take place, an event however, that imposes upon us the 
task of what Stengers (2017b) calls together with Haraway (2008) response ability, “the ability 
to respond for and to respond to, that is, to be interrogated by that which our intentions would 
justify the sacrifice of” (p. 128).98 It means to acquire a taste for the question of how the ways 
we go about in the world affect this world and our modes of living within it. It raises the question 
of habitation, that henceforth can no longer be understood as a process of adaptation, albeit 
mutual and co-dependent, but rather as a process of sympoiesis, a thoughtful and inventive 
making-with that engages multiple beings in a transformative and adventurous process of 
becoming.  
It is important to demarcate sympoiesis from two other concepts with which it might be 
mistaken. It differs from – as already mentioned –, symbiogenesis. Whereas the latter grasps 
how different parts of the world conceived as an organic and dynamic whole develop together, 
mutually interdependent, the former foregrounds and makes explicit the active part we can 
play in the process due to interventions that are always local, precarious, and partial. Neither 
should it be mistaken for autopoiesis, a concept used to describe self-producing autonomous 
units with centrally controlled, homeostatic and predictable spatiotemporal boundaries. 
Sympoiesis, in contrast, as the term was coined in the MA thesis of Beth Dempster, denotes 
“collectively-producing systems [that] do not have self- defined spatial or temporal boundaries. 
Information and control are distributed among components. The systems are evolutionary and 
have the potential for surprising change” (Dempster, 1998, p. v). 
In short, the intrusion of Gaia requires us to think about our modes of habitation on a 
planet that is severely damaged by capitalist extraction and exploitation of its resources.99 Via 
                                                        
97 “La possibilité qu’une amarante devienne tolérante au Round up correspond donc à une ‘adaptation’ 
dont sa population a été capable lorsque le milieu est devenu létal. La science made in Monsanto a 
négligé ce dont la visée de survivre rendait capable le peuple des amarantes”. 
98 “capacité à répondre pour et de répondre à, c’est-à-dire à se laisser interroger par, ce dont nos 
intentions justifient le sacrifice”. 
99 In that sense, it confronts us with what we could call with William James a genuine option. In The will 
to believe, James (2000) draws three contrasts between two kinds of options: living versus dead, forced 
versus avoidable, and momentous versus trivial. Whereas a living option is an option which we can 
relate to, that makes sense to us, and evokes a willingness to act, a dead option is one of the kind that 
pertains to improbable moral dilemma’s that merely attempt to place an interlocutor in difficulty. Some 
options, moreover, can be avoided. For instance, the choice between going outside with our without 
umbrella can be avoided by just staying inside. It is not an option that obliges to choose. Another option 
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Whitehead’s proposition to understand the university as a home of adventure it has been 
argued that the university possibly constitutes a different mode of habitation, one that is linked 
with Haraway’s idea of response ability and the processes of sympoiesis it necessitates. The 
question that today is forced upon us is not what we could do with the world and the 
possibilities it offers us, but rather what the world asks from us and how our response – always 
a response for and a response to – might affect the issue.  
Taking Whitehead’s proposition concerning the university as a home of adventures as a 
point of departure, it is possible to return to the research question of how to situate study in 
the relation between university and society and to formulate a proposition in response to the 
one formulated by Whitehead, of which the consequences will have to be investigated in the 
remainder of the dissertation.  
 
 
Matters of Study 
 
Guided by the research question “How to situate study in the relation between university and 
society?”, compelled by Stengers’ ecology of practices which provides a powerful alternative 
to an institutional understanding of the university, and affected by Whitehead’s proposition 
concerning the university as a home of adventures, I put forward the following proposition of 
which the different components will be inquired:  
 
 
Proposition: Study practices enact a relation between the university and 
the world by convoking matters of study via the arts of 
composition, problematization, and attention.  
 
                                                        
that does not oblige to choose, according to James, is the choice between accepting a theory as true, 
or rejecting it as false, for if this theory does not make a difference to us, the demand that the theory be 
accepted or rejected will be answered with this indifference. A forced option, on the contrary, cannot be 
avoided. The example James gives is of the kind of “Either accept this truth or go without it” (p. 199). A 
forced option leaves no standing place outside of the alternative. Lastly, a momentous option 
corresponds with a chance to be seized. It is an option that will produce a difference in the world and 
that cannot be reversed, otherwise it would be a trivial option. James defines a genuine option as an 
option that is at once living, forced, and momentous. It is a real alternative that obliges the one to whom 
it is posed to act, by consent or refusal. As such, it is an engaging option and the response which it will 
have elicited makes a difference. It is, moreover, an option that cannot be decided based on intellectual 
grounds, as James makes clear, but in its engaging force requires our passional nature to decide. 
Stengers (2009) explains that a genuine option “poses the question of its efficacy, its possible power of 
breaking through indifference and of engaging and obliging one to choose” (p. 10). 
                                                                                         Study practices 
 
149 
 
Defining study practices requires an explanation of the three components of the proposition. 
In this section, I will explain the concept of matters of study by distinguishing it from matters 
of fact, matters of concern, and matters of care. Thereafter, I will argue that study practices 
require arts of composition, problematization, and attention that are related to the convocation 
of a matter of study. This will be the topic of the fourth section. In the last section I will focus 
on the enactment of a relation between university and world via the notion of commons and 
empowerment. Before going into more detail, however, it might be relevant to couple back to 
the scientific practices of Chapter Three and shed light on how they relate to the study 
practices of the current chapter.   
What a university seems to foster is not only the experimental invention of factishes by 
means of scientific practices, but also, and here it differs from the laboratories and research 
units of private companies, what Stengers (2010) calls the acculturation of these factishes via 
study practices. Acculturation, here, refers to the ways in which these factishes relate to the 
world, how they can be received by the world, how they possibly respond to a problematic 
situation that makes common sense ruminate. In this respect, Stengers’ example of GMOs 
might be elucidating. The invention of GMOs, for instance, is in and of itself not a response to 
the situation it attempts to address (e.g. world hunger). It depends on the entire network of 
laboratories, patents, market mechanisms, and aid agencies that will determine how GMOs 
will be used. Acculturation, then, means taking care of the consequences that the invention of 
GMOs entails and slowing down around social injustices or environmental impairments that 
can be called into being due to its existence. Describing study practices as such practices of 
acculturation of scientific factishes is perhaps a bit limiting and makes, moreover, study 
practices secondary to scientific practices. It might be interesting to develop a concept of study 
practices in its own right.   
Now, what are study practices and in what sense do they relate to and differ from the 
scientific practices of the previous chapter? In Chapter Three, I have claimed, with Stengers 
(2006a), that what scientific practices share, irrespective of their different requirements and 
obligations, is that they are driven by the question “Comment apprendre du nouveau?” – How 
to learn something new? The question how to learn something new, seems to be a point of 
convergence for all scientific practices, an issue that every scientific practice has to deal with. 
Consequently and in contrast to Stengers’ understanding of scientific practices, I argue that 
what makes study practices converge, irrespective of the diversity of their requirements and 
obligations, is the question “Comment apprendre de nouveau?” – How to learn anew? How to 
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transform the relationships we entertain with the world we inhabit in a thoughtful and inventive 
way?  
As such, study practices do not want to find something new in the world, they are in first 
instance not interested in the production of new knowledge contents, but are rather concerned 
with addressing problematic situations. This means that they adventurously engage with the 
issues that make common sense ruminate in a way that transforms the terms in which the 
issue is understood. As such, the university emerges at the point where two questions 
intersect and intertwine: “Comment apprendre du/de nouveau? How to learn something new 
and how to learn anew?”  
Invoking the concept of learning in educational discussions means to take a risk. Two 
reasons can be discerned why it involves a risk. Firstly, formulating critiques of the concept of 
learning and how it is deployed within policy discourses has become quite successful within 
the field of educational theory. It has been argued, for instance, that a too strong focus on the 
concept of learning limits our understanding of educational phenomena to include only the 
individual acquisition of knowledge, skills, and competencies, thereby forgetting about the 
educational role of the teacher or the importance of the subject matter. Moreover, it has been 
argued that the focus on learning plays into the hands of neoliberal policies that seek to 
transform societal issues (e.g. unemployment) into individual problems (e.g. employability). 
The concept of learning seems to have been instrumentalized for political or economic aims 
(Biesta, 2006, 2013, 2015, Simons & Masschelein, 2008a, 2008b).  
The second reason why using the concept of learning seems to imply a risk concerns not 
so much its narrowing down within political or economic discourses, but rather its widening up 
in philosophical arguments. In an analysis of the relations between philosophy and education 
Masschelein and Simons (2016) argue that in the work of what they call the learning 
philosophers – the examples given include Latour (‘learning curves’), Habermas (‘learning 
processes’), and Sloterdijk (‘learning’) – the concept of learning is stretched to that extent that 
it merely denotes processes of change or transformation in a very general sense. They claim 
that it has lost its precise educational meaning when it starts to denote only change or 
transformation. In this case, the concept of learning seems to be instrumentalized for the 
social, political, or ethical project of a particular philosophical theory.  
As such, learning has become a suspicious concept in the eyes of many philosophers of 
education. The more it is instrumentalized for sociopolitical purposes (cf. the learning society), 
the more eager philosophers of education have been to do away with it. However, learning 
seems to be an important concept for Stengers (apprendre, apprentissage), although again it 
runs the risk to become a notion that is too general and hence to lose its educational meaning 
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(in that sense Stengers could perhaps be called a ‘learning philosopher’). Nevertheless, I think 
it is relevant to retain ‘learning’ here. Taking the risk of using the notion might provide an 
interesting opportunity to reclaim the concept of learning in view of the damages that have 
been done due to its instrumentalization in policy discourses100. 
In doing so, I do not think that in fact Stengers’ work is educational through and through 
just because she uses the concept of learning. Neither do I think that in her work the concept 
of learning could be easily exchanged for notions such as change or transformation (although 
these connotations are present as well). Rather, my attempt will be to make the notion of 
learning interesting from an educational point of view by conceptualizing it in relation to study. 
Hence, I will not argue that in fact learning and studying are two altogether different 
phenomena, neither that they denote the same phenomenon but rather that they require each 
other. This means that a conception of learning that could be interesting from an educational 
point of view would require to include an aspect of study, as well as that study could benefit 
from a collaboration with learning in order to become a worldmaking transformative process.   
I want to argue that what appears in the university, due to its study practices, is a matter 
of study. What is being invented/discovered/produced is given the power to slow down 
reasoning; it is being studied. Hence, we could say that in a university there is no invention 
without study. The something new that is discovered, acquires the power to make us think 
about how we can learn how to live with it. As such, the university provides a home for those 
who are due to this new factish required to give a response, for those who will engage in a 
thoughtful and inventive process of sympoiesis that will make it possible to inherit from the 
event of learning something new. Inheriting means in this context to learn anew, to begin again 
to find ways to make a world with the newly discovered factish (cf. Stengers (2010)).  
Matters of study has been put forward as an important notion to conceive of the specificity 
of the processes of learning taking place at universities. In order to get a better grasp of this 
notion, it is helpful to delimit it from other matters, in concreto matters of fact, matters of 
concern, and matters of care. I start with the first. Galilean science as described in the previous 
                                                        
100 Instrumentalization comes forward as something that many philosophers of education seem to take 
issue with. The question here is, I think, not so much to be against instrumentalization and to be for a 
genuine, internalist educational account. Turning educational concepts into instruments to help develop 
a social, political, or ethical (maybe even an economic!) project can be a challenging thing to do (and 
some philosophers have done an excellent job in this), and according to me, educational theory has in 
its fear for learning borrowed many conceptual instruments from other disciplines, not in the least from 
philosophy (e.g. techniques of the self, suspension, profanation, subjectification). Considering the 
retooling of concepts into instruments for other purposes, to play other melodies than the ones the 
instruments were intended for, the question, from a pragmatic point of view, can only be whether the 
music is good or bad, whether it makes us think or not. In that sense, a case can be made to retain 
Stengers’ concept of learning and to investigate the consequences using this concept can have from 
an educational point of view.    
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chapter produces what Latour (2008) has proposed to call matters of fact. Via the threefold 
conferral of power the experimental achievement is claimed to be able to speak for itself, in 
order to silence rivalling interpretations. The style in which is talked about such matters of fact 
installs a division between those who know and those who believe. In one corner, we find the 
scientists armed with data and who know about what they speak. Throughout the years, they 
have gained enough expertise to utter scientifically sound statements. In the other corner, we 
find the ignorant public, including pseudo-scientists. They are believed to be the most 
dangerous in case they hold strong beliefs that contest scientific evidence. In the end, 
nevertheless, they will be forced to surrender for the matters of fact, or else risk to be expelled 
from the citadel of rational conversation (Latour, 2004, 2008; Stengers, 2000).  
Latour (2008) proposes to render the web from which the matter of fact emerged – in the 
case of Galilean science the sociotechnical apparatus that made it possible for the fact to be 
corroborated and to acquire the status of evidence – explicit. “A matter of concern is what 
happens to a matter of fact when you add to it its whole scenography, much like you would do 
by shifting your attention from the stage to the whole machinery of the theatre” (Ibid., p. 39). 
Describing something as a matter of concern, instead of as a matter of fact, means to pay 
tribute to the process of becoming of which the thing is the result. In contrast to the matter of 
fact, which gives an objectified version of the thing, cut loose from its sociotechnical 
entanglements, the matter of concern renders the thing as a lively gathering. This does not 
only mean that, as already said, its production process is made present, but also that different 
actors are gathered for whom this thing is of concern.  
As such, the matter of concern gathers in two different ways. On the one hand, it gathers 
the sociotechnical assemblage that made it possible for it to come into being: the machines, 
scientists, policy regulations, and budgets to which it owes its existence. On the other hand, it 
gathers those who are concerned, the people who will have to inherit the event of its 
production, those who will receive it and will have to make a world with it.101 Latour invokes 
here concept of  the Parliament of Things, an assembly that gathers representatives around 
something, an issue of concern. It gathers them, more specifically, not as experts, but as 
representatives of, for instance, the industry, the people, the planet, or the state. They 
represent something in relation to that which is of concern.  
Thirdly, the notion of matter of care, as conceived by María Puig de la Bellacasa (2017), 
adds a layer to the notion of matter of concern. Although concern and care are strongly related, 
                                                        
101 In this context, Latour refers to Heideggers musings on the etymology of the Old German Ding, 
which not only denoted the thing as gathering of the fourfold (heaven and earth, mortals and divinities) 
– the first gathering of the matter of concern –, but also as a form of assembly, of gathering in order to 
discuss (Heidegger, 1971; Latour, 2005a). 
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speaking in terms of care renders, as she argues, the active engagements more explicit: “One 
can make oneself concerned, but ‘to care’ contains a notion of doing that concern lacks” (Ibid., 
p. 42). It intensifies the interrelatedness between the different participants by foregrounding 
the fact that our actions are always already embedded in this web and should therefore be 
subject to ethical reflection, always situated by the specific problem at hand. Whereas the 
matter of concern is foremost a notion that explains how things are constructed and how they 
gather a concerned public, matter of care is a notion that more explicitly addresses our 
participation in the possible becomings of these constructions. Thinking with care, as Puig de 
la Bellacasa (2012) explains, underscores “those doings needed to create, hold together and 
sustain life’s essential heterogeneity” (p. 198). Intensifying matters of concern to bring them 
to bear upon an ethical discussion – Puig de la Bellacasa (2017) understands the stakes of 
her work as “a speculative commitment to think about how things could be different if they 
generated care” (p. 60) –, is indeed an interesting move to render these processes of 
sympoiesis more visible and prone to ethical consideration.  
From an educational point of view however, it is arguable that this question of what to do 
with this something new that has come to the world, this pharmakon-factish, is not only a 
matter of ethical consideration, hence thinking with care, but also and foremost something that 
needs to be studied, that has to be given the power to make us think. In short, whereas a 
matter of fact can be used as a bat to shoo away the irrational ideologues, or to persuade the 
doubters, a matter of concern visualizes the ontogenesis of what was hitherto a matter of fact, 
thereby enabling a political discussion in which the fact itself can participate. A matter of care, 
subsequently, intensifies the matter of concern in the sense that it foregrounds our doings with 
regards to the matter at hand, that it is in fact precarious and therefore in need of care. A 
matter of study, at last, is also an intensification of the matter of concern. However, not in the 
sense that it foregrounds the active maintenance of the construction, but rather that what is of 
concern is given the power to make us think, instead of only becoming susceptible to political 
discussion or ethical consideration.  
More concretely, this means that within the assembly of students something, a matter of 
study, needs to be made present that turns them into a thinking public. It is possible to think 
in this respect – slightly foreshadowing what I will present in Part Three – of maps, 
photographs, comparisons, written accounts, conceptual schemes, or drawings around which 
the students can gather and make them think about the problematic situation that requires 
response. The presence of such a matter of study slows down the discussion between the 
students because it allows for asking questions such as “Where do you see it?”, “Why do you 
say that?”, “How do you draw these relations?”, making the students time and again return to 
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the matter of study and inhibiting that their discussion becomes an exchange of opinions. 
Opinions, however, can be raised within such a conversation around a matter of study but 
because they will have to be brought into a relation with this matter of study, these opinions 
themselves will undergo transformations that cannot be controlled by any one that is part of 
the gathering because the students will start to think about and relate to these opinions in a 
different way.    
Important to emphasize is the fact that the aforementioned matters of study (e.g. maps, 
photographs, drawings) are generated within and by the assembly of students in relation to 
the situation that requires response. With Stengers (2005c), it could be argued that this 
generative process is a practice of convocation, a kind of magic. Not, however, the magic 
associated with the occult or dark arts, but rather the magic of neopaganist, ecofeminist, 
activist, Californian witches who have taken the risk of calling themselves witches and their 
practice magic. Stengers (2005c) explains that in this context magic needs to be understood 
as “the art of triggering events where a ‘becoming able to’ is at stake” (p. 1002). Hence, it does 
not address human beings in the way they perform their ‘characteristic activities’, as we have 
called this with Dewey, but rather as being capable, this means not only prone to adapt to 
changes in the environment but engaged in a situated process of sympoiesis that transforms 
the milieu and its inhabitants, a learning process.  
Magic is a practice of convocation, the ritual makes something present. The efficacy of 
the ritual lies however not in the fact that an answer is given to a question, a problem resolved, 
due to the manifestation and intervention of a Godess who judges – the map or drawing is not 
a ‘matter of fact’, cannot be used to persuade. Its efficacy is rather “that of a presence that 
transforms each protagonist’s relations with his or her own knowledge, hopes, fears and 
memories, and allows the whole to generate what each other would have been unable to 
produce separately” (Ibid., p. 1002). This process of ‘becoming-able-to’ is hence a collective 
process, moreover a process that takes place in the presence of something which is not the 
spokesperson or representative that can confirm or refute, a judge. The Godess is present as 
a cause, but a cause that only exists in the effects that She produces when present, since She 
transforms the stakes that have been put up. Magic catalyzes “a regime of thought and feeling 
that bestows the power on that around which there is a gathering to become a cause for 
thinking” (Ibid., p. 1002). Translating this to study practices, this means that matters of study 
catalyze a regime of thought and feeling that give the problematic situation around which the 
students gather the power to make them think, and by convoking matters of study (e.g. making 
maps, writing stories, drawing sketches, schematizing conceptual frameworks) make present 
a cause for thinking.   
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Consequently, this means to exchange the Dingpolitik that Latour related to the 
Parliament of Things for a thinkpedagogy, or maybe more precisely a pedagogy of study, an 
educational practice that activates thought – not mere persuasion, discussion, or 
consideration – around a matter of study. In other words, it is proposed to add to the 
epistemological term of matters of fact, the political term of matters of concern, and the ethical 
term of matters of care, the educational term of matters of study. This means to do justice to 
the fact that the problematic situation around which the university gathers cannot be given a 
response based on scientific expertise, nor based on purely political or ethical arguments, but 
that the question itself has to be given the power to gather a public of people who study around 
it, an association of students. 
As such, the university as a home of adventures seems not to refer back to political 
solutions of times long gone to deal with the problems of the present, nor is it likely that it 
proposes easy quick-fixes that can take away the problem, but gathers a public of students to 
inquire the problematic situation, to stay with the trouble, in the words of Donna Haraway 
(2016):   
 
In urgent times, many of us are tempted to address trouble in terms of making an 
imagined future safe, of stopping something from happening that looms in the future, 
of clearing away the present and past in order to make futures for coming generations. 
Staying with the trouble does not require such a relationship to times called the future. 
In fact, staying with the trouble requires learning to be truly present, not as a vanishing 
pivot between awful or edenic pasts and apocalyptic or salvific futures, but as mortal 
critters entwined in myriad unfinished configurations of places, times, matters, 
meanings (p. 1.) 
 
In short, matters of study might have the potential to slow down the ways in which response-
ability is exercised, the ways in which troubles of the present are given a response. In the next 
section, it will be explained that the convocation of matters of study requires a threefold art, 
namely of composition, of problematization, and of attention.  
 
 
Composition, Problematization, Attention 
 
Characteristic for the practices of modern sciences, as argued in Chapter Three, was the 
experimental apparatus that allowed to enforce a break between experimenter and 
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experimental achievement, and that hence conferred, ultimately, to the experimenter the 
power to speak in the name of the experimental achievement. Stengers (2017b) contrasts this 
experimental apparatus predicated on a break between experimenter and experimental 
achievement, with what she calls an apparatus of activation of which the achievement is 
always generative, and which I would like to associate with the pedagogy of study of the 
university. This means that the apparatus of activation transforms divergent experiences into 
a javelin projected beyond the limits that define these divergences, that it initiates a 
Whiteheadian adventure. She argues that the efficacy of an apparatus is always to induce and 
deploy ways of affecting and being affected, of doing and undergoing. The experimental 
apparatus, for instance, attributes all power to the scientists who hence can impose his 
interpretation of the experimental achievement onto his opponents who hold other rivalling 
opinions.102 The apparatus of activation, on the contrary, gathers those who are concerned by 
a transformation in the middle voice that it seeks to activate.  
Conceiving of study practices as practices of the middle voice forces us to consider our 
relation towards what we study as neither active nor passive. Studying in the active voice 
would mean that our relation is one of appropriation, that we, as students, make the matter of 
study our own, that we acquire control over it so we can put it to use in our jobs and everyday 
lives. As such, it is arguable that the modern sciences in the current culture of academic 
capitalism study in the active voice, by appropriating what is studied via patents and 
publications. Studying in the passive voice, on the contrary, would imply that our relation is 
one of pure exposition, that a matter of study is disclosed before our eyes so that we can 
attend to it, and that it can begin to command us.  
Studying in the middle voice, however, requires to let oneself be affected in order to affect, 
to let oneself be touched in order to touch. It ties together the becoming of the world with the 
becoming of a collective of students. Moreover, it makes it possible to conceive of learning 
processes as adventures that engage a collective of students around a problematic situation 
that will not only transform this situation but also the students that have accepted to become 
affected by it. The middle voice, according to Stengers (2017b) opens the following questions: 
How does this situation concern us? What does this situation ask from us? How can we 
respond to what the situation demands? Posed in such a way, moreover, that the response 
given can never be general nor generalizable, that there is no criterion with which the 
legitimacy of the response can be evaluated. Besides, it requires of those who come together 
                                                        
102 Stengers however, contends that this division of power is fallacious. She argues that the 
experimental achievement is dependent on a process of negotiation between experimenter and factish 
(Stengers, 2006a). See also Chapter Three.  
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that what will emerge from their assembly will not belong to any one of them in person. It 
induces “a transformation that will remain relative to the event of 'the acceptance of being 
touched by'” (Ibid., p. 68).103 This implies that the apparatus of activation makes it possible to 
become collectively affected by something, to slow down reasoning and study, always in the 
middle voice.  
The convocation of matters of study seems to be then an obligatory passage point if this 
learning process is not just a process of transformation or change (learning in the broad 
sense), but becomes a real educational event, an event where “’a becoming able to’ is at 
stake”, to speak with Stengers (2005b, p. 1002). What is of importance is not so much that the 
problematic situation has been transformed or that the hopes, fears, dreams, and doubts of 
the collective of students have been transformed, but rather that given this problematic 
situation that has been given the power to make a collective of students think by means of the 
convocation of matters of study, has triggered the event of a becoming able to, to give a 
response that is not motivated by political opinions or economic interests, but comes forth 
from the event of study itself.  
With Stengers, it can be argued that the style of matters of study requires a threefold art. 
Together the art of composition, the art of problematization, and the art of attention make up 
the apparatus of activation. In this paragraph, I clarify how these arts play a role in convoking 
a matter of study. It is important to make clear from the outset that the three arts presuppose 
each other in order to convoke a matter of study. Leave one out and the apparatus breaks 
down. Mutually combined however, they reinforce each other and instigate the apparatus of 
activation.  
The first art, of composition, has to do with the way in which people are brought together 
around something, and what kind of role they can assume in this gathering. Stengers 
describes the slow and often repetitive palaver as a thought-provoking practice to think about 
what it means to speak in an assembly. She argues that the palaver in no way resembles the 
democratic debate as we know it. Whereas the democratic debate should be open to all 
citizens, the palaver summons the elders. Stengers explains that assuming the role of elder 
puts a constraint on what can be said and how it can be said. Since the word of the elder 
cannot be contradicted, she should extract from her experience those syntaxes, rhythms, and 
ways of saying that elicit contradiction, that put forward an intentional I that defends its 
reasons. On the contrary, speaking like an elder brings about an impersonal experience that 
transforms the speaking subject into an elder. Every speech act should express a thought that 
                                                        
103 “une transformation qui restera relative à l’évènement d’un ‘s’être laissé toucher par’”. 
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does not contest the question around which the elders gather. The assumption is that the 
question has the power to gather, since there is hesitation, divergence, and risk for conflict. In 
spite of the presence of a matter at risk, the palaver is characterized by a specific kind of trust. 
People do not gather because an agreement has to be made – which makes every 
participant responsible –, but rather because an agreement will produce itself. Such trust 
transforms the listening habits of those involved. They no longer listen for clues that can help 
them construct a counter-argument, or for clues that will unveil the intentions of the 
interlocutor. Hence, the efficacy of the composition is not due to the goodwill or tolerance of 
some of the participants with regards to their more persuasive associates. Rather, the slow 
and repetitive composition is generative. It produces a mutual sensibility concerning the 
reasons of all who will be affected by the decision until the decision will be taken – and the 
impersonal is important here. The decision is not taken by someone, not even by the collective, 
but it will have produced itself: “the decision to be made is made without anyone being able to 
appropriate it, without anybody else being able to guarantee that it is the best possible 
decision. The decision will have received 'its' reasons” (Stengers, 2017b, p. 41).104 It is clear 
that the habits of speech that are fostered within such a composition are different from those 
that are typical for the matter of fact – ‘science has proven that…, and thus…’.  
The art of composition fosters a mutual sensibility and readiness to be affected by a 
question. It brings people together in a way that undoes both personal intentions and general 
solutions, in order to make them susceptible for a sympoietic process of interdependent co-
becoming. It is a composition without composer, and definitely without transcendent position 
from which it is possible to evaluate what has been composed.  
Secondly, the art of problematization has to do with how something is made present within 
the composition, namely as a matter of study. It involves the question how something – a 
situation, a cause – can make us think, how it can be transformed into a question in order to 
suspend the ‘and thus’ of rational debate and slow down reasoning, to make study possible. 
“The problematization does not go back to the most general but confers on the situation, 
always this or that situation, the power to question what seemed to be self-evident” (Ibid., p. 
51).105 Stengers argues that Leibniz’ moral advice – “Dic cur hic? Respice finem”, “Say why 
here? Consider the end” – is of relevance in relation to the art of problematization. What is at 
stake in this question is not the response that will be given, but rather the affective and 
existential transformation it induces, which she describes as an enlargement of the 
                                                        
104 “la décision à prendre soit prise, sans que nul ne puisse s’approprier, sans que nul non plus ne 
puisse garantir qu’elle est la meilleure possible. La décision a reçu ‘ses’ raisons”. 
105 “La problématisation ne remonte pas vers le plus général mais confère à la situation, toujours telle 
ou telle situation, le pouvoir de mettre en cause ce qui, pourtant, semble aller de soi”. 
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imagination. This means to take into account all the dimensions a response to a problem might 
play into, to take care of the consequences, and imagine what a response might imply for the 
ones that are excluded from the gathering of students.  
For Leibniz, indeed, no one can respond truthfully to the question “Dic cur hic?”, except 
for God of course, but He does not respond to such a question. Nobody has access to the 
truth of His reasons. Hence, nobody has access to the ‘why’, or can define ‘the end’. At the 
moment Adam ate the apple, he could not give any reason for doing this. He did not have any 
end in mind with this action. Because, according to the Leibnizian system, it is the world 
chosen by God that conspires in his act. And the end of this act, moreover, belongs to no one 
but God since the divine calculation of the best of all possible worlds had already determined 
that Adam would eat the apple. “The question Dic cur hic aims to have the efficacy to 
problematize the general reasons by making the 'here' [hic] come to matter - suspend your 
action, let yourself be affected by the 'this', that is to say by this world” (Ibid., p. 51).106 Thus, 
Leibniz’ dictum problematizes general reasons that could be invoked in a discussion, in order 
to make the situation and our relation towards it truly problematic. This means that general 
reasons – ‘growth is the only solution’ – do not count in the conversation. The only reasons 
that can be taken up are those that come forth from and engage with the situation, henceforth 
a problematic situation.  
It is a matter of, to take up again a concept encountered before, response-ability, of being 
able, given this specific situation, to respond. This response, moreover, is always a response 
for and to. It is a response for because it takes place in the presence of the problem it engages 
with. It is never a response informed by general reasons, but always specific reasons. Hence, 
it is a response to, always situated by the problem it addresses. It requires to ward off all 
transcendent reasons that could be given, and engage with all the divergent dimensions the 
problem plays into, to effectuate a transformation that takes up these reasons in an always 
local, situated, precarious, and partial response. 
The art of attention is the third and final art that makes up the apparatus of activation. 
Moreover, it is arguable that the presence of this art transforms the apparatus of activation in 
a truly educational invention. A combination of only the arts of composition and 
problematization would engender the coming into being of a Parliament of Things, an 
assembly around matters of concern. The fact, however, that also the art of attention is 
practiced, ensures that what appears due to the working of the apparatus of activation, is not 
only a matter of concern, something which we can have a discussion about that cannot be 
                                                        
106 “La question Dic cur hic a pour efficace recherchée de problématiser les raisons générales en faisant 
importer le ‘ici’ – suspens ton action, laisse-toi affecter par le ‘ceci’, c’est-à-dire par ce monde”.  
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reduced to arguments of the kind as ‘sciences proves that… and thus’, or ‘as evidence 
shows… and thus’, but that it is empowered to become a matter of study, in the sense that we 
are not only summoned to give our reasons, but are also required to slow down reasoning, to 
study. Stengers (2017b) defines the art of attention as follows:  
 
 The art of attention is an art of the middle voice, a tentacular art because it is about 
letting oneself being touched, and to give what touches us the power to make us feel 
and think, but always 'here', never 'off the ground' (p. 197).107 
 
It is important to note that Stengers emphasizes that the art of attention is a relational one, 
tentacular in her words.108 It is impossible to be attentive in general. Attention is rather 
something that is elicited because something requires our attention, because something 
obligates us to think. This something is what she calls a common cause. 
Referring to the commoners who shared and grazed the pastures of medieval England, 
but also to the user movements of people who take illegal drugs, Stengers (2015a) 
understands the commons as empowering those who were initially defined as self-interested 
users to contest this tragic diagnosis and to confer on the common – correspondingly defined 
as endangered by annihilating utilization –, “the power to gather them, to cause them to think, 
that is to say, to resist this definition, and produce propositions that it would otherwise have 
rendered unthinkable. In brief to learn again the art of paying attention” (p. 88). Stengers 
conceives of this tentacular art – in the middle voice – as a back and forth between touching 
and being touched, giving hold and seizing hold, empowering and being empowered. For 
Stengers, the art of attention is intimately linked with the question of the commons. Therefore, 
the last section of this chapter deals with the commons, which, moreover, allows to return to 
the first section that dealt with common sense.   
 
 
                                                        
107 “L’art de l’attention est un art de la voix moyenne, un art tentaculaire car il s’agit de se laisser toucher, 
et de conférer à ce qui nous touche le pouvoir de nous faire sentir et penser, mais toujours ‘ici’, jamais 
‘hors sol’”. 
108 Haraway (2016) clarifies that tentacle comes from the Latin tentaculum, which means ‘feeler’, and 
that tentare, the Latin verb from which it is derived, means ‘to feel’ and ‘to try’. Conceiving of the art of 
attention as tentacular foregrounds the fact that it is a mix of touch and try. It is reminiscent of someone 
who is blindfolded and suddenly has to trust on his haptic senses in order to find his way. As such the 
art of attention is perhaps rather practiced with the hands, than with the eyes. Moreover, it is a risky art 
since one never knows what one will touch or where it will bring you since destinations at a distance 
are literally out of sight. It requires to stay with the trouble.    
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Making Common I 
 
At the end of this chapter, I return to the issue of the relation between university and society 
where the chapter has started with, by means of the theme of the commons. This chapter has 
set out with Whitehead’s proposition concerning the university as a home of adventure. I have 
explained what Whitehead might have meant with his notion of adventure, namely that it 
requires to engage with what makes common sense ruminate, whether it be the question if 
children can learn to be brave by means of battle exercises in war armor, or the question how 
we can deal with nuclear waste. It asks for an interweaving and complicating of the diverging 
lines of thought that are always already ruminating in the landscape of common sense, in 
order to make a transformation possible that engages these different perspectives, without 
imposition of a transcendental rule or order, but rather as situated by something that makes 
the people gathered think, a matter of study:    
 
The entanglements between partial and therefore divergent perspectives are made in 
a tentacular way, by reciprocal affections, without dramatic moments where the 
agreement would be imposed at the same time as its reasons. No drama here, 
because the reasons are those that the situation itself has received, due to the 
constraints associated with the apparatus which hence has had the power to make 
'common sense'" (Stengers, 2017b, p. 199-200).109  
 
Stengers argues that such processes can already be witnessed today in response to what 
is called the commons.110 Referring to Bollier (2014), she makes clear that commons 
necessitate practices in the middle voice where commons and commoners are engaged in a 
sympoietic tentacular process of commoning. “There is no commons without commoning” 
(Ibid., p. 176). In order to speak of a commons, therefore, it is a necessary requirement that 
there are other people with whom to be collectively situated and engaged by this common. 
They are obligated by this common, in the same sense as the scientific practitioner who is 
obligated by what she seeks to research. It initiates and requires processes of commoning, 
                                                        
109 “Les entre-infléchissements entre perspectives partiales et donc divergentes se font sur un mode 
tentaculaire, par affections réciproques, sans moments dramatiques où l’accord s’imposerait en même 
temps que ses raisons. Pas de drame ici, car les raisons sont la situation elle-même telle qu’elle a reçu, 
grâce aux contraintes associées au dispositif, le pouvoir de faire ‘sens commun’”. 
110 As argued in Chapter 1, the work of economist Elinor Ostrom has put the commons again on the 
research agenda. Not only in economy, but also in fields such as geography, urban planning, political 
theory, and law there is a renewed attention for the commons (cf. Capra & Mattei, 2015; De Angelis & 
Stavrides, 2010; Gutwirth & Stengers, 2016; Harvey, 2012; Hilal & Petti, 2013; Linebaugh, 2008; 
Ostrom, 1990; Peters, Gietzen, & Ondercin, 2012). 
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collective deliberation about the terms of use of the common, a mode of thoughtful and 
inventive habitation around and with what is common. As such, commons and commoners 
are always already entangled in a collective process of commoning. The three terms of 
commons, commoners and commoning presuppose each other. Via processes of commoning 
common sense is transformed into a common sensibility, something that can affect us, make 
us feel and make us think, collectively, around a common cause. 
As such, when students generate matters of study with regards to a problematic situation 
that makes common sense ruminate, the diverging dimensions of common sense are taken 
up in a processes of commoning, of making common sense. This means that common sense 
is transformed, taken up in an adventure in the Whiteheadian sense. Matters of study operate 
as common causes which means that they set these adventures in motion and grant them an 
educational dimension which means that not only the ruminations of common sense of the 
commoners, the students are transformed but also that the problematic situation which made 
common sense ruminate in the first instance is being transformed.    
It could be argued that matters of study, common causes, come into being when scientists 
and students meet, which is to say at the point where scientific practice and study practice 
collide, and where the apparatus of activation “achieves the transformation of a problematic 
situation into a cause for collective thinking” (Stengers, 2015a, p. 137).111 It is also this point 
that Bollier (2014) underscores when he claims that the commons “is about honoring the new 
and diverse types of knowledge that are collectively constructed by commoners themselves, 
in their own specific circumstances” (p. 154).  
This means that the scientific practices of Chapter Three and the study practices of this 
chapter are not mutually exclusive. Rather, it could be argued that what is learned within 
scientific practices – be reminded that their driving question is “How to learn something new?” 
– requires to learn again how to inhabit a shared world, a learning process that transforms the 
relations people have towards one another, towards the world they inhabit, and towards the 
problematic situation that they have given the power to make the think. 
Thinking, in this understanding, is always dependent upon a cause for thinking, a cause 
that is common and thus constitutes a specific technology of belonging, a way of bringing 
together people by that what obligates them and makes them think. Stengers (2005b), 
however, emphasizes that a technology of belonging is not the same as a technology of 
causes. She stresses that “causes are causes for those who are obliged to think by them. 
Those do indeed belong and the cause does not belong to them” (Ibid., p. 191). The cause 
                                                        
111 Emphasis in original.  
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cannot be appropriated to become a reason for an individual action, but rather requires to 
think together. Hence, common causes are questions around which scientific practices and 
study practices can converge. Moreover, Stengers (2004b) writes that:  
 
To belong here is not to be assigned an identity, it is to become, in this case to become 
capable of what one would not be capable of otherwise: to participate in a collective 
decision, to resist the dynamics that take the participants hostage, to not accept wearily 
or for the good of the group, and to be up to the field, for that which one has been 
engaged in" (p. 61).112 
 
As such, it can be argued that the question of the commons and of belonging via processes 
of commoning is related to empowerment.  
Starhawk (1982) explains that a practice of empowerment generates power-from-
within.113 It can be associated with the empowerment that the dispossessed experience when 
they seize hold again over what was enclosed, when they reclaim what was expropriated. It 
is important to emphasizes that the empowering relation between commons and commoners 
is never an instrumental relation. The commons is not a means to the end of the empowerment 
of the dispossessed who then will become again commoners. It is rather due to the sympoietic 
process of commoning that the commoners can become commoners and the commons can 
become commons. This means that the making common of what was enclosed initiates a 
learning process that requires the commoners to think about the terms of use of the commons. 
Hence, it becomes a cause for thinking.  
To conclude this chapter, it is important to note that the meaning of the terms ‘university’ 
and ‘society’ has changed in between the research question and the proposition. In the 
research question, ‘university’ seemed to refer to an institution for higher education and 
academic research, and ‘society’ to the social structure in which this institution is implicated. 
For the proposition, firstly, the term ‘society’ had perhaps too strong structural connotations. 
‘World’, on the contrary, seemed to be a more appropriate term to denote that which makes 
                                                        
112 “Appartenir, ici, ce n’est pas se voir assigner une identité, c’est devenir, en l’occurence devenir 
capable de ce dont on serait incapable sinon: participer à une décision collective, résister aux 
dynamiques qui prennent les participants en otages, ne pas accepter par lassitude ou pour le bien due 
groupe, et être à la hauteur, sur le terrain, de ce à quoi on s’est engagé” 
113 It is clear that the notion of empowerment as it is conceived by Starhawk denotes entirely different 
processes than the ones that are sanctioned as ‘empowerment’ by neoliberal policies. Whereas these 
policies generally understand empowerment as getting grip again on one’s own life in order to become 
productive in an economic order focused on growth, Starhawk’s notion of empowerment denotes 
processes of collectively being affected by something by giving this something the power to make feel 
and make think.  
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people think. In the proposition, secondly, ‘university’ no longer refers to the institution, 
comprising different faculties and research units, but rather to the public that has been 
assembled around something that makes them think, a universitas in the medieval sense.  
In that respect, the verb that ties ‘world’ to ‘university’ seems to be of importance. From 
the point of view of an ecology of practices, ‘university’ and ‘society’ are not two entities that 
can be considered as given and between which the relationship has to be drawn. Rather, 
study practices enact such a relationship in that they call into being at the same time a world, 
something that makes people think, as well as a university, a thinking public.  
In the course of this chapter my argument has been that the university, as a home of 
adventures, and thus as a specific mode of habitation, makes it possible to slow down 
reasoning around things that make common sense ruminate. This is effectuated by means of 
its study practices that instigate the apparatus of activation that transforms these common 
causes into matters of study. This process, the pedagogy of study of the university, requires, 
as is made clear, a threefold art: of composition, problematization, and attention.  
 
Relay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this second part has been to develop an understanding of the university that ties 
together an ecological approach and a focus on practices. Stengers’ work has been proven to 
be very helpful in this regard. In the third chapter, I have presented the key concepts and ideas 
of Stengers’ ecology of scientific practices. The aim of the fourth chapter has been to expand 
Stengers’ ecology of practices to include study practices as well. Whitehead’s proposition 
concerning the university as a home of adventures has been taken as an interesting point of 
departure. Via Whitehead’s proposition I have suggested to conceive of study practices as 
enacting a relation between university and world by means of the convocation of matters of 
study via the arts of composition, problematization, and attention.  
In the course of the foregoing chapter the different components of this proposition have 
been elucidated. Besides, I have related it to the question of learning, a notion that seems to 
be essential to Stengers’ understanding of practices. Indeed, she argues that what makes 
scientific practices converge is the question “How to learn something new?” Inspired by 
Stengers, I have proposed to understand study practices as converging around the question 
“How to learn anew?” Given the risks associated with the concept of learning – an either to 
narrow or too broad understanding – it has been proposed to conceive of learning as 
associated with matters of study. Matters of study transform learning processes into collective 
processes where a becoming-able-to is at stake, a becoming-able-to, moreover, that slows 
down the process. 
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As such, on a conceptual level, scientific practices cannot be easily separated from study 
practices. From a more critical point of view, it can perhaps even be claimed that the attempt 
to make a strong separation between scientific practices and study practices can be conceived 
as a way to domesticate these practices. Assuming a strong separation between the two risks 
to turn scientific practices into practices of knowledge creation on the one hand, and study 
practices into practices of knowledge dissemination (or learning in the narrow sense) on the 
other hand. If, however, something is given the power to make scientists and students think, 
both become interchangeable as well as their respective practices. On a practical level, then, 
this understanding of scientific and study practices would require to resist the cut between the 
two kinds of practices. 
Whereas the foregoing part has investigated study practices on a conceptual level, the 
following part will come up with a concrete example of a study practice in order to flesh out 
the concept. Together with Campus in Camps, a Palestinian experimental university in 
Dheisheh Refugee Camp, the concept of study practices will be developed further. In this 
regard, the distinction made in Chapter Three between requirements and obligations to 
investigate respectively how people engaged in a practice think and what makes them think 
will prove to be a helpful tool to analyze the study practice of Campus in Camps. The concepts 
elaborated in Chapter Four, at their turn, will make it possible come to a conceptual 
understanding of the study practice of Campus in Camps.  
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Chapter Five 
University in Exile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How to Inhabit Your Enemy’s House? 
 
One early morning in April 2006, the inhabitants of Beit Sahour, a small municipality in the 
eastern outskirts of Bethlehem, witnessed the evacuation of the military outpost of Oush Grab 
– The Crow’s Nest – that marked the border between the city of Bethlehem and the desert.114 
The withdrawal of the Israeli army was the last act in a long struggle of Palestinian activists 
against the oppressive presence of the base. Continued opposition against The Crow’s Nest 
by the local community and the concurrent refashioning of the military geographical 
organization in the area led to the sudden abandonment of the base. The morning after the 
evacuation people from Bethlehem overran the outpost, smashing windows, walls, and doors 
with iron bars. At the same time, others tried to salvage everything of even the least worth. 
Doors, furniture, and electric plugs were removed from the buildings. The water tower in the 
center of the base partially collapsed due to the removal of steel reinforcement bars.  
It marked the end of the long life of the site as a military outpost. Its location in the 
borderlands between town and desert, as well as the distinct topography of the hill had made 
it an excellent lookout for centuries. Before its occupation by the Israeli military, The Crow’s 
Nest was manned by the Jordan Legion who took it over from the British troops during the 
                                                        
114 See Figure 10. 
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Arab Revolt of 1936 until 1939. Some believe that it served as an Ottoman outpost, and even 
that it was first used for military purposes by a Roman legion.  
Confronted with the evacuated military base, desolate and destitute, Alessandro Petti, 
Sandi Hilal and Eyal Weizman (2013) claim to have experienced “the most radical condition 
of architecture – the very moment that power has been unplugged: the old uses are gone, and 
new uses not yet defined” (p. 13). Already shortly after the raid, Palestinian government 
officials and some representatives of NGOs advocated the view that the base must be 
defended by a police force in order to avoid further vandalism. Petti, Hilal, and Weizman, on 
the contrary, opposed this perspective and suggested ‘to stay with the trouble’, and to start to 
think about other possibilities for use than the two that had already begun to actualize 
themselves, namely destruction and reuse. This initiated a thinking process around the issue 
of decolonization and more specifically the question “how people might live with and in ruins” 
(Ibid., p. 21).  
As the two obvious courses of action – destruction and reuse – show, decolonization can 
all too quickly be understood in terms of a revolution or a solution. A revolution, firstly, depends 
indeed on a definitive moment, an excess of violence that would annihilate the forces of 
oppression instantaneously. Petti et al. (2013) understand destruction as a way to spatially 
articulate a liberation from an architecture that is experienced as an instrument of domination 
and control. Such a conception of decolonization voices Fanon’s warning that the physical 
Figure 10: Oush Grab/The Crow’s Nest. 
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and territorial organization of an erstwhile colonial world order can harbor new oppressive 
regimes, and that it hence should be destroyed. “To destroy the colonial world means nothing 
less than demolishing the colonist’s city, burying it deep within the earth or banishing it from 
the territory” (Fanon, 2004, p. 7).  
Against this violent conception of decolonization, Petti et al. (2013) argue that such 
destructive acts have never allowed for returning to an edenic past, or for creating a blank 
slate on which to build a new state. Rather, destruction generates desolation and long-lasting 
environmental damage. For instance, when the Israeli troops evacuated the Gaza settlements 
in 2005 and destroyed three thousand houses, it did not scour the territory and create a tabula 
rasa, but rather produced more than a million ton of toxic rubble that poisons the ground and 
the water.  
A solution, the second option they wish to omit, is bound by a fixed end state. It abates 
the problem by proposing a quick-fix. In this case, a simple solution would be to reuse the 
infrastructure of Oush Grab and to arm it with a police force that would prevent further 
deterioration. Petti et al. (2013) explain that this was a tried and tested recipe in the past by 
Figure 11: Sara Pellegrini, Return to nature. Transformation of the militiary base of Oush Grab, 2008. 
  Making a university 172 
postcolonial governments. They reused the infrastructure built by their colonial predecessors 
for their own practical administrative needs. The repossession, however, reproduced the 
colonial power relations. New financial elites inhabited the colonial villas, while the political 
elites took up residence in the palaces. The government reused evacuated military and police 
infrastructures as well as prisons for the same purposes, which recreated similar social and 
spatial hierarchies. These precedents caution against an unproblematized reuse of Israeli 
colonial architecture. “Reusing the evacuated structures of Israel’s domination in the same 
way as the occupiers did – the settlements as Palestinian suburbs and the military bases for 
Palestinian security needs – would mean reproducing their inherent alienation and violence” 
(Petti et al., 2013). The insufficiency of both the past-oriented destruction and future-oriented 
reuse to stay with the trouble, and to give the situation the power to think, urged Petti, Hilal, 
and Weizman to reconsider decolonization itself.  
As opposed to a revolution or a solution, destruction or reuse, Petti et al. (2013) propose 
to understand decolonization as a long-term transformative process: “It is an ongoing practice 
of deactivation and reorientation understood both in its presence and its endlessness” (Ibid., 
p. 18). It is a work that cannot be completed and that needs to be taken up time and again. 
This necessitates to consider it also as a process that is situated by a specific problem, a now 
and here, a present that needs to be given the power to make those involved think. In the case 
of Oush Grab, this transformative process was initiated by organizing tours through the site, 
planting olive trees in its environs to disallow its functionality as an outpost to surveil the region, 
and to use the watchtowers for bird-watching – The Crow’s Nest constitutes a bottleneck in 
the migratory routes of amongst others cranes, storks, eagles, swallows, and wheatears.115  
Consequently, the Beit Sahour municipality was encouraged to continue the 
transformation of the site by means of picnic places, playgrounds for children, a bar, and an 
open garden for events in order to repopulate The Crow’s Nest. This made it possible to initiate 
new uses of the site, to decolonize it, and to open it up to the people. Although the future of 
Oush Grab remained contested – as has proven the tense processes of appropriation and re-
appropriation after Jewish colonists tried to establish a new settlement on the site from the 
15th of May 2008 onwards –, it gave nevertheless new impetus to the ideas around 
decolonization and its correlated question how to live with and in ruins.  
In 2007, Petti, Hilal, and Weizman decided to found the Decolonizing Architecture Art 
Residency (DAAR) which aims to be a place for “conceptual speculations and pragmatic 
spatial interventions, discourse and collective learning”.116 This was a way to give a more 
                                                        
115 See Figure 11.  
116 http://www.decolonizing.ps/site/about/ 
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sustainable character to the small-scale projects and initiatives taking place at Oush Grab and 
to give them a bearing on political discussions about the future of Palestine and the dealing 
with the colonial heritage. Around the same time, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA), where Hilal is director of the Camp Improvement Program, wanted to start a project 
around the representation of camps and refugees together with the Refugee Camp 
Communities of Southern West Bank (RCC-SWB). This gave the occasion to think about an 
educational project that could engage more inhabitants of Dheisheh Refugee Camp117, next 
to Beit Sahour, in similar activities as the ones by DAAR. From his experience as a lecturer 
teaching students from refugee camps at Al Quds Bard University (AQBU) and as an architect 
at DAAR, Petti had become “convinced that the camp is the right place for the campus: a truly 
engaged and committed university” (Petti, 2013, pp. 20-21). In a reflection on the startup of 
Campus in Camps, the name of the project, he writes: 
 
In conversation with Al Quds Bard students from refugee camps, I have realized that 
their narrations, ideas and discourses could have flourish [sic.] in a protected space 
such as the university but they needed to be grounded in context and connected with 
                                                        
117 Dheisheh is a refugee camp established after the Nakba in 1948. See Figure 12 and 13. 
Figure 12: Dheisheh Refugee Camp in 1952. 
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the community. And reciprocally, the university moving in camps could have opened 
its doors to other forms of knowledge, to experimental forms of communal learning 
able to combine critical reflection with action (Ibid., p. 21).  
 
Campus in Camps, which will be central in this last part, emerged as such out of a question 
from the UNRWA and the RCC-SWB. Besides, it allowed to give an educational dimension to 
the activities taking place at DAAR. Lastly, based on the teaching experiences at AQBU, it 
made it possible to engage inhabitants of the camp in study practices that concerned and took 
place amidst their very living conditions.118 Taking up the challenge of thinking decolonization 
through practices in the camp, Campus in Camps inherited from DAAR’s ambition of which 
the story at the beginning of the chapter gave a sample. The first complete term of the project 
lasted for two years. In the course of this chapter, the focus will be on Campus in Camps as 
a university, an ecology of study practices. 
Focusing on the specific study practices of Campus in Camps allows for an understanding 
of the work of Campus in Camps outside of the framework of decolonization, or perhaps more 
precisely, allows for raising the question how decolonization actually takes place, how the 
abstract concept of decolonization articulates itself in specific practices. This means that in 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six attention will be paid to how this long-term transformative 
process that Petti et al. (2013) propose as an alternative to destruction and reuse can be 
understood.  
Although the paradigm of decolonization offers a unique and interesting perspective on 
the relations between Israel and Palestine (Busbridge, 2018; Weizman, 2007), it has become 
                                                        
118 In order to complete the network of persons and organizations that gave rise to Campus in Camps, 
two last actors worth mentioning are the GIZ, the German Society for International Cooperation, which 
funded the project and the Al-Feniq Cultural Center in Dheisheh Refugee Camp, which hosted its 
activities.  
Figure 13: Dheisheh Refugee Camp in 2012. 
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a somewhat slippery term since it has become widely used in critical theories. Tuck and Yang 
(2012), for instance, have argued that due to the easy adoption of the concept and tactic of 
decolonization within educational discourses and practices (e.g. the increasing number of calls 
to decolonize schools, the curriculum, methodology, etc.), the notion has become a metaphor 
in that it makes it possible to produce agreement between often contradictory decolonial 
strategies and objectives. Therefore, it risks to hollow out radical anti-colonial critiques and 
become “an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation” (p. 7).  
In response to this critique of decolonization, Pelin Tan (2017b) has brought in that in 
spite of the metaphorical quality of the concept of decolonization, it still has a strong 
emancipatory power in that it raises the question concerning the colonial nature of curricula, 
research methods, and collaborations. According to her, decolonization “not only means 
resisting territorial occupation and violence, but also transforming institutions, cultural 
products, approaches and values. Moreover, in the context of pedagogy, ‘decolonization’ 
basically signifies a non-institutional education where knowledge is produced and shared 
collectively” (p. 85) (cf. Tan, 2017a). In the course of this and the more particularly the next 
chapter, attention will be paid to how Campus in Camps constitutes such an educational 
practice for the collective production of knowledge.  
 
 
It Matters What University We Study to Study the University With 
 
At first sight, the choice to discuss Campus in Camps in order to flesh out the ecology of study 
practices conceptualized in Part Two may seem to be highly arbitrary, and even a bit odd. 
Why would it be relevant to study a university that in almost no sense resembles the 
institutions we know best as universities? Campus in Camps indeed does not offer degrees. 
There are no admission criteria for prospective students. It does not have an extensive 
research program of which the results are published in the most cited academic journals. It 
does not strive for excellence, and it does not seek to attract the interest of the industry or 
other big funding bodies. Its website may have a more fancy design than those of other 
universities, but you will not find information there about the different faculties, research 
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centers, or curricula, simply because it does not have any. Nevertheless, it is a place where 
the question how to learn something new and above all the question how to learn anew 
converge, and hence, it confirms to the understanding of a university suggested in the previous 
chapter. It is a home of adventures where the production of new, situated knowledges 
coincides with a communal learning process that seeks to engage this knowledge in 
responding to the questions the camp condition urges.119 
Making Campus in Camps central in the final chapters does not imply the promise to 
unveil the essence of a university – an essence that would not be possible anymore to recover 
from the often described as degenerated and corrupted institutions that call themselves 
universities today. It rather wagers on the possibility that this university can be given the power 
to make us think about the university. This implies, however, not that it needs argumentation 
why Campus in Camps is a True University, instead of an NGO, an artistic collective, a political 
pressure group, or a community organization, but that it is assumed that as a university it is 
an interesting, remarkable, or important one, and that it is therefore worthwhile to take a closer 
look at their activities from the point of view of the ecology of study practices.120  
The choice for Campus in Camps is, hence, absolutely not arbitrary, but rather comes 
from a commitment to the idea that writing about is always writing with, and hence, that it is 
important to carefully consider what to write about. In the words of Haraway (2016), who took 
inspiration from Marilyn Strathern’s definition of anthropology as the study of relations with 
relations, this sounds as follows:  
                                                        
119 For a few impressions of the work of Campus in Camps, see Figure 14, 15, 16, and 17.  
120 This contrast between the true on the one hand, and the interesting, remarkable, or important on the 
other comes from Deleuze and Guattari (1994). “Philosphy does not consist in knowing and is not 
inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine 
success or failure” (p. 82).  
Figure 14: Seminar in the Al-Feniq Cultural Center. 
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It matters what matters we use to think other matters with; it matters what stories we 
tell to tell other stories with; it matters what knots knot knots, what thoughts think 
thoughts, what descriptions describe descriptions, what ties tie ties. It matters what 
stories make worlds, what worlds make stories (p. 12). 
 
Relaying this line of thought to the topic of this dissertation, it can be argued that it matters 
what university we study to study the university with. Besides this argumentation for the 
specific place of Campus in Camps in this dissertation – a wager on an interesting, 
remarkable, or important university to study the university with –, there are three additional 
reasons for choosing this university.  
The first reason concerns the politics of naming that is being displayed. Campus in Camps 
is a university by choice, not by habit. In spite of its lack of institutional paraphernalia, strong 
organizational structure, and well-founded idea that would situate it within a tradition, it 
chooses to understand its activities as pertaining to a university. This implies that their 
conception of a university refers almost solely to its practice which makes it particularly 
interesting in a discussion on the educational bearing of the ecology of practices. Moreover, 
as Stengers (2015a) argues: “To name is not to say what is true but to confer on what is 
named the power to make us feel and think in the mode that the name calls for” (p. 43). This 
means that naming needs to be understood here as a pragmatic operation which implies that 
its truth-value does not lie in the correspondence between name and reality, but rather in its 
efficacy to make us think in a particular way, rather than another, for instance, the way names 
such as NGO or community organization would call for.121  
Moreover, the fact that they themselves 
claim the name university to grasp their 
practice, demonstrates that there is also a 
process of reclaiming at work here. Indeed, by 
appropriating the notion of university they do 
not only propose a understand the 
experimental program as a university, but they 
also imbue the notion of university itself with 
new meanings.  
                                                        
121 Besides, Campus in Camps was a way to establish an educational program outside of the logic of 
the NGO that many of the participants were vigilant about as there are many NGOs in the region that 
they perceived as serving only the interests of a rather limited group of inhabitants of the camp.  
Figure 15: Fieldwork exercise in Dheisheh. 
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The second reason concerns the materiality 
of the responses given to the camp condition, the 
concrete interventions in the spatial structure of 
the camp. Haraway (2000a) explains that 
materiality and semioticity constitute one another 
and that they cannot be separated, that there is 
no pure materiality that does not already have 
meaning, or that there is pure meaning apart from 
a material substrate. In the figures she discusses 
in her work, such as for instance cyborgs, dogs, 
and OncomouseTM, matter and meaning are 
always already imploded.122  
In this sense, Campus in Camps is just such 
a figure of the university, a literal metaphor of how 
the university relates via study practices to the 
world it inhabits, an allegory of the camp only 
insofar it concerns a real campus and a real 
camp. As such, this chapter does not aim to clarify the preceding chapters with an example of 
a university, because “[F]igures are not representations or didactic illustrations, but rather 
material-semiotic nodes or knots in which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another” 
(Haraway, 2008, p. 4). Hence, Campus in Camps does not represent an idea of a university, 
which would unbind its material practice from the meaning it would represent. Recounting its 
story, presenting it as a figure, is not to aimed at making recognize the university, but at making 
think about the university, with a university.  
The last reason is of a more practical nature. It has to do with the fact that Campus in 
Camps is a small-scale and well-documented university. The fact that it is ideational, 
institutional, and organizational rather weak, makes it possible to attend more carefully to its 
educational practice. On the website, one can find information on the publications part of The 
                                                        
122 In an interview she explains that she finds the distinction between the figural and the literal, or matter 
and meaning, rather absurd, and she refers to her own catholic upbringing where she witnessed 
constantly this implosion of matter and meaning, for instance in the wine as the blood of Christ during 
the Eucharist: “My inability to separate the figural and the literal comes straight out of a Catholic 
relationship to the Eucharist. I told you I have a very Catholic sensibility as a theorist even though I am 
opposed to Catholicism and have lost my faith and developed this elaborate criticism. The fundamental 
sensibility about the literal nature of metaphor and the physical quality of symbolization – all this comes 
from Catholicism. But the point is that this sensibility – the meaning of the menagerie I live with and in 
– gives me a menagerie where the literal and the figurative, the factual and the narrative, the scientific 
and the religious and the literary, are always imploded” (Haraway, 2000b, p. 141). 
Figure 16: Making notes on a map during 
fieldwork. 
                                                                                      University in exile 
 
179 
Collective Dictionary, The 
Initiatives, the teaching cycles, as 
well as reflections on the different 
activities. The analyses in the 
remainder of the chapter will be 
largely based on this 
information.123 It is important to 
underscore in this respect that the 
publications made by Campus in 
Camps are not conceived of as 
external to their practice, as a kind 
of report that is only made after the practice has taken place. The assumption is that the 
publications are part and parcel of the practice of Campus in Camps and that because of the 
fact that they express the way in which the participants124 understand their practice, it provides 
also consistency to the practice.  
At this point it might be relevant to give a general sketch of the temporal structure of the 
program in order to situate the series of publications that will be analyzed in this and the next 
chapter. According to Bianca Elzenbaumer (2018), one of the project activators, the program, 
once it took off, has had four phases. The first eight months of the program were dedicated to 
a process they called unlearning. This phase involved a series of seminars in which the 
participants questioned the concepts with which they usually tended to understand their lives 
from the point of view of their everyday experiences. A common thread in the discussions was 
the need for new narratives about the camp that make it possible to notice the inventive ways 
of self-organization and political practice that take place (cf. Franceschini & Guerrini, 2017). 
                                                        
123 Worth mentioning is perhaps that I have been in contact with Alessandro Petti and Isshaq Al-Barbary 
since September 2015 and that before my request to do fieldwork was declined we had regular 
conversations via Skype to prepare the fieldwork. Also, Isshaq traveled once to Leuven to give a 
workshop to the students of the course Lab: design of educational practices which I was co-tutoring at 
that time (together with Jan Masschelein and Indra Versmesse). When it had become clear that I would 
not be able to go to Dheisheh for fieldwork, our contact weakened. Isshaq, however, was always 
prepared to give additional information via text messages or to have a conversation via Skype. With 
Silvia Franceschini, who worked for her PhD in architecture and design around Campus in Camps 
during the same time span, I exchanged information and discussed about the program. Together with 
her I met Diego Segatto, who was together with Bianca Elzenbaumer one of the project activators of 
Campus in Camps, in June 2017 in Bologna. In August 2018 I traveled to Dheisheh where I had 
conversations with Aysar Al-Saifi, who participated in the program and is involved in the organization 
of other educational activities in Dheisheh.  
124 The publications of Campus in Camps refer consistently to ‘participants’. Therefore, I have taken 
over this term to refer to the people who are engaged in its activities, instead of terms such as 
practitioners or students (terms that would perhaps fit more nicely into my own conceptual framework).  
Figure 17: Presentation during seminar. 
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In a second phase six project activators joined the group that would help the participants 
in giving concrete shape to the social and spatial interventions in the camp they intended to 
do. The challenge at this point was to combine the theoretical work that had been done in the 
course of the seminars with concrete actions on the ground. A problem that they encountered 
was that most of the project proposals either were still heavily informed by the interests of 
international aid agencies (e.g. the proposal for roof gardens by someone who had no interest 
in gardening), or were almost purely imaginative and unattainable (e.g. the proposal to set up 
a water park). Confronted with this situation, they decided to delay the formulation of project 
proposals, and instead focus longer on the language (Elzenbaumer, 2018).  
This announced the coming into being of the third phase in which they created The 
Collective Dictionary. This phase, however, was not only characterized by an increased focus 
on language by means of the elaboration of a shared vocabulary, but also by a shift in 
pedagogical approach. The first phases mainly consisted of discussions and seminars within 
the four white walls of the Al-Feniq Cultural Center. In the third phase, they decided to go 
outside and started to walk through the camps while discussing, observing, mapping, taking 
photographs, and thinking about new concepts. These attempts to situate their thinking by 
concrete situations encountered in the camps resulted in a series of publications on concepts, 
The Collective Dictionary (cf. Feldman, 2016). This dictionary will be the focus of discussion 
in the third section.  
In the fourth phase, lastly, the project activators gradually withdrew leaving the 
participants space to develop their own project proposals that this time were more grounded 
in the reality of the camp that they had studied in the previous phase. Reports on different 
project proposals can be read in The Initiatives which will be the discussed in the fourth section 
(Elzenbaumer, 2018).  
Starting from Stengers’ conception of a practice as a holding together of requirements 
and obligations, the following three sections of the current chapter aim to grasp the obligation 
of the study practice of Campus in Camps. This means that this chapter aims to uncover what 
makes the participants of Campus in Camps think. In the next chapter then I will shed light on 
the requirements of the practice of Campus in Camps, the things that seem important for them 
to do in order to speak of a study practice, in other words, how they think. The following two 
sections analyze respectively The Collective Dictionary and The Initiatives. The last section, 
finally, concludes this chapter with a presentation of The Concrete Tent in which it seems that 
the different concerns of this university are gathered.  
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Right of Return or Life in Exile 
 
In the first year, the participants of Campus in Camps focused on the establishment of a 
common language and approach to understand and discuss the contemporary condition of 
Palestinian refugee camps. The Collective Dictionary is a series of publications that contains 
definitions of concepts they deem necessary to think about the challenges of living in a refugee 
camp, more specifically the improvement of living conditions without normalizing the 
exceptionality of the camp.125 
In small groups, the participants conducted interviews, wrote reflections on personal 
experiences, undertook excursions, did photographic investigations and document analyses 
in order to get a better grasp – which means here more grounded in the everyday experiences 
of the inhabitants of the Palestinian camps – of their living conditions. Next to the work in the 
smaller groups, guests were invited to participate in the biweekly plenary discussions. Some 
guests followed the program for more than a month, while other gave a seminar to the 
participants or a public lecture.126 As such, new input could be provided on the different topics 
of interest that emerged from the interactions between the participants and the sociopolitical 
context at large. Teaching cycles on citizenship, refugee studies, humanitarianism, gender, 
mapping, and research methodologies were organized. Many of these events were open to 
the public in order to reinforce the connection between the participants of Campus in Camps 
and the other inhabitants of the camp on the one hand, but, on the other hand, also between 
the inhabitants of the camp and the students of Al-Quds Bard University (Petti, 2013, 2018).  
At the end of the first year, the participants published The Collective Dictionary. In every 
of the eleven booklets, each more or less between 40 and 100 pages, one key concept is 
scrutinized. The different entries are: 
 
i. Citizenship; 
                                                        
125 The educational philosophy that informed this practice comes from Munir Fasheh, a Palestinian 
mathematician and pedagogue, who collaborated with Campus in Camps. Taking issue with colonial 
knowledges that are detached from but imposed on people, he emphasizes the importance of 
knowledge that is grounded in personal experiences people have with the world (cf. Fasheh, 1990, 
2014).  
126 In the order to give the reader an impression of the intellectual background of the program, a list of 
the different teaching cycles, seminars, and lectures can be found in Appendix A. As my focus is on 
study practices of the university next to the lecture and the seminar, I have excluded the teaching cycles, 
seminars, and lectures from my analysis. Besides, good reports or recordings of all lectures and 
seminars cannot be found, since these publications mainly aim to present the work and discussions of 
the participants themselves. What is interesting, however, about these lectures and seminars is that 
often quite well-known academics were invited (critical geographer David Harvey is probably the most 
well-known of them), which gave the program in its totality more visibility in academia and connected 
local questions and concerns with more global intellectual debates.   
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ii. Common1; 
iii. Common2; 
iv. Knowledge; 
v. Ownership; 
vi. Participation; 
vii. Relation; 
viii. Responsibility; 
ix. Sustainability; 
x. Vision; 
xi. Well-being.  
 
On the notion of common, two booklets were prepared that both deal with this notion from 
another angle. Whereas Common1 mainly discusses the importance of practices of care in 
order to preserve the commons as commons, Common2 relates the notion of the commons 
with the right of return in order to rethink the Palestinian struggle.  
Throughout the different publications becomes clear how much the common sense of the 
camp ruminates about the right of return. In almost all booklets there are references to this 
right and how it is possible to shed a different light on the right of return by reinterpreting it 
through the different understandings of what for instance citizenship or ownership possibly 
means in the context of the camp. It is this distinction between the right of return on the one 
hand and the experience of living together in the camp on the other, that will be clarified further 
in this section based on fragments from The Collective Dictionary. In the following paragraphs, 
this series of publications will be read from an interest in the existing contradiction between 
the strong claim of the right to return on the one hand and the positive reflections on the 
communal life in the camp on the other.  
The understanding of the 
right of return as the right of an 
individual to return to his past 
private house can be read 
most strongly in the booklet 
Vision. In the process leading 
to this publication, the 
participants were asked to 
reflect about the lives of the 
camp inhabitants in 2040. It Figure 18: Map from the booklet Vision. 
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was one of the first exercises, taking place in March and April of 2012, aimed at making an 
inventory of the different views that were held vis-à-vis the right of return. As such, it differs 
from the other booklets that were the result of a group work on a concept, and that were 
finished almost a year later, in January 2013. The booklet contains an array of perspectives 
on the reality of refugees in 2040. Each participant individually expressed his ideas on the 
right of return through a narrative, a simulation of a guided tour, a proposal, a declaration, or 
a media conference.  
Some of the contributions seem to assume an effectuated right of return. People will have 
returned to their original villages, leaving the camp behind as a ghost town.127 One of the 
participants even proposed to transform the desolate camp into a museum that testifies of life 
under the occupation. Some others express a mix of on the one hand a deep despair 
concerning the possibility of returning, and on the other hand the hope that return will be 
effectuated. “In 28 years, I expect the camp will be as it is now, but with more buildings and 
an increased population. […] However, I hope there will be no camp in 28 years. I hope that 
we will be back, back to our destroyed villages” (Al-Laham et al., 2013, p. 47).  
Another contribution that endorses a pessimistic stance towards the possibility of return, 
underscores the ongoing engagement and struggle of the inhabitants of the camp in claiming 
the right of return. A vision is sketched in which the camp conditions have been so much 
improved that the exceptionality of the camp has been normalized. Nonetheless, the camp 
dwellers still hold on to their right of return:  
 
Despite the development of the camp, and despite all its strong social relations, our 
young generation is still insisting on the idea of return. All this development will not 
change the fact of our catastrophe and the beginning of the camp. We still remember 
our lives in the tents. We still remember the cold of winter and the heat of summer, our 
bad educational situation. I insist that we will never lose our right of return even if we 
achieve all the possible development of life (Al-Laham et al., 2013, p. 54). 
 
In some of the later entries in the dictionary, similar sentiments can be noticed.  
In Citizenship, for instance, one of the participants explains the importance of the land 
and the sense of belonging it elicits in order to understand what it means for a Palestinian to 
be a citizen: “The portion of the refugees who live in West Bank refugee camps define 
themselves as ‘temporary residents’. They are waiting to return to the land which their roots 
                                                        
127 For an image in which the camp is erased from the map, see Figure 18.  
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belong to it [sic.]” (Al-Assi, Odeh, & Ramadan, 2013, p. 36). In another booklet, Knowledge, a 
participant argues why the experiences and memories of the older refugees in the camp are 
so valuable. She explains that the later generations of refugees have no experience of life 
before the Nakba, and that hence, the stories told by the first-generation refugees are the only 
access they get to this knowledge: “I found out how much the people love and hold on to their 
land, their stories, and their houses, so I found the first generation of refugees the most 
important source of knowledge in the camp” (Abu Aker, Hamouz, Al-Jaffari, Al-Laham, & Al-
Turshan, 2013, p. 28).  
In short, it could be argued that the first project of Vision has shown how much the 
participants seemed to hold on to the right of return at that time. Moreover, due to the 
divergence of opinions on the matter – some assuming the impossibility of return, others 
predicting the consequences of an effectuated return –, it is possible to say, in the idiom of 
Chapter Four, that the right of return makes common sense ruminate, that it is an issue with 
no easy solution.  
The publications after Vision, on the contrary, and here it is important to mention that they 
were written in the course and after what Elzenbaumer (2018) has called the third phase in 
which they did fieldwork exercises, render in general a more positive view on the life in the 
camp. Instead of starting from the not-yet of the right of return, the participants attempted to 
grasp the specificity of the camp condition and the social relations it fosters.  
In Common1, for instance, a participant compares the life in Doha, a small village next to 
Dheisheh where wealthier refugees can buy a plot of land or an apartment, with the life in 
Dheisheh. From her life in Doha, she has learned that the city misses the common traditions 
and habits because there were no original Dohan people. All residents are new and do not 
know each other very well. She praises the strong social relations in Dheisheh and the 
common culture they have built throughout the years: “It may be familiar to you that life in a 
city would be better than in a refugee camp, but to me, because of the camp’s social relations, 
I prefer the camp. Perhaps that is strange to you” (Abu Alia, Al-Assi, Al-Barbary, Hamouz, & 
Odeh, 2013, p. 43).  
Other participants agree with this positive appreciation of the strong social fabric of the 
camp. In Participation, one of them writes: “Sharing is a precious concept that is represented 
is [sic.] every small detail of our daily lives. We share all that can serve our community and 
our world” (Hamouz, Al-Jaffari, Al-Turshan, Pellegrini, & Racco, 2013, p. 23).  
In almost all publications, the notion of Mujaarawah – a verb that can be translated as 
‘neighboring’ – is used to grasp the social commitment to the camp community. The verb 
expresses the practices of sharing that take place between the different inhabitants of the 
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camp. It includes not only the sharing of food or materials, but most importantly of knowledge 
and experiences. One of the participants writes about how the recipe of maftoul, a traditional 
Palestinian dish, is shared through collective practices: “Even maftoul itself is a knowledge 
transferred between the generations. We learned how to make maftoul from our parents, and 
they learned that from their parents and so on” (Abu Aker et al., 2013, p. 18).  
Next to the social ties in the camp and the practices through which knowledge and 
experiences are shared, also the infrastructure of the camp is conceived of as a shared space. 
Because, the architecture of the camp was never intended to last long, houses are very close 
to each other which creates a network of tiny alleys throughout the camp. One of the 
participants explains that the built environment of the camp is experienced as one living milieu, 
instead of as a concatenation of individual houses, and that the walls constitute the collective 
consciousness of the camp:  
 
For us and for the other inhabitants of the camp, the walls are neither public nor private 
property. Many people consider them common. The paintings tell our stories of 
refugeehood and daily life to visitors of the camps. They are part of a process of 
communal participation, creating collective emotions (Al-Homouz et al., 2013, p. 15).  
 
In short, whereas the publication of Vision expresses the desire to return and all the 
dreams, hopes, fears, and doubts that are related to it, it could be argued that the publications 
written while doing fieldwork in the camp try to come to terms with the ways of living together 
as they are practiced at that time. In contrast to Vision, these publications are situated by the 
camp and emerge from a very concrete and specific way of engaging with the camp.  
Based on this analysis, there seems to be a tension within The Collective Dictionary 
between, on the one hand, the accounts that forcefully claim the right of return and, on the 
other hand, the accounts that try to come to terms in an affirmative way with the actual 
experiences of living together in the camp. At some points, a certain concern or question is 
raised by means of which this contradiction is granted a very powerful presence.  
In Responsibility, for instance, following statement can be read: “This point came out of 
our talks with the community group we met: their biggest concern was how we were going to 
do something in the camp without changing its exceptionality through normalizing it” (Abu 
Aker, Al-Assi, Al-Laham, & Odeh, 2013, p. 39). Affirming the camp as a convivial space with 
strong solidarity bonds seems to involve the risk of undermining its meaning as a temporary 
location of precarity and exclusion, and hence its claim to return.  
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In Participation it is formulated as the following question: “Is it historically acceptable to 
think about the public space of a temporary camp?” (Hamouz et al., 2013, p. 28). Creating a 
public space in a camp seems to be understood as a strongly political act that risks to 
normalize the camp and to turn it into a city, which would ultimately delegitimize the right of 
return. This debate echoes within all publication of The Collective Dictionary.  
At some points, however, the right of return is reconceived through the lens of the camp 
as a site of living together. It is at these points that both the right of return and the camp 
experience are affirmed and taken up in an adventure that transforms both terms. The camp 
condition is conceived there neither as precarious, nor as normal, but rather as a site for 
collective experimentation in living together. Moreover, this allowed to think about both the 
right of return and the camp condition via different words and propositions.  
In Relation, for instance, the right of return is understood as the possibility to roam around 
freely in the region around the camps of Arroub and Dheisheh:  
 
It is a proposal for a right to return [sic.] to the land, to move through a natural space 
and to live in health. The way its green areas are used and shaped by the people 
provides a vision of a sustainable setting, a way of looking forward to the eventual end 
of military occupation (Khannah, Guidi, Jawabreh, Racco, & Segatto, 2013, p. 37). 
 
In Common2, one of the participants recalls a journey outside the camp to contrast how the 
younger generation understands the right of return with the conception the older generations 
hold:  
 
When my refugee friends had the chance to go to the occupied territory of forty-eight, 
their priority was to see the Mediterranean Sea rather than the villages of their origins. 
Such an act explains and reinterprets the third generation’s notion of returning to the 
common, while reflecting the spirit and idea of the evolving culture within refugee 
communities in the refugee camps (Al-Saifi & Al-Barbary, 2013a, pp. 17-18).  
 
Such accounts shed a different light on the right of return. It is no longer understood as a future 
return to a past individual home, but rather turns the present experiences of the camp into an 
ingredient in the collective imagination of future possibilities.128 Ilana Feldman (2016), who 
                                                        
128 Despite the fact that the booklets Sustainability and Well-being were not mentioned in the foregoing 
paragraphs, the same tension between the right of return and the camp experience can be read in these 
publications. For the sake of completeness, the references are included in this footnote (Abu Aker, Al-
Jaffari, Al-Laham, & Segatto, 2013; Al-Saifi & Al-Barbary, 2013c).  
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was engaged in some of the activities of Campus in Camps, writes in a reflection that creation 
of The Collective Dictionary required an engagement with the actual spaces and places of the 
camp. By means of interviews, walks, photographic exercises, and the writing of texts, the 
participants started to situate their thinking in relation to the actual camp as a place of living 
together. She argues that because of these activities participants were able to establish a 
different relationship towards the places that were familiar to them. Moreover, she writes, that 
probably it is “from this new vantage point, this new embodied perspective on the camp, that 
they were able to first produce new kinds of definitions of familiar terms and then embark on 
initiatives that engaged these spaces in new ways” (p. 421). It is these initiatives that Feldman 
mentions that will be analyzed in the next section in order to get a better grip on Campus in 
Camps’ obligation.  
 
 
Creation, Relation, Representation 
 
The second year of the program focused on knowledge creation through specific activities 
such as gatherings, walks, events, and urban actions, that more directly engaged with the 
camp condition. Informed by the reflections and discussions that took place while working on 
the dictionary, The Initiatives aimed to intervene in the spatial ordering of the camp without 
normalizing its exceptional status or blending it into the fabric of neighboring cities (Petti, 2013, 
2016). The participants selected nine sites within the camps and their immediate surroundings 
to investigate this place and to inquire how these sites constitute what they have called an 
urbanity of exile. The very existence of these so-called common places – a desolate pool, the 
small alleys, the pedestrian bridge between Dheisheh and Doha – begets according to them 
new spatial and social formations that allow to conceive of the camp beyond its crystallized 
image as a locus of marginalization, poverty, and political subjugation.  
In June 2013, the participants published nine booklets, one for every site, each around 
80 pages. Each booklet follows more or less the same structure. In the first part, the 
participants present the site with photographs, maps, descriptions, and a short history of its 
use. The second part displays the research process. The participants offer an account of the 
activities they have undertaken – including interviews, focus groups, urban action, document 
analyses, fieldwork, walking exercises, and photography – in order to grasp the current state 
and ways of use of the different sites.  The third part reflects on the entire research process 
and suggests interventions that could possibly allow to excavate new future uses of the sites. 
The different initiatives are named: 
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i. The Garden. Making place (in Dheisheh); 
ii. The Square. Learning in the common space (in Fawwar); 
iii. The Bridge. Challenging perception (between Dheisheh and Doha); 
iv. The Pool. Re-activating connections (between Arroub and Solomon’s Pool); 
v. The Suburb. Transgressing boundaries (next to Dheisheh); 
vi. The Pathways. Reframing narration (in Dheisheh); 
vii. The Stadium. Sustaining relations (next to Arroub); 
viii. The Municipality. Experiments in urbanity (in Doha); 
ix. The Unbuilt. Regenerating spaces (in Dheisheh).  
 
It can be argued that throughout The Initiatives the contradiction between the right of return 
and the camp experience, encountered in the previous section, reemerges in three different 
ways. It shows itself in three problems that all run throughout the different initiatives.129 The 
first problem concerns the issue of public space within the camp. Since the camp is built 
according to the most pressing social and spatial needs, public space is almost absent. 
Nevertheless, there are some sites and places where people gather. Due to the risk of 
normalizing the exceptionality of the camp and hence undermining the claim of return, 
however, public space is a highly contested issue within the camp.  
The second problem has to do with the meaning of the refugee status in relation to the 
camp. Increasingly, inhabitants of Dheisheh move, provided that they have the means, to the 
direct environs of the camp, most notably the Qatar-sponsored village of Doha. This raises 
the issue what it means to be a refugee when you live in a city, instead of a camp. Moreover, 
it requires to reflect on what the right of return could mean when refugees start to dwell in such 
more ordinary places, which again risks to normalize the exceptionality of the camp.  
The last problem concerns the issue of representation. This problem has a very strong 
presence as an aspect in both foregoing problems – how to represent respectively the camp 
and the refugee beyond exceptionality and normality–, but also gets a significance of its own 
in the initiative that deals with the narratives about the Nakba and Palestinian resistance that 
are told in the camp or made present via graffiti. Although the problems of public space in the 
camp, the meaning of the refugee status, and representation are highly interconnected, it can 
be argued that in every initiative one of them prevails over the other two. In the remainder of 
                                                        
129 Again, I adopt the term ‘initiatives’ because the participants refer consistently to initiatives to denote 
those activities that aim to intervene in the social and spatial context of the camp (instead of terms such 
as experiment, or intervention).  
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this section, the different initiatives will be presented from the perspective of the problem they 
deal with. 
First, the problem of the creation of public space in the camp will be discussed. In The 
Garden, the participants elaborated a proposal to redesign the outdated and overgrown 
garden next to the Al-Feniq center. They wanted to create an inviting place where different 
kinds of activities can be organized. Therefore the participants, first of all, proposed to move 
the entrance and perforate the walls in order to increase accessibility and visibility. Besides, 
their proposal comprises a playground, an open-air cinema, a space for seminars, and a 
barbecue. This should attract different people from different ages to the garden. Thirdly, they 
propose to install a system of shadings of which the colors can be changed easily. In this way 
the screens do not only provide sun protection, but can also announce upcoming events. Each 
type of event – movie screening, reading seminar, discussion, etc. – would have its own color. 
Fourthly, small spatial interventions such as a climbing wall aim to increase the interaction 
with the space of the garden. Lastly, and this point is the least elaborate, they were thinking 
about a safekeeping and maintenance system that avoids camera’s, locked gates, and payed 
personnel.  
Overall, they understand this initiative as a challenge to “the assumption that upgrading 
implies normalization or permanence. Improving living conditions in the camp is not 
undermining the struggle for the right of return, rather it reaffirms refugees’ capabilities in 
envisioning and realizing” (Abu Aker, Al-Assi, Al-Saifi, & Odeh, 2013, pp. 50-51). In this 
statement becomes very clear how building in a camp is an act with strong political 
connotations, and that hence requires careful consideration. In this case, the design of The 
Garden attempts to avoid both a normalization of the camp condition on the one hand, and a 
neglect of the need for public space in the camp on the other.  
Not so much the design, as well the use of public space was central to the initiative of The 
Square. In 2007, the UNRWA Camp Improvement Program started the conversation about 
the creation of a public square in Fawwar, a refugee camp with a rather conservative 
reputation. At that time, especially the women of the camp raised questions about the creation 
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of such a place because 
they presumed they would 
be the last to benefit from 
such a project. It instigated 
a discussion about the 
presence of women in 
public spaces, and more 
generally the uses of such 
a square. Many questions 
were raised:  
 
What activities would be acceptable in such a place, who would take care of the space, 
which community members should be using it, what should be the role of women in 
this space, and finally what should the space look like and what would be its impact on 
the surrounding context? (Hamouz & Al-Turshan, 2013, p. 17).  
 
In the course of this initiative, the participants organized a collective cooking workshop 
followed by an English class in the square. On an early morning, the women of the camp 
assembled to clean the square and to install the cooking equipment. Afterwards, they 
proclaimed that through these small actions they regained a sense of ownership over the 
square. During the day they prepared the traditional Palestinian dish maftoul. Afterwards there 
was an English language class, since the women expressed the desire to learn this language. 
In the booklet that was published after this intervention the concerns that were raised before 
the event were put next to the reflections uttered afterwards. It is argued that the square cannot 
be open or public in itself, but rather that through shared and collective practices it needs to 
be made open or public. Hence, rather than a state of affairs, the public square is an 
achievement to be obtained, time and again.  
The following two initiatives both deal with the reactivation of abandoned spaces related 
to the camp of Arroub. The Pool concerns the Solomon’s pool. In the Roman era, this was an 
important node in the water supply network for Jerusalem. In 2012, it was a desolate site that 
during the winter gathered water that would not evaporate until the summer, and that 
throughout the whole year gathered garbage from passers-by. According to the participants, 
the pool looked like a swamp for the most time of the year.130 Nevertheless, because of its 
                                                        
130 See Figure 19. 
Figure 19: Sheep in the Solomon’s pool. 
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historical importance it was deemed an interesting site to reactivate as a node between 
different camps. Throughout the booklet, the spatiotemporal network in which the pool is 
embedded is explored. Both its historical value as well as the aqueducts that situate it in a 
long-gone water supply network, are brought to the fore.  
The participants reclaimed the pool by cleaning it, increasing its accessibility by building 
a small bridge, and organizing a few activities there. In this way, they aim to draw attention to 
this forgotten site. “We started cleaning and collecting garbage to bring attention and a sense 
of concern to the space.” (Khannah & Al-Homouz, 2013, p. 40). In the end, they put forward 
the proposal to reuse the pool as a collective fish farm for the camp. The stakes of The Stadium 
are similar. This initiative was however limited to a fieldwork around the site in order to explore 
how it is used and a conversation between the women who used the stadium for sports on the 
one hand and the women of Fawwar on the other hand. It resulted in three very general 
reflections on the idea of sustainability in connection to social relationships, places, and 
materials. There were however, no specific interventions or proposals for reuse or redesign 
(Al-Jaffari, 2013).  
The last initiative in which the issue of public space in the camp is central is The Unbuilt. 
In the course of this initiative, the participants investigated the history of land possession in 
the West Bank and the emergence of the camps. Often it is not clear who owns the land, and 
notwithstanding UNRWA’s rules, land is continuously being sold, swapped, and passed along, 
which makes it even more unclear who owns which piece of land. This initiative aimed at 
mapping the so-called ‘camp common’ which is understood in a double sense. On the one 
hand, it denotes the open spaces in the camp or the debris of devastated buildings.131 On the 
other hand, the participants use this concept to describe what is called in the previous section 
                                                        
131 See Figure 20. 
Figure 20: Unbuilt space in Dheisheh. 
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the camp experience, namely this strong social fabric that is both beginning and end of 
practices of sharing and Mujaarawah. “Open spaces can be considered a body or material, 
while the social relations, or well-being, are the soul – both of them reinforce and build each 
other to create the common” (Abu Aker, Al-Barbary, Al-Laham, & Al-Saifi, 2013, p. 35). The 
participants mapped all the unbuilt spaces in the camp and attempted to trace their genealogy 
of possession. The booklet contains a map and a series of photographs of these places.  
In short, it has been argued that the first problem in which the contradiction between right 
of return and camp experience emerges is that of the creation of public space. Public space 
is a highly debated topic in Dheisheh and many of the participants held quite diverging 
opinions on the matter, ranging from a plea for the creation of public space in order to have 
places to hang out and meet to a complete refusal of public space since it is believed that the 
presence of public space in a camp would ultimately undermine the right of return. It is possible 
to discern two strategies deployed by the participants to work around this problem, namely the 
formulation of design proposals to refurbish destitute unbuilt spaces, and the reclaiming of 
such spaces via an experimentation with different ways of using the space.  
The second problem, next, concerns the question of the relation between refugees living 
inside and outside the camp. Due to the increasing outflow of Palestinian refugees who go to 
live in the neighboring city of Doha, and the urban sprawl around the confines of Dheisheh, 
the participants were intruiged by how this affected the sense of belonging of the refugees 
who no longer live in Dheisheh.  
In The Bridge, they investigated the meaning of the desolate pedestrian bridge between 
Dheisheh and Doha.132 Initially, the bridge was built by the inhabitants of the camp and Doha 
with the aim that children could safely cross the street while going to school. As such, the 
participants understand it as an example of the resilience of refugees and their capacity to 
accommodate their own needs. Moreover, they see it as a symptom of how the culture of the 
camp infects its neighboring areas:  
 
The importance and reality of building bridges and connecting camps with the 
surrounding areas, like the case of Dheisheh and Doha, led to opening new 
perspectives to influence and combine the existing cultures of cities and villages with 
those that exist in the refugee camps (Al-Saifi & Al-Barbary, 2013b, p. 27).  
 
                                                        
132 See Figure 21. 
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By 2012, however, the bridge was not used anymore, and had instead become a garbage 
belt. In order to reactivate the use of the bridge, and to open it up to new uses, the participants 
proposed some activities that could take place. “We decided to use the bridge to reinforce the 
relations between the families of the camp and Doha city through social activities that focus 
on reviving the social meaning of the bridge” (Al-Saifi & Al-Barbary, 2013b, p. 66). Instead of 
using the bridge, as a way to cross the street, they intend to make it a meeting place between 
the camp and the city, where exhibitions, public events, Ramadan activities, or a market can 
be organized. In doing so, it could also become a meeting space between the camp and the 
city where refugees living in Dheisheh and Doha could meet.  
More than proposing any real interventions, The Suburb presents a long reflection on the 
move of refugees to Khalid Cave Mountain, next to Dheisheh.133 Based on an historical 
overview of the uses of the mountain, a problematization of land ownership in the camp, and 
interviews with people who moved to the suburb, this publication aims to bring to the fore the 
continuities and discontinuities in the sense of belonging to the camp in the people who 
decided to live outside it. One of the interviewees proclaims: “I believe that the place where I 
am living does not have anything to do with my refugee status. I can keep my status as refugee 
no matter where I live” (Abu Aker & Al-Laham, 2013, pp. 72-73). Via such statements the issue 
                                                        
133 See Figure 22. In the center of the picture, the shape of Dheisheh can be discerned. Below Dheisheh 
is the empty plot where in 2012 the suburb started to emerge. Doha is situated left of Dheisheh, on the 
other side of the road. See Figure 23, for an aerial photograph of the region in 2016.   
Figure 21: Pedestrian bridge between Dheisheh and Doha. 
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of what it means to be a refugee is taken away from the realm of law – where it is a question 
of legal documents and passports – to the realm of experience.  
The Municipality has a similar structure and investigates the same topics. It takes its lead, 
however, from the city of Doha. Again, Doha is first historically situated and interviews were 
conducted in order to inquire about the people’s relations towards the camp. An often-heard 
remark was that the inhabitants of Doha have a stronger affinity with the social fabric that had 
the opportunity to organically grow inside the camp since they have lived there for so long. 
The publication describes how people who live in Doha spend much of their time in Dheisheh 
and how the majority of the social life in the area still occurs in Dheisheh, instead of Doha. In 
spite of the fact that the inhabitants of Doha no longer live in a camp, the camp remains an 
important ingredient in the way they conceive of themselves and situate themselves in a 
broader network of relations: “What caught my attention during this research is that the 
refugees in this city are still linking themselves to the camp. They continually present 
themselves as a refugees from this or that camp and they live in Doha” (Al-Assi, 2013, p. 59). 
In short, in the second problem of the relation between refugees living outside the camp 
and refugees living inside the camp, the contradiction between right of return and camp 
experience comes to the fore as a question of identity and belonging. The initiatives 
undertaken voice the concern of the possibility of a shared refugee identity given the fact that 
some refugees already partially obtained a certain kind of return, or a least were able to leave 
the camp and live in Doha. The participants scrutinized this issue not only in relation to official  
Figure 22: Aerial view of Khalid Cave Mountain, 1996. 
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Figure 23: Aerial view of Khalid Cave Mountain, 2016 
legal documents that grant an identification (e.g. passport, land ownership), but also and most 
importantly in relation to shared spaces that help to give shape to a common sense of 
belonging to the camp in spite of physical and legal borders.  
The last problem, the representation of the camp and refugees, spans in a certain way all 
initiatives. Nevertheless, it becomes an issue of its own in The Pathways. This publication 
investigates and presents the drawings that were made on the walls that make up the small 
alleys of the camp.134 The central concern here is how to tell stories about and make images 
of the camp and the refugees, without normalizing the exceptionality of the situation. The 
booklet begins with a reflection on the role of graffiti in the coming into being of a camp 
consciousness:  
 
Graffiti itself creates a cultural climate through paintings and words that mix life’s bitter 
realities in the camp with the dream or future vision that is an awareness of future 
generations of refugees and the striving to create an acceptable present for the future 
(Al-Saifi & Odeh, 2013, pp. 15-17).  
 
Throughout the remainder of the publication, different representational strategies for raising a 
collective consciousness of the camp condition are presented. In general, the participants are 
                                                        
134 See Figure 24. 
  Making a university 196 
quite critical of the capacity of social media to represent what happens inside the camp. They 
propose to focus more on what they call Nakbaliterature, the stories that were told by their 
parents and grandparents, and collective reading and writing exercises.  
In short, in this last problem the contradiction that drives the activities of Campus in 
Camps resurfaces as a matter of representation. Questions dealt with in this problem were 
how to represent refugees beyond the binary opposition of victimization and normalization, or 
repression and agency? How to do justice to all kinds of small-scale engagements and forms 
of self-organization that take shape within the camp without normalizing its exceptionality? 
Referring to the graffiti on the walls of the camp and the stories that are told by the older 
generations, participants developed different narratives to tell about their experiences in the 
camp. 
In the next section, which will be the last of this chapter, it will be explained how these 
three problems, emerging from the contradiction between the right of return on the one hand 
and the camp experience on the other, come together in the construction of The Concrete 
Tent. This will allow to shed light on the obligation of Campus in Camps, that which makes 
them engage in study.  
 
 
 
Figure 24: Graffiti on the walls of Dheisheh. 
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Turning Contradictions into Contrasts 
 
The construction of The Concrete Tent constitutes an important moment in the activities of 
Campus in Camps. It is the result of the collective thinking process that started off in 2011. 
The tent gathers the different problems that surfaced throughout The Initiatives, and 
materializes the contrast between right of return and the refugee experience that has been 
articulated in The Collective Dictionary. It is nevertheless not the final product of Campus in 
Camps, nor is it a ‘solution’ to the three problems. The Concrete Tent proposes on the one 
hand a representation of both the camp condition and the refugee experience. At the same 
time, it offers a place to think together, to continue the conversation concerning the camp and 
its inhabitants. Before clarifying further how the tent relates to the problems of the second year 
and the contrast of the first year, the construction history of the tent will be recounted.  
In the course of the initiative of The Unbuilt, the participants of Campus in Camps mapped 
all unbuilt areas within Dheisheh refugee camp. They selected a few plots that could be used 
for organizing events for the inhabitants of the camp. After discussions with the owners and 
neighbors of the site that was called The Three Shelters, the participants decided to choose 
this place for a new construction that could serve as such a gathering space. The plot consists 
of three original structures that were built by the UNRWA in the 1950s. The structures 
comprise three rooms, one communal toilet, and a water reservoir. In the discussions about 
the new uses of this site, it was brought up that these shelters should not be destroyed 
because they narrate the history of the camp. Moreover, it was argued that instead of an 
understanding of the camp as exceptional, they impose an understanding of the camp as 
historical.135  
In contrast to for instance Agamben (2005, 2011), who conceives of the camp as the 
materialization of the sudden eruption of violence in the heart of the modern nation state, the 
counter-image of the sovereign decision, it is argued that the camp is not so much a temporary 
exceptionality to be redeemed, but rather an evolving process of finding ways of living together 
in exile:       
 
 What appeared to us as a historical heritage in need to be preserved was not just the 
architecture of the three shelters, it was also the immaterial culture and the meaning 
of communal life that people experienced when living in these structures (Petti, 2015, 
p. 2).  
                                                        
135 See Figure 25. 
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In the design plans for the site, the shelters remain present as a way to honor the heritage of 
the camp. On the rubble around them a concrete platform would be made on which gatherings 
could take place. In the course of the design process, in which also the neighbors and the 
owners were involved, the first activities such as film screenings and discussions were already 
organized. Then, however, after two weeks of work at the site, one of the members of the 
family who owns the plot prevented the laborers from working. In spite of the initial agreement 
to open up the site for two years for collective use, he decided to sell the land. In a single night 
all the shelters were demolished.  
In his opening speech for The Concrete Tent, Petti (2015) recollects the frustration and 
disappointment that could be felt among the participants and the other people involved at that 
moment. Nevertheless, he argues that it also created a sense of awareness of the importance 
of preserving the camp and its history. Ultimately, it allowed for a different way of thinking 
about the camp which was expressed in the desire to represent the camp no longer as “a 
place without history, but rather as a place full of stories that can be narrated through its urban 
fabric” (Ibid., p. 3). The historical importance of life in exile was finally recognized:  
 
Claiming that life in exile is historically meaningful is a way to understand refugeehood 
not only as a passive production of an absolute form of state violence, but also as a 
way to recognize refugees as subjects of history, as makers of history and not simply 
victims of it. Claiming the camp as a heritage site is a way to avoid the trap of being 
stuck either in the commemoration of the past or in the projection into an abstract 
messianic future that is constantly postponed and presented as salvation. This 
perspective offers instead the possibility for the camp to be an historical political 
subject of the present, and to see the achievements of the present not as an 
Figure 25: Presentation at The Three Shelters plot. 
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impediment to the right 
of return, but on the 
contrary as a step 
toward it (Ibid., pp. 3-
4). 
 
The discussion and 
conversations right 
after the demolition of 
the shelters gave new 
impetus to the desire to 
design a new gathering 
space in Dheisheh. 
The participants decided to select a plot of land in the garden of the Al-Feniq center to 
construct The Concrete Tent as a gathering space for communal learning, a place to host 
cultural activities, a working area, and an open space for social meetings.136  
The Concrete Tent brings the three problems connected to the contradiction between the 
right of return and the refugee experience discussed in the previous sections together. In 
Stengers’ idiom as presented in the third chapter, it can be argued that life in exile is the 
obligation that activates the study practices of Campus in Camps. Life in exile is that what is 
investigated and what requires response-ability. It is what makes common sense ruminate 
and oscillate between on the one hand the struggle for the right of return and on the other 
hand the affirmation of the camp experience. Moreover, life in exile is what makes the 
participants of Campus in Camps hesitate before the three problems outlined above, and that 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
A. How to create public space in the camp without normalizing its exceptionality? 
B. How to relate to the camp as a refugee living outside its borders? 
C. How to represent the camp?  
 
                                                        
136 See Figure 26 and 27. 
Figure 26: The Concrete Tent. 
  Making a university 200 
In contrast to the camp which comes back in all three of the problems, life in exile is absent 
from them. However, more than the camp in itself, it is the fact that people have been living in 
exile for decades that constitutes the obligation of the practice of Campus in Camps. This 
means that in spite of the fact that the camp is the concrete material condition that connects 
the problems of creation, relation, and representation, life in exile is what makes hesitate and 
think. It can be argued that the camp condition itself is too strongly connected with the right of 
return, which makes it easier to recognize it as an exceptionality and the refugee as its victim. 
The focus on the camp and its injustices as it is present in the publication Vision seemed to 
divide the participants in two fronts: those who forcefully claim the right of return versus those 
who pay tribute to the strong social fabric of the camp. This opposition has been called the 
contradiction between the right of return and the camp experience.  
Imagining the future of the camp during group discussions, however, did not seem to be 
a fruitful approach as the discussions continually revolved around this contradiction. It was 
only by studying the camp that the participants gained an insight in what started to make them 
think, namely life in exile. It is by means of the fieldwork exercises that a reciprocal capture 
came into being between the practitioners, the participants, on the one hand, and the 
obligation of life in exile, on the other hand. As such it can be argued that the camp could only 
be the stake of a public debate or a political action, but, as such, it could never become 
something that could make the participants think as everyone had his or her reasons to argue 
Figure 27: The Concrete Tent. 
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for or against one of the sides of the contradiction. It is only due to the study practice they 
started to do that the camp, and more precisely the fact that there is life in exile, that the camp 
could become an active participant in the discussions, that it could start to object, and that the 
participants could not do otherwise than hesitate.  
The obligation of life in exile allowed to activate the camp as a matter of study that made 
the inhabitants of the camp think (‘what is this place we are living in?’), instead of recognize 
(‘the camp is unjust and should be abolished!’). In doing so, it became possible to start to think 
about the camp – more specifically around the three aforementioned questions which all have 
a relation to the camp – and not to recognize it in terms of either victimization or normalization. 
It made it, in other words, possible to turn the contradiction into a contrast by affirming both 
contradictory terms and transforming them in the course of the adventure of study.  
In sum, it has been argued that a problem of creation, relation, and representation – 
stemming from the contradiction between the right of return and the camp experience – can 
be discerned that converge around the obligation of life in exile. Whereas the foregoing 
chapter aimed to shed a light on the obligation of the practice of Campus in Camps – what 
makes them think –, the next chapter will elucidate the requirements of their practice – how 
they are made to think.   
 
 
Chapter Six 
Studying within 
Ruins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of the previous chapter was to introduce Campus in Camps, to explain their role in 
this dissertation, to present their work, and to bring to the fore the obligation of their practice, 
namely life in exile. Such an obligation comes to the fore throughout practices that have to 
meet very strict requirements to pass the test as study practices. In this chapter, the different 
requirements that constrain the study practices of Campus in Camps will be clarified. In 
Chapter Three, we have seen that Stengers (2005a), drawing on Latour, distinguishes four 
requirements of scientific practices, more precisely the formation of alliances with state or 
industrial power, the achievement of academic recognition, the mobilization of the world (i.c. 
relevant technological instruments as well as interested and motivated collaborators), and the 
production of a public representation of the field. Throughout a reading of the reports on 
Campus in Camps’ activities and projects, I have discerned four requirements that seem 
inevitable to understand their practice as a study practice. In short, the participants seem to 
be required to: 
 
i. Make stories; 
ii. Make comparisons; 
iii. Make maps; 
iv. Make terms of use.  
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Like the scientist has to meet the four requirements of scientific practices in order ‘to learn 
something new’ – the most general description of the aim of scientific practices as we have 
seen –, the student, at least in Campus in Camps, has to make stories, make comparisons, 
make maps, and make terms of use in order ‘to learn anew’ – the most general description of 
the aim of study practices as argued in Part Two. In this chapter the focus lies on these four 
requirements of the study practices of Campus in Camps. It is obvious that the four 
requirements that come to the fore within Campus in Camps cannot be generalized to all study 
practices. Nevertheless, they give an insight in the ways of working in study practices more in 
general, although it is possible that other study practices are guided by altogether different 
requirements.  
The four requirements have been discerned based on a reading of the reports of the study 
practices of Campus in Camps as they can be found in both The Collective Dictionary and 
The Initiatives. Each of the first four sections of this chapter presents one of the four 
requirements of study practices. For every requirement, a presentation of a study activity will 
guide the elaboration of the requirement central in that section. The requirement, however, is 
not limited to that study activity only. The study activity as described in every section illustrates 
a requirement that can be encountered in most – nearly all – other study activities of Campus 
in Camps. Finally, the last section of this chapter summarizes how the requirements of this 
chapter and obligation of the previous chapter come together in the study practices of Campus 
in Camps.  
 
 
Taking Care of Our Abstractions 
 
The first requirement is the requirement to make stories.137 This requirement shows itself in 
all publications contained in The Collective Dictionary. This dictionary aimed to elaborate 
concepts that were deemed indispensable when thinking about the camp dwellers’ life in 
Dheisheh, such as participation, ownership, and well-being. The publication Vision is an 
exception since it is aimed at the imagination of possible futures, instead of the study of a 
concept. In this section, the focus will be on the booklet Knowledge. This publication contains 
seven reflections on the concept of knowledge and how knowledge relates to experience. The 
aim of the publication is to gather people around the concept of knowledge in order to bring 
together different perspectives and standpoints vis-à-vis this notion. These different takes on 
                                                        
137 See Figure 28.  
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the question of knowledge are brought to the fore in the form of stories. As such, textbook 
definitions of knowledge are contrasted with stories about everyday experiences.138 
“The things of which the story tells,” Ingold (2007) argues, “do not so much exist as occur; 
each is a moment of ongoing activity” (p. 90). Whereas a definition obscures the world from 
which the concept emerged, a story recounts and relates it to the different experiences “that 
paved the way for it, that presently concur with it and that follow it into the world” (p. 90). 
Therefore, in opposition to decontextualized definitions, situated stories give an insight in 
specific occurrences that are gathered by a concept. Storytelling recounts the experiences 
and events in which a specific concept came to matter. Not only do stories weave together 
different experienced events, they also allow to share this storied knowledge. Telling a story 
is like laying out a path through a landscape and inviting those who listen to follow, to point 
their attention to what can be noticed along the way, so that it can come to matter in their 
                                                        
138 In other publications of The Collective Dictionary, also diagrams, interviews, and pictures were used 
to contrast with the text book definition of the concept at hand.  
Figure 28: Gathering of participants. 
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thinking. In short, stories recount past events and pave the way for future experiences. Again, 
“it matters what stories make worlds, what worlds make stories” (Haraway, 2016, p. 12). 
In the making of this storied dictionary, two ways of writing are deployed, namely 
dramatization and fabulation. Using four stories from the publication Knowledge, each way of 
writing will be discussed. First, there are the stories in which the central concept is dramatized. 
To dramatize a concept means to hesitate to use a concept to explain a situation, it requires 
on the contrary that the concept itself becomes explained through an inquiry into the situations 
in which it comes to matter. Dramatization forbids holding on to any general definition of a 
concept, and necessitates to situate the concept in the contexts in which it is relevant and 
upon which it exerts its force (Debaise, 2016). Foregrounding the force concepts exert on the 
way we experience situations, underscores the fact that concepts do not simply represent 
phenomena ‘out there’, but that they actively intervene in our experience of the situations they 
render intelligible. Intelligible needs to be understood here as graspable in the specific way 
the concept calls for, rather than another.  
In the case of knowledge, it means to repel all general definitions elicited by the question 
“What is knowledge?”. Instead, this way of writing requires to unfold the drama of knowledge. 
The “What is?”-question is exchanged for a manifold of questions such as “Who wants 
knowledge?”, “How much knowledge?”, “Why does she want knowledge and how does she 
want it?”, “And where and when?”. Whereas the first question – “What is knowledge?” – 
demands an answer that would uncover the essence of knowledge, and that hence would fit 
nicely into a textbook defining knowledge, the other questions allow to situate the concept of 
knowledge within the drama in which it comes to matter (Debaise, 2016; Deleuze, 2004). This 
means that attention is paid to the experiences that are retained within the concept and those 
that are excluded. Two dramatizations of the concept of knowledge will make things more 
clear.  
Dramatization as a way of writing can be discerned, for instance, in the section Academic 
knowledge, where a participant critically reflects on the notion of development. He argues that 
the knowledge generated in view of development purposes often maintains and enlarges 
existing inequalities. Moreover, it is said that the banner of development obscures the way 
academic knowledge plays a role in and even accelerates this process. The example given 
are GMOs. The knowledge produced in relation to GMOs is often legitimized in view of a 
solution to the hunger problem. Genetically modifying crops would allow to intensify the 
production, so the harvest can feed more people. However, this ‘development’ runs the risk of 
making small farmers dependent on big companies that have a patent on the seeds of the 
genetically modified crops. In this sense, the patent functions as a way to privatize and 
                                                                               Studying within ruins 
 
207 
commodify academic knowledge. As such, it plays a crucial role in enhancing inequality, 
because it dispossesses small farmers from their ability to grow their own produce. Instead of 
asking the general question what knowledge would be, the participant reflects on the question 
who benefits from knowledge in this particular case: Who wants the knowledge concerning 
genetic modification? And in what form, as patented or public knowledge? In which way does 
the discourse of development mobilize funding organizations, while obfuscating hidden 
motivations?  
In a second move, he opposes the patented knowledge with the knowledge his 
grandfather acquired in the orchard. Although he did not posses any degree or certificate in 
agriculture, he cultivated and planted trees during his entire life. The knowledge he acquired 
throughout his labor is shared among co-workers and grows in relation to the trees, the 
seasons, nutrients, and so on. The participant argues that conceiving of knowledge as a 
private property decouples people from the knowledge that grows via sharing and experience. 
He concludes that of course there is nothing against the concept of knowledge, but in the way 
he dramatizes this notion, he foregrounds the importance to understand it as something that 
is never universal or value-free, but always in someone’s interest and emerging amidst 
specific activities (Al-Laham, 2013a). Dramatization sketches out the network in which a 
concept can come to matter. Moreover, it investigates for whom this concept potentially comes 
to matter and in what way.  
Another, less elaborate, dramatization of knowledge can be read in the reflection Source 
of value. One of the participants wrote on his experiences while working as a project 
coordinator. He recounts that he had acquired knowledge by executing the tasks and 
performing the roles his job required him to do. He explains that at the moment of writing, he 
is studying at the university in order to finish his bachelor’s degree. He contrasts these two 
experiences, learning by doing a job versus learning in order to get a degree, in order to 
question the relation between knowledge on the one hand, and degrees and certificates that 
would testify of the knowledge someone is supposed to have acquired during his education 
on the other hand. It is argued that it is easy to make a distinction between educated and 
uneducated people, at least when this distinction is based on the acquisition of a degree or 
certificate. A distinction between people based on their knowledge, however, is, according to 
the participant, impossible to make. He argues that knowledge grows through experience, and 
that, hence, degrees and certificates cannot appropriately reflect someone’s knowledge. The 
concept of knowledge is investigated in the concrete drama of its institutional recognition by 
means of degrees and certificates. It raises the question to whose advantage it is to be able 
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to claim to ‘have knowledge’, and who is, in this case, dispossessed of her knowledge because 
it is not recognized in official documents (Abu Aker, 2013).  
In short, dramatization makes attentive to how specific practices are sanctioned, while 
others remain barely recognized. It draws attention to mechanisms that not only include 
specific experiences in our understanding of a concept, but also exclude others from such an 
understanding. It is possible, however, to discern a second way of writing in the stories that 
participants made.  
The second way of writing, fabulation, addresses the question that the style of 
dramatization omitted, viz. “What is knowledge?”. Fabulating about what knowledge is, 
however, is not the same as defining it. In her writings on speculative fabulation, Haraway 
explains that wild facts inhabit fables. Whereas definitions domesticate meanings, fables 
shelter a wild bunch of experiences and events without settling them into a coherent system. 
Fables do not gain their efficacy from convincing correspondences between concept and 
reality, but rather from the imaginative power of their construction and the way in which they 
bring all kinds of real and imagined critters in correspondence (Haraway & Terranova, 2016). 
Taking the relay from Haraway, Martha Kenney (2013) calls such stories that allow to gather 
a manifold of agents in ways that makes us notice, fables of attention. She writes that “fables 
are powerful pedagogical vectors; but their power is not dependent on their grip on reality. Put 
another way, a fable is a case study that asks to be trusted, not believed. Fables are not about 
ontological claims but practical creativity, their capacity to make new relations” (p. 17).  
In contradistinction to airborne concepts, fables are multi-agential muddles that situate 
events in relation toward one another. The aim is however not so much to stabilize the events 
within a History that acquires the power to explain the succession of events in a progressivist 
mode, but rather to tell different kinds of stories that allow to notice different kinds of things. In 
The Collective Dictionary, the reader will not find any coherent theory of the concept of 
knowledge in the contributions adopting a more fabulatory approach, let alone a domesticating 
definition. They rather take the shape of stories that bring together and reflect on experiences 
participants have underwent and that they deem relevant in order to think about knowledge. 
Gropingly, these contributions articulate aspects of the notion of knowledge based on the 
everyday experiences of the participants.  
In the contribution Even a toy is a source, for instance, the participant writes about an 
experience he had as an adolescent. He was standing with a man on a balcony and they were 
watching the man’s daughter who was playing with a small toy car in the street in front of the 
building. Beside the street was a garden full of sand and big stones. When the girl wanted to 
drive her car in the sand, the participant started to shout at her that it is not possible to drive 
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the car there because the wheels would get stuck. The man said to him that when the girl 
would drive the car in the sand, she would discover herself that it is not easily done and that 
it is better for the car to stay on smoother ground. He explained that after trying she would get 
to know it herself, based on this personal experience. The participant goes on to contrast 
learning from experience with the transmission of what he calls pre-packaged knowledge. 
Whereas the transmission of pre-packaged knowledge assumes that knowledge can be 
contained in bits and piece and can be exchanged between one person and another, learning 
from experience assumes that knowledge grows amidst particular situations, making it 
inherently a shared good. The participant fabulates a conception of knowledge which 
foregrounds the relation with everyday experiences. According to this conception, knowledge 
cannot be transmitted in packages from one person to the other. It is rather grown in the 
relationship between the person and his environment, including other human beings, toys, 
stones, and so on (Al-Laham, 2013b).139  
In another contribution, We are the ones who build our knowledge, two participants 
fabulate that it is impossible to think knowledge as either theoretical, or practical, but that it 
needs to be thought of as an action. Moreover, an action that is shared and hence, through 
which knowledge is shared. They situate their argument in the experiences they had during a 
project in the course of which they interviewed different women on their educational 
background. They found that almost none of them held an academic certificate but were 
nevertheless very knowledgeable about many things – the examples given include for 
instance sewing and designing clothes. This kind of knowledge, which is to be found in specific 
skills and activities, remains however often barely recognized as a valuable source of 
knowledge. The participants argue that it is hard or even impossible to confine knowledge in 
certificates and degrees that make it into an individual property.  
They fabulate a conception of knowledge as collective action in which also other persons 
can participate. Initiated, and hence partaking in a specific shared experience – of sewing, of 
cooking, of speaking a foreign language – knowledge can be shared. As such, knowledge 
cannot be appropriated by individuals and commodified by means of degrees and certificates. 
                                                        
139 As a reflection on this fabulation, however, it can be noted that it seems rather difficult to discern 
knowledge that was transmitted from knowledge that is grown. The father’s injunction not to explain his 
daughter what she should or should not do – and why – is recollected here as a so-called ‘personal 
experience’. However, it is not clear why the participant remembers it as his own learning experience, 
and not as an attempt of the father to transmit his own pre-packaged learning theory. This shows the 
ambivalence of knowledge as something learned via personal experiences. One could ask to what 
extent the transmission of knowledge in for instance a classroom setting is really a delivery of pre-
packaged knowledge in return for money, and correlatively, to what extent it can be understood as a 
making present of knowledge contents in relation to which pupils learn via experience?  
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On the contrary, it needs to be understood as embedded in concrete actions that can be 
performed collectively (Al-Turshan & Hamouz, 2013). Fabulating a concept of knowledge 
means in this case to embed it within the concrete activities in which it is used and shared.  
To summarize, the first requirement of study practices calls for storytelling that allows to 
relate abstract concepts to everyday experiences. Storytelling situates concepts inside the 
events, experiences, and relations that make up the fabric of the concept. It is a way of bringing 
together and passing on wild facts without domesticating them inside definitions. Stories can 
make us think about the way a specific concept can be used to explain or justify a situation, 
or they can lure our feelings towards other ways of experiencing an event.  
The first way of storytelling practiced in Campus in Camps dramatizes the concept. This 
means that the concept is shown in the concrete situations in which it is used. Moreover, 
dramatization inquires in whose benefit it is to use a certain understanding of a concept (e.g. 
knowledge as individual property that can be exchanged) rather than another. Dramatization 
lays bare the multiple and dispersed meanings and interests that were covered up under the 
guise of one and the same concept. Its aim, however, is not merely denunciatory. More than 
a method of general deconstruction of all concepts, it is way of telling specific stories about 
specific concepts. Dramatization does not aim to arrive at a truthful understanding of what a 
concept really is, but rather at an insight into how the concept works. This means that it 
inquires how a concept is used to sanction specific practices, whereas others are rendered as 
inappropriate.  
The second way of writing deploys a more speculative approach to the concept. Based 
on personal experiences, participants fabulated alternative understandings of the concepts 
that are relevant to their lives, such as knowledge, citizenship, or well-being. Fabulation aims 
to bring different experiences, events and relations together in more or less coherent stories 
that provide always partial descriptions of the concept at hand. Warding off anything that could 
sound like a concluding event of a progressive History, fabulatory stories stage a diversity of 
actors enmeshed in a here-and-now muddle populated with wild facts.  
Storytelling, by either dramatization or fabulation, hence plays a key role in the making of 
the dictionary. The concern to take care of the concepts we use to describe our experiences 
on the one hand, and the concern for the lure for experience that concepts constitute – the 
way in which they allow us to become affected by a question or an issue – resonate with 
Whitehead’s caution to take care of our abstractions.140 Stengers (2008) explains that: 
                                                        
140 There is a shift here from the more commonsensical notion of concept as it used to describe what is 
contained in The Collective Dictionary, to the more technical term of abstraction that plays an important 
role in the philosophy of Whitehead. A detailed discussion of the specific similarities and differences 
between concepts and abstractions is worthy of a dissertation on its own, but in the context of this 
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For Whitehead, abstractions as such were never the enemy. We cannot think without 
abstractions; they cause us to think, they lure our feelings and affects. But our duty is 
to take care of our abstractions, never to bow down in front of what they are doing to 
us (p. 50). 
 
It is important to make clear that abstractions are not a purely intellectual affair. Stengers 
(2017b) argues that Whitehead is not interested in ‘abstract thought’ as such, but that 
abstraction for him is a necessary ingredient in thinking. Moreover, not only thinking, but also 
perception requires abstraction because it makes recognition possible.  
An event, the most concrete fact, for instance a bird singing his song in the early morning, 
can be named, but as soon as we talk about it, we use more abstract terms to refer to the 
actual singing. Stengers (2011e) explains that it is due to our abstraction of the bird’s song 
that we can recognize the bird singing. As such, abstraction makes recognition possible and 
vice versa. We recognize the bird’s song although we barely have words to describe it. 
Abstractions make it possible to draw attention to events that otherwise could have remained 
barely noticed. Of the bird’s song, it is possible to say “Did you hear it? There it is again!”, 
drawing attention to the song, even without recourse to any abstract name. Whitehead (1964) 
explains the relation between abstraction and recognition as follows: “Recognition and 
abstraction essentially involve each other. Each of them exhibits an entity for knowledge which 
is less than the concrete fact, but is a real factor in that fact” (p. 189).  
Abstractions therefore do not inhabit the realm of abstract thought – which is of little 
interest to Whitehead –, but are crucial ingredients in the happening of the event. They are 
part and parcel of the ways in which we experience the event and sensitize us to what we can 
be aware of in perception. Abstractions seem to have a double efficacy. First, they allow to 
render intelligible and communicate experiences. Abstractions, however, not only ‘catch’ 
events by naming them, they also – and this is their second efficacy – lure our feelings and 
affects, make a specific experience of an event possible. Consequently, we cannot be against 
abstractions as if we would have a more true experience without them, it is rather due to 
                                                        
dissertation it would take us too far (especially too far from the practices of Campus in Camps). It could 
be argued however that whereas all concepts are abstractions, not every abstraction is a concept. 
Concepts are hence a subset of the set of abstractions, more specifically they denote those abstractions 
that can be put in words and hence be communicated. The example of the bird further on in this 
paragraph would be an example of an experience of which there is abstraction (one can recognize the 
singing of the bird), but no concept (although one can recognize it, it cannot be put in words).   
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abstractions that we can experience what happens in this way, rather than another. And 
therefore it is important to take care of them, to the ways in which they lure our experience.  
In The Collective Dictionary, the participants engage in a process of taking care of the 
abstractions that are at play in their experience of the camp by means of both dramatic and 
fabulatory storytelling.141 As such, The Collective Dictionary can be understood as a way of 
overcoming what Whitehead (1938) has called “The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary” (p. 235). 
This term indicates the belief that we know and have coined all the fundamental ideas that 
can be applied to our experience, and that these ideas can be explicitly expressed in human 
language. The participants’ dictionary, on the contrary, demonstrates the internal differences 
of the various concepts. It makes clear how the concepts cover up a multiplicity of experiences 
that can henceforth affect us in a particular way rather than another. Moreover, the 
participants’ attempt was to question these concepts from the point of view of experiences 
that were until then neglected by the concept, in order to transform its efficacy, to lure our 
feelings through other conceptions of knowledge, ownership, participation, responsibility, or 
one of the other concepts of The Collective Dictionary. Making a dictionary with stories allows 
to take care of our abstractions. At least, however, if we refuse any understanding of the 
dictionary as containing an exhaustive set of universally applicable definitions.  
In order to omit The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary and inspired by what SF-writer Ursula 
K. Le Guin calls The Carrier Bag Theory of Fiction, it is proposed to think about The Collective 
Dictionary as a carrier bag of concepts for living together in the camp. Stories, according to 
Le Guin, are carrier bags that are used for collecting, carrying, and telling the stuff of living. 
Containing not only wild facts and messy descriptions, but also remote memories and high 
hopes, it is often said of stories that they blind us for the present. Instead of seeing storytelling 
as deceit and disguise, however, Le Guin (1989a) asks to understand the story as “an active 
encounter with the environment by means of posing options and alternatives, and an 
enlargement of present reality by connecting it to the unverifiable past and the unpredictable 
future” (pp. 44-45). Stories do not distract from ‘what is really happening’, but draw our 
attention to specific ingredients pertaining to the construction of lived reality. Even more, they 
contribute to further construction work.  
Stories are carrier bags for clashing points of view without pacifying conflicts. Again in the 
words of Le Guin (1989b):  
 
                                                        
141 In the context of the Palestinian camps, anthropologists have at many occassions argued that it is 
of great importance which notions are used to describe situations since they play an important role in 
the shaping of public perceptions and humanitarian policies (cf. Feldman, 2012, 2014; Peteet, 2016). 
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Conflict, competition, stress, struggle, etc. within the narrative conceived as carrier 
bag/belly/box/house/medicine bundle, may be seen as necessary elements of a whole 
which itself cannot be characterized either as conflict or as harmony, since its purpose 
is neither resolution nor stasis but continuing process (p. 169). 
 
Stories do not aim to settle conflicts once and for all, nor do they aim to explain events so they 
can no longer make us think. They rather collect a manifold of experiences and events in order 
to make us pay attention to what is happening. Wild facts tumble into stories, as stories tumble 
into concepts, as concepts tumble into the dictionary. Making a dictionary means thinking with 
abstractions. This requires storytelling to become attentive to the ways in which these 
abstractions lure our experience. Therefore, storytelling in either the dramatic or the fabulatory 
mode makes it possible to take care of the abstractions with which we experience the world 
and can be discerned as the first requirement of the study practice of Campus in Camps.     
 
 
Comparison as Concern 
 
The second requirement for the study practice of Campus in Camps is the requirement to 
make a comparison. This section is based on the material that can be found in the publications 
Common1 and The Municipality, belonging to The Collective Dictionary and The Initiatives 
respectively. The aim of these projects was to compare the city of Doha with the camp of 
Dheisheh, and to investigate what it means to move from the camp to the city as a refugee 
(cf. the second problem discerned in Chapter Five). The two publications make use of 
interviews and photographs in order to construct a rapport between Dheisheh and Doha.  
Before discussing two different ways of making a comparison between the city and the 
camp, it is necessary to explain how a comparison can be understood as a rapport, an notion 
already encountered in Chapter Three. Therefore it is important to distinguish rapport from 
relation. The two should not be confused. In comparison to the notion of relation, the term 
rapport renders the constructed nature of the relation explicit. Because of the perhaps unduly 
use of the notion of relation in social theory, it has become the default position to conceive of 
human beings as always already embedded in social and technological networks of relations. 
As such, it is argued that the relations are constitutive of those – human and other-than-human 
critters such as cats, molecules, or djinns – who become in their interweaving. Le Guin (2017) 
renders this perspective as follows:   
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In this view, we humans appear as particularly lively, intense, aware nodes of relation 
in an infinite network of connections, simple or complicated, direct or hidden, strong or 
delicate, temporary or very long-lasting. A web of connections, infinite but locally 
fragile, with and among everything – all beings – including what we generally class as 
things, objects (p. 15).  
 
All beings are related among and with one another in an endless network of relations. Together 
with human beings, objects and things are part of this continuously forming and deforming 
web.  
Thingification is what Karen Barad (2003) has called the turning of relations into things, 
entities, or relata, a view that, she argues, has enormously infected the way in which we 
perceive and understand the world. Instead of arguing that everything is always related – 
which would imply that there are first things and that the relations between them are only 
secondary –, Barad (2007) goes a step further by claiming that “relata do not preexist relations” 
(p. 140). It is within this and out of this web of relations that relata – entities, objects, humans, 
etc. – emerge. Inspired by Bohrian quantum physics and Butlerian performativity theory, she 
works towards a relational ontology that understands the world as a bundle of relations that 
produce things. She places relations before the relata that are usually seen as constituting the 
relation, by claiming that it is not the relata who interact – establish a relation –, but that it is in 
the intra-actions of phenomena that things emerge (cf. Barad, 2017). First come the relations, 
only afterwards the relata.   
In opposition to the notion of relation which has become a commonplace in social theory, 
the notion of rapport underscores the fact that the relation is not always already there, that it 
does not always preexist relata, but that it can be and needs to be constructed. Moreover, it 
makes explicit the work that has to be done in order to create a relation; or, in the case of this 
requirement, to make a comparison. In the words of Stengers (2011b): 
 
Both logos and the Latin ratio are an etymological source for terms such as reason 
and account but also proportion, which signifies an operation of comparison. The 
French word rapport has inherited this constellation of meanings, while its usual 
translation, ‘relation’, has lost it. Everything may be described as related, but not 
everything entertains ‘rapports’ (pp. 48-49).     
 
Starting from, but going further then the tendency of seeing everything as always already 
related, the notion of rapport makes us pay attention to how these relations are made. The 
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notion of rapport, for instance, underscores the constructed nature of relations in experimental 
settings. In the third chapter, it was argued that Galileo needed to set up the experimental 
apparatus of the inclined plane in order to put the height of the starting point of the ball in 
relation with its point of impact on the ground. In Stengers’ French becomes more clear that 
this was a ‘mettre en rapport’ of two variables, instead of a demonstration of a relation that 
was always already there. Whereas Galileo took advantage of the experimental achievement 
to silence his rivals by claiming that the discussion why bodies fall is nonsense and that we 
should limit ourselves to inquire how bodies fall, the question is now whether it is possible to 
inherit the achievement of a rapport in a different way, in a way that it can make us think.  
In the next paragraphs, two ways of making a comparison will be presented and 
discussed. Whereas the first is based on indicators, the second makes use of photographs. 
In Common1, we find two contributions that explicitly deal with the relation between Dheisheh 
and Doha. The first, Does residence matter when defining the Palestinian refugee identity?, 
reports on an interview one of the participants conducted with his father on the growth of 
Dheisheh and the foundation of Doha in the 1970s.142 Inspired by the story of his father, the 
participant went on to investigate the relation between Dheisheh and Doha and attempted to 
create a rapport between the two areas of residence. He compared the two from the point of 
view of nine indicators: housing, streets, interrelationships, organizations (NGOs), public 
space, water, electricity, education & schools, and healthcare. For housing, for instance, it is 
written that in Doha houses are neatly spread which leaves room for gardens, whereas in 
Dheisheh the houses are very close to one another and that the camp cannot hold population 
growth. In the case of public space, the privatized or surveilled parks in Doha are put next to 
the narrow streets of Dheisheh. For each of the indicators, Dheisheh and Doha are compared 
in a few lines followed by a small comment. Besides, this comment is often evaluative. For the 
housing indicator, for instance, the participant writes that he would prefer to live in Doha 
because it has more open space between the houses and people do not live as close to one 
another as they do in Dheisheh. However, the case is not always settled in favor of Doha. In 
relation to the indicators of organizations and health care, the participant argues that Dheisheh 
is better equipped than Doha, which means in this context that there are more NGOs and that 
it has a hospital (Abu Alia, 2013).  
Two issues can be raised concerning the comparison based on indicators. The first issue 
has to do with the neutrality of the indicators. There is no rationale for the choice for these 
rather than other indicators. At first sight, they seem quite arbitrary. Nevertheless, it could be 
                                                        
142 In 2012, when The Collective Dictionary was published, approximately 11 000 people lived in Doha.  
  Making a university 216 
called into question whether they not already take the assumption of a fully equipped city for 
granted. It is not sure whether the choice for these indicators can provide an interesting 
perspective – one that can make us think – on the mode of living together of the camp, as 
opposed to the city.  
This issue immediately relates to the second issue which has to do with the comments. 
After the often very short descriptions of both Dheisheh and Doha – sometimes not longer 
than three lines – the participant all too easily jumps to conclusions. In comparing the electricity 
in Dheisheh with Doha, he writes that the electricity of Dheisheh is for free but that it is rather 
weak, whereas the people of Doha pay for constant and powerful electricity. He concludes 
that it is therefore more preferable to live in Doha, because energy supply is warranted. The 
question would be to what extent such judgement already endorses the city condition as a 
default position. This would imply that the camp is only evaluated from the point of view of the 
city. Moreover because the comparison is based on indicators that favor the city instead of the 
camp, it can be called an unfair competition, a race that the camp has already lost before it 
even began. Judging the camp from the perspective of the city makes us recognize an 
anomaly or exception, but it does not give the camp the power to make us think.  
In the contribution that follows, Visual investigation Dheisheh/Doha, a second attempt is 
made to make a comparison between the camp and the city. By means of photographs the 
participants have made some comparisons between Dheisheh and Doha. The contribution 
contains fourteen pictures in total, most of them are arranged two by two. The first image is a 
wide camera shot taken from the middle of the street that separates the camp from the city.143 
This style of exhibiting a strong contrast between Dheisheh and Doha is sustained throughout 
the other pictures. The remainder of the pictures is always presented two by two. Whereas on 
the left side a view of Dheisheh is shown, the right pictures show Doha. The first set contrasts 
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Figure 29: Main entrace of Dheisheh and Doha. 
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the main entrances of the two areas.144 In the second set a picture of Doha taken from 
Dheisheh is put next to a picture of Dheisheh taken from Doha. Thereafter follow two wide 
shots that portray an empty space in Dheisheh and Doha.145 Another set follows with empty 
space in both areas. The last comparative couple contains pictures of the street in Dheisheh 
and Doha146, and the last two pictures are from respectively a gated park and a gated football 
field, both in Doha (Brave New Alps, 2013).  
What is striking when looking at these pictures is the difference that is demonstrated 
between Dheisheh and Doha. The pictures of Dheisheh give the impression of a crowded, 
disorderly, dirty, overgrown town, cluttered with informal dwellings heaped up next to small 
alleys. Doha, on the contrary, is represented as an empty, orderly, tidy settlement, that seems 
to be constructed according to a strict and fixed housing scheme with big lanes and where 
public and private are nicely separated. In the previous paragraph, two concerns were raised 
in relation to comparison, namely the concern not to judge or evaluate from a seemingly 
external point of view and the concern not to conduct the comparison within the terms of one 
of the compared.  
The question is now how this different way of comparing Dheisheh and Doha passes this 
double test. In relation to the first concern, it can be argued that the visual representation 
seems to suspend the judgement that was made all too quickly in the course of the comparison 
via indicators. The comments under the pictures are very limited (e.g. ‘Street in Dheisheh’) 
and merely aim to name what is shown, rather than to evaluate or pass judgement on. 
Nowhere can be read that it would be preferable to live in Dheisheh, rather than Doha, or the 
other way around. The aim of the series is not to compare Dheisheh and Doha from the point 
of view of a normal or ideal city, but rather draws out the differences between the two. This 
brings us to the second concern: to what extent is the comparison conducted in the terms of 
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Figure 30: Dheisheh and Doha, respectively left and right. 
  Making a university 218 
only one of the compared parties? In this regard, it is arguable that both areas get the chance 
to present themselves on their own terms. The pictures do not seduce the beholder to judge 
one of the sides from the point of view of the other. Neither the left, nor the right side seems 
appealing in the sense that the beholder would be inclined to make his preference where to 
live clear as was done in the comparison via indicators. Both sides convey an uncanny feeling 
which allows the beholder to retain some distance towards both the camp and the city.  
In sum, whereas the pictures of Dheisheh give the impression of a labyrinthine urban 
jungle, the pictures of Doha transfer a feeling of a cold and sterile lifelessness. Dheisheh looks 
like an impenetrable network of alleys that are overgrown with plants and cluttered with dirt, a 
hotchpotch in which even a cat would not be able to find its kittens. Doha, on the contrary, 
resembles an anonymous, modernist Siedlung. The pictures seem to depict desolate 
dwellings that look like they have been deserted after the shattering of every dream of 
progress. As such, it can indeed be argued that the camera refuses to make its preference 
clear. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the camera would constitute some kind of neutral 
standpoint that allows both the camp and the city to present themselves in their own idiom. Of 
course, the camera takes images from both areas and only registers what is there to be seen, 
but by the specific way of arranging the images and the specific shots that were taken, it could 
be argued that the camera is used as a rhetorical device. The camera functions as a tool of 
exaggeration that reinforces the differences between Dheisheh and Doha. As such, it seems 
that the comparison via pictures allowed to let both Dheisheh and Doha present themselves 
Figure 31: Empty space in Dheisheh and Doha. 
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on their own terms, although these terms were exaggerated by the use of the camera and the 
way of arranging them in oppositional pairs.  
A rapport has been created between a camp and a city that were always already related. 
This rapport made it possible to make a comparison between Dheisheh and Doha. This was, 
however, not a comparison that allowed to judge which of the two was more preferable to live 
in, but rather one that made the participants think about the always-already-there relation 
between Dheisheh and Doha. As such, it can not only be claimed that the rapport made a 
comparison possible, but also, and more importantly, that the comparison made a rapport 
possible. The comparison allowed to rethink and recreate the relationship between the camp 
and the city on the one hand, and the relationship between the Dheisheh/Doha agglomeration 
and its inhabitants on both sides of the border that separates the camp from the city on the 
other hand. In short, the construction of a rapport between Dheisheh and Doha in the form of 
a comparison allowed to create a rapport between the issue of the relation between camp and 
city on the one hand and the thinking public that gathered around this issue – made present 
via the photographs –, on the other hand.  
Now, what measure can be used in order to gauge the efficacy of the comparison that 
has been made? It can be argued that the efficacy of the comparison is relevant from the point 
of view of study practices in so far as it concerns the efficacy to make us think – as opposed 
to the efficacy of the Galilean rapport that could silence his rivals. Stengers (2011b) explains 
that:     
 
‘Learning from’ requires encountering, and encountering may indeed imply 
comparison, but there is no comparison if the encountered others are defined as 
unable to understand the point of the comparison. We are returned here to the Latin 
etymology of ‘comparison’: compar designates those who regard each other as equals 
Figure 32: Street in Dheisheh and Doha. 
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– that is, as able to agree, which means also able to disagree, object, negotiate, and 
contest (p. 63).  
 
She argues that there is only one rule to be respected in order for comparison to be relevant, 
and that is that a rapport is constructed between terms in their ‘full force’, and without ‘foul 
play’ that weakens one while ensuring the position of the other. Hence, the terms of the 
comparison can neither be imposed from above, as neutral, nor can they come from one of 
the parties because this would require that the other party would describe itself in the terms 
of the other. In sum, comparisons involve a challenge. If they are to have an efficacy in terms 
of making a public think, the rapport cannot be constructed on a so-called neutral terrain, nor 
on the terrain of one of the compared parties. It is rather in the border zone, where each party 
presents itself in its own terms, in its divergence, that friction can arise. Friction being in this 
case the capacity to disagree, object, negotiate, or contest – in short, to compare.  
In a commentary on Stengers’ reflections on comparison, Helen Verran (2011) draws the 
argument a bit further. Rephrasing Stengers’ analysis of Galileo’s threefold conferral of power 
as a framing triplet she asks what it means that the constructed rapport between height of 
departure and point of impact authorized claiming that what is measured lends itself to 
measurement. It is namely only in the case of this rapport, testifying of a specific kind of motion 
between specific kinds of bodies, without any internal source of motion (as opposed to a car 
or a horse), in an ideally frictionless manner (as opposed to an avalanche), that the fall of 
Galilean bodies made sense (Verran, 2001, 2014). Nevertheless, the framing triplet made it 
possible for Galileo to withdraw from the experimental setting to let it speak for itself. As such, 
the rapport did not only demonstrate how bodies fall, but became also – as we have seen – a 
weapon that could fend off theologians and philosophers who were contemplating the question 
why bodies fall – a question that the experimental apparatus had shown to be nonsensical.  
The apparatus did not only testify of a natural phenomenon, but also, and most 
importantly, proved to be a horrifying participant in a polemic. That is why Verran (2011) calls 
the experimental achievement a participant-comparison. She draws attention to the fact that 
the comparison does not represent a state of affairs, but calls one into being. Moreover, the 
comparison participates in the way we think and argue about what is compared. In the case 
of the Galilean experimental achievement, the participant-comparison denounced the so-
called irrational – be reminded that ratio besides reason also means proportion or rapport – 
arguments of the philosophicotheologically inclined audience. Verran’s notion of participant-
comparison allows to ask the question to what extent the series of photographs could be 
                                                                               Studying within ruins 
 
221 
understood as such a participant-comparison in the discussion about the relation between 
Dheisheh and Doha.   
It seems that the pictures have managed rather well to present both the camp and the 
city in their divergence, without reducing one to the other. Moreover, they made the 
participants capable of starting to think about the relation between Dheisheh and Doha as two 
diverging but interweaving entities. As such, the comparison participated in the discussions 
that took place about the specificity of the camp in relation to the city. In the booklet The 
Municipality, for instance, this relation is scrutinized by means of interviews and testimonies 
in order to get a better grasp on the different senses of belonging of both the inhabitants of 
Dheisheh and Doha. One of the participants declares: “What caught my attention during this 
research is that the refugees in this city are still linking themselves to the camp. They 
continually present themselves from this or that camp and they live in Doha” (Al-Assi, 2013, 
p. 59).  
Drawing out the divergence between the city and the camp, each in their own terms, with 
full force, without foul play, by means of a translation into a visual idiom allowed to get a sense 
of where and how the two intermingle, for instance in the construction of a collective refugee 
identity. Besides, in The Municipality, we find an image that imitates the style of the first picture 
of the series. It is again a wide shot of both Dheisheh and Doha on opposite sides of the 
street.147 Below is indicated that on the left hand side is Doha, whereas on the right hand side 
we see Dheisheh. However, in contrast to the first picture, this image does not allow to make 
a clear distinction between the camp and the city based on the picture alone. The beholder 
needs the additional information that is given below in order to discern the two, and even then, 
each side of the street seems to mirror the other. The sharp contrast demonstrated in the 
series in Common1 did not participate in a way that silenced – such as the rapport constructed 
by Galileo –, but rather in a way that initiated a learning process concerning the question what 
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Figure 33: Doha and Dheisheh on both sides of the street. 
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it means to be a refugee when living in a city, instead of a camp. The contradiction between 
camp and city evoked in the initial comparison was transformed into a contrast. The 
comparison required to attend to the specific ways in which camp and city diverge, but also to 
the alliances that come into being between the inhabitants of the camp and those of the city.   
 
 
Milieu, Milieu  
 
As a third requirement, students need to make maps. In the process of mapping, elements 
from the environment are retained, selected and ultimately assembled on a two-dimensional 
plane. In this section follows an inquiry into how it is possible to make a map, and how this 
relates to the study of the milieu, understood in this context as an environment. Milieu is a very 
ambiguous notion of which the precise meaning cannot be pinned down straightforwardly. 
Drawing on the different meanings that will be distinguished, this section inquires how it is 
possible to study a milieu and which role maps can play herein. Moreover, it will be shown 
how in the process of mapping the different meanings of milieu entangle. The publication that 
will guide this section is The Unbuilt. The aim of this publication was to make an inventory of 
the unbuilt spaces within Dheisheh in order to discern sites for possible interventions. In the 
first paragraphs of this section, however, the different understandings of the notion of milieu 
will be sketched out in order to lay out the complexity of this concept to get a sense of what it 
could mean to study an environment by means of mapping.  
At first glance, the meaning of the concept of milieu seems to be constantly oscillating 
between two poles: “Le mot ‘milieu’ en français signifie à la fois l’entre et l’entour, le centre et 
l’environnement, le medium et l’Umwelt, le mi-lieu et le milieu” (Petit, 2017, p. 11). On the one 
hand, the milieu seems to be that what surrounds a center and forms an environment for it. 
On the other hand, the milieu seems to be what is in the middle, or in between, and is as such 
what is at the center of attention. Both understandings of milieu, middle and surrounding, can 
be found in in the concept of Umwelt. Reacting against the mechanistic biology of his time and 
interested in how animals perceive their environments, the Estonian biologist Jakob von 
Uexküll (1957) argued that the animal cannot be treated as a machinic assemblage of sensory 
and motor organs, since this would leave out what he called the subject that uses these organs 
as tools of perception and action. “All that a subject perceives becomes his perceptual world 
and all that he does, his effector world. Perceptual and effector worlds together form a closed 
unit, the Umwelt” (p. 6). This understanding of milieu implies that the animal is caught up in a 
species-specific bubble of sensory data which it perceives and reacts to. In this conception, 
the animal, for instance a tick, is at the center and the milieu is what encloses it, what elicits 
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specific behaviors such as letting itself drop due to the olfactory experience of butyric acid 
which emanates from the sebaceous follicles of mammals (cf. Agamben, 2004; Buchanan, 
2008; Heidegger, 1995).  
The notion of Umwelt, for von Uexküll, integrates both the animal as perceiving and acting 
subject and the environment in which it is situated. Umwelt should hence not be confused with 
the environment as such or as the habitat in which different species cohabit – as Petit did in 
abovementioned quote in which he draws a too stark contrast between medium as middle and 
Umwelt as surrounding. Von Uexküll calls the environment in itself the Umgebung, as opposed 
to the species-specific Umwelt. The notion of Umwelt merges and splits at the same time the 
Innenwelt of the animal and the surrounding Umgebung (cf. Ingold, 2000). As such, this bipolar 
concept gathers the two contrasting understandings of milieu that opened this paragraph.      
Michel Serres (1990), however, warns for such an all too dichotomized understanding of 
milieu since it exaggerates the two poles of the concept, middle and environment. He argues 
that every middle is an environment for another middle. As such, middle and environment are 
always expressed relatively towards something else – middle or environment – and should 
hence not be absolutized. In the words of Georges Canguilhem (2001) the milieu can be called 
“a pure system of relations without supports” (p. 11). Understanding the milieu in this way, as 
a system of relations without a center around which the system would be organized, prevents 
from exaggerating the importance of the middle as a point of orientation. The milieu lacks 
indeed any orientation. It is an ever-emergent system of interdependent relations.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of milieu summarizes the different aspects of the notion 
of milieu that we have discerned so far rather well. Deleuze and Guattari (2004) write that:  
 
Every milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of space-time constituted by the 
periodic repetition of the component. Thus the living thing has an exterior milieu of 
materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an 
intermediary milieu of membranes and limits, and an annexed milieu of energy sources 
and actions-perceptions (p. 345). 
 
In this understanding, the ‘living thing’ comes to the fore as an evasive permeable structure 
that emerges in a ‘block of space-time’, continuously traversed by elements – cells, bacteria 
– that are interchangeably on the inside, on the outside or at the border. The milieu lacks every 
point of orientation. It cannot be perceived from a center, because this center would be a part 
of the environment from another point of view. The ‘living thing’ is, in the somewhat more 
visual idiom of Tim Ingold (2011), a “knot in in a tissue of knots, whose constituent strands, as 
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they become tied up with other strands, in other knots, comprise the meshwork” (p. 70). As 
such, the milieu is a meshwork of interdependent relations that is generative of always new 
connections, or knots.  
Brian Massumi (2004) complicates things a bit further by adding yet another meaning, 
namely that of the milieu as medium: “In French, milieu means ‘surroundings’, ‘medium’ (as in 
chemistry), and ‘middle’” (p. xvii). The meaning that Massumi adds to the two discerned before 
refers to the way particles react with and in the medium in the course of chemical processes. 
The medium does not only provide a background against which – or environment within which 
– a reaction takes place, it moreover actively enables this reaction. Drawing on James 
Gibson’s psychology of perception, Ingold elaborates a similar understanding of medium as 
that what affords perception and action. It is not what we perceive or what we act upon, but 
rather what we perceive in and what we act with (cf. Gibson, 1986; Ingold, 2015). He argues 
that the sky, for instance, is not an object of perception. It is indeed not so much what we see, 
as what we see in. The sky is hence not illuminated. It is luminosity itself. The light of the sky 
is not what is perceived, it is rather what affords perception. Ingold (2011) makes a similar 
argument for sound and feeling as he made for light:  
 
The sight, hearing and touch of things are grounded in the experience, respectively, of 
light, sound and feeling. And if the former force us to attend to the surfaces of things, 
the latter, by contrast, redirect our attention to the medium in which things take shape 
and in which they may also be dissolved (p. 129). 
 
The milieu, here understood as medium, is what affords something to happen. In relation to 
the chemical understanding proposed by Massumi, it can be argued that the medium that can 
be found in the chemists’ laboratory is also that which affords a reaction to take place.  
The different meanings discerned so far concern the milieu as middle, environment, and 
medium. It needs to be stressed that these understandings are deeply interwoven. It has been 
argued, for instance, that every middle is part of the environment of another middle. The 
question is now how these different meanings can help us to understand the activity of making 
maps in Campus in Camps?   
In The Unbuilt, the participants have made a map of Dheisheh, in order to get an overview 
of the different unbuilt spaces. Their concern was what one of the participants has called ‘the 
forum of the camp’. This term is defined as “the place in which people used to talk, to plan, to 
demonstrate, and to organize social and political practices freely and without being restricted 
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by a certain vision or agenda but rather the vision that they decided to adapt” (Abu Aker, Al-
Barbary, et al., 2013, p. 22).  
The participants tracked the history of the forum of Dheisheh from the street as a locus of 
demonstration during the first years after the establishment of the camp onwards, in order to 
get a sense of the meaning of the concept of ‘forum of the camp’ and in order to discern actual 
problems related to the NGO-ization of the so-called forum. They argue that the second phase 
of the forum, after the street, was the youth center that was built in 1969 in order to host social, 
cultural and political activities and discussions. The youth center could perform this role as 
forum until the first Intifada in 1987. At that occasion it was shut down by the Israeli military 
because it was perceived as a stronghold of Palestinian political activism. The participants 
argue that the forum, as a site of debate, then moved to the prison in which many of the young 
inhabitants of the camp were locked up. Because of the huge amount of confined Palestinians 
the discussions and debates continued in the prison. The aftermath of the first Intifada saw an 
enormous increase in the presence of NGOs in the camps due to the Oslo accords. The 
participants argue that at that moment the NGOs tried to give shape to the forum but that they 
failed because of several reasons. Due to the fact that there are so many NGOs, each with its 
own political affiliation and criteria of access, they cannot perform the role played by the forum, 
Figure 34: Map of Dheisheh with unbuilt plots in black. 
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namely to offer one free space of open debate in which different voices can be heard 
regardless of political affiliation.  
The investigations conducted in the course of this activity were aimed at surveying 
potential sites to recreate such a forum. The unbuilt plots that were found, were photographed 
and together with the map they constitute the materials of this publication that led in the end 
to the construction of The Concrete Tent. The map delineates the territory of Dheisheh. The 
participants have indicated the different plots of land on it. Some plots are colored black, fifteen 
in total. These are the unbuilt areas. As such, the map demonstrates where the unbuilt spaces 
can be found, how big they are and how they are situated in relation to one another.148 By 
means of pictures, the reader gets an impression of what these sites look like. The publication 
contains a series of fifteen pictures, one for every plot.149 
It can be argued that in the process of mapping and photographing the camp, the different 
meanings of the notion of milieu entangle. It is by drawing a map and taking pictures of 
Dheisheh that the camp as environment is visualized and becomes something that the 
participants can behold. In other words, it can be claimed that the camp as environment 
becomes a middle around which people gather. As such, the camp is a milieu in a double 
sense. On the one hand, it is the environment in which people live from day to day. On the 
other hand, it is the middle that brings people together and makes them ask questions about 
the future of the camp. In this case, the discussion revolves around the question how a forum 
of the camp can be created by means of the regeneration of unbuilt spaces. And even the 
third meaning of milieu, namely medium, can be discerned in the activity of mapmaking. The 
map as medium indeed affords the participants to gather around an issue of concern – what 
they have called the forum of the camp – in a way that they make the camp present in their 
conversation. The map makes it possible not only to discuss about the camp, but it makes the 
camp-as-map a participant in the discussion. It becomes something to think with.  
Now, how does the milieu as middle relate to the multiplicity of relations that make up the 
milieu as environment? David Turnbull (1996) argues that maps not only function as spatial 
representations. Maps also, and most importantly, create a social space in which the map can 
be operative in the process of administration or government. He writes that “maps connect 
heterogeneous and disparate entities, events, locations, and phenomena, enabling us to see 
patterns that are not otherwise visible” (p. 7). Maps allow people to make sense of the world 
they inhabit. By underscoring the social space that maps disclose, Turnbull makes attentive 
to the way in which maps allow to ‘grasp’ reality in the sense that it is not only understood, but 
                                                        
148 See Figure 34. 
149 See Figure 35. 
                                                                               Studying within ruins 
 
227 
also can be administered and governed. As such, the map is not to be localized outside the 
reality of the camp, but is an important operator in its becoming (cf. Latour, 1986; Turnbull, 
1989).  
In the processphilosophical language of Whitehead (1978), it can be argued that “the 
novel entity,” the map, “is at once the togetherness of the ‘many’ which it finds, and also it is 
one among the disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the 
many entities which it synthesizes” (p. 21). The ‘many’ of the milieu as environment are 
synthesized, drawn together, into the ‘one’ of the milieu as middle, the novel entity of the map. 
The mapping of the milieu, however, does not entail a redoubling. The ‘novel entity’ of the map 
draws together the ‘many entities’ of the camp as a living environment. This means that it 
offers a spatial representation of the camp. In the words of Turnbull quoted above, it connects 
heterogeneous and disparate entities, events, locations, and phenomena. Most importantly, 
however, it is situated ‘disjunctively among’ the many entities which it leaves. This refers to 
the fact that mapping is never a neutral activity and that the map does not grant its beholder 
a so-called objective point of view – a view from nowhere from which it is possible to go 
everywhere. Maps are situated representations that form an active ingredient in the becoming 
of the camp. With Ingold (2000), it could be argued that the map is “not forged in the ascent 
from a myopic, local perspective to a panoptic, global one, but in the passage from place to 
place, and in histories of movement and changing horizons along the way” (p. 227). At this 
Figure 35: Unbuilt spaces in Dheisheh, plot n° 1 (above) and n° 8 (below). 
  Making a university 228 
point, a fourth understanding of the milieu comes in, namely the milieu as point of passage. It 
is possible to argue that the map as representation of the camp is not located outside it. It is 
rather a point of passage that opens up new future possibilities.  
Retaking this issue of passage in the visual idiom of the knot and the meshwork 
introduced before, it can be argued that just like the meshwork is drawn together by and in the 
knot, the camp is drawn together by and in the map. Different strands come near and entangle 
in the creation of the knot. Neither the map, nor the knot, however, are end points in the 
process of respectively mapping, or tying. Rather they are points of passage that force to slow 
down on the way to a future still unforeseen: 
 
Knots are places where many lines of becoming are drawn tightly together. Yet every 
line overtakes the knot in which it is tied. Its end is always loose, somewhere beyond 
the knot, where it is groping towards an entanglement with other lines, in other knots 
(Ingold, 2013, p. 132). 
 
At this point, the fourth understanding of the milieu comes in. The notion milieu denotes not 
only the environment that surrounds us, the middle that we can attend to, and the medium 
that affords us capacity to perceive and act. It is also a place of passage, of indeterminacy 
and hence present-oriented possibility. It is the place where past and future grope together 
and entangle, a passage point where the direction is still unknown and topic of debate.  
As passage point it is reminiscent of the middle of the river that Serres’ swimmer crosses. 
Serres (1997) sketches the image of a swimmer who crosses a broad river that floats between 
two banks. The movement of the swimmer, however, cannot be defined as going from point 
A to a point B already known beforehand. When he reaches the middle of the river, where he 
cannot touch ground anymore, he loses sense of direction, which opens up the possibility to 
go in every direction. Likewise, the map allows for “learning in this blank middle that has no 
direction from which to find all directions” (Serres, 1997, p. 7). The map constitutes a passage 
through the middle. It is important to give a more positive rendering of what Turnbull has 
termed the social space of the map. He is definitely right in arguing that maps do not only 
represent reality, but actively shape it in the practices of administration and government that 
they afford. It would, however, be limiting to curb our understanding of the social space of the 
map to such an all too critical and political perspective. With Stengers, it is possible to conceive 
of this social space not only as an arena of subjugation, but also, and most importantly, as a 
forum where it is possible to think about the future of the camp with the camp, made present 
as map. In this case, it made it possible to discern possibilities for reinstalling a place to 
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discuss and debate within the infrastructure of Dheisheh. Moreover, it made it possible to raise 
the question what it means to create such a place within a refugee camp.    
In conclusion, to understand the map as ‘disjunctively among’ the entities of the camp 
which the map synthesizes – as we did based on the quote by Whitehead –, decelerates the 
speed with which ever more and ever new relations come into being within the generative 
meshwork of the camp. It makes it possible to slow down around the camp as map, as a 
middle around which people gather in their discussion about the creation of a future forum of 
the camp. To situate this map among the other entities underscores the fact that the map does 
not allow to reach a point outside the camp, an Archimedean point that due to its exteriority 
would allow to pass judgement. The fact that the map is ‘among’ other entities requires to 
understand it as a new knot in the meshwork of the camp. A knot that should not merely be 
understood as a political operator aimed at administering and governing the camp, but can 
also be conceived of as a pedagogical artifice that allows to slow down. It is here, in the 
transformation of the milieu as environment into the milieu as middle – a new knot in the 
meshwork –, that it is possible to discern this fourth understanding of milieu, viz. the milieu as 
a site of possibility and indetermination. With the making of stories, comparisons, and maps, 
three requirements of the study practice of Campus in Camps have been discussed. The next 
section focuses on the fourth and last requirement, more precisely the importance of use.  
 
 
Making Common II  
 
The fourth and last requirement for study practices in Campus in Camps is the requirement to 
make terms of use. Making terms of use for the sites under scrutiny, for instance the Arroub 
Pools, the Fawwar square, or the Al-Feniq garden, seems to be an integral part of the study 
practices of Campus in Camps. In this section the investigations conducted during the 
preparations for the publication of The Square are taken as a starting point to think about 
practices of use and the possibility of common use. In the course of this initiative the 
participants investigated the meaning of public space in the camp in relation to a specific 
square commissioned by UNRWA.150 Via an action approach they experimented with different 
ways of using this space. The challenge was to find a way of gathering in this open space that 
was until then in principle public, but in practice barely used. 
As a preliminary comment on the concept of use, it is important to note that the term use 
does not define in this context an instrumental or intentional relation between a subject that 
                                                        
150 See Figure 36.  
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makes use of an object being used. In line with the argumentation laid out in the fourth section 
of Chapter Four, it can be claimed that use is a practice of the middle voice, an action in which 
both agent and patient become indistinguishable, or are rather generated through the activity 
of use. Take for instance the example of drinking coffee. From experience we have learned 
that not every sip of coffee is the result of a fully intentional act – taking in caffeine in order to 
stay awake, getting warm when it is cold outside – on behalf of a fully conscious subject, but 
that it is rather in the activity of drinking coffee that the coffee lets itself be drunk while the 
drinker accepts becoming the subject of the action of drinking. Use is the name of the 
reciprocal agreement between two parties that henceforth will become known as object and 
subject, or in this case coffee and drinker. Agamben (2016) describes this process as follows:   
 
Every use is first of all use of self: to enter in a relation of use with something, I must 
be affected by it, constitute myself as one who makes use of it. Human being and world 
are, in use, in a relationship of absolute and reciprocal immanence; in the using of 
something, it is the very being of the one using that is first of all at stake (p. 30). 
 
An important characteristic of use seems to be the fact that the components that use brings 
together find themselves in a relationship of interdependency towards one another. All 
components are thoroughly enmeshed with each other in the course of the activity of use 
which makes that one depends on the other as long as the activity of use takes place. From 
the moment one of the components disappears, use becomes impossible. In the context of 
the aforementioned example one could think of the situation when you run out of coffee and 
hence can no longer commit yourself to the activity of drinking which until then constituted you 
as a drinker. Now, how does this conception of use as processual and interdependent relate 
to what has been called the requirement to make terms of use?  
In the context of the initiative of The Square, the participants tried to think about the 
meaning of public space within a camp in relation to the public square that was constructed in 
Fawwar in 2007. Fawwar has the reputation of being a rather conservative camp in which 
women are often assigned the role of staying at home and taking care for the household. 
Hence, most of the women were very skeptical about the establishment of the square when 
the UNRWA came up with this idea. The women argued that they would have no right to the 
square because women did not not feel authorized to be present in public spaces. The 
experience that an external authority (i.c. UNRWA) cannot make a public space via the 
construction of a square instigated a learning process around the question what it means that 
a space is public, how the presence of the square normalizes or legitimizes the camp, and 
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how such a place can be used so it is not just ‘made free’ by an external authority, but taken 
in hands as a commons by a community of people who henceforth become commoners? 
After a discussion in the Women’s Center that helped to articulate the unease the women 
felt in relation to the square, they decided to research which new uses would be possible by 
means of using the square, instead of taking the feeling of exclusion as a critical point from 
which it is possible to denounce the publicness of the square. The action they organized on 
the 19th of December 2012 consisted of three activities: cleaning, cooking, and an English 
class. In the early morning the women started to clean the square. At first sight, this seems to 
be a banal act, but it is noteworthy that it acquired a specific political importance in the course 
of the Egyptian revolt. The day after President Mubarak was forced to step down, protesters 
began cleaning the Tahrir Square. The alienated ‘public’ space, a space installed by and 
associated with the fallen regime, was reappropriated by the people (Hilal & Petti, 2013). 
Inspired by this gesture of care, the women cleaned the square in Fawwar in order to 
regain a sense of ownership over the place, to feel at ease in a place where they felt until then 
that they did not belong to. Before noon, they started the preparations for making Maftoul, a 
traditional Palestinian dish.151 In the discussions prior to that day, the women had expressed 
a strong desire to learn English. Therefore, the cooking exercise served as a step-up to the 
English class that was organized later that day in the square. Cleaning, cooking, and learning 
English were three activities that helped the women to regain ownership over a place of which 
they had been alienated due to its ‘publicness’ (Hamouz & Al-Turshan, 2013). This peculiar 
relation between space and use was expressed by one of the participants: “Open spaces can 
be considered a body or material, while the social relations, or well-being, are the soul – both 
                                                        
151 See Figure 37. 
Figure 36: The Al-Qassas square in Fawwar, commissioned by UNRWA. 
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of them reinforce and build each other to create the common” (Abu Aker, Al-Barbary, et al., 
2013, p. 35).  
It is in the use of the square as a commons, that the community that gathers there 
constitutes itself as a community of commoners, as people dependent on and affected by this 
common space. In addition, it is also in the use of the square as commons, that the space is 
taken care of, and is regenerated by new possibilities of common use that were initiated by 
the participants. In adopting an action approach to the questions that instigated this activity, 
the women did not so much inquire what public space is in general, or who they are in relation 
to this public space that they do not feel to have access to. The requirement to make terms of 
use forced to reformulate these questions in a speculative-pragmatic mode: What is this 
square where we do not feel to belong to capable of, and correlatively, what are we capable 
of in making use of the square?152  
What emerged around the public square in Fawwar can be understood as a culture of 
use. In her work with Tobie Nathan, Stengers coined this term in order to grasp what it means 
that people gather in order to discuss and debate about the possible uses of a what she calls 
a pharmakon, a force of which the efficacy is unstable and dependent upon how it is used. 
The examples include not only drugs and medicines, but also rabs, djinns, and mlouks – 
                                                        
152 See Figure 38. 
Figure 37: Preparations for the event. 
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divinities that can exert force over the lifes of the people who honor them, or devour those 
who refuse to do so. Nathan (2012) discerns three phases in the coming into being of a culture 
of use. First of all, there is the appearance of a force of which the efficacy is ambivalent, 
capable of both fostering and ruining, curing and poisoning. In a second phase, a collective 
concerned by this force constitutes itself in order to investigate the modalities of control over 
this force. The third and concluding phase coincides with instituting a culture of use. This 
means to give shape to a continuous process of learning how to use this force. Nathan refers 
in this context to the appearance of Dionysius in Ancient Greece, but it is also possible to think 
it in relation to the appearance of a public square in contemporary Palestine.  
The public square commissioned by UNRWA constituted a new force in the camp, one 
that moreover could easily be converted into a threat – ‘the camp is a living environment like 
any other, since there are even public squares’. Therefore, it was necessary to think about 
possible uses of this force. A collective concerned by the force of the public square, the women 
of Fawwar, gathered in order to learn what it means that this square is a public square, and 
moreover, they learned that its publicness is never granted, but needs to be achieved. 
Concerned with the possibility of a shared use of the space, and vigilant about an 
understanding of public as ‘for anyone’ – from previous experiences, they had learned indeed 
that they were practically excluded from such an ‘anyone’ –, they experimented with different 
activities that allowed to reclaim the square, partially appropriate it through use. Stengers 
(2012) explains that:  
 
The culture of uses, and not just uses justified by a diagnosis or aiming at an end, is a 
problem of collective interest, which requires a collective knowledge. This can be 
Figure 38: Learning English in the square. 
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called a collective expertise in the old sense where the expertise referred first of all to 
a knowledge derived from experience and cultivated in its relationship with experience 
(p. 199).153  
 
In relation to cultures of use, Stengers underscores two aspects. In the first place, it is 
about collectives. She does not write about individuals that acquire insight in how something 
can be used, but about collectives that produce knowledge in relation to the pharmacological 
force – a drug, a djinn, a square – around which they gather. This knowledge, and this is the 
second aspect, is experiential. It cannot be derived from a general rule or a faraway objective, 
but should be related to experiences of use. This requires an experimental investigation of 
how this force can be used. It suspends every moral consensus – ‘it is prohibited to use drugs’, 
‘djinns should be averted’, ‘the construction of a public square normalizes the exceptionality 
of the camp’ –, and opens the way for a technical consensus, the construction of an apparatus, 
a way of gathering around a matter of study, that allows to become collectively affected by 
something, to give something the power to make us think (cf. Stengers & Ralet, 1991). This 
refers to another meaning of consensus as that what everyone agrees on, as unanimity. It 
refers to the etymological meaning of consensus in which we find con-, meaning ‘together’, 
and -sensus, from sentire, meaning ‘to feel’. Consensus denotes the experience of collectively 
being affected by something. It does not mean to think the same, but to think together. A 
consensus, moreover, can never be taken for granted, but needs to be achieved. This 
achievement, Stengers argues, is a technical operation – therefore it is a technical consensus 
– that requires the invention of a way of gathering around something that is being convoked 
so that it can collectively affect us, make us think.  
Having started from Agamben’s definition of use and the example of coffee, the study 
activity of the women of Fawwar as we have tried to grasp it through the lens of Nathan and 
Stengers, now necessitates a slight modification of the concept of use. What is made present 
even more than the interdependency between who uses and what is used, is the generativity 
of the process. Here, the example of the coffee fails greatly, since the use of coffee is always 
an extractive use. After the last sip, the relation dissolves. The use of the square on the 
contrary is not extractive, but generative (cf. Capra & Mattei, 2015). It generates new 
relationships between the people and the square, new activities that can be performed there 
(such as learning English), new social bonds between the people that have gathered. Gutwirth 
                                                        
153 “La culture des usages, et non des utilisations justifiées par un diagnostic ou visant une fin, est un 
problème d’intérêt collectif, qui requiert un savoir collectif, ce que l’on peut appeler une expertise 
collective au vieux sens où l’expertise désignait d’abord un savoir issu de l’expérience et cultivé dans 
ses rapports avec l’expérience”. 
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and Stengers (2016) explain that: “Generative defines in a transversal way a capacity to beget, 
to engender, or to generate. It needs to be distinguished from a reproduction of the same by 
the same, and from a manufacture for which an intentional agent would be responsible” (p. 
336, fn97).154 The use of the square as commons allows for the coming into being of new 
relationships between people and the square, for the emergence of a sense of belonging. The 
process does not extract the potential of the square to the full, neither does it exclude other 
possible uses, it rather activates the space in a way that it is no longer public in the sense of 
commissioned by an external authority, ‘for anyone’, but rather that it is made public, that the 
use of the square gathers a public. As such, it is possible to broaden Agamben’s claim that 
every use is first of and foremost use of self to include also the level of the collective. It is 
groups of people that initiate common use and that in their relation to that which gathers them 
constitute themselves as a collectivity of commoners affected by what makes them think, in 
this case the possible uses of public space in the camp.  
Returning to the requirement with which this section began, namely the making of terms 
of use, it is possible to ask the question how the making of terms of use relates to the process 
of use itself. As we have seen in the activities of the women of Fawwar, there were a few 
discussion sessions before the event took place, but in all there was not that much reflection 
on terms of use beforehand. With Ingold (2000) it is possible to argue that “making arises 
within the process of use, rather than use disclosing what is, ideally if not materially, ready-
made (p. 354). Terms of use for the square are generated within the process of using the 
square, making it a public square. In order to meet the fourth requirement, it is hence 
necessary to experiment with different possible uses. Moreover, it should be noted that the 
requirement to make terms of use in no way coincides with a prescription for future use. Since 
the use is common and generative, there is always something that escapes every possible 
definition of the use that can or could be made. Common use – using something as commons, 
not as private property – generates not only the commons – the square as space made public 
– and the commoners – the women as belonging to the square, as gathered in the square. It 
generates also, and maybe most importantly, commoning – future processes of use of the 
public square. There is indeed ‘no commons without commoning’ (Bollier, 2014; De Angelis & 
Stavrides, 2010; Linebaugh, 2008). 
In short, a threefold generativity discloses itself in the course of the process of use. Use 
is first and foremost generative of what is being used. At first sight, this might sound counter-
                                                        
154 “Génératif définit de manière transversale une capacité de faire naître, faire émerger, engendrer, à 
distinguer d’une reproduction du même par le même ou d’une fabrication dont un agent intentionnel 
serait responsible”. 
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intuitive as use is often conceived as extractive. But, what is meant is that use does not 
necessarily entail extraction, but that it can also foster care. Cleaning the square allowed the 
participants to gain a sense of belonging to it. It is by cleaning, taking care, that they made the 
plaza a commons. Secondly, use is generative of the community that uses. It is by using that 
the participants got used to the square and that they became capable of making common use 
of it. Finally, use is generative of the terms of use by which the association of users makes 
use of what is being used. Such terms of use can however never be formulated in general, for 
once and for all, but are subject to continuous careful reconsideration. Due to the prevalence 
of the notion of use in the aforementioned sentences, it has probably become redundant to 
stress that use is a highly interdependent affair, and that it is impossible to discern what comes 
first – commons, commoners, or commoning – as they all emerge through use.  
In the aftermath of the event, the women started to raise questions about what other kind 
of activities could be organized in the square and how they could keep it open for other people 
that possibly might be interested in the activities. Agamben (2016) conceives of use as a mode 
of habitation in a similar sense as was outlined in Chapter Four. He explains that “every use 
is a polar gesture: on the one hand, appropriation and habit; on the other, loss and 
expropriation. To use […] means to oscillate unceasingly between a homeland and an exile: 
to inhabit” (p. 87). Making use of the square, making it common means to inhabit it in the 
sense that the women regain a sense of belonging to the square that nevertheless does not 
exclude other people, but rather, on the contrary opens the possibility of engaging them in this 
collective process of use, otherwise known as commoning.  
 
 
Thinking With Artifices 
 
The aim of the chapters of the third part was to further elaborate the pedagogy of study that 
was tentatively formulated in the course of the fourth chapter. In this part, the question of the 
possibility of an ecology of study practices was relayed to the experimental university Campus 
in Camps. Adopting Stengers’ ecology of practices, this university has been grasped in terms 
of the requirements and obligations its study practices bring into play. The focus of the fifth 
chapter was the obligation of Campus in Camps. The notion of obligation has been used as 
the name for what makes the people engaged in a practice, scientific or study, think or 
hesitate. It is what prevents them from jumping to conclusions and instead stay with the 
trouble. Therefore, it needs to be carefully distinguished from the notion of occasion. In the 
case of Campus in Camps, the camp itself has been the occasion to engage in study practices, 
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but it was not what made the participants think. All too quickly the camp can be invoked in 
order to call guilty and claim innocence. What emerged, rather, while studying the camp and 
what made the participants think was the fact that people already live there for decades and 
that a genuine sociality emerged that they tried to grasp in words such as common. What 
made the participants of Campus in Camp think and hesitate was not the camp itself, but 
rather life in exile as has been argued in Chapter Five.  
Whereas the fifth chapter was centered around the question of what made the participants 
of Campus in Camps think, the sixth chapter was focused on the question of how they were 
required to think, what they had to do in order to make their thinking study. In this context, four 
requirements were distinguished that thinking had to meet in order to pass the test as study, 
namely making stories, making comparisons, making maps, and making terms of use. Here, 
it is important to distinguish requirements from results. This means to resist the temptation to 
conceive of stories, comparisons, maps, and terms of use as the results or the traces of the 
process of thinking, of what remains when study has done its job. Instead, conceiving of it as 
requirements for thinking makes clear that it is not what comes after thinking, or what is 
generated in the process of thinking, but rather that it constrains thinking by making the 
achievement of study possible.  
Indeed, as argued in the third chapter, requirements and obligations are not so much 
conditions for thoughts, but rather constraints on thinking. They do not facilitate thought or 
make it possible, but rather constrain thinking in order for it to become study. It means to 
assume that thinking happens always and everywhere, and that there is hence no necessity 
for a university that would create the conditions for thought or where it would be possible to 
learn to think. Think we must. In line with Dewey (1958) it is possible to argue that it is perhaps 
more precise to say ‘it thinks’ rather than ‘I think’. Thinking, in this view, is like a raging storm 
that sweeps by and that absorbs everyone and everything it overblows. Thinking is not an 
activity to be done on behalf of an intentional subject that chooses to think, it is rather what 
one gets caught up in, like one gets caught up in the storm. It is not to play with thoughts, but 
rather to be put at play by thinking. Practices, however, tame the whims and fancies of 
capricious thinking by steering thought in the direction of obligations and submit it to 
requirements. That is why it has been argued that practices do not shape the conditions for 
thinking, but rather constrain thinking. 
At this moment, it is important to pay attention to how thinking comes to the fore in the 
work of Stengers and to relay it to Campus in Camps in order to see how her understanding 
of thinking works in an educational context. The phrase ‘make us think’ seems to run like a 
refrain throughout Stengers’ work. At no point, however, it is made clear what it exactly means 
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to think. The issue of what it means to think, moreover, seems to be all the more urgent as 
Stengers’ refrain ‘make us think’ seems to run counter to the refrain of this dissertation, ‘think 
we must’. Therefore, the challenge will be to specify what the thinking of ‘make us think’ entails 
in order not to contradict the thinking of ‘think we must’. In other words, it will be a matter of 
experimenting with refrains, of trying to weld ‘makes us think’ with ‘think we must’, and in this 
respect the study practice of Campus in Camps will prove to be very helpful tool. 
Based on the activities with which thinking is allied and from which it is separated, it is 
possible to guess what thinking could mean according to Stengers. Beginning with the verbs 
that thinking is contrasted to, knowing, judging and recognizing seem to be the most prevalent. 
The notion of thinking seems to function as an operator to turn the modern contradiction 
between those who know – or those who claim to know – and those who believe – or those 
whose attachments are denounced as illusions by the ones who know –, into a contrast 
between diverging practices that all are attached to what makes them think – be it the neutrino 
or the Virgin. As such, thinking is opposed to knowing. Whereas the one who knows can only 
recognize not-knowing, the one who thinks can encounter others who think, others who are, 
like herself, attached via practices to what makes her hesitate and think. Hence, thinking is 
also opposed to recognizing because the one who recognizes can only recognize what she 
already knows. Ultimately, thinking is opposed to judging. This relates back to the modern 
contradiction Stengers reacted against. However, instead of criticizing those who know 
because of their contempt for those who believe, Stengers chose to develop the framework of 
the ecology of practices that allowed to confront practices in their diverging requirements and 
obligations, instead of a perspective that, again, would provide a position from which it is 
possible to judge.  
More interesting perhaps are the activities that Stengers relates to thinking, instead of the 
ones she separates it from. Here we find first of all feeling. This underscores that thinking is 
not a purely cognitive capacity, but rather that it has a strong affective component. Thoughts 
can be felt according to Stengers, they are lures for feeling. As such, they incite imagination 
and action, also related to this affective component of thinking. Thinking activates a sense of 
the possible and makes its insistence felt. This makes that those caught up in thinking acquire 
a capacity to imagine and act. Hence, Stengers argues that thinking is a way of testing, of 
seeing how for instance a proposition works when it is uttered, what kind of feelings and affects 
it elicits in the people who hear it. Thirdly, thinking relates to learning. Learning, for Stengers, 
means a collective process around something that has gathered different people but of whom 
no one can claim to know. Therefore, it is required to think. Since learning is opposed to 
knowing, it is while thinking impossible to say ‘and thus’. It means never to jump to 
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conclusions, and instead always to hesitate, to check whether all dimensions of the problem 
were taken into account, whether everyone and everything that may be affected by the 
decision of the ‘and thus’ has been listened to. Thinking suspends every ‘and thus’, every 
judgement based on knowledge, and initiates a learning process around a problematic 
situation.  
Lastly, thinking is related to paying attention, and it will be argued that the notion of 
attention will be able to transform the contradiction between ‘make us think’ and ‘think we 
must’ into a contrast. According to Stengers, paying attention means to take care of the 
consequences of a decision that is risked being taken. It is, however, important to note that 
this is not limited to scrutinizing the probable, but that it also entails activating the possible. 
Hence, on the one hand, it means to attend to those who will be affected by the decision and 
in what way. On the other hand, it means to attend to the possible that makes its insistence 
felt. As such, it is the capacity to feel the lure of the possible that has become numbed by the 
widespread logic that ‘there is no alternative’, a logic that requires a position of knowing and 
judging, and that hence prevents thinking. When Stengers argues that something ‘makes us 
think’, this means first and foremost that it requires us to pay attention, not to shut our eyes 
for consequences or possibilities. Therefore, it is possible to argue that our capacity to think – 
think we must –, to feel the insistence of the possible, a possible that requires attention, is 
often numbed by anesthetizing policies and discourses that claim to know that ‘we do not have 
an option’, and that hence practices that ‘make us think’ are required to activate our sense for 
the possible, that constrain thinking by means of their requirements and obligations and hence 
force us to pay attention.  
At this point, it could be argued that the study practice of Campus in Camps has been a 
test in this experiment with refrains. In spite of having always already been able to think, 
engaging in study practices that forced the participants to pay attention to what is happing to 
the camp, made it possible that a reciprocal capture between the camp dwellers and life in 
exile, between practitioners and obligation could come into being. Returning to the four 
requirements expounded in the course of this chapter, it is possible to argue that what we 
have witnessed is what is possible to call with Stengers a thinking with artifices. The aim of 
the study practices of Campus in Camps was to slow down thinking, avoid hasty conclusions, 
and make the participants hesitate. This allowed to generate a way of thinking about the camp 
that refrained from foregrounding either its exceptionality, or its probable normalization. 
Instead, the participants discussed what life in exile could mean for them, developed a 
language to grasp their experiences, and engaged in initiatives that tried to execute social and 
spatial interventions in the camp. In order to think according to the requirements of the study 
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practices of Campus in Camps, it was necessary for the participants to think with stories, to 
think with comparisons, to think with maps, and to think with common use.  
In short, and referring to Stengers (2017b) it can be argued that they were required to 
think with artifices,  
 
whose effectiveness is to force the divergent reasons to express themselves in a way 
that asserts that each one needs others to become what it aims to be, namely an 
adequate reason for the problematic situation itself. This means that the situation 
becomes able to resist arguments claiming to impose themselves by disqualifying 
others. It is thus not a question, as in the experimental art, to purify the scene of proof 
but to densify it, to give consistency to the interdependency of the reasons of which 
none can avail of the capacity to define 'the problem' (p. 45).155  
 
The efficacy of artifices is that they give the problem the chance to pose itself in its own terms, 
that they give a situation the power to gather a thinking public. As such, it can be argued that 
it is possible to discern three features of an artifice.  
First, there is a social feature. Artifices bring together people in a specific way in which 
they need to adopt a role. Stengers (2015a) gives the example of citizen juries where ordinary 
citizens are recruited to pass judgement on a case. Their way of gathering and the role they 
assume, prevents them from taking a decision based on personal tastes or convictions, but 
rather requires them to speak as a representative of the people and to decide accordingly. In 
the case of Campus in Camps, the participants assume the role of students, which means that 
they are required to slow down around what they are thinking about. It involves that the 
participants do not call guilty or claim innocence, but that they engage in study practices to 
map the condition they live in and try to think through what is actually happening. This feature 
is most strongly present in the activity on the square in Fawwar.  
Second, there is a technical feature. Artifices are not only about bringing people together 
in a certain way rather than another, but require them to produce something around which 
they can think. In the previous section, it has been shown that participants need, for instance, 
to write stories, take photographs, and make maps in order to generate a common cause for 
                                                        
155 “dont l’efficace est de forcer les raisons divergentes à s’exprimer sur un mode qui affirme que 
chacune a besoin des autres pour devenir elle-même ce qu’elle vise à être, une raison adequate à la 
situation devenue elle-même problématique, devenue capable de resister aux arguments prétendant 
s’imposer en disqualifiant les autres. Il ne s’agit pas, comme dans l’art experimental, de purifier la scène 
de la preuve mais de la densifier, de donner consistence à l’interdépendance des raisons dont aucune 
ne peut se prévaloir de la capacité de définir ‘le problème’”. 
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thinking. As such, the creation of artifices requires a certain technical capacity. This feature is 
demonstrated in the writing of stories and the making of maps.  
The third feature of the artifice is a material feature. This relates to the second feature, in 
that the aim of technical production of for instance maps and stories is not an end in itself. On 
the contrary, what is produced is study material. In the case of Campus in Camps it is used to 
gather a public and engage them in a discussion about an issue based on the material (e.g. 
pictures, maps) that they have worked on. Salient examples of this feature are the comparative 
pictures of Dheisheh and Doha.  
In sum, the artifice functions as an assemblage that is at once social, technical, and 
material, an apparatus of activation as it has been called in the fourth chapter, to give 
something, in the case of Campus in Camps life in exile, the power to gather a thinking public. 
Artifices initiate a collective learning process by means of the experimental convocation of 
something that makes the people who gather around it think. In an interview with Bordeleau, 
Stengers (2011) makes clear that “the artifice complicates the process, slows it down, 
welcomes all doubts and objections, and even actively incites them, while also transforming 
them and listening in a different mode” (p. 27). In that sense, it could be argued that the artifice 
disrupts the conversation in which everyone gives his or her reasons, in which everyone 
comes together to come to a rational agreement, instead the artifice forces to go slower, to 
stop for a moment the exchange of reasonable arguments, to hesitate, and hence, to give 
something the power to make them think. Therefore, thinking with artifices does not offer any 
theoretical guarantees. It is not warranted that making maps, for instance, could work for 
another problem through which other people are affected. Thinking with artifices is a pragmatic 
challenge comparable to the recipes of the alchemists or the rituals of the witches encountered 
in Chapter Four. Its efficacy has to be verified by the “Is that true?”, “Are you sure?”, “Why do 
you claim that?”, questions that are posed when something is given the power to slow down 
reasoning because its existence cannot be neglected anymore. Hence, it requires practices 
that instigate the apparatus of activation by generating artifices to think with.  
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World and University 
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to reconsider the relation between university and society 
from an educational point of view. It has been explained that the debate over this relation has 
been dominated by two major positions. These two positions make up the ruminations of 
common sense toward which this dissertation is situated. Together they turn the relation 
between university and society into the problematic situation I have tried to engage with. The 
two positions constitute two poles in a more variegated landscape of diverging opinions that I 
have sought to activate and transform by studying the problematic situation of the relation 
between university and society. Before summarizing my argument, these two positions will be 
briefly outlined.  
First, there is the call for more autonomy. This position is often embraced by scientists 
and scholars who argue that academic research is valuable in and of itself and that the public 
should not meddle with scientific issues. It is assumed that academics have the best insight 
in to what might be important to research, and how, and that the scientists should be 
unhindered in their search for knowledge. Moreover, it is argued that the free and disinterested 
pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake benefits not only the university and the academics, 
but also, and most importantly, society. Indeed, too much interference by society – and hence 
the public and power – in the university might corrupt the scientific process. This position is 
not only taken by biomedical and exact sciences, but also by scholars in the social sciences 
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and the humanities, as the latter often feel threatened by what can be discerned as the second 
dominant position in the debate.  
Second is the call for more instrumentalization. This call is not always an open and explicit 
one, but is voiced via policy measures that reconstruct the university in the image of a producer 
and provider of useful knowledge. In this conception, which has been actualized increasingly 
since the postwar era, the university emerges as an institution that creates commodifiable 
expertise (e.g. patents) and that disseminates its knowledge via course modules (e.g. 
educational credits). Arguments in favor of this position include mainly financial and economic 
claims, for instance the contention that universities should be held accountable in view of the 
substantial investments made in them on behalf of the society. Therefore, universities should 
produce expertise that proves its worth in its capacity to sell and solve. The knowledge 
produced should thus either be easily marketable, or be able to eliminate a problem. Besides, 
the education of the students is mainly understood as preparation for the labor market.  
Although both positions obviously have strong implications for the university as an 
educational setting, neither of the positions seems to take the university as a site for education 
seriously. Whereas the first position does not seem to bother about education as long as 
academic freedom is granted, the second position seems to endorse a conception of 
education as a goal-oriented activity, more precisely the awarding of (preferably useful) 
diplomas. In this dissertation it has been proposed to take study as a starting point to 
investigate the relation between university and society in order to come to an educational 
understanding thereof. Study is a concept that has been rediscovered in recent years in 
educational theory and philosophy (cf. Lewis, 2013; Ruitenberg, 2017). Not only does it bear 
the promise of a different narrative with which to understand the educational activity of the 
university as opposed to learning (e.g. active learning, service learning) – or, as argued in 
Chapter Four, a perhaps more interesting conception of learning –, but also it seems to have 
its own particularity and specificity in relation to the practices of the university (cf. universitas 
studii). 
A focus on the problem of the relation between university and society, and an interest in 
the concept of study as an educational way into this problem led to the formulation of the 
following research question: 
 
How to situate study in the relation between university and society? 
 
The ways in which the relation between university and society has been problematized was 
the starting point for the literature review.  
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In this literature review, it has been argued that in general two main approaches can be 
discerned in the scientific and academic discourses on the topic. On the one hand, there are 
texts that propose a certain idea of the university. Texts pertaining to this strand of literature 
include Kant’s The conflict of the faculties, Humboldt’s On the spirit and organizational 
framework of intellectual institutions in Berlin, and Newman’s lectures The idea of a university. 
This approach is distinguished by the way it sketches a general framework for the university 
and its relation to societal institutions in philosophical terms. In doing so, authors writing from 
this perspective, which has been called the transcendental-philosophical approach, tend to 
understand the university as an idea.  
On the other hand, we find texts that analyze and critique trends and developments in the 
higher education sector in the age of academic capitalism. Texts pertaining to this strand of 
literature include Kerr’s The uses of the university, and the works of Slaughter, Leslie, 
Rhoades, Jessop, Hoffman, and others. This approach provides an analytical framework with 
which it is possible to understand the entrepreneurial behaviors of the university in relation to 
the tightening of its relationships with state and industry. Authors writing from this perspective, 
which has been called the critical-sociological approach, tend to understand the university as 
an organization.  
I have argued that both approaches seem to hinge on an institutional understanding of 
the university, although what the university as institution means depends on the approach 
adopted. For the transcendental-philosophical approach, the institution of the university seems 
to function mainly as a way to put flesh on the bone of the idea of the university that is brought 
forward in philosophical terms. Explaining how the relation between the different faculties 
should be conceived (e.g. Kant), or proposing how the university can relate to other intellectual 
institutions such as the school and the academy (e.g. Humboldt) is a way of articulating the 
idea of the university. For the critical-sociological approach, by contrast, the institution of the 
university seems to indicate mainly a zero-degree for the process of its increasing 
capitalization in the knowledge economy. Analyzing how different commercial and other-than-
commercial organizations have nested themselves around the university allows these 
theorists to criticize how these organizations have enforced transformations in the institutional 
value framework of the university.  
Furthermore, next to this reliance on the university as institution, both approaches seem 
to share a forgetfulness about the medieval university. Neither of the two perspectives makes 
reference to the universitas magistrorum et scolarium of the 12th century. This forgetfulness 
inspired an excursus on the emergence of the first universities in the Middle Ages in order to 
retrieve another way of looking at the relation between university and society.  
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This excursus on the medieval university has shown us, first, that from its inception 
onwards, the university was entangled with societal issues through and through, not only in 
the sense that the university was influenced by the society in which it took shape, or that there 
was a societal imprint on the working of a university, but most importantly, in the sense that 
the university provided a place and time to engage with societal issues via texts, and to study 
these societal issues. One example is the process of urbanization that occurred in medieval 
Italy, which put forward the question of how to live together outside the hierarchical order of 
feudalism and inside the more egalitarian order of the emerging city-states. Due to the 
presence of translations of, for instance, the Corpus Iuris Civilis, an important document in 
Byzantine law written under Emperor Iustinian, people could gather around these texts and 
study them.  
This brings us to the second thing we learned from the medieval university; namely, the 
precise meaning of the word universitas. It does not denote merely an idea of universality of 
knowledge or a universality of humankind. Rather, its literal translation is that of both 
association and guild. It has been argued that it is important to retain the two different 
meanings. The translation of association stresses the fact that the collective aspect is an 
indispensable feature of the university. Study cannot be done alone, but relies on the presence 
of other people, masters and students, who gather around the same text. At this point, the 
second meaning, of guild, comes in. The way in which the students come together around the 
text is not just to discuss the text, or to exchange opinions on it, but to deal in a technical way 
with what has become material for study. The notion of guild brings to the fore that studying 
is a technical way of dealing with materials. Together, the social, material, and technical 
features of the universitas magistrorum et scolarium emphasize that it should not be 
understood as just a gathering of people, but as a practice.   
Returning to our first lesson from the Middle Ages – the intertwinement of the university 
and societal issues – we proposed to adopt an ecological approach. Such an approach is 
characterized by the features of interdependency, generativity, and a concern for matters of 
living and dying on a shared planet. It has been demonstrated that an ecological approach 
has already been elaborated in relation to the university. Whereas Ron Barnett has proposed 
the ecological university as an idea of the university for our current times, Susan Wright has 
placed herself in the tradition of academic capitalism by scrutinizing the interrelations between 
different commercial or other-than-commercial organizations and the university in a 
knowledge ecology. 
At that point I discerned a gap in the literature on the university. Both the transcendental-
philosophical as well as the critical-sociological tradition have received an ecological 
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interpretation in the work of both Ron Barnett and Susan Wright, but neither of them focus 
particularly on the practices of a university. An interesting path to take seemed to be to tie the 
ecological approach to the understanding of the university as a practice – the second lesson 
from the 12th century. Therefore, and borrowing from Isabelle Stengers, I have proposed to 
understand the university from the point of view of an ecology of practices. This point of view 
promises to give way to a theoretical account that is situated by and engaged with practices. 
Moreover, and here the ecological aspect comes in, it makes it possible to understand how 
practices engage with other practices, how they maintain their border, and how they draw from 
and give back to their environment. Inquiring into the university from the point of view of study 
practices allows for an account that is immanent, rather than transcendental, that is 
affirmative, rather than critical, and that is, most importantly, educational rather than 
philosophical or sociological.  
On the basis of Stengers’ ecology of practices and the study practices of the Palestinian 
experimental university Campus in Camps I have tried to give way to a third possibility outside 
the dominant positions of the plea for more academic freedom on the one hand, and the 
tendency of instrumentalization on the other hand. Slowing down the marches of both the 
scientists and scholars claiming “More money! More autonomy!” and the public officials 
demanding “More output! More accountability!”, I propose the slogan “Make a university!”.  
But, what could making a university mean? In the remainder of this conclusion I will outline 
some introductory notes on an ecology of study practices. 
 
 
The Adventure of Study  
 
Throughout this dissertation, the concept of study practice has been elaborated in relation to 
both the theoretical work of Isabelle Stengers on the philosophy of Whitehead (Part Two) and 
the Palestinian experimental university Campus in Camps (Part Three). Zigzagging through 
my thoughts on Whitehead’s proposition concerning the university on the one hand, and my 
analysis of the activities of Campus in Camps on the other hand, will make it possible to 
propose a concept of study practice situated by a particular practice. Indeed, it matters what 
university we study to study the university with. Let us, however, take Whitehead’s proposition 
on the university as a starting point for our zigzagging movement.   
On the occasion of the inauguration of the Harvard Business School in 1929, Whitehead 
gave the address Universities and their function. He started his speech by proposing to 
understand the university as a ‘home of adventures’. The aim of the fourth chapter of this 
  Making a university 250 
dissertation was to grasp Whitehead’s enigmatic message. This entailed, first, inquiring into  
what his notion of adventure could mean. It has been argued that Whitehead, who endorses 
a conception of thinking as a speculative gesture that welds the possible to problems that 
make common sense ruminate, understands the adventure as just such a speculative 
operation. The point of departure for every adventure is the landscape of conflicting opinions 
concerning a problematic situation, the ruminations of common sense. To initiate an adventure 
means, however, not to denounce these opinions in order to unveil the truth – as if there would 
be something more true than the hopes, fears, dreams, and doubts that are related to a 
situation that is perceived as problematic – but to activate this landscape of diverging opinions 
in a way that makes something present, so this landscape of often contradictory claims can 
be transformed into a fabulous scenery of contrasting shades. 
The right of return, the right to go back to the houses and territories from which the 
Palestinians were expelled from after the Nakba in 1948, is what makes the common sense 
of Dheisheh Refugee Camp in the West Bank ruminate. It is the landscape of diverging and 
conflicting opinions on this matter that Alessandro Petti and Sandi Hilal activated with the Back 
to the future seminar, the first activity of Campus in Camps in 2012. During this seminar the 
participants were encouraged to envisage the future of the camp in 2040. It appeared that 
there were many different and conflicting ways of envisaging the future of Dheisheh. Some 
wrote on the continued struggle of the people that still were living in the camp, while others 
dreamed about a formal possibility of return and the camp turning into a museum, still others 
reported on a civil war that would take place, during which the Palestinians acquired their right 
of return. It is clear that the right of return kept the participants captivated; it was the right of 
return that made common sense ruminate.  
At that time, the question was how to allow for another way of relating to the right of return. 
How to begin to think about inhabiting the camp and being a refugee in a different way than 
the ones that were so dividing? How to give the camp itself the power to make the participants 
think instead of giving their opinions on the right of return? This does not mean that these 
opinions and the divides they laid bare were not important, but rather that they should be 
transformed somehow in order to become able to relate to the camp and each other in a 
different way. It is at that point that the participants realized that, via their discussions, time 
and again the same conflicting opinions arose, and that somehow the camp itself had to 
become a vital ingredient in their conversation, that it could no longer remain something to 
think and talk about, but that it had to become something to think and talk with. It is at that 
point that they realized that the camp had to be activated as a problematic situation in one 
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way or another and that engaging in study practices, such as walking exercises, mapping 
exercises, photographic exercises, and interviews, could be a relevant path to follow.  
Drawing on Stengers’ work on Whitehead, I have proposed to define a study practice as 
an apparatus of activation, as opposed to the experimental apparatus that in the form of 
Galileo’s inclined plane gave way to the coming into being of modern science. Whereas the 
experimental apparatus is aimed at purifying the scene of proof, at taking away everything 
that might complicate the interpretation of the result in order for the phenomenon ‘to speak for 
itself’, the apparatus of activation is aimed at giving something the power to gather people and 
make them think about what gathers them. The apparatus of activation induces a process of 
what has been called a ‘thinking with artifices’ due to which matters of study come into being. 
It requires arts of composition, problematization, and attention.  
For the participants of Campus in Camps, instigating an apparatus of activation meant, 
first, that they started to create study materials in and about the camp. Fieldwork exercises 
have proven to be a very efficacious means for the participants to situate themselves in 
relation to the camp and to think in the presence of the camp. Thinking with artifices, or 
studying, had for them most of all to do with telling stories about the past, present, and future 
of the camp, with comparing the camp of Dheisheh and the city of Doha via photographs, with 
mapping their immediate environment, and with experimenting with new possible uses of 
forsaken sites. Storytelling, comparing, mapping, and using have been the names for the 
artifices with which the participants made it possible to make the camp a vital ingredient in 
their reflections and discussions. Via their study practices they engaged with the ruminations 
of common sense and initiated an adventure that took up these ruminations in a learning 
process that took place in the presence of the camp.  
As such, it can be argued that the apparatus of activation instigated by the participants of 
Campus in Camps had a threefold efficacy. First of all, it allowed for the convocation of matters 
of study. Due to the outcomes of the fieldwork exercises participants had something to study. 
This means that something (e.g. a story, a picture, a map) could become a vital ingredient in 
their discussion in the sense that it could make them digress from the opinions that they were 
usually prone to defend, but that it instead made them hesitate. Second, the apparatus of 
activation made it possible that a reciprocal capture between practitioners and obligations 
came into being. In this case, the practitioners are obviously the participants of Campus in 
Camps. The obligation, that which makes the practitioners think and hesitate and that which 
makes the practice come to matter to the practitioner, was not so much the camp, as argued, 
but the fact that people have been living in the camp for decades. Life in exile, therefore, more 
than the camp itself, has been the name given to what makes the practitioners of Campus in 
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Camps hesitate and think. Third, the efficacy of the apparatus of activation is that it takes up 
the hopes, fears, dreams, and doubts that make common sense ruminate in a transformative 
process by which none of the terms with which the participants conceived of their situation go 
unchanged.  
In short, study practices instigate what could be called with Stengers, an apparatus of 
activation. Due to processes of thinking with artifices such as stories, maps, and pictures, an 
assemblage with social, technical, and material features comes into being that activates a 
problematic situation. The social feature denotes the fact that studying cannot be done in 
isolation. It is always a process of taking turns in a conversation. Moreover, this conversation 
comes forth out of a concern or a care for the matter at stake, but at the same time the 
conversation transforms the attitudes of concern and care, because the matter at stake is 
studied. Here the technical and material features come in. Study is a technical dealing with 
the world in a way that it transforms the world in study materials so that it becomes a matter 
of study. In doing so, study practices initiate learning processes that transform not only the 
world but also those who have become affected by this world, who have exposed themselves 
to it, who have studied it.  
To conclude this section, and taking the relay from Stengers (2008) who took the relay 
from Marx and his Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, it could be argued that the wager of 
engaging in study practices is to change the world, not just to understand it. At least, that is, if 
the world, if this world, is given the power to change us, to force our thinking, and become 
affected by it. As such, study practices are practices of empowerment in which a problematic 
situation is given the power to make the people who have gathered around it think. In that 
way, the arts of composition, problematization, and attention are indispensable in transforming 
the world into a matter of study and a cause for thinking. Moreover, the empowerment of a 
problematic situation in turn becomes empowering for the people who have gathered around 
it; they become capable of learning anew, of establishing new ways of relating to what has 
been given the power to make them think, of response-ability.   
 
 
University, Science and Study 
 
Zigzagging through the theoretical argument on study practices on the one hand, and the 
analysis of the reports on the study practice of Campus in Camps on the other hand, the aim 
of the previous section was to propose a concept of study practices. The university, however, 
understood as an ecology of practices, does not merely harbor study practices. Scientific 
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practices also claim their place in the ecology of the university. Indeed, going back to the times 
of Humboldt’s modern research university, it is clear that the university had two tasks to fulfill. 
As opposed to the academies, which were only concerned with Wissenschaft, and the 
schools, which focused only on Bildung, the university had to concern itself with both 
Wissenschaft and Bildung (1809/2018). Besides, the contemporary university of excellence 
as scrutinized by Slaughter, Leslie, Rhoades, and others also seems to be predominantly 
inhabited by profitable scientific practices, whereas study practices are increasingly deployed 
according to the needs of the labor market and the wants of the student-consumer (Slaughter 
& Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). 
The question, then, is what grants the university its unity if it is conceptualized as an 
ecology of scientific and study practices? The question of the unity of the university is, 
however, not a new question that is particular to its conception as an ecology of practices. It 
can be argued that the question of the unity of the university goes back to the seminal texts of 
both the transcendental-philosophical and critical-sociological approaches discerned in the 
literature review. Indeed, Kant (1789/2018) already thought about the relation between the 
faculty of philosophy on the one hand, and the faculties of theology, law, and medicine on the 
other hand. He argued for a parliament of faculties in which the right benches would be taken 
by the professional disciplines, the higher faculties, and in which Reason could assume its 
task in the opposition seated on the left benches, the lower faculty. But Kerr (1963/2018) was 
also concerned about the unity of the university, which he described as increasingly becoming 
a multiversity, “a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common 
grievance over parking” (p. 470). 
More in general terms, it seems as if at different points in history, the unity of the university 
has been threatened by some kind of struggle. The conflict of the faculties was already 
mentioned, but one could think as well of C. P. Snow’s Two Cultures, or the Science Wars 
that gave impetus to Stengers’ philosophy of science. Against this background, Stengers’ call 
for diplomacy seems all the more relevant, especially in universities where academics of both 
the natural-scientific and the humanistic-scholarly persuasion often live in close proximity. As 
such, Stengers’ cosmopolitical proposal is a valuable intervention in the debate, one that 
activates a possibility of peace when war is more probable and that encourages scientists to 
present themselves in terms of the requirements and obligations of their practice, instead of 
in terms of the nature of the truth claims they pretend to be able to make. In the course of this 
dissertation, however, I have tried to put forward the concept of study practices which could 
be taken as a starting point to formulate a slightly different response to the question of the 
unity of the university in the light of struggle.  
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This section aims to shed light on the question of the unity of the university, a question 
that concerned thinkers from Kant to Kerr, in light of the conception of the university as an 
ecology of practices brought forward in the dissertation. First, however, I will discuss how, in 
line with Stengers, I conceive of a practice in general terms. Thereafter I will conceptualize the 
relation between scientific practices and study practices in order to come to a response to the 
question of what grants the unity of the university.  
It has been argued that Stengers’ conception of practice can be considered as 
constructivist, speculative, and pragmatic. First, her constructivist rendering of practices 
allows for an understanding of a practice, such as conducting experiments in physics, as a 
specific, temporary, and local holding together of different human and other-than-human 
actors. The experiment, for instance, brings together technical equipment, scientific 
hypotheses, postgraduate students, and professors in the pursuit of a possible discovery. The 
expectation of this possible discovery, moreover, plays a vital role in the assembling of the 
experimental situation, for instance via its capacity to raise funds and attract colleagues.  
This aspect of the possible brings us to the second feature of Stengers’ practice theory; 
namely, that it is speculative. This implies the commitment to understand practices in terms of 
what they make their practitioners capable of. This means that practices enable people to 
think in this way rather than another. For instance, the experiment enables the physicist to let 
her reasoning be objected by the outcome of the experiment. Besides, in the case of 
experimental success, it allows her to speak in the name of what she has discovered. 
Moreover, endorsing a speculative conception of practice means that the possible is always 
a vital ingredient of every practice, that every practice needs to be understood as being on a 
trajectory of transformation, that no practice can be conceived of as finished.  
Finally, the third feature of Stengers’ concept of practice is that it is pragmatic. This relates 
to the unfinished nature of practices referred to above. Because the possible is inevitably 
present in practices, it is, according to Stengers, a matter of paying attention to the possible 
and to make it affect transformations. This relates to an understanding of pragmatism as care 
for the consequences (instead of the more commonsensical identity of pragmatism as having 
an interest in what a practice ‘yields’). Pragmatism, here, means to pay attention to the fact 
that no practice is good or bad in and of itself, but that it always depends on the milieu in which 
it tries to survive. This pharmacological quality of practices necessitates the care for the 
consequences that Stengers associates with pragmatism.  
Apart from these three rather general characterizations of Stengers’ practice theory, it is 
of particular importance to emphasize that practices, according to Stengers, always and 
inevitably constrain thinking. Moreover, the extent to which a practice manages to constrain 
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thinking makes up its efficacy. Stengers discerns two constraints within practices, namely their 
requirements and obligations. Whereas the notion of obligation denotes what makes 
practitioners do something, what makes them hesitate and think, the notion of requirement 
denotes how practitioners are supposed to think, the activities that they should undertake in 
order to be recognized as part of a practice. Practices, according to Stengers, can engage in 
a civilized dialogue with each other on the condition that they manage to present themselves 
in terms of their requirements and obligations. Differentiating requirements and obligations will 
allow for describing both scientific practices and study practices.  
With regards to the obligations, it can be argued that in principle anything can be an 
obligation of a practice. For instance, the Virgin Mary can incite people to engage in the 
religious practice of a pilgrimage, just like the neutrino can incite people to engage in the 
scientific practice of an experiment. As such, the obligations do not say much about the nature 
and consistency of practices. Obligations denote the what of a practice, not the how. For the 
how of a practice, it is important to inquire into the requirements. Based on the writings of 
Latour (1999) on the scientific practices of Pierre Joliot-Curie in Pandora’s Hope, Stengers 
(2005) discerns four requirements for scientific practices. This means that there are four things 
practitioners need to do in order for the practice to pass the test as scientific.  
First of all, scientists have to create alliances with the state or industrial organization in 
order to receive financial means. Second, scientists need to move into their respective 
scientific fields in order to achieve academic recognition for their work. This means that they 
offer reassurance that not only they, but also the international disciplinary community, agree 
upon the scientific character of their work. The third requirement is called the mobilization of 
the world. This requirement entails that scientists come to terms with the social and 
technological preconditions of their practice. Most notably this includes the recruitment of 
young talented researchers to conduct experiments, but also the acquisition of technical 
equipment (e.g. devices, substances). Finally, the production of a public representation of the 
field is the fourth requirement. This means that the scientists have to be able to give the 
broader public an insight into the relevance of their field. Together these four requirements 
give consistency to the diversity of scientific practices by constraining how the practitioners 
engage in scientific practices.  
Based on an analysis of the study practice of Campus in Camps, I have discerned four 
requirements that seem to be of importance for their practice. Generalizing these four 
requirements to make them count for each and every study practice is obviously something 
that must be done with care (if it can be done at all). Therefore it may be more appropriate to 
bring them forward as the requirements of the study practices of Campus in Camps, with the 
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possibility that they might be helpful in understanding other study practices as well. The 
requirements that I have discerned include, first, the making of stories. Storytelling seems to 
be important to situate concepts in the everyday experiences, events, and relations that make 
up their fabric. It plays a key role in the process that the participants often refer to as a 
‘decolonization of the mind’. This means to take a distance from the often alienating 
frameworks with which they understand their situation and returning to the sphere of the 
everyday. The second requirement has to do with the making of comparisons. The example 
here was the photographic exercise in which participants took pictures of Doha, the city, and 
the Dheisheh, the camp. This series of pictures helped to draw out similarities and differences 
between the camp and the city and initiated a debate on the relation to the camp of refugees 
who live in the city nowadays. The third requirement concerns the making of maps. Mapping 
exercises can turn the environment into a middle, a map, something around which people can 
gather and that slows down their deliberations because it can intervene in them. The fourth 
and last requirement has to do with experimentation in using something; in the case of 
Campus in Camps, a public square. This requirement puts forward that study has also to do 
with the question of how something can be used and what consequences this use might entail, 
for what are commonly known as user and used, respectively. 
 It has already been explained that the requirements for scientific practices that Stengers 
discerns based on Latour’s work are situated on a more abstract level than the requirements 
for study practices that I have discerned based on an analysis of Campus in Camps. Going to 
a more abstract level, it could perhaps be argued that the requirements of study practices 
more generally have to do with gathering (bringing people together in a certain manner), 
observing (being in the presence of that which is to be studied), materializing (generating 
material objects in the course of the process of study that are not only the result of study, but 
are part of the practice of study itself), and experimenting (trying out new ways of relating 
towards things and the situation they find themselves in). Analysis of a greater variety of study 
practices is necessary, however, to corroborate this more abstract distinction. Therefore, it is 
formulated only as an hypothesis at this point. 
Nevertheless, it sets an interesting way of thinking in motion as these requirements seem 
to be of still another nature than the requirements that Stengers and Latour have formulated. 
In the course of the dissertation, I took their requirements of scientific practices, that are 
perhaps more sociological in nature, as a point of departure to think about the requirements 
of study practices. The question, then, is whether it is possible to, mutatis mutandis, look at 
scientific practices from the point of view of study practices. Indeed, gathering, observing, 
materializing, and experimenting seem to be processes that are relevant for scientific practices 
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as well, and hence, the commonalities between scientific practices and study practices might 
be larger than their differences.   
After comparison of the requirements of scientific practices and study practices, the 
question regarding the unity of the university remains. This is not an easy question, as the 
focus on practices brings the landscape of the university forward as being very dispersed and 
fragmented. Not only is it indeed impossible to postulate an umbrella science that would keep 
all practices together (e.g. philosophy, literature, logic) under the rubric of the university. But 
also, it would be strange to invoke a metaphysical force that would explain the existence of 
the university as a unified whole (e.g. amor sciendi, Wille zur Macht) when particular practices 
seem to prevail over the institution of the university as a whole.  
Returning to the two general questions that guide scientific practices and study practices 
respectively might give way to an insight into the unity of the university. Focusing on the 
questions around which scientific practices and study practices converge, in spite of their 
mutual differences, makes it possible to relate to the issue of unity without taking recourse to 
a strong framework that would risk being exclusive of certain practices. Putting forward a 
question makes practices for which this question matters converge. Claiming that this question 
matters to them, however, does not mean that they would answer the question in the same 
way. The question is something that relates to them, and over which they can, while relating, 
diverge, hold other opinions and convictions. It has been argued that the question that makes 
scientific practices converge is “How to learn something new?”. It is assumed that this question 
matters to all scientific practices, although representatives of different practices would respond 
in a different way. The question that makes study practices converge is “How to learn anew?”. 
It has been argued that this question matters to all study practices. This means that study 
always has to do with ceasing to take a certain situation for granted and inquiring into how the 
situation concerns us and how we can learn again in relation to this situation. 
As such, it is possible to discern two diverging lines: one that holds scientific practices 
together, another that holds study practices together. University could be the name of the point 
of intersection of these two diverging lines, the point where scientists and students, those who 
are concerned with learning something new and those who are concerned with learning anew, 
meet. What practitioners from both groups share, however, seems to be a concern for the 
new. For scientists this is more related to the discovery or invention of something new, 
whereas for students this has to do with finding new ways of relating to a situation. Hence, it 
could be argued that both scientific practices and study practices are oriented towards the 
future. Moreover, that their shared aim, and consequently the aim of the university, is the 
creation of the future. 
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This concern for the new and orientation toward the future is something that Whitehead 
(1938) already associated with the university, when he wrote in Modes of thought that:  
 
The task of the university is the creation of the future, so far as rational thought, and 
civilized modes of appreciation, can affect the issue. The future is big with every 
possibility of achievement and of tragedy (p. 171). 
 
It is in this shared orientation towards the new that the two conceptions of learning, the one 
associated with scientific practices and the one associated with study practices, entangle. 
Learning anew – to begin to relate to something in a new way – seems to go hand in hand 
with the experience of learning something new. It could be argued that the participants of 
Campus in Camps learned about life in exile as something new via study, and hence became 
capable of learning anew, establishing a new way of relating to life in exile.Here again, study 
practices do not seem to be that different from scientific practices as we might have thought 
beforehand. Postulating the three tasks of the university – research, teaching, and service – 
hence, seems to fall short in trying to grasp the way in which questions of learning something 
new, learning anew, and being engaged in worldly issues often converge within study 
practices.  
Arguing that the university is oriented towards the future, however, does not mean that it 
is able to control what is to come in any determined way. In his apparently innocuous 
proposition, Whitehead does not relate the future to growth, accumulation, or any predefined 
outcome. Rather, the future seems to come with radical uncertainty, as it is impossible to know 
how ‘rational thought, and civilized modes of appreciation’ can affect the future (Ibid., p. 171). 
A condition of radical uncertainty, moreover, that is only aggravated by the event of the 
intrusion of Gaia. 
At this point, it might be relevant to emphasize some of the limitations of the conception 
of the university as an ecology of study practices. By now, the reader will have noticed that 
the research is heavily biased by the research interests and background of both myself and 
the author who has been the main source of theoretical inspiration. Due to Stengers’ interest 
in chemistry and theoretical physics, the understanding of scientific practices as elaborated in 
Chapter Three is mostly applicable to the natural sciences of that kind. One could ask to what 
extent for instance, neurology or geology would fit into such understanding (e.g. factishes). 
However, the question whether these disciplines (or linguistics, or biology, or economics, or 
etc.) are scientific or not is perhaps not the most interesting. More relevant perhaps, is to ask 
the question how scientific practices pertaining to these disciplines would respond to the 
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question “How to learn something new?”, or to ask them to present themselves in terms of 
their requirements and obligations.  
A similar argument can be made for study practices. The conception of study practices 
brought forward in this dissertation bears witness to the author’s interest in fields of study that 
have often called themselves action sciences or design sciences, more particularly pedagogy 
and planning. These are disciplines where the possibility of making thought creative of the 
future seems always to be at stake. This bias limits to a certain extent the applicability of the 
concept of study practices and it is important to be nuanced at this point. Claiming that the 
university can be understood as an ecology of study practices risks to obscure the fact that 
this ecology is inhabited by a myriad of other-than-study practices, most notably perhaps 
scientific practices and lecturing practices. What I was interested in was to investigate how we 
can think about the university from the point of view of study practices, and I do not want to 
claim that all practices of the university are therefore study practices (not even that all 
educational practices of the university are study practices).  
Here again, the question is for which practices the question “How to learn anew?” matters 
and in what way? And maybe, there will be practices coming from other fields than the design 
and action sciences, for which this question matters, formulating maybe other requirements 
and obligations than the ones that can be expected based on this dissertation. Perhaps such 
a dialogue between study practices in terms of their requirements and obligations might be 
more interesting than a criterium that could be used to define or recognize study practices. To 
a certain extent, these questions operate as such a criterium, but not in the sense that they 
allow to judge from an external position, but rather that they will solicit a response from certain 
practices and will leave others indifferent.   
 
 
A Final Contrast  
 
Returning to the research question, it can be summarized that this dissertation has made an 
attempt to situate study in the relation between university and society by invoking the ecology 
of practices. Therefore, the concept of study practices has been coined to give an insight into 
the process of how, via study, the world enters the university by means of the convocation of 
matters of study, and how the university enters the world in effectuating transformations of 
common sense and exercising response-ability. The university as a whole, then, has been 
conceived of as an ecology study practices, including scientific practices. It has been argued 
that what both practices share, and what might, therefore, be called the unifying principle 
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behind the university, is an orientation towards the future, a future that comes with radical 
uncertainty. It is an unknown who will inhabit the times called the future, and in what kind of 
coexistences. But it is this unknown that the university engenders and takes care of via its 
study practices, and their associated forms of “rational thought, and civilized modes of 
appreciation” (Ibid., p. 171).  
So far so good, but at this point the reader will object: “Not too fast! You have taken in 
hand the pattern of the university as institution and then, by playing it to Stengers and Campus 
in Camps you have drawn out a pattern in which the university emerges as a bundle of 
practices. You have left the game! You have been disloyal to what has been held out by Kant, 
Kerr, and the authors that came in their wake by starting to play with people who seem to be 
not sincerely interested in the university in the first place, who even despise the university!” 
Betrayal is a serious accusation, but the reader is probably right to make the accusation. 
Indeed, the game of cat’s cradle cannot be played without any kind of betrayal: taking in hand 
what has been held out unavoidably implies betraying the one who has held it out, 
transforming the pattern in an unforeseen and – from the point of view of the one who held 
out – maybe undesirable way.  
The reader’s objection puts forward a challenge; namely, to play back the pattern to the 
authors that have conceived of the university from an institutional point of view, the authors 
that I have betrayed in the first place. This is indeed a challenge, as it implies the unavoidable 
betrayal of the ones I enjoyed playing with so much. Overall, this poses not too much of a 
problem in the case of Campus in Camps, as they are not really opposed to the university. 
Endorsing a minimal understanding of the university as “a place for public assembly” (Petti, 
2013, p. 28), the university as institution is, from their point of view, more a question than a 
problem. It is a question in the sense that institutionalizing their practice or reinforcing their 
embeddedness in institutional infrastructures might entail a series of consequences (e.g. 
accreditation, enrollment, student fees, curriculum) that they will have to think about whether 
they are willing to accept.  
In the case of Stengers, on the contrary, the conception of the university as institution 
poses a real problem, as she is extremely critical of the ways in which universities have 
organized the massive sale of scientific expertise and the acceleration of the scientific 
process. On various occasions, she has spoken up against the new role universities have 
adopted in the globalized knowledge economy (cf. Despret & Stengers, 2011; Stengers, 
2013b, 2015a, 2018; Stengers & Bordeleau, 2011; Stengers, Manning, & Massumi, 2009), 
and there is no doubt that she makes a strong case in doing so. However, as Stengers is a 
person who fled from chemistry to philosophy – a discipline for which the university is perhaps 
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the very last refuge –, who wrote a truly magnificent book based on her teachings on the 
philosophy of Whitehead, and who talks with enthusiasm and passion about her philosophical 
workshops with students, it is clear that despite her disrespect, the university has been an 
important context in which Stengers’ thinking could unfold. Hence, it is perhaps a matter of not 
forgetting the university, not being too quick in leaving it, but instead, of paying attention to the 
possible that perhaps still insists in its interstices.  
Indeed, the university as institution might still hold some promises. First of all, and this is 
perhaps the most important promise, an institutionalized university could to a certain extent 
grant sustainability to study practices. In the case of Campus in Camps, for instance, it has 
been quite a difficult task to keep activities and discussions going after some of the initiators 
withdrew from the program. A stronger institutional infrastructure might make it easier to relay 
questions, conceptual tools, and methodologies from one generation of students to the other. 
This would perhaps allow the program to maintain a strong focus, hence creating continuity 
as practitioners who have had leading roles leave and new members join. 
Another advantage, and here I take inspiration from the medieval university, is that 
perhaps contrary to what could be expected, a stronger institutional setting could allow for a 
more democratic governance of the university. In relation to the emergence of the university 
in the 12th century, it has been argued that the University of Paris, which had a stronger 
institutional framework, was generally governed in a more democratic way than the student-
led University of Bologna, where often a small group of students took charge and could appoint 
doctors at their will. Of course, this possibly more democratic feature of weak 
institutionalization should be dealt with with care. A too strong institutionalization could lead to 
forms of domination and exclusion that far exceed those of the perhaps too weak 
institutionalized University of Bologna.  
A third advantage that can be discerned, although again it should be dealt with with care, 
is that today there exists an enormous global network of universities whose existence may be 
due to their institutional infrastructures. This network of existing universities is an enormous 
container of resources, both in terms of human and social capital. It makes it possible to 
access large libraries of books relatively easily, but also to meet and co-operate with people 
who work on interesting topics from all over the world. Hence, it would be a very undesirable 
option to leave this network because of its flaws. The question rather seems to be how this 
network can be used in order to rethink the institutional universities that make up its nodes.  
Given these advantages, it seems all the more relevant not to leave the game that 
scholars have been playing in the wake of Kant and Kerr, to pay attention to the possible that 
inhabits the interstices of the university as institution, and instead, once again, one last time, 
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to transform a contradiction, between practice and institution, into a contrast. This requires 
that we reconceive of the institution of the university from the perspective of the ecology of 
practices on the one hand, and to reinforce possibly sustainable features of practices on the 
other hand. 
First of all, reconceiving of the university from the point of view of the ecology of practices 
implies the need to come up with a slightly different understanding of what an institution is. 
From the perspective of the ecology of practices, an institution is not a neutral backdrop before 
which practices play their game, nor is it some kind of mould that shapes the practices that 
are situated inside it. It requires rather that we see the institution as a habitat in which a variety 
of practices live and move and have their being. Among the practices that inhabit the university 
it is possible to discern scientific practices and study practices, as has been done in the course 
of this dissertation, but also administrative, governmental, and leisure practices. Examples of 
practices inhabiting the university ecology include not only laboratory work, article writing, 
conducting experiments, discussing texts, and doing fieldwork, but also accounting practices, 
faculty board meetings, sports events, and student councils.  
It is important to emphasize that understanding the institution of the university as a habitat 
for these practices does not mean that it is an empty and neutral container in which practices 
can be stored. A habitat only comes into being due to the predative, parasitic, or symbiotic 
relations between species, or in this case, practices. Examples of these relations include the 
ways in which governmental practices make claims on scientific practices via benchmarking 
procedures or policy measures, or how administrative practices force study practices into the 
mould of the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS). No habitat exists in and of itself, but 
only by means of and via the multiple and various kinds of entanglements between its 
inhabitants.  
Second, it is possible to argue that within the conception of practice put forward there are 
already germs for a more durable sustenance of practices. More specifically, the requirements 
seem to grant some degree of duration to practices. Indeed, it has been explained that 
whereas obligations make practitioners diverge, requirements allow for continuation because 
they make it possible to initiate novices into the practice. Engaging together in study practices 
makes it possible for new people to become apprentices, to learn from and with those who 
already have some experience in studying, in spite of the fact that each new problematic 
situation will demand to be dealt with in its own manner.  
A focus on practices, in short, does not make the institutional understanding of the 
university superfluous, nor should it be read as a plea for a dismantling of the university as 
institution. Rather, it requires that we rethink how the institutional infrastructure of the 
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university can be reconceived, and, from the point of view of the ecology of practices, this 
would mean to reconceive it as a habitat for all kinds of practices that entertain more or less 
symbiotic relations towards each other. As such, it is clear that inquiring into the university 
from the point of view of the ecology of practices does not require that we do away with the 
institution, but rather that we conceive of the institution as a habitat in which a myriad of 
different practices coexist.  
 
 
Resist, Reclaim, Relay  
 
“Slow down a bit!” At this point, the reader, feeling the end of the text coming nearer, will call 
me to order again: “These introductory notes on an ecology of study practices are all very nice 
and fine from a theoretical point of view, but why don’t you say anything about the main title 
of the dissertation, namely what it practically requires to make a university?! This could 
perhaps be an elegant way to reconcile with Stengers and Campus in Camps after the betrayal 
of the previous section, as they are both more interested in practical experiments than in 
theoretical speculation?”  
Yet again, the reader is sharp in seeing through my astute attempt to leave her behind 
with some theoretical reflections but without any indications for concrete action. But her 
question, the question of what can be done, seems the hardest question, especially since it 
falls entirely outside the scope of this dissertation. Indeed, my aim was not to solve a problem, 
to formulate advice, or to propose a reconstruction. Rather, my aim was to slow down around 
the question of the university and give it power to make us think. Think we must! 
Nevertheless, I will do my best to take a first step toward an answer by briefly outlining 
three principles of action that can be summarized as: resist, reclaim, relay. For the first, 
resisting, three meanings can be discerned. In the first place, it means to resist the university’s 
way of capitalizing on knowledge practices – science and study – by always trying to install 
disconnections. This is done by separating knower (e.g. expert, professor) and known (e.g. 
patent, course content), and uncoupling knowledge from that which is known about (e.g. 
population, situation). These are disconnections, separations, and uncouplings that are 
essential for commodifying knowledge as ‘expertise’ that can be sold to present and future 
‘professionals’. It means to resist university policies that play into the hands of an increasing 
capitalization of knowledge.  
Second, resisting means to acknowledge that more money or more autonomy will not 
save the university. More money will only result in the call for more output and more autonomy 
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risks decoupling the university from the worldly problems that it could concern itself with. It 
means to resist playing the goose with the golden eggs and instead come to terms with the 
non-innocent ways in which the university plays its role in the world.  
Third, resisting means to resist the temptation to give in to cynicism, to resist the lure of 
the academy of misery with its complaints and its grievances. This means to recognize that, 
overall, most of the European universities are still resourceful sites where appropriate tools 
can be found to study. And to study means to resist, it means to organize, problematize, 
scrutinize in spite of the many attempts to capitalize on study. Resistance requires study, and 
to study means to engage in joyful practices that connect with and transform the ruminations 
of common sense. In the words of Stengers (2010): 
 
To resist a likely future in the present is to gamble that the present still provides 
substance for resistance, that it is populated by practices that remain vital even if none 
of them has escaped the generalized parasitism that implicates them all (p. 10).  
 
In the previous section, some of the advantages of the university as institution have been 
highlighted. The great advantage of a practice point of view, however, is that at the level of 
practices things can be done fairly easily. As such, practices are powerful loci of resistance, 
and, hence, an important work to be done is reclaiming the practices of the university.  
Reclaiming is the second principle of action suggested before. Although reclaiming might 
at first evoke a sense of rediscovery of something old and authentic that has been forgotten, 
it is important to clarify that it does not imply such a conservative-restorative operation. It is 
not about going back to the past, but about inventing manners of inheriting the past such that 
it can come to matter here, now, and for the future. Within the field of ecology, reclaiming 
designates processes of renewing and restoring degraded, damaged, or destroyed 
ecosystems and habitats in the environment by means of active human intervention and 
action. The aim of reclaiming is not to restore the land to how it was before, but rather to render 
it again capable of fostering life.  
In a similar way, reclaiming the practices of the university does not mean to do again in 
the same way what has been done before, but about inventing ways of engaging in study 
practices that resist the current kinds of parasitism. It means to experiment with the artifices 
that might be of use in giving this situation – always this situation – the power to make us think. 
As such, reclaiming is not so much past-oriented, as it is future-oriented. Reclaiming study 
practices means not so much to consolidate a certain image of the university (e.g. as a public 
institution for the production and transmission of knowledge), but rather to give shape again 
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to an image of the university by means of engagement in study practices that are situated by 
that which requires response-ability.  
Lastly, and this relates to practices as sites of resistance, reclaiming, which seems to be 
by definition situated on the level of practices, is always, or at least most of the time, a joyful 
activity. Reclaiming practices excites the feeling that things can be done otherwise and that 
there are many other people who are willing to become engaged together in study practices. 
Reclaiming means to become sensitive to the insistence of the possible, and to become a 
witness of its progressive actualization. As opposed to the sadness of complaining, which 
always foregrounds the bad and the ugly, the joy of reclaiming takes actual situations including 
the possible that inhabit their interstices as a starting point for collective creation.  
The last principle concerns not only the question of what can be done, but also the strange 
question of how this dissertation can be concluded. The task at hand is indeed not so much 
one of concluding, but rather one of relaying. What matters is above all not to conclude, not 
to formulate any ‘and thus’ that would follow logically from the argument of the dissertation, 
the patterns and ideas that have been elaborated, knowing that every ‘and thus’ marks a cut 
in the process of thinking that will have made this ‘and thus’ possible. Relaying means holding 
out. What is held out here is not so much a blueprint for a university to come, or for an ecology 
of study practices that has already started to actualize itself. Such knowledge would indeed 
be of the kind of the ‘and thus’, of the ‘conclusion’. 
Instead, relaying means to trust in the creative uncertainty of the encounter, that what has 
been held out will be taken in to new hands that will draw out new patterns, new 
transformations, new ways of reclaiming. Emphasizing the creative uncertainty that 
accompanies every relay, foregrounds the fact that what has been held out comes without any 
theoretical guarantee, without any security that it will work in whatever situation. Rather, what 
has been held out comes always with a pragmatic challenge, namely the challenge to take it 
in hand, to perform the necessary transformations that will make it work, that will give this 
situation here the power to make us think.  
Relaying a conclusion that is not of the kind of ‘now we know that … and thus’, but rather 
of the kind of ‘given this situation, it is possible to’ poses a pragmatic challenge for pedagogical 
action. It demands, namely, that we weld the possible to the questions that transform a 
situation into a problem, that, in this case, transform the university into an ecology that requires 
reclaiming, and for which the practices that still inhabit this ecology provide a thousand 
possible entry points, a thousand different initial impulses to give very precise and concrete 
meaning to the far too vague and too general words that served as the empty title of this 
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conclusion namely that, indeed, another university is possible. The pattern is in your hands. 
Think we must.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
  
 
Cycles, seminars, and lectures at Campus in Camps  
 
This overview is based on Campus in Camps. A university in exile by Alessandro Petti 
(2013).  
 
 
The House of Wisdom 
M. Fasheh 
 
February – June 2012 
 
Cycle 
 
in the House of Wisdom, the stress is on what the participant 
searches for in one’s life. Research refers to what may deepen 
and clarify one’s search. since we agree in our discussions 
that knowledge is action, then the backbone of their learning 
are the projects that participants decide to work on, built on 
what is abundant and on sources of strength in people and 
community, and in harmony with pluralism and well-being. 
 
International law and 
human rights 
T. Hamam 
 
February – April 2012 
 
Cycle 
The cycle tackled some of the core issues for Palestinians 
such as refugees, prisoners, Jerusalem, and territory. Working 
from publicly available government documents, the 
participants took part in a simulation exercise that allowed 
them to examine these topics from various positions. The 
participants were then tasked with developing their own vision 
on how these important questions should be addressed. While 
taking into account various constraints, the participants were 
encouraged to think outside the box and challenge 
conventional wisdom. 
 
Culture and 
representation 
A. Khalifah 
 
July 2012 
 
Cycle 
The purpose of the cycle is to introduce the concepts of 
culture and representation. it aims to explore the relationship 
between culture and representation by discussing how culture 
constructs shared meanings, i.e. how culture constructs 
patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting through using 
language and visual images. 
 
Political life and 
humanitarian 
assistance 
I. Feldman 
 
July 4, 2012 
 
Lecture 
 
 
Part of what I seek to understand is what happens as 
humanitarianism moves from crisis response to a condition of 
life. Humanitarian practice clearly shifts from disaster relief – 
provision of food, clothing, emergency shelter – to efforts that 
look more like social service work and development projects. 
How are people and communities shaped by this 
transformation and by living – long-term – in a humanitarian 
condition? 
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Agri-culture and 
resistance 
V. Sansour 
 
August – September 2012 
 
Cycle 
The cycle explores the relationship between agricultural 
practices, food production, and political power. a combination 
of readings and fieldwork will provide a framework in which 
participants can critically look at all the ways in which 
communities find independence through means of food 
production and food security. as we explore different 
readings including the work of Michael Perelman on the 
economic, social, and environmental costs of the current 
global trend in agricultural systems, we will be exploring the 
concept of agriculture and liberation more specifically in the 
Palestinian context. 
 
The UNRWA Camp 
Improvement Program 
S. Hilal 
 
September – October 
2012 
 
Cycle 
Refugee communities are involved in the planning and 
design process to ensure that new facilities meet their needs. 
While unRWa does not administer the camps, it does have a 
clear interest in improving the conditions of Palestine 
refugees living in them. A new program was launched in 
2006 that focused on a improving the camps’ physical and 
social environment through a participatory, community-driven 
planning approach, rather than relief. 
 
Reclaiming the political 
H. Toukan 
 
July 29, 2012 
 
Seminar 
The seminar aims to converse with some of the 
conceptualizations related to the politics of aesthetics, the 
public performance of affect and the politics of cultural 
production. it aims to do so by considering the potentials held 
within possibly already existing radical emancipatory 
practices underwritten by the specific social and political 
realities related to visual production in Dheisheh Camp. 
 
Conflict transformation 
G. Kramer, W. Graf, O. 
Karsh, & T. Ernstbrunner 
 
April – June 2012 
 
Cycle 
During the cycle, participants get acquainted with an 
approach to conflict transformation, which has been 
developed over the last decade by the trainers. The 
approach isbound by a theory of generalized complexity, 
which bridges social-psychological interactionism with realist-
systemic theory and cultural hermeneutics. it goes beyond 
the post-modern cultural turn towards a “soft” universalism, 
which is informed by post-modern critiques of universalism 
but also goes beyond it. This practical model for conflict 
transformation attempts to answer the challenge by applying 
the epistemological and methodological approaches 
mentioned to the concept of basic human needs, which can 
serve as the frame of reference for “soft universalism”. 
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Power and language 
D. McKenzie, T. Rahmeh, 
T. Piltzecker, & I. Simon 
 
February – December 2012 
 
Cycle 
The five week course is an exploration of arabic and 
English texts to see the impact of facing the text in two 
different languages. a four-week intensive English 
workshop that aims to bolster project participants’ critical 
inquiry in English. Through writing, reading and speaking 
practice, participants should master essential rhetorical 
skills. 
 
Mapping modern 
Palestine 
L. Quiquivix 
 
July 9, 2012 
 
Lecture 
We will critically examine the Palestinian adoption of the 
template after the Nakba, looking first at the various ways 
Palestinian refugees appropriated the map as a popular 
logo to rally a liberation movement around, and next at how 
the Oslo ‘peace process’ sparked the Palestinian 
cartographic spirit to grow in force and causing the map to 
evolve from a popular icon toward a scientific, state-building 
tool. We trace how, as such cartography grows in 
importance, the refugee question becomes increasingly 
sidelined from the ‘peace process.’ 
 
Context as field, relations 
as tools 
B. Catanzaro 
 
July 20, 2012 
 
Lecture 
 
 
Throughout the past ten years, i have been questioning the 
very potential of the art practice as response to specific 
contexts and the ultimate possibility of its unfolding in reality 
as an enduring shift, beyond the presence of the author. 
intangible values of time, relations and mutual trust are 
some of the threads that, in retrospective, i can trace as 
light motive to my personal experience, as well as honestly 
recognize the inner drive that leads you to embark in a long 
term project. 
 
Navigating the dialectics 
of desire and disaster 
B. Abbas & R. Abou-Rhame 
 
August 6, 2012 
 
Lecture 
Critically ‘reading’ the transformation of the PLO into an 
‘authority’ and eventually a ‘security’ regime and with it the 
birth of new political discourses and desires largely 
centered on consumption; seemingly ‘beyond’ but always 
brushing up against the outer limits of occupation, its 
increasingly dystopian wider environment. “The Zone”, by 
evoking both the phantasmagoria of the dream-world and 
the dystopia of the catastrophe, reflects this state of being, 
full of surrealism, absurdity and a growing sense of the 
uncanny. 
 
Palestinian civil society: 
What went wrong? 
T. Dana 
 
September 22, 2012 
 
Lecture 
In this lecture we will discuss critical dimensions 
of palestinian civil society’s structural transformation as well 
as the implications and consequences 
of this process on the ground. The lecture sheds light on 
the transformative trajectory of palestinian civil society 
throughout the last century. in particular, 
we will compare between structural differences of 
the contradictory versions of palestinian civil society 
in both pre and post Oslo periods.  
Making a university 
 
D 
Voluntary primitivism 
F. D. Scott 
 
November 5, 2012 
 
Lecture 
This lecture will address the Open Land communes which 
emerged in northern California during the late 1960s, 
focusing in particular on the escalating “code wars” 
that their attempts to abandon private property rights, 
normative forms of life, and other trappings of modernity 
and capitalism elicited from the state. What, it will ask, 
might have motivated this portion of the american back- to-
the-land movement to open their land to anyone who 
wished to settle? 
 
Three stories from a camp 
K. Bshara 
 
November 24, 2012 
 
Lecture 
In the lecture will be narrated three stories from a refugee 
camp to complicate our understanding of resilience, 
resistance, and the gender component 
of exile. my claim is that there is a discontinuity and 
fragmentation of our understanding of the refugee camp 
(the life and the space); there is a subtle resistance driven 
by hope manifested in the everyday practices; and there is 
a hidden but important gender quality of the resistance, in 
which female refugees occupy a different subject position 
than male refugees. 
 
Culture and collective 
work 
S. Abdelnour 
 
March 23, 2013 
 
Lecture 
How does culture and identity influence community and 
collective work? Is it possible for NGOs to play a supportive 
role in their construction? Samer Abdelnour explored these 
issues using the case study of the Hadaadeen 
(blacksmiths), who now reside in El-Fashir, North Darfur. 
The blacksmiths are amongst Darfur’s most discriminated 
castes. Historically, their socio-cultural distinction has 
rendered them unable to engage as regular members of 
society. Yet today the blacksmiths have managed—through 
a long-running partnership with NGO practical action—to 
gain some degree of economic and political recognition. 
Rather than conceive of their poverty as economic alone, 
practical action recognized identity to be the root 
of their social isolation. 
 
Prefiguring the state 
M. Herz 
 
April 4, 2013 
 
Lecture 
The Western Sahara, occupied by Morocco in 1975 is one 
of the world’s last remaining colonies. The fleeing 
population – the Sahrawis – established refugee camps 
across the border in Algeria, and have lived there 
ever since. How is life organized in the refugee camps 
located in one of the remotest and inhospitable areas of our 
planet? How do the refugees live, how do they move 
through the camps, in what spaces do they work or learn, 
and how do they go about activities of leisure and 
recreation? 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
 
E 
A constitution for a non-
state 
E. Dabed 
 
April 27, 2013 
 
Lecture 
 
During the “Palestinian constitutional process” significant 
political and social dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict – i.e. the nature of the actors’ power relations, their 
conception of the Oslo process, the role that they attributed 
to the PA – were spelled out in legal- institutional terms and 
mirrored in the political structure of PA. It is in this sense 
that the constitutional order can be understood as a sort of 
“metaphoric representation” of Palestinian politics. 
 
The history of philosophy 
of science 
C. K. Raju 
 
April 29, 2013 
 
Lecture 
As we have begun to problematize the origins of political, 
philosophical and social thought, can we also dismantle 
common beliefs about the origins of maths and science? 
How has the history of the development of maths and 
science been falsified by Europe? How did the interaction 
between African, Indian, Persian and Arab-Islamic 
civilizations create another approach to the maths and 
science?  
 
Autobiography of a city 
M. Jabali 
 
March 2012 
 
Seminar 
“Autobiography of a city” is a project that operated in Jaffa 
since 2000, addressing the urgent need to reveal the 
Palestinian history of the city by enabling the Palestinian 
population to take an active role in the process. The project 
is an attempt to examine the ways in which urban-
communal memory and consciousness are being shaped 
via the use of artistic and documentary tools and thrush the 
direct and wide involvement of the community members. 
 
Idea of return 
R. Salih 
 
April 2012 
 
Seminar 
Debates on rights, democracy, dignity and pluralism seem 
to suffer from a chronic methodological nationalism, which 
perpetuates the idea that people seek and fight for rights 
exclusively in their national territory, the natural and main 
place for self-determination, so that those who are at the 
margins of nation-states or excluded from their own 
territorial nations come to be twice marginalised and their 
plague made even more invisible. 
 
Camps of knowledge 
D. Segatto 
 
February – May 2012 
 
Cycle 
Camps of Knowledge aims to rise awareness on the 
participants starting from direct experiences inside other 
refugee camps looking at common and different aspects of 
everyday life and environmental settings, built by UNRWA 
Improvement Department and the inhabitants from the 
exodus in 1948 to nowadays, both as a source of proposals 
and possibilities for future cultural and urban 
transformations. such framework had a significant result in 
Back to the Future, a seminar of imagination and freedom 
where the participants presented their imageries and 
perspective about the future in the camps, through different 
ideas and different forms of tale.  
 
Making a university 
 
F 
Global-scape of camps 
and the politics of 
neutrality 
M. Agier & T. Keenan 
 
May 2012 
 
Seminar 
The seminar will start with Michel Agier presenting 
comparative studies on refugees, camps and humanitarian 
politics followed by Thomas Keenan critical reflection on 
humanitarian action as an “apolitical or neutral gesture”. 
The participants to the seminar will be invited then to 
discuss some key concepts, notions and theories related to 
the production of the politics of humanitarian and 
refugeehood spaces. 
 
Pragmatism and politics 
of funding and resource 
mobilization 
M. Kocache 
 
July 2012 
 
Seminar 
This three day seminar is designed to shed light on the 
various structural and institutional frameworks of charitable 
giving, aid and philanthropy in an interactive forum of 
knowledge transfer, debate and critical analysis. Through 
lecture, group presentations and discussions, the seminar’s 
aim is to empower participants with fundamental knowledge 
about the function, the role, the opportunities as well as the 
politics that lie behind the various processes of resource 
mobilization and distribution. What are the local, regional 
and global trends?  
 
Deconstructing 
citizenship 
S. Chaleshtoori 
 
November 2012 
 
Seminar 
For the most part, nation-states use the citizenship 
framework as the primary organizing relation between the 
state and its constituents, or citizens. Traditional readings 
of citizenship depict it as the intersection of identity and law, 
where both a national belonging and a constitutionally 
recognized membership in a state are articulated. 
Citizenship is conventionally conceived of as a mechanism 
of civic incorporation within a state; a form of social 
membership used as a basis for claim- making with which 
comes access to rights, privileges, and freedoms allocated 
and protected by state institutions.  
 
Placing Antigone 
J. Champlin 
 
December 2012 
 
Seminar 
The seminar undertakes a reading of Antigone that asks 
after her place. Who's side is she on – if she has a side? 
What kind of demand or cry for justice can come from one 
without a home base? How does the drama situate her? 
How does she define herself and her position? These 
questions will lead us to investigate how reading Antigone 
in Palestine in the 21st century changes the points of view 
offered by German, French, and American interpretations.  
 
  
  
  
 
